KV2/962
Report on the investigation into the 'NORDPOL' affair, based on the interrogation of Giskes & Huntemann.
Report on the investigation into the 'NORDPOL' affair, based on the interrogation of Giskes & Huntemann.
1. General Situation in AST-Niederlande.
In August 1941, Giskes was transferred from AST-Paris to AST-Niederlande, with the rank of Oberstleutnant and appointment of Leiter Referat-III-F. On taking up his new appointment he found that the entire section needed reorganization, as many of the officers were quite incapable and in addition many of the NSB members of the section were using their position merely to terrorise their own nationals; moreover Giskes had to reckon with the hostile attitude of the SiPo and the SD towards the Abwehr. This hostility became more acute every year until, as will be seen later, Giskes life was even in danger.
There was a German civil administration in Holland as opposed to a Wehrmacht administration in the other occupied countries, internal security was completely in the hands of the Höhere SS and Polizeiführer and theoretically at least, the work of III-F was confined entirely to military matters and was not executive. The Abwehr had no powers of arrest and so in all cases where action was necessary it was taken by the Sipo.
For purely disciplinary matters Giskes found that he was subordinated to the Leiter of AST-Niederlande, but, as regards his own activities, he was responsible to a certain Oberst Rohleder ABTG-III, Berlin. While Giskes was still at Paris, Rohleder had painted a gloomy picture of the unsatisfactory state of affairs of III-F at The Hague and had charged him with the task of reorganizing the Referat.
On arrival Giskes made sweeping changes and restaffed his section with men recommended to him for their capabilities, amongst these being a certain Gerhard Hunteman.
2. British Activity in Holland in summer 1941.
It was known trough RDF (Radio detection Finding), operated at that time by the Funk-Abwehr, that two enemy transmitting stations were active and there were constant rumours about sea-communication between Holland and the UK. Prior to Giskes' arrival, a seaplane had endeavoured to land of the Dutch coast (Tjeukermeer) and in a brush with the German police, several of the latter being killed. It is thus evident that at this stage British espionage and resistance activities in Holland were on a small scale, at least as far as III-F were aware.
3. Arrest of WT Operators.
At the beginning of September 1941, as a result of RDF, a WT operator was arrested in the Bildhoven district and on him was found a series of messages, signed AC. The messages were of a purely intelligence nature. This matter was handled entirely by the SD and III-F were not told of the identity of the arrested agent, but Giskes thinks that he was a Dutch Naval Cadet whose name may have been Ter Haak, or Ter Laak. (Wrong, Hans Zomer was arrested in Bildhoven)
A second operator, whose name Giskes believes was Van der Reijden, was arrested probably in January 1942. This man agreed to act as a double agent, but the attempt by the SD to play him back proved abortive. This case also was handled exclusively by the Sipo and the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo, who had replaced the Funk-Abwehr towards the end of 1941.
4. Arrest of EBENEZER.
Amongst those handling counter-espionage and counter resistance agents in III-F, was a certain Uffz. Kup, who had been employed by the Referat sinve the German occupation of Holland in 1940. Sometime in the late summer or early autumn of 1941 a certain George Ridderhof also known as Van Vliet, an agent of Kup, had been imprisoned in Amsterdam for illicit dealings in gold and diamonds. Whilst serving his term of imprisonment made the acquaintance of a man, name unknown to Giskes or Huntemann, who was apparently a member of an indigenous resistance group. When Ridderhof was released he was asked by the unknown to make contact with his wife and visit certain friends, whose addresses would be given by his wife. Ridderhof reported this to Kup who in turn informed Giskes. The latter then gave instructions that Ridderhof was to attempt to penetrate this group by contacting the addresses. In due course reports came in from Ridderhof as follows:
a) About the beginning of December 1941, Ridderhof reported that a man with a motor-boat intended to make an
escape to the UK and that he required petrol for the journey. Ridderhof was given 25 litres of petrol from III-F and the Sipo had the starting point watched. But nothing transpired and Ridderhof later reported that the man had departed from a point other than the one which had previously been decided upon. Enquiries were made at the man's home address, near the Abwehr Stelle Scheveningen, on the corner of Parkweg and Hoogeweg and it was established that the man's name was Maas and that he had been absent from home for three months.
b) In January 1942 the broadcasting by London of the Wilhelminalied was to be the signal that a motor-boat would be arriving at Scheveningen to pick up certain members of the Dutch Resistance Movement (Wiardi-Beckman, Goethart, Pasdeloup, Tazelaar en Dogger), to take them to the UK. On the appointed day (18-01-1942) plain clothes policemen were on the beach and arrested the Dutch patriots (Wiardi-Beckman, Goethart en Pasdeloup) who were awaiting the motor-boat, which however failed to arrive.
c) Later in January 1942, Ridderhof reported that he was in touch with a certain captain van den Berg (Orde Dienst), a Dutch Army reserve officer, living in The Hague, who was connected with a resistance organization (L.O.) at Vierlingsbeek, near Nijmegen. reports on this organization were to the effect that arms and explosives were hidden in churches and monasteries in the neighbourhood. A sub-agent, Graan, was charged with the surveillance of this group.
Again later, Ridderhof reported that the organisation expected an aeroplane to arrive from the UK to drop sabotage material and gave the locallity but not the exact position of the dropping ground. Upon hearing this, Giskes, who at this time was sceptical, said to Kup: "Gegen Sie zum Nordpol mit solchen Geschichten". It is for this reason that the code name Nordpol was given by III-F to cover the subsequent turning and playing back of SOE agents.
Huntemann, who had recently been discharged from hospital, was accordingly sent to Assen to keep observation. Towards the end of February 1942 a British plane was seen one night, during the full moon period, circling in the vicinity and later it was learned that in fact two containers had been dropped. On this occasion there was a genuine Dutch resistance reception committee headed by Capt. van den Berg and a certain Sgt. Bierman. One one container was found by the committee, which was taken to a warehouse nearby; Van de Berg then went to Ridderhof, living at that time in The Hague, and asked him to arrange for the transport of the material to his (Ridderhof') flat for safe keeping, Ridderhof obliged. This incident, when reported to Giskes, convinced him that there was a WT operator in direct touch with the UK, especially as prior to this date the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo had intercepted, but not deciphered, signals in the The Hague area. Furthermore, Ridderhof had also given information gleaned from Van den Berg, to the effect that two British agents had been dropped at the end of November 1941 in the area of Assen (Wrong, near Ommen). It was therefore decided by Giskes that intensive efforts would have to be made to locate and arrest the WT operator. Accordingly, the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo was given the task as a first priority and the area in which the WT operator was working was finally narrowed down to the vicinity of Laan van Meerdevoort, The Hague. A raid was organised in the district and one Hubertus Mattheus Gerardus Lauwers, codename EBENEZER was arrested on the 6th March 1942. he had evidently become aware that a raid was in progress and after throwing the WT set into the garden, left the house with Teller, the proprietor.
5. Implications of EBENEZER's arrest.
Interrogation of EBENEZER by Krimrat. Schreider and to a lesser extent by Giskes himself, convinced the latter that if British intentions were realized and numerous well equipped sabotage and resistance groups were created an extremely dangerous military situation would arise, particularly if these measures succeeded simultaneously in all the Western occupied countries. For this reason, therefore, Giskes decided to concentrate the activities of his Referat on the hindering or prevention of any such plans.
6. Employment of Double Agents.
An Abwehr ABTG-III directive from Berlin, circulated during the early parts of the war, laid down the objects to be achieved in playing back captured agents, as follows:
a. To maintain contact with Allied espionage agents and their HQ's in order to ascertain missions and enemy intentions.
b. Deception.
c. To control any Allied organization and thus prevent the growth of a sister organization unknown to the Germans.
d. To prevent organized escape routes (III-F were not interested in individuals who escaped haphazardly as these
matters were handled by the Sipo).
7. The 'turning' of EBENEZER.
Shortly after EBENEZER's arrest, Kup asked permission to visit him in prison and on his return informed Giskes that EBENEZER was prepared to work for the Germans. Giskes maintains that no physical force was used to turn him. Giskes also personally visited him in prison and with Schreieder guaranteed his life as well as the lives of any subsequent Allied agents who might fall into German hands through his treachery. EBENEZER, on accepting the proposal to work for the Germans told both Giskes and Schreieder that he had been assured by a certain Colonel Blunt (Blizzard) before leaving the UK that in the event of his arrest he was at liberty to accept any proposal put forward by the Germans to save his life; for, at the most, it would be discovered within three weeks if he were working under control. EBENEZER accordingly accepted the German proposal and on 18-03-1942 sent his first message of German origin. This message requested further supplies and stated that the location of a previously agreed dropping point was too dangerous (Ebenezer CXG 18-03-1942 refers).
Three further messages, all dated 15-03-1942 - CXG-14 containing information about a ship's crew, money and a reference to BRANDY (Jan Bottema), CXG-15 dealing with political and industrial information and CXG-16 containing information about the position of the Prinz Eugen - all of which had been previously composed by EBENEZER and found on him after arrest, were allowed to go forward by the Germans.
The information as to the locality of the Prinz Eugen was found on reference to Referat-III-M to be false, but Giskes denies that prior to this date false information had been passed to Resistance Groups for onward transmission. He declares that as far as he can remember EBENEZER had received the information from his organizer Thijs Taconis, alias CATARRH, who in turn probably obtained it from Van den Berg as the latter was believed to have certain sources among the Port Authorities and dockyard workers in Rotterdam.
Indien deze informatie over de Prinz Eugen niet van de Duitsers kwam, hoe waren zij dan in staat om Lauwers daarmee te confronteren, ondanks dat zij niet in staat waren zijn gecodeerde berichten te ontcijferen?
8. Distribution of Functions.
Giskes was responsible for the general policy of playing back EBENEZER and subsequent WT operators captured, but the non technical detailed conduct of the traffic i.e. preparing drafts of messages seeing London signals received answers, keeping traffic on the right lines and when necessary the notional killing of operators, etc was the sole responsibility of Huntemann, who was struck of all other duties until the termination of the traffic on 1st April 1944. The message were drafted by Huntemann and then taken to the Fu-B-Stelle of the Orpo which was always in close proximity to III-F. The
B-Stelle was solely responsible for the encyphering and decyphering of all signals and for the actual transmission. In this connection it is interesting to note that only two SOE WT operators ever actually transmitted, namely EBENEZER (Lauwers) for about three months after capture and TRUMPET (Jodaan). All traffic with these exceptions was conducted by trained operators of the Fu-B-Stelle.
The actual arrest and Custody of the agents were entirely Sipo responsibilities, but of course both Giskes and Hunteman had access to them when necessary.
An account of the procedures and division of responsibility during a dropping operation is given in Annexure II.
9. Arrest of CATARRH.
About the 18th March 1942, Thijs Taconis @ CATARRH was arrested by the Sipo at Arnhem whilst trying to effect the rescue of a member of his group who had been taken prisoner by the Germans. Neither Giskes or Huntemann know much about the circumstances of the arrest as the entire affair was handled by the Sipo, but it appears that at the time of his arrest the Germans were unaware of his identity and it was only at a later date that they realised the importance of their capture. Giskes had an interview with him at the prison at Scheveningen the day after he had tried to escape, but CATARRH refused to give details about himself, and it was only at a later date, when he had been convinced that the whole organization had been 'blown' that he could be induced to give details of his mission. As he was not a WT operator he was not much interest to Giskes and Huntemann, but Giskes expressed considerable respect for his steadfast ann soldierly behaviour.
Giskes en Huntemann waren dus niet op de hoogte van de inzet van V-Mann Johnny den Droog die voor de gevangen nomen verzetsman speelde.
10. Arrest of WATERCRESS.
On 19th March 1942, SOE signal CXG-21 to EBENEZER advised that an independent agent was to be expected from the 24th March 1942 onward, together with three containers, with the result that Albert Arnoldus Baatsen alias ABOR, alias WATERCRESS was received on the 27th March 1942 near Steenwijk by a Dutch reception committee working under SD control/ Among those taken part in the reception were the Dutch subjects Schlagter (Slagter), Poos and Ridderhof, the latter was drunk and his behaviour was such that his attendance on future occasions of this nature was forbidden by the Germans. The 'safe' arrival of WATERCRESS was acknowledge in EBENEZER's CXG-24 of the 28th March 1942 to London.
WATERCRESS voluntarily offered his services to the Germans and was even prepared to undertake a mission abroad for the SD. He was used, however, by the Sipo for spying on his fellow prisoners at Haaren to which all captured agents were sent after a short stay at Scheveningen prison.
11. Arrest of LETTUCE, TRUMPET and TURNIP.
Early in April 1942 III-F was informed by the Feldgendarmerie that a dead parachutist (Jan Molenaar) had been found in a field noord-west of Holten; it appeared that he had hit his head on a stone water-trough on landing. From tracks in the neighbourhood of the body there were grounds for believing that other agents had landed at the same time. Early in May 1942 the Sipo, on information received from a certain Dr. Stemmel of the Incasso and Hypotheken Bank, Utrecht, arrested Goswigen Hendrik Gerard Ras, alias LETTUCE and Johan Jordaan alias TRUMPET. The arrests were effected by the Sipo and Giskes thinks that the informant acted unwittingly. About the same time the Sipo also arrested Leonardus Andringa, alias TURNIP on information supplied by a woman (name unknown) in Utrecht. The informant is thought by Giskes to have acted unwittingly
Interrogation of the three agents produced the full story of the dropping operation on the 28th March 1942 and established the identity of the dead man, a WT operator named John alias SWEDE. The latter's signal plan was found on TURNIP which enabled the Germans at a later date to operate a notional, locally recruited operator named SWEDE.
Moreover, under interrogation the three captured men gave the numbers of Dutch SOE agents who had completed their training and who could therefore expected to be arriving in the not distant future. In addition, personal description of their future roles, i.e. WT operator, saboteur, clandestine press, organizer, etc were obtained. Thence-forward the Germans devoted a good part of the interrogation of captured agents to the obtaining of this type of information, with the result that they generally knew whom to expect in the future; the information obtained enabled them to impress captured agents during interrogation with their seeming omniscience.
It must be remembered that towards the end of April 1942, Fu-B-Stelle had been aware that clandestine transmissions were taking place, but they had been unable to decipher the messages.
The first controlled message on the TRUMPET link was transmitted on the 5th May 1942 (CXG-14) proposing a new dropping point.
12. LEEK and WT operator.
On the 5th April 1942 Barend Klooss, alias LEEK was dropped blind with his WT operator Hendrik Sebes, alias HECK. It appears that during the drop the WT set was damaged and although these two agents were not like the others, apprehended immediately, they were never able to get in touch with the UK. They were eventually arrested at a date unknown to Giskes and Huntemann. Huntemann recollects that after the arrest, London was asked for a replacement of the WT set on another link and this was furnished. The HECK transmitter was first operated on the 22nd August 1942 by the Germans, but HECK himself never operated.
13. Arrest of POTATO.
On the 19th April 1942 Johannes Henricus Marie de Haas alias PIJL, alias POTATO arrived in Holland by a sea-operation. On the 24th April 1942 TRUMPET in CXG-7 reported to London that he was in tough with POTATO, contact having been established through TURNIP (Andringa), but that he could not contact EBENEZER (Lauwers). At this date TRUMPET had not been arrested although his signals had been intercepted by the Fu-B-Stelle. On TRUMPET's arrest, in early May 1942, the Germans were able to decypher the TRUMPET messages that they had intercepted and it is possible, according to Giskes and Huntemann, that POTATO's (de Haas) arrest by the Sipo was due to information furnished by TRUMPET. The first POTATO message sent CXG-14 on 5th May 1942, refers to a dropping point.
14. Meeting of CARROT and TURNIP.
On the 15th May 1942 London, in CXG-17, advised TRUMPET (Jordaan) of a meeting place where he was to contact GEORGE, alias CARROT (Dessing) who had arrived in Holland on the 27th February 1942. The name of the rendez-vous was sent in an elaborately coded message, but was decoded bu Fu-B-Stelle and found to be the bodega, Leidsche Poort, Leidsche Plein, Amsterdam. For some reason unknown to Giskes and Huntemann, the Sipo decided to send TURNIP (Andringa), not TRUMPET, to the rendez-vous and TURNIP was able to warn CARROT that his comapanions were members of the Sipo.
CARROT thus succeeded in escaping through a lavatory, eventually arriving in the UK on the 2nd September 1943.
The situation in May 1942.
It had, at this period, become evident to Giskes from interrogations of captured agents that SOE was trying to build up a well organized sabotage organisation capable of operating throughout Holland. Groups were to be formed by the various organizers by recruitment among NCO's of the Dutch Army, railwaymen and dockyard hands for sabotage of railways. harbour installations, dockyards, shipbuilding yards, locks and bridges; in addition instruction had been given in 'sabotage insaissisable', Regions and missions had been allotted as follows:
CATARRH, Provinces of North and South Holland and Gelderland.
WATERCRESS, Special mission not divulged by SD to III-F.
LETTUCE, Utrecht area.
LEEK, Overijssel area.
POTATO, Establishment of sea communication between Holland and UK. Suitable landing places were to be reconnoitred
in the area of Katwijk and later Egmond-am-Meer.
Giskes gave consideration to the possibility of using the organizers, already arrested, for forming German controlled Resistance Groups; this would have ensured that the best and most resistance elements in the population would be known and could, therefore, be arrested at any time when it was thought necessary, but he decided that such action was too great a risk to the security of his controlled WT links.
16. BEETROOT and WT Operation.
On the 1st May 1942 London advised EBENEZER in message no. 36 of the impending arrival of two agents, and on
29th May 1942 Herman Parlevliet, alias BEETROOT and his WT operator Antonius van Steen were both dropped to the customary SD reception committee.
Giskes describes these two men as being excellent agents and it was only at a much later stage that they divulged, under interrogation, that they were Eureka (radiobaken) instructors; in addition they were to be assistants to WATERCRESS (Baatsen).
17. PARSNIP and SPINACH.
On the 15th June 1942 London advised TRUMPET (Jordaan) in message no. 28 of the impending arrival of two further agents and accordingly on the 22nd June 1942, John Jacob van Rietschoten, alias PARSNIP and his WT operator Johannes Jan Buizer, alias SPINACH were dropped to a German Reception near Holten. Interrogation showed that PARSNIP had an independent mission in North Holland Whilst SPINACH was to act as WT operator, not only to PARSNIP, but also to POTATO (de Haas), who had notionally been using EBENEZER (Lauwers), as London apparently feared that too much traffic on the EBENEZER link might endanger the latter who, of course had been arrested on the 8th March 1942.
Huntemann deduced from this that London regarded EBENEZER as being the best operator.
The 'safe' arrival of PARSNIP and SPINACH was notified to London on the 24th June 1942 in TRUMPET No. 77.
18. MARROW and WT operator.
On the 15th June 1942 London in message No. 61 to EBENEZER, advised the field to stand by from the night of the
24th June 1942 onwards to receive two bodies with the result that on the night of the 26th June 1942, George Louis Jambroes, alias MARROW and his WT operator Joseph Bukkens (Bakkers) alias SMIT, alias MARROW were duly arrested neat Wezep. EBENEZER (Lauwers) acknowledged the 'succes' of the operation on the 27th June 1942, adding that "SMIT is staying with us some time".
19. The six main links.
Although during the NORDPOL affair the Germans operated many links (at one time they were operating 15 links), the six main over which fresh arrivals were advised were as follows: EBENEZER (Lauwers), MARROW (Bukkens), TRUMPET (Jordaan), HECK (Sebes), SWEDE (Molenaar), SPINACH (Buizer), accounts of whose arrests have been given above.
An account of the APOLLO (van Schelle) and BRUTUS (Grün) affair advised over GOLF (W, van der Wilden) is given in Annexure V.
At a conference at which SOE and MI-5 were represented it was decided that it was unnecessary to give an account of the arrests of subsequent agents as they present little interest, the procedure being monotonously identical with that already described, i.e. London advising departure to the Germans with the resultant SD reception.
20. Reasons for closing the NORDPOL.
At the end of August 1943, two of the captured SOE agents, Pieter Dourlein, alias SPROUT and Johan Bernard Ubbink, alias CHIVE, escaped from Haaren and eventyally reached the UK via Switzerland.
When in October 1943, London intimated that Holland could expect no further deliveries owing to commitments elesewhere, Giskes was certain that these two men had either reached the UK, or had in some way conveyed to London the information that the entire SOE organization in Holland was German-controlled. During the next two months, the traffic from London was of non-commital character and Giskes concludde that the 'NORDPOL' possibilities were at an end. Confirmation that SOE was aware of what had happened came through the arrest, at the beginning of 1944, of the HEINTJE Group, which took place in Amsterdam through RFD of one of the WT operators (zie BI netwerk). It is interesting to note that at this period relations between the SD and Abwehr were so strained that III-F were only informed of this group after its arrest and the subsequent attempt to play it back was entirely handled by the SD.
Groep Zwaantje uit Delfzijl had Londen ook al ingelicht over het feit dat 6 SOE agenten in Haaren zaten opgesloten, deze inlichtingen werden aan hen verstrekt via Groep Wim.
The HEINTJE Group had been sent by the Dutch SIS in London and had been briefed for an espionage mission by Major Somer. According to Giskes and Huntemann, this group had received, towards the end of November 1943, a WT signal from London that the sister-organization, the SOE Resistance Movement, was completely under German control and further that two agents who had been in Haaren had reached London. This information of course only became available in early 1944, when the group was arrested and the intercepted traffic could be deciphered. Giskes wanted to close the 'NORDPOL' affair immediately, with a message to London, giving the news that all those agents who had been notionally killed were in reality still alive. However, ABT. III-F Berlin refused permission for this and sent orders that the closing message must breath a spirit of confidence in the final victory for German Arms and in the certitude of repelling any Allied invasion of Holland. Accordingly, the closing signal to this effect was transmitted to London, not unappropriately on the 1st April 1944, thus ending the 'NORDPOL' affair which had lasted a little over two years.
Annexure I
Annexure II
WEGGUM.COM
In August 1941, Giskes was transferred from AST-Paris to AST-Niederlande, with the rank of Oberstleutnant and appointment of Leiter Referat-III-F. On taking up his new appointment he found that the entire section needed reorganization, as many of the officers were quite incapable and in addition many of the NSB members of the section were using their position merely to terrorise their own nationals; moreover Giskes had to reckon with the hostile attitude of the SiPo and the SD towards the Abwehr. This hostility became more acute every year until, as will be seen later, Giskes life was even in danger.
There was a German civil administration in Holland as opposed to a Wehrmacht administration in the other occupied countries, internal security was completely in the hands of the Höhere SS and Polizeiführer and theoretically at least, the work of III-F was confined entirely to military matters and was not executive. The Abwehr had no powers of arrest and so in all cases where action was necessary it was taken by the Sipo.
For purely disciplinary matters Giskes found that he was subordinated to the Leiter of AST-Niederlande, but, as regards his own activities, he was responsible to a certain Oberst Rohleder ABTG-III, Berlin. While Giskes was still at Paris, Rohleder had painted a gloomy picture of the unsatisfactory state of affairs of III-F at The Hague and had charged him with the task of reorganizing the Referat.
On arrival Giskes made sweeping changes and restaffed his section with men recommended to him for their capabilities, amongst these being a certain Gerhard Hunteman.
2. British Activity in Holland in summer 1941.
It was known trough RDF (Radio detection Finding), operated at that time by the Funk-Abwehr, that two enemy transmitting stations were active and there were constant rumours about sea-communication between Holland and the UK. Prior to Giskes' arrival, a seaplane had endeavoured to land of the Dutch coast (Tjeukermeer) and in a brush with the German police, several of the latter being killed. It is thus evident that at this stage British espionage and resistance activities in Holland were on a small scale, at least as far as III-F were aware.
3. Arrest of WT Operators.
At the beginning of September 1941, as a result of RDF, a WT operator was arrested in the Bildhoven district and on him was found a series of messages, signed AC. The messages were of a purely intelligence nature. This matter was handled entirely by the SD and III-F were not told of the identity of the arrested agent, but Giskes thinks that he was a Dutch Naval Cadet whose name may have been Ter Haak, or Ter Laak. (Wrong, Hans Zomer was arrested in Bildhoven)
A second operator, whose name Giskes believes was Van der Reijden, was arrested probably in January 1942. This man agreed to act as a double agent, but the attempt by the SD to play him back proved abortive. This case also was handled exclusively by the Sipo and the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo, who had replaced the Funk-Abwehr towards the end of 1941.
4. Arrest of EBENEZER.
Amongst those handling counter-espionage and counter resistance agents in III-F, was a certain Uffz. Kup, who had been employed by the Referat sinve the German occupation of Holland in 1940. Sometime in the late summer or early autumn of 1941 a certain George Ridderhof also known as Van Vliet, an agent of Kup, had been imprisoned in Amsterdam for illicit dealings in gold and diamonds. Whilst serving his term of imprisonment made the acquaintance of a man, name unknown to Giskes or Huntemann, who was apparently a member of an indigenous resistance group. When Ridderhof was released he was asked by the unknown to make contact with his wife and visit certain friends, whose addresses would be given by his wife. Ridderhof reported this to Kup who in turn informed Giskes. The latter then gave instructions that Ridderhof was to attempt to penetrate this group by contacting the addresses. In due course reports came in from Ridderhof as follows:
a) About the beginning of December 1941, Ridderhof reported that a man with a motor-boat intended to make an
escape to the UK and that he required petrol for the journey. Ridderhof was given 25 litres of petrol from III-F and the Sipo had the starting point watched. But nothing transpired and Ridderhof later reported that the man had departed from a point other than the one which had previously been decided upon. Enquiries were made at the man's home address, near the Abwehr Stelle Scheveningen, on the corner of Parkweg and Hoogeweg and it was established that the man's name was Maas and that he had been absent from home for three months.
b) In January 1942 the broadcasting by London of the Wilhelminalied was to be the signal that a motor-boat would be arriving at Scheveningen to pick up certain members of the Dutch Resistance Movement (Wiardi-Beckman, Goethart, Pasdeloup, Tazelaar en Dogger), to take them to the UK. On the appointed day (18-01-1942) plain clothes policemen were on the beach and arrested the Dutch patriots (Wiardi-Beckman, Goethart en Pasdeloup) who were awaiting the motor-boat, which however failed to arrive.
c) Later in January 1942, Ridderhof reported that he was in touch with a certain captain van den Berg (Orde Dienst), a Dutch Army reserve officer, living in The Hague, who was connected with a resistance organization (L.O.) at Vierlingsbeek, near Nijmegen. reports on this organization were to the effect that arms and explosives were hidden in churches and monasteries in the neighbourhood. A sub-agent, Graan, was charged with the surveillance of this group.
Again later, Ridderhof reported that the organisation expected an aeroplane to arrive from the UK to drop sabotage material and gave the locallity but not the exact position of the dropping ground. Upon hearing this, Giskes, who at this time was sceptical, said to Kup: "Gegen Sie zum Nordpol mit solchen Geschichten". It is for this reason that the code name Nordpol was given by III-F to cover the subsequent turning and playing back of SOE agents.
Huntemann, who had recently been discharged from hospital, was accordingly sent to Assen to keep observation. Towards the end of February 1942 a British plane was seen one night, during the full moon period, circling in the vicinity and later it was learned that in fact two containers had been dropped. On this occasion there was a genuine Dutch resistance reception committee headed by Capt. van den Berg and a certain Sgt. Bierman. One one container was found by the committee, which was taken to a warehouse nearby; Van de Berg then went to Ridderhof, living at that time in The Hague, and asked him to arrange for the transport of the material to his (Ridderhof') flat for safe keeping, Ridderhof obliged. This incident, when reported to Giskes, convinced him that there was a WT operator in direct touch with the UK, especially as prior to this date the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo had intercepted, but not deciphered, signals in the The Hague area. Furthermore, Ridderhof had also given information gleaned from Van den Berg, to the effect that two British agents had been dropped at the end of November 1941 in the area of Assen (Wrong, near Ommen). It was therefore decided by Giskes that intensive efforts would have to be made to locate and arrest the WT operator. Accordingly, the Fu-B-Stelle-Orpo was given the task as a first priority and the area in which the WT operator was working was finally narrowed down to the vicinity of Laan van Meerdevoort, The Hague. A raid was organised in the district and one Hubertus Mattheus Gerardus Lauwers, codename EBENEZER was arrested on the 6th March 1942. he had evidently become aware that a raid was in progress and after throwing the WT set into the garden, left the house with Teller, the proprietor.
5. Implications of EBENEZER's arrest.
Interrogation of EBENEZER by Krimrat. Schreider and to a lesser extent by Giskes himself, convinced the latter that if British intentions were realized and numerous well equipped sabotage and resistance groups were created an extremely dangerous military situation would arise, particularly if these measures succeeded simultaneously in all the Western occupied countries. For this reason, therefore, Giskes decided to concentrate the activities of his Referat on the hindering or prevention of any such plans.
6. Employment of Double Agents.
An Abwehr ABTG-III directive from Berlin, circulated during the early parts of the war, laid down the objects to be achieved in playing back captured agents, as follows:
a. To maintain contact with Allied espionage agents and their HQ's in order to ascertain missions and enemy intentions.
b. Deception.
c. To control any Allied organization and thus prevent the growth of a sister organization unknown to the Germans.
d. To prevent organized escape routes (III-F were not interested in individuals who escaped haphazardly as these
matters were handled by the Sipo).
7. The 'turning' of EBENEZER.
Shortly after EBENEZER's arrest, Kup asked permission to visit him in prison and on his return informed Giskes that EBENEZER was prepared to work for the Germans. Giskes maintains that no physical force was used to turn him. Giskes also personally visited him in prison and with Schreieder guaranteed his life as well as the lives of any subsequent Allied agents who might fall into German hands through his treachery. EBENEZER, on accepting the proposal to work for the Germans told both Giskes and Schreieder that he had been assured by a certain Colonel Blunt (Blizzard) before leaving the UK that in the event of his arrest he was at liberty to accept any proposal put forward by the Germans to save his life; for, at the most, it would be discovered within three weeks if he were working under control. EBENEZER accordingly accepted the German proposal and on 18-03-1942 sent his first message of German origin. This message requested further supplies and stated that the location of a previously agreed dropping point was too dangerous (Ebenezer CXG 18-03-1942 refers).
Three further messages, all dated 15-03-1942 - CXG-14 containing information about a ship's crew, money and a reference to BRANDY (Jan Bottema), CXG-15 dealing with political and industrial information and CXG-16 containing information about the position of the Prinz Eugen - all of which had been previously composed by EBENEZER and found on him after arrest, were allowed to go forward by the Germans.
The information as to the locality of the Prinz Eugen was found on reference to Referat-III-M to be false, but Giskes denies that prior to this date false information had been passed to Resistance Groups for onward transmission. He declares that as far as he can remember EBENEZER had received the information from his organizer Thijs Taconis, alias CATARRH, who in turn probably obtained it from Van den Berg as the latter was believed to have certain sources among the Port Authorities and dockyard workers in Rotterdam.
Indien deze informatie over de Prinz Eugen niet van de Duitsers kwam, hoe waren zij dan in staat om Lauwers daarmee te confronteren, ondanks dat zij niet in staat waren zijn gecodeerde berichten te ontcijferen?
8. Distribution of Functions.
Giskes was responsible for the general policy of playing back EBENEZER and subsequent WT operators captured, but the non technical detailed conduct of the traffic i.e. preparing drafts of messages seeing London signals received answers, keeping traffic on the right lines and when necessary the notional killing of operators, etc was the sole responsibility of Huntemann, who was struck of all other duties until the termination of the traffic on 1st April 1944. The message were drafted by Huntemann and then taken to the Fu-B-Stelle of the Orpo which was always in close proximity to III-F. The
B-Stelle was solely responsible for the encyphering and decyphering of all signals and for the actual transmission. In this connection it is interesting to note that only two SOE WT operators ever actually transmitted, namely EBENEZER (Lauwers) for about three months after capture and TRUMPET (Jodaan). All traffic with these exceptions was conducted by trained operators of the Fu-B-Stelle.
The actual arrest and Custody of the agents were entirely Sipo responsibilities, but of course both Giskes and Hunteman had access to them when necessary.
An account of the procedures and division of responsibility during a dropping operation is given in Annexure II.
9. Arrest of CATARRH.
About the 18th March 1942, Thijs Taconis @ CATARRH was arrested by the Sipo at Arnhem whilst trying to effect the rescue of a member of his group who had been taken prisoner by the Germans. Neither Giskes or Huntemann know much about the circumstances of the arrest as the entire affair was handled by the Sipo, but it appears that at the time of his arrest the Germans were unaware of his identity and it was only at a later date that they realised the importance of their capture. Giskes had an interview with him at the prison at Scheveningen the day after he had tried to escape, but CATARRH refused to give details about himself, and it was only at a later date, when he had been convinced that the whole organization had been 'blown' that he could be induced to give details of his mission. As he was not a WT operator he was not much interest to Giskes and Huntemann, but Giskes expressed considerable respect for his steadfast ann soldierly behaviour.
Giskes en Huntemann waren dus niet op de hoogte van de inzet van V-Mann Johnny den Droog die voor de gevangen nomen verzetsman speelde.
10. Arrest of WATERCRESS.
On 19th March 1942, SOE signal CXG-21 to EBENEZER advised that an independent agent was to be expected from the 24th March 1942 onward, together with three containers, with the result that Albert Arnoldus Baatsen alias ABOR, alias WATERCRESS was received on the 27th March 1942 near Steenwijk by a Dutch reception committee working under SD control/ Among those taken part in the reception were the Dutch subjects Schlagter (Slagter), Poos and Ridderhof, the latter was drunk and his behaviour was such that his attendance on future occasions of this nature was forbidden by the Germans. The 'safe' arrival of WATERCRESS was acknowledge in EBENEZER's CXG-24 of the 28th March 1942 to London.
WATERCRESS voluntarily offered his services to the Germans and was even prepared to undertake a mission abroad for the SD. He was used, however, by the Sipo for spying on his fellow prisoners at Haaren to which all captured agents were sent after a short stay at Scheveningen prison.
11. Arrest of LETTUCE, TRUMPET and TURNIP.
Early in April 1942 III-F was informed by the Feldgendarmerie that a dead parachutist (Jan Molenaar) had been found in a field noord-west of Holten; it appeared that he had hit his head on a stone water-trough on landing. From tracks in the neighbourhood of the body there were grounds for believing that other agents had landed at the same time. Early in May 1942 the Sipo, on information received from a certain Dr. Stemmel of the Incasso and Hypotheken Bank, Utrecht, arrested Goswigen Hendrik Gerard Ras, alias LETTUCE and Johan Jordaan alias TRUMPET. The arrests were effected by the Sipo and Giskes thinks that the informant acted unwittingly. About the same time the Sipo also arrested Leonardus Andringa, alias TURNIP on information supplied by a woman (name unknown) in Utrecht. The informant is thought by Giskes to have acted unwittingly
Interrogation of the three agents produced the full story of the dropping operation on the 28th March 1942 and established the identity of the dead man, a WT operator named John alias SWEDE. The latter's signal plan was found on TURNIP which enabled the Germans at a later date to operate a notional, locally recruited operator named SWEDE.
Moreover, under interrogation the three captured men gave the numbers of Dutch SOE agents who had completed their training and who could therefore expected to be arriving in the not distant future. In addition, personal description of their future roles, i.e. WT operator, saboteur, clandestine press, organizer, etc were obtained. Thence-forward the Germans devoted a good part of the interrogation of captured agents to the obtaining of this type of information, with the result that they generally knew whom to expect in the future; the information obtained enabled them to impress captured agents during interrogation with their seeming omniscience.
It must be remembered that towards the end of April 1942, Fu-B-Stelle had been aware that clandestine transmissions were taking place, but they had been unable to decipher the messages.
The first controlled message on the TRUMPET link was transmitted on the 5th May 1942 (CXG-14) proposing a new dropping point.
12. LEEK and WT operator.
On the 5th April 1942 Barend Klooss, alias LEEK was dropped blind with his WT operator Hendrik Sebes, alias HECK. It appears that during the drop the WT set was damaged and although these two agents were not like the others, apprehended immediately, they were never able to get in touch with the UK. They were eventually arrested at a date unknown to Giskes and Huntemann. Huntemann recollects that after the arrest, London was asked for a replacement of the WT set on another link and this was furnished. The HECK transmitter was first operated on the 22nd August 1942 by the Germans, but HECK himself never operated.
13. Arrest of POTATO.
On the 19th April 1942 Johannes Henricus Marie de Haas alias PIJL, alias POTATO arrived in Holland by a sea-operation. On the 24th April 1942 TRUMPET in CXG-7 reported to London that he was in tough with POTATO, contact having been established through TURNIP (Andringa), but that he could not contact EBENEZER (Lauwers). At this date TRUMPET had not been arrested although his signals had been intercepted by the Fu-B-Stelle. On TRUMPET's arrest, in early May 1942, the Germans were able to decypher the TRUMPET messages that they had intercepted and it is possible, according to Giskes and Huntemann, that POTATO's (de Haas) arrest by the Sipo was due to information furnished by TRUMPET. The first POTATO message sent CXG-14 on 5th May 1942, refers to a dropping point.
14. Meeting of CARROT and TURNIP.
On the 15th May 1942 London, in CXG-17, advised TRUMPET (Jordaan) of a meeting place where he was to contact GEORGE, alias CARROT (Dessing) who had arrived in Holland on the 27th February 1942. The name of the rendez-vous was sent in an elaborately coded message, but was decoded bu Fu-B-Stelle and found to be the bodega, Leidsche Poort, Leidsche Plein, Amsterdam. For some reason unknown to Giskes and Huntemann, the Sipo decided to send TURNIP (Andringa), not TRUMPET, to the rendez-vous and TURNIP was able to warn CARROT that his comapanions were members of the Sipo.
CARROT thus succeeded in escaping through a lavatory, eventually arriving in the UK on the 2nd September 1943.
The situation in May 1942.
It had, at this period, become evident to Giskes from interrogations of captured agents that SOE was trying to build up a well organized sabotage organisation capable of operating throughout Holland. Groups were to be formed by the various organizers by recruitment among NCO's of the Dutch Army, railwaymen and dockyard hands for sabotage of railways. harbour installations, dockyards, shipbuilding yards, locks and bridges; in addition instruction had been given in 'sabotage insaissisable', Regions and missions had been allotted as follows:
CATARRH, Provinces of North and South Holland and Gelderland.
WATERCRESS, Special mission not divulged by SD to III-F.
LETTUCE, Utrecht area.
LEEK, Overijssel area.
POTATO, Establishment of sea communication between Holland and UK. Suitable landing places were to be reconnoitred
in the area of Katwijk and later Egmond-am-Meer.
Giskes gave consideration to the possibility of using the organizers, already arrested, for forming German controlled Resistance Groups; this would have ensured that the best and most resistance elements in the population would be known and could, therefore, be arrested at any time when it was thought necessary, but he decided that such action was too great a risk to the security of his controlled WT links.
16. BEETROOT and WT Operation.
On the 1st May 1942 London advised EBENEZER in message no. 36 of the impending arrival of two agents, and on
29th May 1942 Herman Parlevliet, alias BEETROOT and his WT operator Antonius van Steen were both dropped to the customary SD reception committee.
Giskes describes these two men as being excellent agents and it was only at a much later stage that they divulged, under interrogation, that they were Eureka (radiobaken) instructors; in addition they were to be assistants to WATERCRESS (Baatsen).
17. PARSNIP and SPINACH.
On the 15th June 1942 London advised TRUMPET (Jordaan) in message no. 28 of the impending arrival of two further agents and accordingly on the 22nd June 1942, John Jacob van Rietschoten, alias PARSNIP and his WT operator Johannes Jan Buizer, alias SPINACH were dropped to a German Reception near Holten. Interrogation showed that PARSNIP had an independent mission in North Holland Whilst SPINACH was to act as WT operator, not only to PARSNIP, but also to POTATO (de Haas), who had notionally been using EBENEZER (Lauwers), as London apparently feared that too much traffic on the EBENEZER link might endanger the latter who, of course had been arrested on the 8th March 1942.
Huntemann deduced from this that London regarded EBENEZER as being the best operator.
The 'safe' arrival of PARSNIP and SPINACH was notified to London on the 24th June 1942 in TRUMPET No. 77.
18. MARROW and WT operator.
On the 15th June 1942 London in message No. 61 to EBENEZER, advised the field to stand by from the night of the
24th June 1942 onwards to receive two bodies with the result that on the night of the 26th June 1942, George Louis Jambroes, alias MARROW and his WT operator Joseph Bukkens (Bakkers) alias SMIT, alias MARROW were duly arrested neat Wezep. EBENEZER (Lauwers) acknowledged the 'succes' of the operation on the 27th June 1942, adding that "SMIT is staying with us some time".
19. The six main links.
Although during the NORDPOL affair the Germans operated many links (at one time they were operating 15 links), the six main over which fresh arrivals were advised were as follows: EBENEZER (Lauwers), MARROW (Bukkens), TRUMPET (Jordaan), HECK (Sebes), SWEDE (Molenaar), SPINACH (Buizer), accounts of whose arrests have been given above.
An account of the APOLLO (van Schelle) and BRUTUS (Grün) affair advised over GOLF (W, van der Wilden) is given in Annexure V.
At a conference at which SOE and MI-5 were represented it was decided that it was unnecessary to give an account of the arrests of subsequent agents as they present little interest, the procedure being monotonously identical with that already described, i.e. London advising departure to the Germans with the resultant SD reception.
20. Reasons for closing the NORDPOL.
At the end of August 1943, two of the captured SOE agents, Pieter Dourlein, alias SPROUT and Johan Bernard Ubbink, alias CHIVE, escaped from Haaren and eventyally reached the UK via Switzerland.
When in October 1943, London intimated that Holland could expect no further deliveries owing to commitments elesewhere, Giskes was certain that these two men had either reached the UK, or had in some way conveyed to London the information that the entire SOE organization in Holland was German-controlled. During the next two months, the traffic from London was of non-commital character and Giskes concludde that the 'NORDPOL' possibilities were at an end. Confirmation that SOE was aware of what had happened came through the arrest, at the beginning of 1944, of the HEINTJE Group, which took place in Amsterdam through RFD of one of the WT operators (zie BI netwerk). It is interesting to note that at this period relations between the SD and Abwehr were so strained that III-F were only informed of this group after its arrest and the subsequent attempt to play it back was entirely handled by the SD.
Groep Zwaantje uit Delfzijl had Londen ook al ingelicht over het feit dat 6 SOE agenten in Haaren zaten opgesloten, deze inlichtingen werden aan hen verstrekt via Groep Wim.
The HEINTJE Group had been sent by the Dutch SIS in London and had been briefed for an espionage mission by Major Somer. According to Giskes and Huntemann, this group had received, towards the end of November 1943, a WT signal from London that the sister-organization, the SOE Resistance Movement, was completely under German control and further that two agents who had been in Haaren had reached London. This information of course only became available in early 1944, when the group was arrested and the intercepted traffic could be deciphered. Giskes wanted to close the 'NORDPOL' affair immediately, with a message to London, giving the news that all those agents who had been notionally killed were in reality still alive. However, ABT. III-F Berlin refused permission for this and sent orders that the closing message must breath a spirit of confidence in the final victory for German Arms and in the certitude of repelling any Allied invasion of Holland. Accordingly, the closing signal to this effect was transmitted to London, not unappropriately on the 1st April 1944, thus ending the 'NORDPOL' affair which had lasted a little over two years.
Annexure I
Annexure II
WEGGUM.COM
Herman Giskes, 1945.
Gerhard Huntemann, 1945.
