Annexure I

German policy and Procedure.

The passing of 'Spielmaterial. to enemy intelligence services was aregular part of the functions of the Abwehr. All Dienststellen carrying out this work kept on hand a regular stock of such material in order to be able to comply, within a reasonable time, with any request for information that might be made by WT by the Allies.

For definite deception purposes, prepared material was distributed by higher authority (i.e. C-in-C West, Ic Army Groups, OKW, Seekriegsleitung) to the III-F Referats concerned for passing on to the Allies, where possible through several independent channels.

Each time contact was made with the Allies, no matter in what manner, Abw. Abt.III had to be informed and authority obtained for maintaining this contact. All enemy requests for information had to be reported immediately to Abt.III together suggested replies. Material for drafting replies was collected by III-P with the help of other branches of the Ast and had then to be submitted for approval to the relevant military authority, e.g. Luftgau Kdo Holland. When this approval had been obtained, the suggested answer was telephoned to Abt. III-D in Berlin for approval. If, however, time passed, the information was often supplied and III-D's authority obtained afterwards. All material regarding economic of political conditions in Germany, or the sphere of activity of another Ast, was supplied by III-D.

When information on any specific target was required, a member of III-F had to assume the role of an agent in order that only such information should be sent as could normally be procured by a real agent.

Deception.

The intelligence branches of the highest military authorities in the occupied countries could give information to the relevant Ast for passing to the Allies, but in such cases the onus of informing III-D lay with the originator, e.g. the intelligence branch of the service concerned.

Referat III-D.

This was a small section in the OKW at Berlin (Tirpitzerufer) consisting of the Leiter, Oberst SCHÄFER, one technical assistant and a female secretary. With the gradual eclipse of the Abwehr this section lost its importance and its role in the RSHA as III-D was only a small one.

There was apparently however no very fixed policy after the eclipse of III-D with regard to 'Spielmaterial' and some very curious incidents occurred; for example in January/February 1944 GISKES heard that films seized in Brussels were forwarded through G.I.S. channels by mistake immediately after they had been developed.

One Source of 'Spielmaterial'.

In this connection GISKES states that genuine seized espionage material was always a good source of 'Spielmaterial'. The Dutch and Belgian I.S. were in the habit of forwarding material in triplicate by three different means and if it was established that copies of the seized material had already been sent through other channels it was then forwarded in order to inspire confidence in the German-controlled channel.

Nordpol 'Spielmaterial'.

During the Nordpol affair, GISKES states, that at various dates which he cannot remember, information was passed about the position of German warships, coastal batteries on the island of Beveland, the positions of HQ of Divisions alleged to be in Holland; in addition reports on the Dutch armaments industries were also sent.

These reports were, of course, additional to the normal current traffic which was being sent over the various SOE (radio) links. More such routine traffic GISKES gave HUNTEMANN a free hand and unless it was necessary to forward answers to questions on specific military targets or troop movements, etc, no other authority was required; but as has been stated above this latter type of message had to be referred to the relevant authority and III-D for their approval.

Copies of all signals sent or received had to be sent monthly to Abw. Abt. III.

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