Annexure II

"Preparations for and Description of a Dropping Operation".

During moon periods in the morning and afternoon London broadcast warning signals as to whether an operation was to take place. The times were given by a certain figures. Three different message, of fifteen figures each, indicated the dropping of agents, the dropping of stores, or scrubbing.

If in the morning a signal was given announcing the dropping of stores or agents, the actual confirmation came through late in the afternoon. If, however, the morning signal was negative, no further signal was sent and the operation was scrubbed.

As soon as a positive warning order came through in the morning it was the duty of Hauptmann WURR to warn the relevant branches of the impending operation, namely the Ast itself (III-F was always located at some distance from the other sections of the Ast), SD The Hague, the ORPO and at a later period and army units in the neighbourhood of the dropping ground.

At the beginning when it was only a question of one operation during a single night, the necessary action was taken by III-F and SD alone and the following procedure was adopted. The four lights were held by members of the III-F (the senior officer present holding the white light at the apex of the triangle) whilst the SD waited at a certain distance from the dropping ground and only intervened if complications arose. As soon as agents left the plane, members of III-F who were holding the lamps withdrew, and SD, using Dutchmen in its service, occupied the dropping ground and arrested the agents. It was an unwritten law that whoever was in charge of the lighting arrangements, was also in charge of the operation and for this reason it never happened that the SD ever got hold of a lamp even to help out temporarily.

When dropping operations increased and when often 4-6 took place during a single night, the problem of occupying all the dropping grounds became a difficult one, since there were only 5 officers on the strength of III-F, who were often not all available. Resource was then made then made to other officers employed in the Ast who were then used for this purpose. As also there were not enough of these, at a later date, members of the B-Stelle Orpo were used, who often came to the scene in all available strength. It was so arranged that on only one occasion was the SD in charge of the operation.

When in the morning an operation was signalled, Hauptmann WURR warned the AST to that they could make available the nesessary number of officers and also the S.D. so that they could do the same.

The passing of this information to the two interested branches was done by telephone in a disguised form. The droppong ground which had already been selected by WURR were given cover names as 'Moorgragen', 'Brandheide', 'Wochenendhaus', etc. These covernames, together with a detailed description of the dropping ground an route of approach, were notified in writing to these branches concerned.

The word 'Damen' was used to indicate agents. Thus a telephone warning to the S.D. of an impending operation would be something like this: "We would like to invite you this evening to a little party at Wochenendhaus. We shall have some guests and would be delighted if you could come. A couple of 'Damen' are also coming. Bring a couple of partners for them or 'or they may be bored'. The B-Stelle Orpo was not warned by telephone, but orally, as they were always close to where III-F was located. They of course knew that an operation was planned before III-F, as it was they who operated the WT sets but consultations had to take place with them over the availability of their men.

As the lack of personnel became more and more acute (the same men could not be out three nights running, especially as their normal daily duties remained to be carried out which would have meant that they got no sleep) Hauptmann WURR, on choosing a new landing ground approached units in the neighbourhood and asked for the loan of 1 or 2 officers for the nights when an operation was planned. This request was always gladly granted and we got the greatest support from these units in Steenwijk, Wezep, etc. and before returning in the morning were well looked after. For these army officers a parachute operation was a new and unheard of thing and a very pleasant break in the dull daily routine. But for an another reason also, units in the neighbourhood of the dropping ground had to be warned na ely because of the experience gained in France and Belgium when receptions not under Abwehr control took place, it had been ordered that all units were to send out strong bicycle patrols at night espacially in lonely heath country to look for suspicious lights and and people wondering about and to search for reception committees and if necessary shoot immediately. After such a patrol had almost attacked a reception committee under Major KIESEWETTER at Rolde near Assen, it was decided that, in the future, all units near a dropping ground must be warned of the operation, although such a measure was obviously undesirable on security grounds.

At first night-fighter units i.e. XII-Fliegerkorps, were warned of impending dropping operations in order to obviate the possibility of any aeroplane destined for us being shot down. Later this fighter 'protection' was dropped, as it would have become noticeable, if these planes were never attacked. Later they were again reported to the night-fighters, but no longer protected and were treated in the same way as other planes. In one instance a plane was shot down immediately over the dropping by a night-fighter, so that the reception committee only just managed to get to safety in time and on one occasion a plane crashed on its right wing whilst coming in to drop. Evidently it was too slow and too low. Two of the pilots were saved from the burning plane by Hauptmann WURR and his men and brought to the Luftwaffe hospital in Amsterdam. A WT Operator (Funker) was also employed on the dropping ground after representations had been made by the Luftwaffe and he kept in contact with the night-fighter organisation, signalling as soon as the plane had dropped its load and was making off, the idea being that the plane should then be chased by night-fighters which were then taking off. However, this produced no results and this arrangement was dropped. III-F, in any case was against it, as we feared that WT signalling in the immediate neighbourhood of the dropping ground might endanger matters.

After all sections concerned had been advised by Hauptmann WURR to the effect that one or several droppings were to be expected for the following night, the places were notified within III-F. Operation Commander on the dropping point was a member of III-F section, even if, in addition, a higher ranking officer was ordered from AST Hilversum to act as his assistant. Only if nobody from II-F could be allocated to the job, the command of the party on the spot was taken over by an officer from Hilversum.

If toward the late afternoon it was established through a repetition by London of the definite signals, that a parachutage would take place during the course of the evening, Hptm. WURR again notified the sections concerned and after this there was nothing more to do.
In written descrition of the dropping point, which the Stellen concerned received from us, the approach route, its duration, time of the rendezvous, camouflaged parking place, were accurately stated.
When the parachutage took place at the dropping points north of Amersfoort, this was nearly always the place, the RV for III-F Driebergen, AST-Hilversum, SD-The Hague was nearly always the Hoevelaaken crossroads, about 5 km behind Amersfoort. Generally speaking, the Orpo- B-Stelle travelled in III-F transport, as both sections lay close to one another.

On arrival in the vicinity of the dropping ground, which had to be approached without lights, the transport was parked and camouflaged with parachutes, at pre-determined points underneath trees. The SD personnel generally selected a position for themselves in the neighbourhood of the dropping ground and the members of III-F took up their positions on the ground, according to the direction of the wind. If the plane was to be expected after midnight everybody had to be ready in their positions by 23:30 hours, after lamps had been given a brief test.

Lights had to be extinguised immediately after the drop had occured in order to make observations difficult for the plane in case it made a second flight over the ground. At the beginning of the Nordpol affair it was up to the Abwehr to attend to the carting away of the material, whilst the SD were responsible for the collection of the agents. However, the SD attempted systematically and with success to take the matter out of Abwehr hands. Whilst at first all the material was put in Abwehr disposal, later this was reduced to half, again later this was whittled down to half of the weapons and ultimately this was reduced to what the SD considered it good for the Abwehr to have. About the end of 1942 the SD took over the carting away of the containers and from then onwards the Abwehr had to be satisfied with what the SD permitted them to have. The Orpo-B Stelle in Driebergen wanted to participate in the distribution of the weapons and they were catered for by the SD in this respect.

The return journey from the dropping ground had to take place at the earliest possible moment and the transport had to disappear before the farmworkers went out to the fields.

The arrest of the agents generally occured after a short greeting at the xact moment when they were endeavouring to release themselves from their parachute harness. Later the SD decided to conduct the agents to specially reserved houses in the vicinity of the landing ground where they arranged a large reception party celebration with the supposed chiefs of the organisation. during the course of these celebrations the agents generally became fairly loquacious and were interrogated by Dutchmen who were in the employ of the SD service. When the agents eventually became tired and turned in for the night they were arrested. This new procedure may have been motivated by the reaction on the part of agent ARIE, who maintained after his arrest, that the reception committee was supposed to send a WT message to London, composed in the terms which follow, at the earliest opportunity, to indicate that he had arrived safely: "ELVIRA ARRIVED AT STATION 57 MINUTES LATE".

This message was not despatched, because I had the instinctive feeling that there was something not quite in order with it. I therefore created the story about ARIE's brainstorm which notionally led to his ultimate death. Later it transpired that the message with "ELVIRA" really was a warning and there was something about it not in order. I assume that SCHREIEDER introduced the variation in arresting the agents on account of this incident. In other words, they were only arrested after they had told everything to the supposedly genuine reception committee.