REPORT POULSSON.
MOST SECRET
"FRESHMAN" - "GUNNERSIDE"
GENRAL REPORT ON WORK OF
ADVANCE PARTY - "SWALLOW"
BY
FENRIK JENS ANTON POULSSON, R.N.A.
THE MISSION.
A.
As advance party to act as reception committee for English airborne troops who were to arrive by glider during the November moon period.
Having good knowledge of the country, to guide these troops to the sabotage objective: the heavy water installation at VEMORK
B.
To organise and train guerrilla detachments in ØVRE TELEMARK, independently and in collaboration with the military organisation.
ARRIVAL.
We were dropped from a plane at 23.30 hrs on the 18th October 1942 and landed on the mountainside east of FJAREFIT in the SONGADAL. The dropping place agreed on was LØKKJES marches, east of UGLEFLOTT. It was fortunate that none of us was severely hurt when we landed. The ground was just a mass of stones. Helberg hurt himself, but was all right in a week's time.
After four hours search we found all the containers and packages.
It too two days to collect the equipment and put it in order. The equipment that we did not need at first was placed in a depot, together with half the food. The plan was to make our way back here when the operation had been carried out. The weather was fine during these days. There were only patches of snow here and there. I had no difficulty in determining our position.
ADVANCE TO OPERATION AREA.
I had first intended to go over the mountains right to BITDAL. On the 21st October 1942 a violent snowstorm set in and it was full winter suitable for ski-ing. On that day Helberg and I went with full packs into the HAUGEDAL, where I know there was a hut, but this was not to be found and we got to know later that it had been moved. Heavy march back in the dark and mist.
The other two tried in vain to get WT contact. He had no paraffin for our primuses and could not therefore make use of a route over the mountains where there was food to be found.
I then decided to make the journey through SONGADAL where there were birch woods and where we could make use of huts to spend the night.
On October 22nd 1942 we started on our heavy and toilsome march. We had about 250 kilo of equipent to carry:
- 1 wireless without suitcases.
- 2 accumulators.
- The Eureka without suitcases.
- Handgenerator.
- Field equipment.
- 1 Stengun.
- Food.
We left the S-Phone behind.
I hoped that the food would be sufficient for about 30 days, with severe rationing. If possible, the operation was to be carried through without making contact.
This was altogether 8 loads of about 30 kilos. This meant that each man would have to make two journeys every day and the distance travelled was three times so long.
In the SONGADAL the ground was bad and rugged. The snow was heavy and deep. The man who went out of the skitracks sank up to his knees. It was mild weather and the skis got clumps of snow underneath. The little bit of ski wax we had we wished to keep for the retreat. the lakes and marches were not properly covered with ice, nor were the rivers and could only be walked on here and there. There was surface water on the ice and we had our feet soaked all the time.
The days' marches, therefore were sorrowfully short. We often advanced only a few kilometres a day. On the very first day I broke a ski stick and it was a month before I got a new one.
On 24th October 1942 we reached the vacated farm, BARUNUTEN. we found some meat and flour and ate our fill for the first time since our arrival. We also found a ski toboggan.
The next day we had fine weather and the going was good. We took our loads all the way to the VALASJØ hut at the top of the VALASJØDAL and got back to BARUNUTEN in the evening.
On the 26th October 1942 the following arrangement was now made: Kjelstrup and I took new loads up to the VALASJØ hut and spent the night there. Helberg and Haugland stayed behind in order to make a new attempt to get wireless contact. They were to follow after with the reminder of the equipment on the ski toboggan.
Kjelstrup and I took two roads through to the BITDALENVATN. We arranged that we should all meet in the VALASJØ hut that evening. But the boys did not come. They came in the morning, after having being out in the open that night on account of the mist and darkness. They had not had any wireless contact. All equipment was now packed into four rucksacks and on the ski toboggan.
On the water divide between the VALASJØDAL and the BITDAL we met two men from RAULAND who were out looking for sheep. They had a hut in the neighbourhood. They could see from our enormous packs and by the sight of the accumulator on the ski tobogann that we were not on any ordinary pleasure trip. We therefore gave them a hint that we were engaged in listening to the wireless and on information services and they promised to keep their mouth shut. An attempt to play the innocent would have never succeeded and there would probably have soon been rumours in RAULAND that mysterious people had been seen in the mountains. These men were also of assistance to us. The tip of the ski toboggan runner broke in the rough passage down to the BITDAL. The men got tools and nails and helped us to fix on an aluminium ski tip. In spite of the delays we reached the BITDALENVATN in the evening.
On 29 October 1942 we had bad weather. The BITDALENVATN was not frozen over and we toiled along the by the eastern bank.
30 October 1942, we reached REINAR. Now we were getting in the neighbourhood of habitations. We were fairly done in and I had a throbbing boil on my left hand and had to have my arm in a sling. We had kept to ourselves in good form during the waiting period at STS-61, bu the hard toil on short rations had sapped our strength. A days'ration consisting of a quarter of a slab of pemmican, one handful of groats one handful of flour, 4 biscuits, a little butter, cheese, sugar and chocolate was not much to travel on. We took the situation in consideration and decided on the following:
Helberg was to go back to BARUNUTEN and steal all the food he could carry.
Kjelstrup and I were to reconnoitre the best way for our future march. The fact was that I had left my map at RAULAND with the containers and I had no knowledge of this district. We were also to investigate the landing place that had been agreed on for the glider.
Haugland had a sked again and was to make a new attempt with the wireless.
We were to meet again at REINAR three days later.
Helberg travelled the seven miles there and back under terrible going conditions. He proved the old saying: "A man who is a man goes on till he can do no more and then he goes twice as far".
Kjelstrup and myself did not do many kilometres. I fell through the ice while crossing a river. This was the second time. The next day we had to cross a river again on our onward way, but there was no ice on this river, and we could not find a crossing, but we found a good hut called FOLABU. We returned to REINAR tired out and exhausted.
This time Haugland had obtained contact, but the accumulator had run down. It couldn't be recharged with the hand-generator.
Our plans had to be altared. the solution of our job was dependent on our being able to get a new accumulator. We decided to get into contact with Torstein Skinnarland, the keeper of the dam at MØSVATN.
We hid the accumulator, the handgenerator and some of the fieldstuff at REINAR. We had also get rid of some unnecessary thing at BARUNUTEN.
By 3rd November 1942 all the equipment had been brought to FOLABU and a crossing found over the FARHOVD river.
On 4th November 1942 Helberg returned with the following information:
- An accumulator could be obtained.
- There was a German guard at the industrial installations.
- The SANDVATN hut at GRASFJELL was the most suitable base.
I had the whole time been of the opinion that the SANDVATN hut was the most suitable base, in spite of the fact that it was about 5 kilometres from the landingplace at SKOLAND. It was seldom that people came there and the wireless conditions ought to be good as there are no high mountain peaks close to it.
On the 6th of November we arrived at the SANDVATN hut in the morning. We were completely exhausted, but glad to have reached our destination. For serurity reasons our march along the main road was done at night.
We took 15 days to do this march, because of the extraordinarily bad going conditions and the difficult country. Under normal conditions, either open fields or ordinary going, we should have taken a week at the most.
PREPARATORY WORK FOR THE GLIDER OPERATION.
The first thing we had to do was to get into wireless contact with England. We presumed that they were beginning to be quite anxious about us. Antenna masts of a good size were put up. Another unse=uccessful attempt to make contact was made, this time the WT set was damp. On 19th November we got contact at last and after that the wireless service went well.
Helberg was in contact with Torstein Skinnarland at regular intervals. As well as an accumulator, the latter procuced for us food and some small things we badly needed. He also gave us full information about the German forces, camps, telephone lines, etc.
As I wanted to see with my own eyes how the German guards were posted, Helberg and I made a trip to VAAER. The landing place was reconnoiitred and found in order. For further information about the intelligence service I refer to our wireless messages.
We had visits on three occasions. The first time it was Editor Tønsaker from OSLO, who came past on skis and saw the wireless masts. But this man was a true Norwegian and again we told our story about listening in to wireless and information service. The second time it was Brorusten from VEMORK, who came to inspect the hut. He is superintendent of Shipowner Klavenes' property in the district. Both Haugland and myself had known Brorusten before and could rely on him. He asked no questions. He came once again later to see if we were still there.
Our supply of food received a needed increase, so we found a sheep with two lambs that had gone astray.
OPERATION PLAN.
A.
Helberg and myself were to place out the lights in good time before the arrival of the glider and put up the Eureka on the lading place.
B.
Haugland was to wait at the wireless until we got last message agreed on. Kjelstrup was to stay with him as orderly, so as to be able to warn us at the landing place if new orders came or if the operation was cancelled. Afterwards, they were to proceed to the landing place.
C.
When the glider had arrived, Helberg was to put on his uniform and after having conferred with the Commander and myself, go and cut the telephone line MØSVATN-VEMORK-RJUKAN and the line TRØYSTUL-RJUKAN. This was to be done at the time agreed on. After that, he was to join the detachments and myself at TRØYSTUL and we were to lead the detachments on to VEMORK.
D.
Haugland and Kjelstrup were to destroy the Eureka and collect the lights and divide the equipment we had requisitioned by the glider. They were then to return to the wireless station, hide the set and destry all traces.
The retreat was also planned and prepared.
A. Haugland and Kjelstrup were to retire by the same way we had come.
B. Helberg and myself were to proceed up the HJERDAL to the mountains east of MØSVATN.
C. Within a week after the operation, we were to meet in the TAMMEDAL's hut, west of MØSVATN's northerly area.
Was nothing planned for the escape of the British detachments?
GLIDER OPERATION.
18th November was the first day of the stand-by period. The weather in our part of the country was fine, but the wireless message was "BOY", which meant no operation to-night.
On 19th November we received "GIRL". The Operation would be carried out the same night. At the time our last weather report was sent, the weather was quite good and the wind moderate, but not long afterwards the wind increased to strong and when Helberg and I started the north-west wind howled in our ears.
The lights were placed in position and the Eureka put up. At 17:00 hrs, Norwegian time, we started the Eureka. That is to say, one hour before the time fixed for arrival. At 17:45 hours Kjelstrup came with the report that the arrival was postponed for 19:30 hours. The Eureka was then turned off and not put on again until 18:30 hours.
At 19:30 hours we had no contact in the Eureka. At 21:00 hours we still heard nothing. At 21:40 hours the tone of the Eureka suddenly changed. A quarter of a hour later we heard the sound of a plane from the south-west. The lights were lit and our spirits were high. But when the plane was about 2 kilometres away it turned eastwards away from us and soon disappeared in the Eureka also. In the coures of an hour it came in the Eureka several times, but disappeared again. We also heard the drone of the plane in different directions.
At 23:00 hours we heard it for the last time. At 23:30 hours we gave up and turned off the Eureka.
We could not understand how it was that the plane lost us every time it was close in to us. I was already struggling with the problem as to how we should manage to get a new source of energy for the Eureka. The battery's capacity was four hours, and it had been in use for longer than that time. The telegram the next day about the glider disaster was a hard blow. It was sad and bitter, espcially as the weather in our part of the country was splendid during the following days. But we were glad to hear that another attempt would be made in the next moon period.
PERIOD OF WAITING.
New plans for the future had to be made. The SANDVATN hut was no longer a healthy place to live in. It began to be too well known, and the wireless contact needed breaking off for a time.
We once again got in contact with Torstein Skinnarland. He was given the accumulators for re-charging. He recommended usa safe place to live in the GRASDALS hut, which belonged to Skogen, the leader of the military organisation at RJUKAN. We should some food there, and the key could be obtained. The GRASDALS hut was then chosen. When the sabotage operation had been carried out and later on, as we hoped, we began our organisation work, we should be widely separated. It was therefore of importance that each man had his own equipment ready. It was therefore decided to utilise the priod of waiting as follows:
- A trip to the containers, to distribute the remainder of the equipment and food.
- Kjelstrup and I were to go to VAAGSLI in VUYE, to get into contact with the organisation that had been formed there
and prepare our further work.
- Haugland was to go to RAULAND to investigate the possibility of establishing a station where he could train
telegraphists.
- Helberg was to make contact with the RJUKAN organisation, to prepare his connection with it. But first of all, he was
to see that food and accumulator were brought into the GRASDAL hut.
We went to the GRASDAL hut with all our equipment except the Eureka, which was hidden. We then made our way to the container depot via the TOMEDAL with light packs.
On 25th November we reached TJAREFIT late at night, but it was impossible to find the containers in the dark. We went to a heap of snow, crept into our sleeping bags and fell asleep.
There was mist and bad visibility and so it was rather difficult to find the containers. There was a bit of a blizzard, but we rigged up a parachute and shaltered by this we were able to work without getting the containers full of snow. The equipment was devided out.
We separated. Kjelstrup and I went to VINJE. Haugland and Helberg loaded themselves up with all the food and other equipment they could carry and returned to the GRASDAL. They ran into a storm and on VOLLENVATN in the KVAERNADAL where there was ice without snow on it they were blown away from one another. They did not get into contact again until the next day. They had spent the night at the farms NOGEN and ARCEHOVD. This was not very good, as rumours got about. They were back in the GRASDAL on 28th November 1942 and later each man went his own place.
PRELIMINARY WORK FOR THE PARACHUTE OPERATION.
On 10th December 1942 we were again collected in the GRASDAL hut. We had all in a remarkable way escaped the German razzia which had taken place in the mountains. Kjelstrup and I came to RAULAND to day after the Germans had been there. Haugland left RAULAND the same day they arrived there. Helberg had arranged to meet Torstein Skinnarland the same day the latter was arrested, but it so happened that he was unable to come.
The situation was difficult. We were still provided with food. We were without the Eureka and had no accumulator for it. We did not know if the strength of the guard at VEMORK had been increased. Luckily, the accumulator for the wireless had been charged and taken in before the razzio took place. Helberg had been at KALHOVD and spoken to Einar Skinnarland and Phien, but now search was being made for Einar and Torstein had been arrested. They had arranged to meet on 11th December 1942.
On 14th December 1942 they started off again. On the same day Helberg returned with food. The conditions were now clearer and Kjelstrup and Phien had gone to fetch the Eureka. All went well and he returned on the 15th.
On 16 December the stand-by period began, but we still had no accumulator for the Eureka. It was arranged that Fhien should get one from HOVDEN and that Helberg should meet him at HOFSTJAARN near GALAR. The weather and the going were bad and Helberg had to leave the accumulator behind when he was half way home.
To make matters worse, everybody except myself went sick with fever and pains in the stomach. Helberg and Kjelstrup fetched the accumulator on the 18th in spite of the fact that they were still sick. We were short on food and were again obliged to begin eating reindeer moss. Helberg had got a Krag rifle and some cartridges from Einar Skinnarland. I went out after the reindeer, but the weather was bad and there were few reindeer in the district. Your supply of dry wood came to an end
We moved to the FETTER hut. Helberg went to LANGSJØ to steal food from a hut. He came back the next day with fish preserved in earth.
On the 23rd December it was mountain weather, good visibility and I managed at last to shoot a reindeer and the problem was solved. We celebrated a happy Christmas. Later there were always reindeer in the district and Helberg soon learned the tricks of the reindeer hunter and took over most of the hunting.
On the 26th Einar Skinnarland joined us. He was surprised to see me. On the 29th the stand-by period ended without our having had a single attempt.
PRELIMINARY WORK FOR JANUARY.
We needed fresh information. Both the accumulators had to be charged again as we had to have resource to the Eureka accumulator to keep the wireless going. We had still some food in the containers that had to be fetched. There was an arrangement that either Kjelstrup or muself should meet the leader of the organisation in VAAGSLID. The following decisions were made:
- Einar Skinnarland and Haugland were to take both accumulatots to HAMAREN at HØSSTIND. Fhien was then to see
that they were charged and brought afterwards up to BEKKESTØL, from where we could fetch them He was also to
obtain fresh information from VEMORK.
- Kjelstrup and myself were to meet Haugland at NILSBU in the HAMREFJELL. We were then to go together to the
containers and Kjelstrup further on to VAAGSLID.
- Helberg was to fetch some things he had lying in the HJERDAL and at LANGSJØ, to shoot reindeer and otherwise to remain quiet at the FETTER hut.
On 2nd January 1943 Kjelstrup, Haugland and myself arrived at TRESKOW's hut at UGLEFLOTT. Thenext day we went to the containers. We were extremely lucky. In the morning the frost mist lay thick, but it lifted. We found the containers, did our work and then the mist came down again, thick as porridge. Haugland and I returned to UGLEFLOTT. Kjelstrup went westwards.
Einar Skinnarland came with bad rumours about the Germans. We were to get exact information later. He took some equipment with him and wentback to HAMAREN via NILSBU to arrange what was necessary regarding Phien.
Haugland and I took the way by the SIMBENUT hut in the KVENNADAL and were back in the FETTER hut on the 5th.
The weather was splendid but it was awfully cold these days. On the walls of the FETTER the hoar frost lay inches deep, so well as on the roof inside. Only round the stove was there some degree of warmth. According to plan, we were to have resumed wireless contact on the 9th January 1943. But on account of the bad going and other unforeseen difficulties I wasn't able to fetch the accumulator until the 13th.
We obtained contact on the 14th and on the same day Helberg came with the Eureka accumulator. Unfortunately, it proved that the accumulators had been badly charged and that there was too little acid in them. Einar Skinnarland therefore went to NILSBU and fetched acid we had there. The wireless began to be weak. Someting had to be done. Einar Skinnarland was the only one of us who could leave the FETTER hut during a stand-by period. He therefore went the same day to REINAR to fetch the handgenerator. We wished to make a new attempt to charge with that.
Arne Kjelstrup should have been back in good time before the stand-by period. He came four days after the date agreed on. he had been weather bound at UGLEFLOTT.
UNSUCCESSFUL OPERATION.
On 23rd January 1943 we got the crack signal 211. Operation!
The weather was fine in the evening, but during the night a frost mist came on. After working for a couple of hours the Eureka accumulator was exhausted. There was now the devil to pay. But in the middle of the night Skinnarland came from REINAR with the hand generator. On this initiative the generator was tried as the source of energy. It went slendidly. At ???? hours we suddenly heard the drone of an aircraft from the east. The lights were lit at once, but the aircraft disappeared in a westerly direction. We heard nothing in the Eureka. At 03:00 hours we gave up.
Now bad weather set in. Haugland went sick and I got inflammation in a sore place I had rubbed on my left foot. We kept the wireless working for the remainder of the stand-by period by the handgenerator.
PRELIMINARY WORK FOR FEBRARY.
The same problems were present as previously and were solved in the following way:
- Einar SKINNARLAND went to LIEN to meet Phien and I put him to work.
- Helberg went to Skinnarland's hut at HOLVIK with the 6-Volt accumulator; Skinnarland was to meet him there.
On 3th February Helberg returned with food. This time we did not want to bother about the 12-Volt accumulator as we had the handgenerator.
Helberg and Kjelstrup made a unsuccessful attempt to bring the 12-Voly accumulator down to TULLESTAUL, so that Phien could bring it later to HOVDEN. They had to return on account of bad weather.
On 7th February they made another attempt and this time they succeeded. On the same day Einar Skinnaerland returned. He should have had with him the charged accumulator, but he had become ill, the very same was as 11th December.
At this time I had no knowledge of what the plans in LONDON were, but, whatever these were for us, it was quite impossible to receive people at any other place than in the neighbourhood of where we were now living. We should not be ready for the stand-by period if we had to move.
Wireless contact was resumed. We were informed about that new plan and we sent over the latest information about the Germans'dispositions. STORESAURE was agreed on for the new dropping place. I sent Helberg and Kjelstrup to the vAAGEN hut to meet Einar Skinnarland and to fetch the Eureka if possible. They returned the next day, bringing fresh information about the Germans, but no Eureka. Skinnarland had thought it too dangerous to go to the SANDVATN hut for it.
... the way and had lain helpless for two days in GRUNNOS hut, and had been obliged to leave the accumulator behind. Helberg started off again and came back the next day with the accumulator. Einar Skinnarland went to LIEN to meer Fhien, who was bringing the latest information about the Germans.
The stand-by period began. The weather had been bad ever since the change of moon, but now a furious storm set in. It was impossible to move out of doors.
THE OPERATION.
On 16th February 1943 fine weather set in. Crack signal 211. Everything was arranged as before, apart from the fact that the Eureka was kept going the whole time with the handgenerator. But nothing happened. Haugland thought, however, that he heard the drone of an aircraft. We were given 211 again. But later in the afternoon a storm arose and at night there was bad weather and it was out of the question to move out of doors. Haugland tried in vain to obtain wireless contact in order to get the arranged operation cancelled.
It was not until the next day that we got a telegram to say that GUNNERSIDE had been dropped on the BJORNESFJORD on the 16th. This surprised us not a little and there were many guesses about what the crack signals on the 17th February could mean. None uf us dreamt that it would be a mistake in transmission.
The north-west wind raged with undiminished strength right up to the 21st February. We began to be anxious about GUNNERSIDE unless they had got into a house or in a tent, it would be hardly go well with them. There was a feeling that we should send out an expedition to the BJORNESFJORD to search, as soon as weather permitted, but I set myself resolutely against this. I hardly believed that the lads really had been dropped at the BJORNESFJORD. If the pilot had been unable to find a place so well marked as STORESAURE, he would never find the BJORNESFJORD, which lies right in the middle of flat STOT VIDDA, where it is hopeless to see the difference between land and water. They could have been dropped anywhere on SOR VIDDA and to search for them might easily mean that we should keep on hunting about on different sides of the VIDDA.
On 23rd February I sent Helberg and Kjelstrup up to the KALLUNGSJØ. No matter where GUNNERSIDE had been dropped on the big VIDDA, the KALLUNGSJØ would lie on their natural line of march on to the FETTER hut. In the afternoon we saw Helberg returning alone, dragging a toboggan. This could only mean one thing: they had made contact with GUNNERSIDE!
Einar Skinnarland then went at once to the VRAASJØ dump, so as not to come into contact with GUNNERSIDE. Haugland was to join him the next day.
The 24th was a rest day for GUNNERSIDE. They were not acclimatised and were pretty done up. The same day Helberg went to RJUKAN according to plan. He was there to look up a certain person whose name Einar Skinnarland had given and who would provide him with the most recent information about the Germans' dispositions and other things of importance. He was to meet us in the FJØSBUDAL the next day.
THE ATTACK.
We, the members of SWALLOW, had long ago formed the opinion that the FJØSBUDAL was the only serviceable starting place for the attack. Here we would lie close in to the objective of the operation and make the final preparations. It was seldom that people came to this place and also the desent to the VESTFJORDAL was easy. If we had gone down VESETLIA we should in the first place, for security reasons. have had to lie in a starting place far into the mountains and would therefore have had a long march to reach the objective. Secondly, it was very doubtful if we should have managed al all to come down the mountain side.
In any case, we should never have got up again. 2nd/Lieut Ronneberg agreed and relied on my knowledge of the country. As regards the sabotage team operation and the combined retreat, I refer to his report.
THE RETREAT.
On 3rd March 1943, we arrived at SKRYKEN. We employed the night in arranging the equipment and the food which GUNNERSIDE had brought for us. These were buried in the snow to be fetched later. By arrangement, Haugland and Skinnarland had been there and taken their share of the stores.
Next day we separated. GUNNERSIDE started northwards on their long trip to Sweden. BONZO went westwards with all the equipment they had with them. I myself turned my skis eastwards, setting course for OSLO.
As time went on I had become more and more convinced that when the sabotage operation had been carried out it would be quite impossible for me to do any positive work at home this spring and during the summer months. The only thing I could do was to put other people's lives in danger.
- Haugland: was first of all to train Einar Skinnarland and other telegraphists later, so he would have his hand full.
- Kjelstrup: wished himself to go west to Vinje to continue our work there. I considered the possibility of going there
myself, but the food sityation in the west was very difficult and the conditions such that strangers would be
conspicuous. One man would manage better than two
- Helberg: It would not be possible to do anything in the RJUKAN district during the first months after the operation.
It was therefore decided that he and I should make for OSLO by different ways and meet there. he himself preferred
to remain in Norway. When the conditions had become settled and the worst excitement after the sabotage had
subsided, he would return. Helberg and I were to make contact with the military organisation at NOTODDEN. It was
difficult to stay in this district and one man could manage better than two more than ever.
The arrival of Knut Haukelid with written instructions made no great change to the situation and our plans. Kjelstrup joined BONZO. Hauglands job was the same.
That night I spent at a depot ar SØNSTEVATN in the TININGDAL. The going was splendid. I followed the mountains to VEGLI in NUMUDAL. After that I went via SIGDAL and on the third day of my march I reached KRØDSHERAD, wgere I stayed in a charcoal burner's hut.
I then took the train from KRØDEREN station and arrived at OSLO on the morning of the 8th March 1943.
Monday 9th March was the first day Helberg and I had arranged to meet. Both of us were there. I have seldom been more pleased to see a human being. He had wisted his ankle during his lonely retreat to the FJØSBUDAL. This had delayed him little. He had gone on ski to GEILO and taken the train there to OSLO. After that we went back into the mountains and I went to SWeden. Nothing in this story about Helberg's broken arm.
POINTS OF GENERAL INTEREST.
In October the following German, or rather Austrian forces were in the district:
- 10 man at MØSVATN.
- 10 men at VEMORK.
- 24 men at RJUKAN.
The glider disaster caused the Germans to know that sabotage had been planned in the RJUKAN district. A razzia was started. Hostages were taken, and people arrested who were suspected of having been in communication with the glider affair.
Torstein Skinnarland was taken without a shadow of proof. Einar Skinnarland, who was then working at the installations at KALHOVD, was searched for, but he was warned and made his get-away.
The enemy apparently had knowledge of the landing place, because the district round SKOLAND was therfore combed.
In December the Austrians were replaced by Germans and the strength of the guard at the MØSVATNDAM increased to 40 men, and 4 anti-aircraft guns and searchlights were brought into position. The force at VEMORK was the same. Two D/F (Direction Finding) stations were erected, one at KROKAN and one at the MØSVATNDAM. They appeared to suspect the existence of a secret transmitter, but no search was made in the mountains They hardly had people with experience enough to move into the mountains in the winter-time; also the weather was, as previously stated, exceptionally bad.
The Germans Steadily improved the strength of their guards at the installations as the winter went on. In January the forces had been increased to about:
- 200 men at RJUKAN.
- 30 men at VEMORK.
- 40 men at the MØSVATNDAM.
Torstein Skinnarland (geboren op 17 mei 1910 in Rauland, overleden op 25 december 1993) was een Noorse combinatieskiër die uitkwam voor IF Rjukan en Rjukan IL.
In 1928 begon Torstein Skinnarland met slalomwedstrijden in Hjerdalen. Dit wordt beschouwd als het begin van de geschiedenis van het moderne slalom. Tijdens het WK in Lahti in 1938 werd hij 7e in de Noordse combinatie en 40e in het schansspringen. Hij eindigde als 2e in de combinatiewedstrijd van Holmenkollen in 1939 en 1940, en ontving de beker als beste combinatiespringer in 1936 en 1939. In 1939, toen hij 57 meter sprong, was hij een van de zeven deelnemers die het schansrecord vestigden in de Holmenkollenschans. Op het Noors kampioenschap was zijn beste resultaat een 4e plaats in 1940. Hij kreeg tweemaal de Koningsbeker toegekend: voor de overwinning in de wedstrijd van Morgedal IL in 1937 en in de wedstrijd van IF Pors in 1939.
Skinnarland werkte vanaf 1931 als damwachter bij de Møsvassdam en was betrokken bij de Vemork-actie tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Hij werd in december 1942 gearresteerd en bleef gevangen tot de bevrijding, het grootste deel van de tijd in Grini. Skinnarland speelde zichzelf in de film De strijd om het zwaar water uit 1948.
Torstein Skinnarland werd in 1977 onderscheiden met de Zilveren Medaille voor Verdienste van de Koning. Hij was de broer van verzetsman Einar Skinnarland.
SECURITY.
The security was good on the whole, but in a stay of almost six months it was unavoidable that we had to disclose our presence to more people than we really ished and that a number of rumours came into circulation.
The conditions in the towns and country districts in ØVRE TELEMARK are such that strangers are very soon noticed. We should never have managed if we had lived among people in a civilised way. Our only chance was to live up in the mountains.
In the middle of the winter there are few people moving about there. Only occasional reindeer hunter, but as soon one of these has set eyes on you it gets about that there are strangers up in the mountains and the rumours spread. In the late winter more and more people roam about, and then comes Easter with its invasion of town people on holiday.
GUNNERSIDE arrived at the eleventh hour. Perhaps we should have managed the job in March also, but after that it could hardly have been done owing to lack of security.
SHELTERINGS AND FUEL PROBLEM.
There are two things of decisive importance during a stay in the mountains for a considerable time in the middle of winter, namely, shelter and wood especially when one had to keep in hiding. It was not so difficult to find a hideaway hut or a depot suitable for our job. It was worse to find a place where one also had a sufficient supply of wood.
"FETTERHYTTE" at STORE SAURE was ideal in both respects. The hut lies hidden away and is not marked on a map. There is a clump of birch trees, the only one for miles. But the most important thing was the stove. It was that which madewintering in the mountains possible. It was inlaid with stones, and therefore burns one seasoned wood. We had only to chup the wood and put it straight in the stove.
FOOD PROBLEM.
The food question was the problem that was always at the back of our minds. We had some food with us from ENGLAND. Half of this was used up in October. Later Einar Skinnarland got us some food, especiallly flour and oatmeal. When we added what we got from him to what we had our selves we managed, also with coffee, tea, sugar and butter. Now and then he got us some things: dried milk, sadines, beans, groats, potatoes and other things. Such things added most to our existence.
We couldn't have managed if it had not been for the wild reindeer on the VIDDA. We shot and ate thirteen reindeer, but it was not till after Christmas that the hunting got going. Before then it was often short comdone. We often had to mix Iceland moes in the food to make it go round. Later we lived mainly on meat and we ate every morsel of the animal in Indian fashion. One can live entirely on meat. One gets C vitamine by eating the stomach with its contents. These contents mixed with blood are a delicacy. Preparing our food required much consideration and a good deal of work. It was important to be able to vary the diet as much as possible.
THE WEATHER.
The weather was exceptionally bad the whole time. Seldom fine weather. Constant snowstorms. There was a period of fine weather in January, but on the other hand the cold was troublesome: - 30o.
The days are short in mid-winter. Sometimes we were short of means of illumination and we had to go slow with our candles. All the work, therefore, had to be carried out in daylight and the WT service put forward to the middle of the day. During the stand-by periods in December and January we managed to sleep 15 hours in the 24. That was a virtue of necessity.
STATE OF HEALTH.
Out states of health was not entirely good. On account of our unvaried diet er were all at one time or anotherbothered with stomach troubles. Norwegian bread always gave us diarrhoea. Eating meat gave Kjelstrup and to some extent Haugland, digestive troubles. Apart from this we had some cases of pains, inflamed chafing sores and frostbite.
MORALE.
All the members were of an even good disposition and had a mental balance which was of the greatest importance.
We were living the whole time in the mountains in primitive conditions. We never saw any new faces. The conditions were therefore present for the so-called "Polar-Sickness" but this was an illness unknown to us. It was just the primitive conditions we were living under that caused the battle for existence itself to take all our energies. We had not time to get on one another nerves.
THE MEMBERS OF THE PARTY.
The composition of the group was a fortunate one.
2nd/Lieut Knut Haugland: was keen and clever as WT operator. A man who knows his job and who manages to do his work even under the most difficult conditions.
Sergt Klaus Helberg: a worker and hard as nails. A man who never spared himself. On account of the circumstances, the heaviest jobs fell to his lot. Always in good humour, always willing.
Sergt Arne Kjelstrup: accustomed himself to circumstances and never attracted attention to himself, in spite of the fact that he had chronic stomach trouble on account of the unacoustomed diet. Clever and careful.
I wish to draw attention to the able work carried out by TORSTEIN, OLA and EINAR SKINNARLAND. They never asked questions, they never raised objections. When they could help us they did so. I specially mention EINAR. A good mountaineer. Practical. Full of initiative. Knows his job. Excellent spirits.
I also want to mention the mountaineer FHIEN. I never saw him personally. But for a long time he was our only link with civilasation and he did some heavy transporting for us. A capable fellow.
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