MESSAGES SEPTEMBER 1942.
CONFIDENTIAL.
SUBJECT: Agents - 'GROUSE' 2.
Reference 20/34/42.
To: Group Capt. Grierson,
STS Headquarters.
From: S.T.S. 61.
During the stay of the four Agents of 'Grouse' 2, I have got to know them pretty well and they have brought the following points to my notice:
1. Maps.
The maps they are supplied with are marked "Reproduction from Norwegian Map at 1930 - Ordnance Survey 1940 - War Office 1940." As one of these agents points out that there would be no harm in this map being found in the possession of a member of the fighting forces, it would be incriminating if it were found in his kit.
2. Electric Battery.
This was supplied to him not charged. He suggests that it should have been charged and the acid emptied out. If he had proceeded on his mission with an uncharged battery, it is probably not realised that he would have had to walk 50 kilometres in order to get the battery charged. The battery should if possible not have English markings, but a Norwegian manufacturer's name. If an English battery is necessary, one should be supplied of a make prior to the war.
3. Documents - District Pass.
'Grense Bevis' is the wrong colour and it is not the same quality of paper as the original.
4. Toothpaste.
This has been supplied in tubes with English labels. Could not tooth powder be supplied in plain tins.
5. Tooth brushes.
Are marked 'made in England'.
6. Razor blades.
Should be Gilette blades which are commonly used in Norway.
7. Ration Cards.
These agents say tha they should have ration cards which could probably be got through Stockholm. they have only been issued with ration cards available for use in restaurants and as in some cases no restaurant will be available in the neighbourhood they are in, the ration catds will be useless and theoretically they will not be able to get any food.
I respectfully bring these points to your notice, because although the agents take it in very good part, they remarked to me that they thought we were stupid and lacked thoroughness. one of them particlarly pointed out out that it was quite possible that whilst he was away from his billet his kit might be examined and these points that I have mentioned would arouse suspicion to say the least of it.
8-9-1942 Major,
Commandant STS-61
SUBJECT: Agents - 'GROUSE' 2.
Reference 20/34/42.
To: Group Capt. Grierson,
STS Headquarters.
From: S.T.S. 61.
During the stay of the four Agents of 'Grouse' 2, I have got to know them pretty well and they have brought the following points to my notice:
1. Maps.
The maps they are supplied with are marked "Reproduction from Norwegian Map at 1930 - Ordnance Survey 1940 - War Office 1940." As one of these agents points out that there would be no harm in this map being found in the possession of a member of the fighting forces, it would be incriminating if it were found in his kit.
2. Electric Battery.
This was supplied to him not charged. He suggests that it should have been charged and the acid emptied out. If he had proceeded on his mission with an uncharged battery, it is probably not realised that he would have had to walk 50 kilometres in order to get the battery charged. The battery should if possible not have English markings, but a Norwegian manufacturer's name. If an English battery is necessary, one should be supplied of a make prior to the war.
3. Documents - District Pass.
'Grense Bevis' is the wrong colour and it is not the same quality of paper as the original.
4. Toothpaste.
This has been supplied in tubes with English labels. Could not tooth powder be supplied in plain tins.
5. Tooth brushes.
Are marked 'made in England'.
6. Razor blades.
Should be Gilette blades which are commonly used in Norway.
7. Ration Cards.
These agents say tha they should have ration cards which could probably be got through Stockholm. they have only been issued with ration cards available for use in restaurants and as in some cases no restaurant will be available in the neighbourhood they are in, the ration catds will be useless and theoretically they will not be able to get any food.
I respectfully bring these points to your notice, because although the agents take it in very good part, they remarked to me that they thought we were stupid and lacked thoroughness. one of them particlarly pointed out out that it was quite possible that whilst he was away from his billet his kit might be examined and these points that I have mentioned would arouse suspicion to say the least of it.
8-9-1942 Major,
Commandant STS-61
To: SN From: SN/A
10th September 1942.
GROUSE
This question is somewhat difficult. The Operation the MO Section refer to as "GROUSE II" is, according to our records and D/CE records, merely "GROUSE", since "D/CE" issued the Code Name "GROUSE" to Knut M. Haugland, a W/T operator going to Norway and this is the Operation in question.
However, in March last, the Grouse organizer (Skinnarland) was sent over, and the MO Section, in order to keep their records clear, are calling this Operation Grouse, "Grouse II". In actual fact, they are very wrong, because we have not yet had a "GROUSE I" Operation.
The arms dropping Operation they are calling "GROUSE III", should in reality be called "GROUSE I", because it will be the first arms dropping operation to the Grouse Organization.
We would prefer all this to be corrected, but we understand from the MO Section that if we insist on the Operations being called "GROUSE Organizer", "GROUSE" and "Grouse I", it will cpmplicate matters very much in their records and those of the Air Ministry.
10th September 1942.
GROUSE
This question is somewhat difficult. The Operation the MO Section refer to as "GROUSE II" is, according to our records and D/CE records, merely "GROUSE", since "D/CE" issued the Code Name "GROUSE" to Knut M. Haugland, a W/T operator going to Norway and this is the Operation in question.
However, in March last, the Grouse organizer (Skinnarland) was sent over, and the MO Section, in order to keep their records clear, are calling this Operation Grouse, "Grouse II". In actual fact, they are very wrong, because we have not yet had a "GROUSE I" Operation.
The arms dropping Operation they are calling "GROUSE III", should in reality be called "GROUSE I", because it will be the first arms dropping operation to the Grouse Organization.
We would prefer all this to be corrected, but we understand from the MO Section that if we insist on the Operations being called "GROUSE Organizer", "GROUSE" and "Grouse I", it will cpmplicate matters very much in their records and those of the Air Ministry.
26 SEP Recd
Rapport avgitt i Oslo 6-9-1942.
Turen over forlöp uten uhell. Ca, kl. 11:30 blev lemmen i gulvet åpnet. Väret var meget fint, med klart märtneskinn. Nogen minutter efter kjendte jeg igjen Rjukdalen og jeg gav besjed om å fölge denne mot vest op til Mösvann. Ganske snart opdaget jeg at vi flöi mot öst. Kursen blev så lagt om og snart efter fikk jeg se et oplyst arbeidsted rett under mig. Dette var et av anleggene rett nord for Rjukan. Jeg skulde ca. 7 km lenger mot vest og gav beskjed om det. Men kursen må ha värt nordvest. Ikke lenge efter fikk jeg se rödt lys og derpå grönt og ordre om å gå ut. Vi passerte nettop da et nutt oplyst sted. Jeg nektet å gå, da jeg visste at jeg var på feil sted. Det var igjen et av arbeidsstedene nordvest for Rjukan. Imidlertid var containeren som lå i vingen droppet. (den Har siden ikke värt mullig å finne, og er heller ikke värt funnet ab andre det jeg vet). For å finne stedet jeg skulde ned bad jeg om å fly syd til närmeste lys, da jeg antok det måtte väre Mösvann, hvilket stemte. Jeg gav igjen beskjed om at det vat 10 km rett nord jeg skulde ned. Men vi passerte öst for Langesjö over endel stugge fjellpartier, hvor det er mindre bra å komme med. Jeg fikk nu den beskjed av flyveren at de ikke gikk ut nu, måtte jeg bli med tilbake.
The flight proceeded without incident. At approximately 11:30 a.m., the hatch in the floor was opened. The weather was very fine, with clear moonlight. A few minutes later I recognized the Rjukan Valley and gave instructions to follow it westward up to Møsvatn. Quite soon, however, I discovered that we were flying east. The course was then changed, and shortly afterward I saw an illuminated work site directly below me. This was one of the installations just north of Rjukan. I was supposed to be about 7 km further west and informed them of this. But the course must have been northwest. Not long after, I saw a red light and then a green one, and received the order to jump. We were just passing a faintly lit place. I refused to jump, as I knew I was in the wrong location. It was again one of the work sites northwest of Rjukan. Meanwhile, the container that was lying in the wing was dropped (it has since been impossible to find it, and as far as I know it has not been found by others either). In order to find the place where I was supposed to land, I asked them to fly south toward the nearest light, as I assumed it must be Møsvatn, which proved to be correct. I again informed them that the drop point was 10 km straight north. But we passed east of Langesjø over some rough mountain terrain, where it is not very suitable to land. I then received the message from the pilot that they were not making a drop now, and that I would have to return with them.
Jeg bad ham da igjen pasere det sted han mente var Langesjö . Litt efter fikk jeg "Action station" og gikk ut. Alt fungerte normalt og jeg så skiene og den andre containeren komme efter. Da jeg så mig om, så jeg at jeg var for langst öst. Like ved så jeg lysene fra to arbeidssteder og Gaustadtoppen i sydöst. Vinden var nokså serk nordvest og drev mig over et lite forrevent fjellparti. Landingen foröp utrolig heldig midt mellem nogen stener i en litendal oppe i fjellpartiet. Jeg så det andre komme ned like i närheten og efter ca 20 min leting fant jeg det, og tok med det som jeg kunde bäre og gjemte resten. Jed måtte snarest mulig komme mig hjem för det blev lyst, da jeg hadde landet bare vel 1 km fra närmeste arbeidssted på anlegget. Stedet jeg landet ligger ca 25 km nordöst for Mösvann og ikke enn 6 km fra Rjulan. Jeg kom fint hjem uten å bli sett av nogen.
I then asked him once again to pass the place he believed was Langesjø. Shortly afterward I received “Action station” and jumped. Everything functioned normally, and I saw the skis and the other container come after me. When I looked around, I saw that I was too far to the east. Nearby I could see the lights from two work sites and Gaustatoppen to the southeast. The wind was fairly strong from the northwest and carried me over a small rugged mountain area. The landing went incredibly well, right in between some stones in a small valley high up in the mountains. I saw the other container come down close by, and after about 20 minutes of searching I found it, took with me what I could carry, and hid the rest. I had to get home as quickly as possible before it became light, as I had landed barely a little over 1 km from the nearest work site at the installation. The place where I landed is about 25 km northeast of Møsvatn and no more than 6 km from Rjukan. I got home safely without being seen by anyone
Erfaringer som kan väre av betydning.
Er den som skal droppes lokalkjendt på sedet han skal ut, bör gå ut gjennem dören og ikke gjennem lemmen i gulvet. Det var svärt vanskelig å Bedömme höideforskjelle for en ikke-flyver. Man kan heller ikke på ???and si at der er stedet, men först når man er rett over. Dette vil i de ?leste tilfelder la sig gjöre når man ser gjennem dören. Hvis der er mulig Böre dem som skal gjenkjenne stedet väre utstryt med mikrotelefon med forbindelse til observatören eller flyveren, slik at hans besjkeder uten misforståelser hurtig kan bli utfört av flyveren. Dette vil sapre tid, og dermed forminske risikoen både for flyvere og han eller de som skal droppes. Det falt svärt vanskelig både å opfatte og få gitt de nödvendige beskjeder da jeg skulde droppes, på grunn an motordur og hjelmen. Observatören bör ha et detaljkart av sedet hvis dette kan skaffes. (Det kart av ditriktet Rjukan som blev visy mig för jeg startet, med Langesjö tydelig merket, hadde ikke observatören da han spurte mig om forskjellig ting för vi startet fra den siste flyplassen. Han hadde bare et kart av Syd-Norge i lieten målestokk, hvor Langesjö ikke engang var avmerket) Observatören og han skal droppes bör på forhånd diskutere de spörsmal som har betydning for opgaven.
Experiences that may be of significance.
If the person who is to be dropped is familiar with the local area where he is to go out, he should exit through the door and not through the hatch in the floor. It was very difficult for a non-pilot to judge differences in altitude. One also cannot, at a distance, say “there is the place,” but only when one is directly above it. In most cases this can be done when looking through the door. If possible, those who are to recognize the location should be equipped with a microphone with a connection to the observer or the pilot, so that his instructions can be carried out quickly by the pilot without misunderstandings. This will save time and thereby reduce the risk both for the pilots and for the person or persons being dropped. It was very difficult both to perceive and to give the necessary instructions when I was to be dropped, because of the engine noise and the helmet.The observer should have a detailed map of the area if this can be obtained. (The map of the Rjukan district that was shown to me before I started, with Langesjø clearly marked, was not available to the observer when he asked me various questions before we took off from the last airfield. He had only a map of southern Norway on a small scale, on which Langesjø was not even marked.) The observer and the person to be dropped should discuss in advance the questions that are important for the mission.
Flyverne.
Det som overrasket mig mest vat at det så ut som om det var meget vanskelig å finne målet, som var en flate, som i motsetning til de mörke fjell omkring er helt hvit og 7-9 km i diameter. Det skulde väre lettere å finne dettemål som hadde 3-4 fullt oplyste stder i närheten, hvis beliggenhet i forhold til målet både vat opgitt på forhånd og blev opgitt da vi passerte over, enn det er å finne et lite mål i et fullstendig mörklagt område. hvilket jo er en vanlig opgave for flyvere. På mig virket det som om deres opgave bestod i å få dropet både mig og lasten snarest mulig uten hensyn til hvor det var og hvordan det gikk, og selv komme tikbake snarest mulig. Dette både overrasket og skuffet mig. Hvis det er mulig tror jeg vi alle vilde väre tjent med å la norske Flyvere få slike opgaver, da disse jo er mere kjent med Norge og de virkelig har fölelsen av at de gjör noget for sitt hjemland. Jeg tror også det haren ganske stor betydning. Om skulde uhellet väre ute vil en norsk flyver ha alle sjangser for å klare sig bra hvis han kommer levende fra det.
The pilots.
What surprised me most was that it seemed to be very difficult to find the target, which was a flat area that, in contrast to the dark mountains around it, is completely white and 7–9 km in diameter. It ought to have been easier to find this target—which had 3–4 fully illuminated sites nearby, whose positions in relation to the target were both given in advance and pointed out as we passed over—than to find a small target in a completely blacked-out area, which is after all a common task for pilots.To me it seemed as if their task consisted of dropping both me and the cargo as quickly as possible, without regard to where it was or how it went, and then returning as quickly as possible themselves. This both surprised and disappointed me. If possible, I believe we would all benefit from letting Norwegian pilots carry out such missions, since they are more familiar with Norway and truly have the feeling that they are doing something for their homeland. I also believe this has quite great significance. Should an accident occur, a Norwegian pilot would have every chance of coping well if he comes through it alive.
Rapport for det senere arbeide.
På grunn av uväre fant jeg ikke resten av mitt utstyr igjen för senere, men det var fullstendig uskadd som meddelt tidligere. Utsettelsesordren blev mottat i slutten av juni og jeg bekreftet dette Fra lördag den 22 august var jeg på avtalt sted med det nödvendige utstyr. Jeg var da uvitende pm det telegram som Bamse hadde sendt uten nogensomhelst ordre eller beskjed fra mig. Först den 2 september fikke jeg melding om at telegrammet var sendt. Riktignok hadde jeg bud fra Bamse 18 august med nogen radiorör til en mottager som jeg bedt om. Dette bud spurte samtidig om alt var i orden, hvilket jeg bekreftet og sa at jeg hadde värt på plass fra den avtalte tid. Da jeg s september mottok hand meddelese om telegrammet, reiste jeg ved förste anledning til Oslo, hvor jeg fikk rede på at han hadde sendt et nytt telegram om at alt var klart den 29 og at han hadde fått beskjed at ordren gjaldt fortsatt. Grunnen til at han sendte förste telegram var at han trodde de radiomottagerrör jeg bad om hörte till S-Phone, hvilket jeg ikke kan forstå, da han blev av radiosakkyndige forklart at det var rör til en vanlig kortbölgemottager og at de var fabrikert i Holland efter krigens begynnelse. Jeg beklager meget det inntrufne, som jeg har värt help uvitende om og som jeg ikke kan si er min skyld. Vi har hele tiden värt på plass og er det fortsatt inntil ordren blir trukket tilbale. S-Phone og annet utstyr er i orden.
Report on the subsequent work.
Because of bad weather, I did not recover the rest of my equipment again until later, but it was completely undamaged, as previously reported. The postponement order was received at the end of June, and I confirmed this. From Saturday, 22 August, I was at the agreed location with the necessary equipment. At that time I was unaware of the telegram that Bamse had sent without any order or instruction from me whatsoever. It was not until 2 September that I received notice that the telegram had been sent. It is true that I had a messenger from Bamse on 18 August with some radio tubes for a receiver I had requested. This messenger also asked whether everything was in order, which I confirmed, and I said that I had been in position since the agreed time. When on 2 September I received his notification about the telegram, I traveled at the first opportunity to Oslo, where I learned that he had sent a new telegram stating that everything was ready on the 29th and that he had received confirmation that the order was still valid. The reason he sent the first telegram was that he believed the radio receiver tubes I had requested belonged to the S-Phone, which I cannot understand, since he was informed by radio experts that they were tubes for an ordinary shortwave receiver and that they were manufactured in Holland after the beginning of the war. I very much regret what happened, of which I have been completely unaware and which I cannot say is my fault. We have been in position the entire time and still are, until the order is withdrawn. The S-Phone and other equipment are in order.
Efter avtale med Bamse skal jeg selv sende all beskjeder angående special opgaver herefter slik at misforståelser undgåes. Denne rapport sendes gjennem 24 til 12, og beskjeder til mig vil nå mig gjennem samme. På grunn av riskioen for mine medhjelper vil jeg väre taknemlig for snarest å bli underrettet om mulige forandringer slik at vi ikke behöver å väre på plass når det er unödvendig. Telegram om dette er sendt tidligere. Rapporten er skrevet i Oslo, den 6 september efter sanråd med Bamse.
By agreement with Bamse, I will personally send all messages concerning special operations from now on, so that misunderstandings may be avoided. This report is sent via 24 to 12, and messages to me will reach me through the same channel. Because of the risk to my helpers, I would be grateful to be informed as soon as possible of any possible changes, so that we do not have to remain in position when it is unnecessary. A telegram concerning this has been sent earlier. The report was written in Oslo on 6 September, after consultation with Bamse.
Grouse.
Rapport avgitt i Oslo 6-9-1942.
Turen over forlöp uten uhell. Ca, kl. 11:30 blev lemmen i gulvet åpnet. Väret var meget fint, med klart märtneskinn. Nogen minutter efter kjendte jeg igjen Rjukdalen og jeg gav besjed om å fölge denne mot vest op til Mösvann. Ganske snart opdaget jeg at vi flöi mot öst. Kursen blev så lagt om og snart efter fikk jeg se et oplyst arbeidsted rett under mig. Dette var et av anleggene rett nord for Rjukan. Jeg skulde ca. 7 km lenger mot vest og gav beskjed om det. Men kursen må ha värt nordvest. Ikke lenge efter fikk jeg se rödt lys og derpå grönt og ordre om å gå ut. Vi passerte nettop da et nutt oplyst sted. Jeg nektet å gå, da jeg visste at jeg var på feil sted. Det var igjen et av arbeidsstedene nordvest for Rjukan. Imidlertid var containeren som lå i vingen droppet. (den Har siden ikke värt mullig å finne, og er heller ikke värt funnet ab andre det jeg vet). For å finne stedet jeg skulde ned bad jeg om å fly syd til närmeste lys, da jeg antok det måtte väre Mösvann, hvilket stemte. Jeg gav igjen beskjed om at det vat 10 km rett nord jeg skulde ned. Men vi passerte öst for Langesjö over endel stugge fjellpartier, hvor det er mindre bra å komme med. Jeg fikk nu den beskjed av flyveren at de ikke gikk ut nu, måtte jeg bli med tilbake.
The flight proceeded without incident. At approximately 11:30 a.m., the hatch in the floor was opened. The weather was very fine, with clear moonlight. A few minutes later I recognized the Rjukan Valley and gave instructions to follow it westward up to Møsvatn. Quite soon, however, I discovered that we were flying east. The course was then changed, and shortly afterward I saw an illuminated work site directly below me. This was one of the installations just north of Rjukan. I was supposed to be about 7 km further west and informed them of this. But the course must have been northwest. Not long after, I saw a red light and then a green one, and received the order to jump. We were just passing a faintly lit place. I refused to jump, as I knew I was in the wrong location. It was again one of the work sites northwest of Rjukan. Meanwhile, the container that was lying in the wing was dropped (it has since been impossible to find it, and as far as I know it has not been found by others either). In order to find the place where I was supposed to land, I asked them to fly south toward the nearest light, as I assumed it must be Møsvatn, which proved to be correct. I again informed them that the drop point was 10 km straight north. But we passed east of Langesjø over some rough mountain terrain, where it is not very suitable to land. I then received the message from the pilot that they were not making a drop now, and that I would have to return with them.
Jeg bad ham da igjen pasere det sted han mente var Langesjö . Litt efter fikk jeg "Action station" og gikk ut. Alt fungerte normalt og jeg så skiene og den andre containeren komme efter. Da jeg så mig om, så jeg at jeg var for langst öst. Like ved så jeg lysene fra to arbeidssteder og Gaustadtoppen i sydöst. Vinden var nokså serk nordvest og drev mig over et lite forrevent fjellparti. Landingen foröp utrolig heldig midt mellem nogen stener i en litendal oppe i fjellpartiet. Jeg så det andre komme ned like i närheten og efter ca 20 min leting fant jeg det, og tok med det som jeg kunde bäre og gjemte resten. Jed måtte snarest mulig komme mig hjem för det blev lyst, da jeg hadde landet bare vel 1 km fra närmeste arbeidssted på anlegget. Stedet jeg landet ligger ca 25 km nordöst for Mösvann og ikke enn 6 km fra Rjulan. Jeg kom fint hjem uten å bli sett av nogen.
I then asked him once again to pass the place he believed was Langesjø. Shortly afterward I received “Action station” and jumped. Everything functioned normally, and I saw the skis and the other container come after me. When I looked around, I saw that I was too far to the east. Nearby I could see the lights from two work sites and Gaustatoppen to the southeast. The wind was fairly strong from the northwest and carried me over a small rugged mountain area. The landing went incredibly well, right in between some stones in a small valley high up in the mountains. I saw the other container come down close by, and after about 20 minutes of searching I found it, took with me what I could carry, and hid the rest. I had to get home as quickly as possible before it became light, as I had landed barely a little over 1 km from the nearest work site at the installation. The place where I landed is about 25 km northeast of Møsvatn and no more than 6 km from Rjukan. I got home safely without being seen by anyone
Erfaringer som kan väre av betydning.
Er den som skal droppes lokalkjendt på sedet han skal ut, bör gå ut gjennem dören og ikke gjennem lemmen i gulvet. Det var svärt vanskelig å Bedömme höideforskjelle for en ikke-flyver. Man kan heller ikke på ???and si at der er stedet, men först når man er rett over. Dette vil i de ?leste tilfelder la sig gjöre når man ser gjennem dören. Hvis der er mulig Böre dem som skal gjenkjenne stedet väre utstryt med mikrotelefon med forbindelse til observatören eller flyveren, slik at hans besjkeder uten misforståelser hurtig kan bli utfört av flyveren. Dette vil sapre tid, og dermed forminske risikoen både for flyvere og han eller de som skal droppes. Det falt svärt vanskelig både å opfatte og få gitt de nödvendige beskjeder da jeg skulde droppes, på grunn an motordur og hjelmen. Observatören bör ha et detaljkart av sedet hvis dette kan skaffes. (Det kart av ditriktet Rjukan som blev visy mig för jeg startet, med Langesjö tydelig merket, hadde ikke observatören da han spurte mig om forskjellig ting för vi startet fra den siste flyplassen. Han hadde bare et kart av Syd-Norge i lieten målestokk, hvor Langesjö ikke engang var avmerket) Observatören og han skal droppes bör på forhånd diskutere de spörsmal som har betydning for opgaven.
Experiences that may be of significance.
If the person who is to be dropped is familiar with the local area where he is to go out, he should exit through the door and not through the hatch in the floor. It was very difficult for a non-pilot to judge differences in altitude. One also cannot, at a distance, say “there is the place,” but only when one is directly above it. In most cases this can be done when looking through the door. If possible, those who are to recognize the location should be equipped with a microphone with a connection to the observer or the pilot, so that his instructions can be carried out quickly by the pilot without misunderstandings. This will save time and thereby reduce the risk both for the pilots and for the person or persons being dropped. It was very difficult both to perceive and to give the necessary instructions when I was to be dropped, because of the engine noise and the helmet.The observer should have a detailed map of the area if this can be obtained. (The map of the Rjukan district that was shown to me before I started, with Langesjø clearly marked, was not available to the observer when he asked me various questions before we took off from the last airfield. He had only a map of southern Norway on a small scale, on which Langesjø was not even marked.) The observer and the person to be dropped should discuss in advance the questions that are important for the mission.
Flyverne.
Det som overrasket mig mest vat at det så ut som om det var meget vanskelig å finne målet, som var en flate, som i motsetning til de mörke fjell omkring er helt hvit og 7-9 km i diameter. Det skulde väre lettere å finne dettemål som hadde 3-4 fullt oplyste stder i närheten, hvis beliggenhet i forhold til målet både vat opgitt på forhånd og blev opgitt da vi passerte over, enn det er å finne et lite mål i et fullstendig mörklagt område. hvilket jo er en vanlig opgave for flyvere. På mig virket det som om deres opgave bestod i å få dropet både mig og lasten snarest mulig uten hensyn til hvor det var og hvordan det gikk, og selv komme tikbake snarest mulig. Dette både overrasket og skuffet mig. Hvis det er mulig tror jeg vi alle vilde väre tjent med å la norske Flyvere få slike opgaver, da disse jo er mere kjent med Norge og de virkelig har fölelsen av at de gjör noget for sitt hjemland. Jeg tror også det haren ganske stor betydning. Om skulde uhellet väre ute vil en norsk flyver ha alle sjangser for å klare sig bra hvis han kommer levende fra det.
The pilots.
What surprised me most was that it seemed to be very difficult to find the target, which was a flat area that, in contrast to the dark mountains around it, is completely white and 7–9 km in diameter. It ought to have been easier to find this target—which had 3–4 fully illuminated sites nearby, whose positions in relation to the target were both given in advance and pointed out as we passed over—than to find a small target in a completely blacked-out area, which is after all a common task for pilots.To me it seemed as if their task consisted of dropping both me and the cargo as quickly as possible, without regard to where it was or how it went, and then returning as quickly as possible themselves. This both surprised and disappointed me. If possible, I believe we would all benefit from letting Norwegian pilots carry out such missions, since they are more familiar with Norway and truly have the feeling that they are doing something for their homeland. I also believe this has quite great significance. Should an accident occur, a Norwegian pilot would have every chance of coping well if he comes through it alive.
Rapport for det senere arbeide.
På grunn av uväre fant jeg ikke resten av mitt utstyr igjen för senere, men det var fullstendig uskadd som meddelt tidligere. Utsettelsesordren blev mottat i slutten av juni og jeg bekreftet dette Fra lördag den 22 august var jeg på avtalt sted med det nödvendige utstyr. Jeg var da uvitende pm det telegram som Bamse hadde sendt uten nogensomhelst ordre eller beskjed fra mig. Först den 2 september fikke jeg melding om at telegrammet var sendt. Riktignok hadde jeg bud fra Bamse 18 august med nogen radiorör til en mottager som jeg bedt om. Dette bud spurte samtidig om alt var i orden, hvilket jeg bekreftet og sa at jeg hadde värt på plass fra den avtalte tid. Da jeg s september mottok hand meddelese om telegrammet, reiste jeg ved förste anledning til Oslo, hvor jeg fikk rede på at han hadde sendt et nytt telegram om at alt var klart den 29 og at han hadde fått beskjed at ordren gjaldt fortsatt. Grunnen til at han sendte förste telegram var at han trodde de radiomottagerrör jeg bad om hörte till S-Phone, hvilket jeg ikke kan forstå, da han blev av radiosakkyndige forklart at det var rör til en vanlig kortbölgemottager og at de var fabrikert i Holland efter krigens begynnelse. Jeg beklager meget det inntrufne, som jeg har värt help uvitende om og som jeg ikke kan si er min skyld. Vi har hele tiden värt på plass og er det fortsatt inntil ordren blir trukket tilbale. S-Phone og annet utstyr er i orden.
Report on the subsequent work.
Because of bad weather, I did not recover the rest of my equipment again until later, but it was completely undamaged, as previously reported. The postponement order was received at the end of June, and I confirmed this. From Saturday, 22 August, I was at the agreed location with the necessary equipment. At that time I was unaware of the telegram that Bamse had sent without any order or instruction from me whatsoever. It was not until 2 September that I received notice that the telegram had been sent. It is true that I had a messenger from Bamse on 18 August with some radio tubes for a receiver I had requested. This messenger also asked whether everything was in order, which I confirmed, and I said that I had been in position since the agreed time. When on 2 September I received his notification about the telegram, I traveled at the first opportunity to Oslo, where I learned that he had sent a new telegram stating that everything was ready on the 29th and that he had received confirmation that the order was still valid. The reason he sent the first telegram was that he believed the radio receiver tubes I had requested belonged to the S-Phone, which I cannot understand, since he was informed by radio experts that they were tubes for an ordinary shortwave receiver and that they were manufactured in Holland after the beginning of the war. I very much regret what happened, of which I have been completely unaware and which I cannot say is my fault. We have been in position the entire time and still are, until the order is withdrawn. The S-Phone and other equipment are in order.
Efter avtale med Bamse skal jeg selv sende all beskjeder angående special opgaver herefter slik at misforståelser undgåes. Denne rapport sendes gjennem 24 til 12, og beskjeder til mig vil nå mig gjennem samme. På grunn av riskioen for mine medhjelper vil jeg väre taknemlig for snarest å bli underrettet om mulige forandringer slik at vi ikke behöver å väre på plass når det er unödvendig. Telegram om dette er sendt tidligere. Rapporten er skrevet i Oslo, den 6 september efter sanråd med Bamse.
By agreement with Bamse, I will personally send all messages concerning special operations from now on, so that misunderstandings may be avoided. This report is sent via 24 to 12, and messages to me will reach me through the same channel. Because of the risk to my helpers, I would be grateful to be informed as soon as possible of any possible changes, so that we do not have to remain in position when it is unnecessary. A telegram concerning this has been sent earlier. The report was written in Oslo on 6 September, after consultation with Bamse.
Grouse.
RVM/53 27th September 1942.
To: A.1.2c. Major Wooler; Country Section. From: G/Capt. C. Grierson
GROUSE 2.
Please note the following amendment to A.T.F. No. 2b issued 27-8-1942, Para 7d:
Delete Dropping Point SN/26.
Party to be dropped at SN/33, without reception.
To: A.1.2c. Major Wooler; Country Section. From: G/Capt. C. Grierson
GROUSE 2.
Please note the following amendment to A.T.F. No. 2b issued 27-8-1942, Para 7d:
Delete Dropping Point SN/26.
Party to be dropped at SN/33, without reception.
To: SN From: SN/A
28th September 1942.
Operation Grouse
Since the Grouse men have been equipped, the most important of the poisons, "U", has become available and it has been suggested that they be equipped with it.
We therefore suggest six doses with one syringe only
28th September 1942.
Operation Grouse
Since the Grouse men have been equipped, the most important of the poisons, "U", has become available and it has been suggested that they be equipped with it.
We therefore suggest six doses with one syringe only
weggum.com