IV - MISSION TO HOLLAND
July - September 1944, page 234 IV. Mission to Holland
Re-organisation of Underground Forces
The RVV reported on September 11th that they wished to substitute the previous division of the underground movement into districts by a normal military organization in brigades of some hundred men, the brigades to be named after their locations. This had now been done so that Allied High Command would be able to handle these units more easily (277).
All these brigades had been ordered to withdraw their mobile personnel before the German Army and to maintain communications by means of a relay system with the localities through which the Germans were withdrawing. Two men had been designated by each brigade to make contact with the Intelligence Officer of the Allied troops. For this reason these brigades should have normal military powers, such as billeting, requisitioning, etc. Would PRINCE BERNHARD please telegraph his approval? PRINCE BERNHARD cabled (278) that he fully agreed that the brigades should have some powers as the regular Dutch Army
London cabled NORTHAW (279) that the JEDBURGH STAAL (280), who had jumped with the airborne troops, reported making contact with the resistance sub-leader. at Groesbeek. Where there were some 300 active men.
The population was co-operating excellently and the OD was giving every assistance. PRINS BERNHARD stated (281) that the 'Triangle' command was not to conduct the war but merely to nominate leaders when necessary and pass through his orders. The technical details connected with these instructions should be left to local leaders. It should be emphasised that weapons would be distributed only to such persons as were able and willing to use them. DRAUGHTS (Biallostreski) should contact the Driehoek immediately and act as liaison officer.
Resistance Pleads for Anonymity.
London transmitted to PRINS BERNHARD a message from SIS sources in Holland (282) urgently requesting the Prince not to mention on the radio names of organisations as this was dangerous for work in non-liberated areas. For this reason London had requested that the Prince recorded proclamation should not be broadcast. NORTHAW (Prince Bernhard) was informed (283) that a message had been received from DRAUGHTS to the effect that the various reports received from KAREL of the RVV with reference to the disputed commands were KAREL's own views and not those of the DRIEHOEK. DRAUGHTS recommended support for the DRIEHOEK, which was in line with the Prince's own views. London had confirmed this to him and KAREL had once more been instructed to subordinate himself to the DRIEHOEK.
Bernhard refuses to Cancel Broadcast.
PRINCE BERNHARD complained (284) that FOCK of the Dutch SIS had repeatedly stopped messages from the NORTHAW mission which he had been asked to pass on. This had to stop. FOCK must carry out the Prince's orders as received. The Prince's recordings must be broadcast immediately over RADIO ORANGE. FOCK reported (285) that further confirmation had been received from the OD that the DRIEHOEK (which was known as the DELTA CENTRUM) had achieved real unity. FOCK reported to PRINCE BERNHARD (286) that KAREL (Jan Thijssen) of the RVV had informed him that he had followed the Prince's orders and had now taken a seat in the DRIEHOEK. KAREL assured the Prince that he had never intended to disregard his orders.
PRINCE BERNHARD cabled (287) that the underground movement should be informed by all possible channels that the DRIEHOEK was ordered by the Price only for the leadership of resistance. Local appointments should be filled not by a triangle or committee but by single commanders.
Rail Strike Threatens Food Supplies.
London advised NORTHAW (Prins Bernhard) (288) of a message from the field to the effect that the OD, KP and RVV had requested an experienced regular officer (289) to act as the central commander of the DRIEHOEK. He had been functioning since September 20th.
A message from the Dutch War Minister (van Heuven Goedhart) to PRINCE BERNHARD (290) asked the Prince to ascertain whether the 21stArmy Group considered the continuation of the railway strike to be of military importance. If not it was intended to inform the Dutch to make the best possible arrangements in order to maintain food supplies for the cities.
(284) Northaw 52 of 22-9-1944
(285) 79 to Northaw of 22-9-1944
(286) 95 to Northaw of 24-9-1944
(287) Northaw 74 of 26-9-1944
(288) 127 to Northaw of 28-9-1944
(289) Van den Over (Koot), see page 188.
(290) 137 to Northaw of 30-9-1944.
w.mugge@home.nl
SOE WAR DIARIES JULY 1944 - SEPTEMBER 1944 PART IC.