OPERATION DUDLEY :                                                                           JEDBURGH LIAISON WITH RVV

It was required to dispatch one JEDBURGH team to the RAAD VAN VERZET in Holland in order to assist the leaders of that organization in their work; to prevent enemy demolition as much as possible; and to provide an additional W/T link (204a). The team, which would consist of MAJOR BRINKGREVE (Dutch), MAJOR OLMSTED (American) and SERGEANT AUSTIN (British), would be dispatched as from the night of Tuesday, September 5th to contacts of the RVV. The Dutch section would be responsible for the operation.

The team would be dropped in uniform to a reception Committee organized by the RVV or, if no reception was seen, the team would be dropped blind at a point of which the details had been sent to London by the RVV.
The JEDBURGHS would be attached to the RVV, would remain under the direct command of the Dutch Section. They would immediately contact the RVV with the help of the contact address provided. They would assist in recruiting men for intelligence purposes, forming resistance groups and preventing enemy demolitions.
It was essential that the RVV should tell London immediately whether they and the OD had agreed to work together in accordance with the messages sent to them The team would take two W/T sets and spare receivers, and would establish communication with the Home Station as soon as possible. Headquarters Signals would arrange for signal and cipher briefs. Each member of the team would take with him 10.000 Guilders. The
DUDLEY team was sent to the field on the night of September 5th , 1944. The operation was successful.

  W/T Traffic

DUDLEY reported (202) the safe arrival of all containers and equipment. He had made contact with the leader
Capt. Lancker) of the RVV for the Overijssel district. There were available approximately 500 men in 18 groups of varying strength, but with no arms and equipment. Would London send eight containers with pistols and stens? London replied (203) that this operation would be arranged as soon as possible. The choice of weapons (204) was very difficult, depending on which squadron did the operation. Owing to the urgency of the situation London would send what was available rather than wait indefinitely and miss opportunities.

(202)   Dudley 1 of 13.9.44
One stop Arrived safely with all containers and equipment contact made leader RVV district Overijssel available approx five zero zero men in eighteen groups of varying strength arms and equipment none send supplies eight containers C seven two H three pistols ten Kremado two hundred pistols cigarettes and tea sam de zwart love Aappy Hank Bunty stop

(203)   1 to Dudley of 13.9.44
Good work stop Laying operation for Evert ground soonest listen for BBC message Bericht voor Grote Jan gefeliciteerd met je verjaardag stop Message Henk Oranjehaven not repeat not suitable for BBC Flemish broadcast stop Confirm understood and that you will use non moon period lighting system stop

(204)   2 to Dudley of 14.9.44
Reference your three stop Committee should not repeat not be on ground unless they hear message Bericht voor Grote Jan gefeliciteerd met je verjaardag on Belgian Flemish radio stop Offical non moon period stand by times twenty two hundred to two hours GMT repeat GMT stop If earlier take off is expected will broadcast special bericht at the beginning of message stop Middle light for non moon period must be bonfire or strong car light which can make complete circle stop Advise if using Eureka at your ground and what signal you will give stop Choice of weapons very difficult depending on which squadron does the operation stop Owing urgency sending what we can than rather wait indefinitely and missing opportunities stop No operations Thursday night owing mist stop                                              

(204a) Orders for operation “Poaching” (undated)

Dutch Forces to Dig German Defences

DUDLEY reported (205) that in Zwolle all men between the ages of 17 and 45 had been ordered to report for digging along the river IJssel. The general situation was ”getting hot”. The Waal line was being fortified. DUDLEY was advised of the Arnhem airborne landing and given orders which were to be passed to the underground (206). DUDLEY reported (207)that railway lines were being out nightly. He could organize a day dropping ground with 200 men to protect the field. London feared (208) that such daylight operations would not be feasible at the moment. DUDLEY reported (209) that active OD groups in the Twente area were working under the KP during the fighting. Rivalry between the RVV and KP (210) still existed, however. He had moved to the KP Headquarters in Zenderen, near Almelo. Three Huns had been killed and four wounded during the move, but they had had no casualties themselves.


An airborne force was being sent to Holland . Its object was to deny to the enemy and prevent the destruction of important bridges at Nijmegen and Arnhem until the arrival of ground forces
(211). Owing to the lack of communication it was not known what active resistance existed in this area, but there were several resistance organizations in Holland, i.e. RAAD VAN VERZET, KNOK PLOEGEN, LANDELIJKE ORGANISATIE and the ORDE DIENST. The RVV was spread throughout the country, but owing to the state of its security it was not known how many members it had at its disposal although there were believed to be several thousand. It was thought possible that they had contacts in the operational area. Information had been received that the KNOK PLOEGEN consisted of 500 active men spread out all over the country. Here again it was possible that they had some representation in the operational area. No figures were available the OD. This organization had been principally concerned with the supply of intelligence. They might be able to give some assistance. The LANDELIJKE ORGANISATIE had been supplying identity and ration cards for people living underground. The JEDBURGH teams might be able to contact them.

(205)  Dudley srl Bk 452/7 of 16.9.44
Standrecht in Zwolle stop All men seventeen to forty five to report for digging along IJssel near Olst and Wijhe stop Hun rapidly increasing east of IJssel stop XQ Christiansen reported soon in Denekamp will confirm stop Situation getting hot stop Waal line being fortified stop
(206)  3 to Dudley of 17.9.44

(207)  Dudley 22 of 19.9.44
Rail lines out nightly stop Re supply arms deplore stop Can organize day dropping stop Two hundred men armed to protect field over one thousand unarmed stop Can protect roads in area if so armed stop One night drop urgently needed no confirmation HQ Christiansen as yet stop

(208)  8 to Dudley of 19.9.44
Information received from field states farmers area Epse rpt Epse two km south of Deventer have been instructed report with wagons for transport of benzene rpt benzene opslagplaatsen stop Tried your new ground Monday night but no reception seen trying again Tuesday night regret early take off stop Fear daylight operation not feasible at present stop Indicate more grounds if you can stop
Teheran won …

  Dudley srl B1637 of 20.9.44
Now lead ED to Twente active groups have put selves under KP during fighting stop In forest Epse is fortnight old depot Epse now full stop HQ Christiansen at hotel Dinteloord one and one half kms south of Denekamp repeat Denekamp stop He lives at Singraven repeat Singraven one and half kms east of Denekamp stop

(210)  Dudley srl B1626/93 of 20.9.44

(211)  Order Mission for Operation “Market” (undated)

Instructions to be Transmitted to Dutch Resistance by Jedburgh Teams

A) Inside the Airhead, Resistance inside the airhead would be directed to remain quiet and to take no action - unless directed to do so by the Allied Forces- beyond; -
1) Providing guides
2) Obtaining intelligence
3) Providing labour
4) Possibly, providing guards and patrols
B) Outside the Airhead, Resistance outside, but within a radius to 20 kms of the airhead, would be instructed to provide the same assistance as that ordered within the airhead. Resistance groups outside the airhead but within this radius would, in addition, be ordered insofar as their armaments permitted, to interfere with and harass enemy columns. Approaching the airhead
C) In Areas other than in the Locality of the Airhead. In those parts of Holland not included in  a) and b) above, resistance would be instructed: - I To interfere with enemy movements towards the airhead. II To protect and preserve enemy fuel dumps. III To harass enemy attempts to withdraw through Holland.
D) Immediately after the establishment of the airhead the RVV would be told by London that there were four JEDBURGH teams operating with the Airborne Forces and instructed to order resistance groups in the area to co-operate. The OD would be instructed to infiltrate to the airhead agents bearing intelligence reports.

Liaison missions consisting of four JEDBURGH teams representing Special Forces Headquarters and Dutch Resistance would be established with the Airborne Corps. Mission would be attached as follows: -

Airborne Corps HQ                             EDWARD                            Mission HQ

Capt. STAAL (Dutch)
Capt. SOLLENBERG (American)
Sgt.   BILLINGSLEY (American)
Capt. MILLS (British)
2/Lt. WILLMOTT (British)

1 Air Tranport Division (BR)                  CLAUDE                            Sub-Mission

Capt. GROENEWOUD (Dutch)
Lt.      TODD (American)
Sgt.   SCOTT (American)
Lt.      KNOTTENBELT (Dutch)

82 Division
                                       CLARENCE                          Sub-Mission

Lt.      VERHAEGHE (American)
Sgt.   BEYNON (American)

101 Division                                       DANIEL                            Sub-Mission

Major WILSON (British)
Lt.        DUBOIS (Dutch)
Sgt.     FOKKER (
Faber) (Dutch)
Sgt.     MASON (British)

The JEDBURGH teams would advise Headquarters as to the possibilities of using resistance groups to understand specific task in support of Allied operations in Holland. They would maintain liaison between the Airborne Force and SF HQ in London and they would assist in the identification of members of recognized resistance movements when they were over-run. They would establish contacts with resistance groups within the airhead and its vicinity for the purpose of ensuring that the services of these groups were made available to the Force Commander. The four JEDBURGH teams would join the staff of Airborne Forces Headquarters or Divisions and would move with these formations when they proceeded to the airhead. Each party would take with it the sum of 5.000 Guilders, with an additional 5.500 Guilders for the STAAL party. The EDWARD party would have a 24-hour W/T plan which could be worked by two operators. The CLAUDE, CLARENCE and DANIEL parties would have their normal JEDBURGH plans for communication with SF HQ London. The JEDBURGH teams EDWARD, CLAUDE, CLARENCE and DANIEL went to the field at 11.30 am on September 17th 1944. The dropping operation was successful.