SOE WAR DIARIES JANUARY 1945 PART IA
I - GENERAL
POSITIONS IN THE FIELD
SD ultimatum to Rummy
On January 10th it was reported to RUMMY (Bert de Goede) that TINE (Dini Gaazenbek, courier), who together with CRIBBAGE (Arie van Duyn) had been transferred for interrogation to The Hague, was in Rotterdam to contact the KP (1). Under conditions of extreme security, TINE was brought to see RUMMY. She told him a disquieting story. She had been interrogated by a certain HAUBROCK who had released her with an ultimatum for RUMMY, concerning whose existence he was evidently aware, in which he threatened to shoot 30 prisoners held in The Hague if RUMMY did not disclose the locality of his weapon stores. He promised that in return for his information, and RUMMY’s surrender, all arrested organization members, including RUMMY would be transferred to comfortable quarters in Germany. Should TINE not return then her lover CRIBBAGE (Arie van Duyn), would immediately be shot.
Courier held: Rummy carries on
TINE was closely questioned by the security group of the KP, which decided that she was not a willing traitor, having been influenced only by her affection for CRIBBAGE (van Duyn). She was therefore believed when she admitted that the SD knew much of the organization from her, but she had been instructed to talk by CRIBBAGE, who had managed to whisper to her in the corridor of the SD HQ in The Hague.
RUMMY refused to comply with the SD demands and placed TINE under protective arrest outside Rotterdam. Meanwhile he continued to arrange for the delivery of supplies to the field.
Resistance arsenal captured
On January 14th RUMMY received information that his main arsenal, known as the central weapon magazine, had the previous day been captured by the Germans. A considerable proportion of the material dropped to him in Holland had been assembled in a barge, the property of the KP, which was located in the vicinity of The Hague, but which for security reasons was frequently moved.
Barge versus German Platoon
On January 13th, the barge completed one of its periodical moves, returning to a side which had already been used, to find a platoon of 50 Grüne polizie awaiting it. The crew of the barge had a running fight with the enemy, which ended in the liquidation of the crew and the seizure of arms.
Resistance groups appeared to be working openly, and one leader of the LO lad listed special hours during which he could be interviewed by any caller. The underground Press designed a calendar for 1945 which had a cartoon for every month of the year, showing dropping ground, the delivery of containers and recognizable caricatures of leading underground personalities. This last, however, did not get into print, thanks to RUMMY.
And Poor Leadership
Most of these highly undesirable activities appeared to be due to a complete lack of control by the leaders, the DRIEHOEK being apparently quite unable to maintain order. In the opinion of those members of the organization who had come to England, this was due to the personalities of its leaders. RUMMY himself said: “The PRINCE sends orders to the DRIEHOEK who send them to the local commanders who put them in a stove”.
Rummy plans to leave
RUMMY was beginning to feel that the organization in Holland was getting out of hand, and he was laying plans for his temporary return to England, coaching an instructor FRITS (COURSING, Hoogewerff) to take his place.
New Labour Regulations
Conditions in the field generally were becoming extremely difficult, especially since the Germans had issued a new regulations calling up for forced labour all men between the ages of 16 and 40. Many men who were unable to obtain food were compelled to report to work in order to support their families. As a
counter-measure DRAUGHTS asked London to supply 200.000 blank identity cards. These were to be used to evade the new system whereby all German Ausweise - papers granting exemption from forced labour - were to be entered on the holder’s identity card and in the official archives.
SQUEAK (Sjoerd Sjoerdsma), a W/T operator, was dropped on the night of 5/6th January to an EVERT reception committee in Overijssel (2). He remained in the area for a short time and then acted operator to EDUARD (Hotz), Region 1 Commander for the Overijssel.
During this month 53 containers and 14 packages were sent to the field (3).
(1) Security report on SOE organizations in Holland, August 1944 - February 1945.
(2) Weekly sitereps No. 64 of 8.1.45
(3) Weekly sitreps for January, 1945
II - RESISTANCE GROUPS
BOWLS (GERMAN CONTROLLED)
London advised BOWLS (4) that the W/T material he had requested had been delivered to the address given by him in The Hague, Would he confirm its receipt as soon as possible, after which London would start listening on his new signal plan.
PODEX, RUMMY & CRIBBAGE (Contact with CS-6 and RVV)
RUMMY reported that at the moment everything was rather disorganized in his region, owing to the arrest of CRIBBAGE and others. He had done everything possible to help them, but without success. At the moment they were in prison at Scheveningen (5).
Mystery of Rotterdam “Revolt”
London cabled (6) that a report had been received that the Germans were leaving the island of Dordrecht for Rotterdam, where they feared a revolt. Had he heard anything about this? If the report were true and referred to a revolt by the civil population then he should do everything possible to prevent it, otherwise unnecessary bloodshed would result. On the other hand it referred to a revolt of German troops then he should bear in mind that it might be a German trap to bring resistance forces out in the open. It was suggested that he should do all he could by means of secret propaganda to widen mutual differences between the Germans, but on no account to use armed force.
Attempt to contact rocket expert
RUMMY was in contact with a person who had worked in Germany as an electro-technician in the Geheimbau department (7). He had left Germany in November after working in secret underground factories named RICHARD I, II and III in the Sudetenland. He knew everything about rockets and supply factories and also which breakwaters to attack to put these factories out of action. Could RUMMY send him to liberated Holland so that he might pass on this information? London cabled (8) that this person should be sent to Brabant as soon as possible, but before he left RUMMY should make a copy of the information in case the man got caught. RUMMY should be careful “in case something was wrong”. He should advise London when the man left.
(4) 13 to Bowls of 1.1.1945
(5) 197 from Rummy of 02.01.1945
(6) 239 from Rummy of 2.1.1945
(7) Srl No. B1980 from Rummy of 05.01.45
(8) 244 to Rummy of 5.1.1945
No News of Revolt
RUMMY (Bert de Goede) advised London (9) that ROB commandant of the Rotterdam Stoottroepen (Shock Troops) was on his way to liberated territory. Would London please give him every assistance? With regard to London’s cable about impending revolt in Rotterdam, RUMMY reported (10) that nothing was known about it. The civil population was very quiet at the moment, but a little nervous about the next razzia.
RUMMY cabled that the KP had captured KEES ZUID (Kees Bitter). He had confessed to being a traitor, so they had killed him. ROB of Amsterdam would be able to tell HQ more about this.
One-Man Torpedoes Well Guarded
He (Rummy) reported (11) that a great many men were going to the labour offices to sign on for work in Germany. When asked why they were going they answered: “No food and no coal”. They did not listen to warnings on the Radio Orange station in London. Their morale was right down. He reported (12) that the one-man torpedoes on trailers were very well camouflaged and guarded and it was impossible to carry out ant sabotage.
Hunger driving men to Germany
Within a few weeks there would no longer be an underground movement (13) as it was impossible for men of the resistance to go in the streets. More and more men were going to the labour offices, simply because they were hungry.
SD asks for interview
RUMMY cabled (14): “Have now contact with female courier of CRIBBAGE. She wqs sent to me by HAUBROCK, one of the highest SD men. He wants to talk with me. Will keep you advise. London replied (15): URGENT. Cut contact immediately with CRIBBAGE’s courier and in no circumstances have anything to do with SD. If you do you will end up in Scheveningen prison with the rest.
(9) 210 from Rummy of 6.1.1945
(10) 211 from Rummy of 6.1.1945
(11) 221 from Rummy of 6.1.1945
(12) 225 from Rummy of 9.1.1945
(13) 226 from Rummy of 9.1.1945
(14) 227 from Rummy of 11.1.1945
(15) 254 from London of 11.1.1945
Threat to shoot 30 captives
With reference to TINE’s visit RUMMY cabled further (16) that she had delivered to him from HAUBROCK an ultimatum that unless he capitulated on Friday night, January12th, CRIBBAGE (van Duyn), TURNIQUOITS (Gerrit Reisiger) and 30 other man of the underground movement would be killed.
Draughts in danger
All the agents sent by London were known to the SD. Would they please warn HANS (DRAUGHTS) that the SD “knew him by heart”. The SD also knew names like “DUIKER” (Cees Dekkers, POKER) and “BOREL” (Jan Bockma HALMA). He thought these names were known only in England. VAN DE WILDE (van der Waals) had been mentioned in this connection. The SD knew everything about the Dutch Country Section and the position of the Special Training Schools.
“DUIKER” (Cees Dekkers, POKER) died in a plane crash near Gilze, Brabant and “BOREL” (Jan Bockma HALMA) died in a plane crash in the IJsselmeer.
Country section on SD’s “weak attempt”
The Dutch Section replied (17) that they considered CRIBBAGE’s courier “a menace”. The position of the men in SD hands was deeply regretted, but it was considered that the SD would not issue such an ultimatum if they knew as much as they pretended to know. The Training Schools had been known to the Germans years ago through captured agents. The training names mentioned might have been given by four agents captured last May. DRAUGHTS would be warned, but the Section thought the SD “had demonstrated a weak attempt at intimidation” as there was no Guarantee that the captives would not be shot in any case. RUMMY’s loyal attitude was appreciated, but if he considered himself in danger, he should come out.
Draughts received this message on January 12th: To Draughts via night Elan. LEO (Rummy) Rotterdam reports having ultimatum from SD that if he does…. No more text visible.
Reply from Draughts (HANS) after being warned: From Draughts via Elan. January 13th 1945. Nr four seven zero stop Your nr two seven three stop Even without ultimatum underground men will be shot stop Please do not care about knowledge SD of my person stop Thanks for message stop Feeling proud with decoration (MBE) stop
Rummy: “Don’t underrate SD”
RUMMY cabled (18) that he would try to stay at his post as long as possible. HQ should not underrate the SD. At the moment they knew PODEX’s (Mulholland) real name and how he escaped from Holland, etc. Would HQ please ask the RAF to attack the SD buildings at The Hague and Dordrecht? London replied (19) that the SD was not underrated. It was repeated that he should come out if he were in danger. The targets he had mentioned had been recommended.
SD captured resistance arsenal
RUMMY (Bert de Goede) cabled (20) that the SD also knew everything about SHOOTING (Luykenaar). RUMMY had warned SHOOTING that Rotterdam was too dangerous for him. He had just received a message that the central weapon magazine of the Netherlands Forces of the Interior had fallen into the hands od the SD (21).
(16) 228 from Rummy of 12.01.45
(17) 256 to Rummy of 12.01.45
(18) 231 from Rummy of 14.01.45
(19) 261 to Rummy of 14.01.45
(20) 235 from Rummy of 15.01.45
(21) 236 from Rummy of 15.1.1945
Big Losses of Material
He reported later (22) that the underground forces had lost 350 Stens, 25 bazookas, 25 Brens, 100 rifles and all their railway sabotage material. It was impossible to get arms or material into Rotterdam, as all means of transport were known to the SD.
RUMMY had decided (23) that he would leave occupied territory the following week with SHOOTING (Luijkenaar). He would hand everything over to COUSING (Hoogewerff). London cabled entire approval of his decision (24).
In his last message to London (25) RUMMY reported that the “Westerdam” had capsized in the Merwedehaven after an attack with five limpits (magnetic mines).
(22) 238 from Rummy of 16.1.1945
(23) 244 from Rummy of 17.1.1945
(24) 22 from Rummy of 26.1.1945
(25) 22 from Rummy of 26.01.1945
SHOOTING, HUNTING & CHARADES (Contact with RVV)
SHOOTING (Luykenaar) asked to send in its next load of containers (26), six military telescopes and a few hundred benzadrine tablets to keep the men on the reception committee awake.
Shooting Known to SD
He cabled (27) that according to CRIBBAGE’s female courier TINE, SHOOTING’s description and his fieldname “LODEWIJK” were known to the SD. Would London please tell him what to do?
Leaving with Rummy
London replied the following day (28) that they had since been informed by RUMMY that he, SHOOTING, was coming out with him. London agreed to this course of action.
(26) 27 from Shooting of 15.1.1945
(27) 29 from Shooting of 21.1.1945
(28) 21 to Shooting of 22.1.1945
CHARADES (Jaap Beekman) cabled (29) that the situation in the high ranks of the NBS (Netherlands Forces of the Interior) had been chaotic since the death of FRANK (van Beijnen) of the KP and KAREL (Thijssen) of the RVV. He had heard that a split might be imminent.
Overijssel Breaks away
The Commandant of the Overijssel (Lancker) had therefore temporarily broken direct contact with the commander of the NBS and expected his orders via London radio or Eindhoven.
(29) 101 from Charades of 8.1.1945