TRANSCRIPTION   HS6-739                                                                                                    1 juni 1944

                                                                    DUTCH OPERATIONS

After the new Dutch BBO had been set up in March under the command of General Van Oorschot, we immediately set to work with him to recommence operations. It is worth commenting here that he had appointed Lt. de Graaf, a recent arrival from Holland, to take over from Major Lieftink who had previously under Col. de Bruyne, been in charge of the Dutch SOE activities.

One of my first moves was to consult both SIS. Gen. van Oorschot inregard to active resistance generally in Holland, because it was, and still remains, my impression that the Dutch have more detailed information on resistance movements than they have ever disclosed to us. In the past, this was no doubt largely due to the distrust and dislike of Major Somer of the Dutch IS for Col. de Bruyne and Major Lieftink.

With SIS, I drew a virtual blank. They admitted to knowledge of the RVV, and the CS-6, in Holland but could give us no details which were not already known to us. With the Dutch, Gen. van Oorschot was unable to supplement the information imparted by De Graaf and, Celosse, a friend of De Graaf, both of whom had been of CS-6 in Holland and had escaped to the UK.

Our problem was to establish contact with the resistance in Holland, material for carrying out these directives . Our difficulties were serious and we had suffered major disasters during 1942 and 1943 and were well aware of the fact that the Germans had a fairly complete knowledge of our organisation and our methods. Moreover, it was fullyrealised that all Dutch resistance groups, without exception, were probably penetrated to a lesser or greater degree.

Apart from consulting SIS and the Dutch BBO, I asked the advice of BSS. In this connection I might mention that I had been some septical of the bona fides of De Graaf and Celosse, but BBS reassured me on this point. As regards CS-6, RVV, it was the view of BSS that the former was less penetrated than the latter, their recommandation was to avoid RVV in spite of this fact that there were certain common denominations between the two organisations.

Our first suggestion to the Dutch, therfore, was to play with the CS-6, as a start it was suggested that Celosse should return to the field after a brief period of training and act as our representative to this organisation. The intention was that he should communicate our SHAEF directive, taking with him an organiser and a WT-Operator.

The Dutch agreed to this plan but at the same time suggested a mission to the RVV. It was emphasised by them that CS-6 was the better equipped organisation to carry out current sabotage, but that the RVV had more widespread membership and was more suitable for our purpose in regard to D-Day action. After discussion it was agreed to send personnel for the two missions, on understanding that Celosse would introduce the mission to RVV only if he were satisfied that all was well from the security point of view. I must make it quite clear that we all realise there were risks attached to this project; but it was considered that these risks had to be accepted in view of the overriding necessity of getting our directive to the field and in view of the time factor. In 1ddition to the missions to the CS-6 and RVV it was also deceided to send a joint SOE/PWE mission to the Underground Press (Biallosterski & Steman).

Consequently, on the night of 31st March/1st April the following teams were despatched:

CS-6   FARO (Celosse)
SKITTLES (Aart Penning) (WT-Operator)

RVV    CRICKET (Cnoops)
CURLING (Sanders) (WT-Operator)

Clandestine Press   DRAUGHTS (Biallosterski)
BEZIQUE (Jan Steman) (WT-Operator)

The two operations were successful and all were dropped blind with the exception of SKITTLES who refused to jump at the last moment.
On 1 April 1944 the famous message was received on the German-controlled set of HECK-BLUE (Gerard van Hemert); addressed to: 'Messrs. Blunt, Bingham and Successers Ltd'. as its time of origin was 10.20 (22.20) hours and inasuch as the agents were dropped between 02.00 - 03.00 hours, we discounted any possibility of the message having been sent as a result of the capture of these agents. Subsequent developments, in fact led us to believe that a leakage over the Dutch traffic via Berne was probably the explanation of the enemy's information on which the telegram was drafted.

Giskes had inderdaad in de gaten dat men in Engeland medio oktober 1943 al op de hoogte was dat er een spel gespeeld werd. Het had dus geen zin meer om het spel voort te zetten.

Some weeks elapsed before any news of the men was received in London. The first sign of life was given by BEZIQUE (Jan Steman), who came up on a SIS set. At this time DRAUGHTS (Biallosterski) had already left for the UK as the BEZIQUE's WT-set was lost or damaged and he was consequently without communication.

DRAUGHTS met DARDANIUS (Ides Floor) (Belgian agent) in Paris at the escape-line address given to both men by D/F. DARDANIUS satisfied himself as to DRAUGHTS identity, arranged to send the latter's material to us (underground press publications, reports on Gestapo agents, maps, etc) and told DRAUGHTS to return to Holland.

Our latest information is that he started back for Holland, but is now again in France on his homeward journey for some reason or other.

We have had a fair amount of traffic regulary from
BEZIQUE which I consider can be accepted as untained. BSS has thrown some doubts on BEZIQUE due to

a) that he was using somebody else's WT-set
b) a contact address whose name and address may possibly be suspect (
Jos Gemmeke).

As regards, the CS-6 and RVV missions, the first major setback was that SKITTLES (WT-Operator) refused at the last moment to jump. This left one WT-Operator for the two missions, and obviously undesirable development. Our first news of these parties came via SIS channels (o.a. Louis d'Aulnis, alias SPIJKER?), and SIS confirmed to their contacts with RVV that FARO (Bob Celosse) was a genuine emissary from London.

CURLING (Sanders) came on the air and has been sending messages in his own code, and also for FARO and CRICKET (Cnoops). As pointed out above, this crossing of lines was dangerous, but in circumstances it can well be appriciated that FARO was reluctant to cut contact with his only means of communication with London.

Several unusaul elements have appeared in this CURLING traffic, which has been carefully analysed by BSS, and which can be summarised briefly as follows:

a) a message of the 10th of May reporting that RVV official, having checked up on FARO and his 
    colleagues, had decided to liquidate them. After discussion with SIS we sent a reply to the eefect
    that the individual representing himself to be a RVV official was undoubtedly false. SIS sent a
    message on similar lines to their contact.

b) Messages reporting penetration and arrests in the RVV on the 11th and 12th May.

c) A message reporting that
PINGPONG (Seyben) was missing.

d) Two messages asking for the date of the invasion to be communicated for passing to certain Dutch
    police officials in The Hague who, it was alleged, wanted to disappear just prior to the invasion so as
    to avoid being deported by the Germans. This appeared to be too naive a request to have been
    intiated by the enemy.

e) A complaint about the behaviour of PINGPONG. The indiscretions alleged against him did not
    correspond at all with his record while under training in the UK.

Finally, several messages have been received from both CRICKET and CURLING in which the identity checks were incorrect, and it is now our assumption that the CURLING traffic has been conrtolled by the enemy since 18th May 1944. More recently information was received through SIS that FARO, CRICKET and CURLING are all in the hands of the enemy. A farly detailed explanation of this disaster is given by the RVV to SIS in which it is alleged that the necessarily lengthy and careful check on the bona fides of CRICKET by the RVV made CRICKET impatient and that the latter contacted sundry individuals and organisations here there and everywhere which brought about his downfall, and that of CURLING. The assumption is that the arrest of these two agents then led to the arrest of FARO.

In my opinion this explanation is quite sufficient in itself to account for the arrests ant that we need look no further that the man's impetuosity and lack of security precautions for what happened.

BSS hold a different opinion. The inference to be drawn from their findings is:

a) The Dutch Government has not come clean with us and has deliberately withheld from us information
    in regard to resistance in Holland.
    It is true that since the ban on foreign government telegrams,
certain traffic between the Dutch
    Government and Berne regarding resistance matters has come to our knowledge.
    After lengthy discussion with SIS, however, I do not believe that information of a material nature
    affecting Dutch action organisations has been withheld.

b) De Graaf en Celosse may be suspect as they came out via escape-lines which are questionable. I find
    it hard to believe that
we are nursing such a viper at our breast. In any event, our security services
    passed both these men and raised no objection to De Graaf occupying his present position with the
    Dutch serive, nor to Celosse returning to the field.
    Incidentally, De Graaf is very much persona grata with Major Somer of the Dutch IS (

c) SIS have not been helpful in giving us vital information concerning the position in Holland. On the
contrary, I can vouch for the fact that SIS have been most co-operative.

In conclusion, I feel it relevant to emphasise the following:

a) No step has been taken without the approval of the Dutch BBO.

b) SIS and the Dutch IS have been taken into our confidence and have given us theirs.

c) Admittedly there was danger in playing with the RVV but it was a choice of this or nothing. It was
FARO's responsibility. however, to decide on the spot whether he would take this risk.
    Moreover, SIS are playing with the RVV.

d) In my opinion, in spite of the debit of the picture our course of action has been fully justified if, as
    we believe, SHAEF's directives have reached both the RVV and CS-6.

Het lijkt er op dat dit rapport niet compleet is, mogelijk mist er een pagina, want er staat geen handtekening of naam op de laatste pagina die in mijn bezit is.