TOP SECRET SERIAL no. 8
REPORT OF JEDBURGH TEAM DUDLEY
11 September - 24 November 1944
Team Members: Major H. BRINKGREVE (RDA)
Major John OLMSTED (US)
Sgt. J. AUSTIN (BR)
DATE OF DISPATCH: 11 September 1944.
MISSION: 1. To organise and equip the partisans of OVERIJSSEL.
2. To provide liaison between the partisans and Allied HQ.
3. To select and train operators for reception committees.
4. To select and train operators for air landing operations.
5. To carry on active sabotage in the area.
6. To establish an intelligence system in the area.
7. To prepare plans for defenses of essential bridges for Allied movements.
To report on any other activities which might be of interest to the Allied cause.
TRANSPORT. Sterling Aircraft of the R.A.F.
DROP: Drop was entirely satisfactory. Pilot and dispatcher were exellent.
RECEPTION: Reception was OK. Some confusion, however, existed as it was the first operation of this reception
On Saturday, 2 September 1944, the four Dutch members of the Dutch Jed Teams were given a warning alert to proceed to London on Sunday, 3 September, to receive a preliminary brief from the Dutch Section, receive false papers and civilian clothes and be assingned areas for future operations. The other team members would proceed to London at a later date, receive the brief and be ready for the operational drop. The Dutch Officiers proceeded to London as ordered and were given a preliminary picture of intended uses. The remainder of the team were ordered to London on Tuesday, 5 September, and team 12 consisting of Major BRINKGREVE, Major OLMSTED and Sgt. AUSTIN were briefed for Mission DUDLEY and were to proceed to HOLLAND that night. The briefing was good but little was know of the situation in Eastern Holland. It was decided that the Dutch Officers only should take civilian clothes, no false papers were available to any of the team and were to drop in uniform. This plan, although sounding feasible and having been largely successful in France was unfortunate for our assigned area causing us several days delay upon arrival while the 'underground' procured papers and cililian clothes for the members of the team. The briefing was completed by 1500 hrs and the team was sent to STS-61 for supper and to await transport to the airdrome.
The weather was not good and the mission was scrubbed at the airport. Again on Wednesday, 6 September, the mission was cancelled, however on Friday, 8 September, team was taken to TEMPSFORD Airport emplaned and took off at 2300 hrs. The flight was uneventful until after we had crossed the island TERSCHELLING when the pilot encountered bad weather and decided to return to England. The return trip was uneventful for us although the sister plane was shot down. (Dit was het vliegtuig waar Tobias Biallosterski en Pieter de Vos in hadden gezeten. Het botste op de terugweg boven Texel tegen een staalkabel van een losgeslagen versperringsballon) We arrived at the airport at 0330, 9 September and returned to Milton. The team was realerted Monday, 11 September, proceeded to TEMPSFORD by truck and were flown by Locheed Hudson to ....... where we took off at 2200 hrs. The flight was uneventful until we reached the Dutch coast at IJMUIDEN where we received light flak. The plane was not hit and we proceeded to the drop area. The chech points were picked up immediately and at approximately 0045 hrs the night of 11/12 September the drop was made. Luckily we had persuaded the crew to let us jump first as this was the first reception by this group, who immediately turned off the lights. Major BRINKGREVE contacted the leader immediately upon landing and told him to turn the lights on again as there were containers to come. The reception proceed according to schedule, containers divided into two parts for disposal and the team was taken to our first safe house. Here we met EVERT (Kapitein Lancker), the RVV, leader of the area and self-styled Commandant of OVERIJSSEL. We also had a hot supper and met several men of the local partisans. The liaison officer of the RVV to the Veluwe was present at the drop as were KRISS (Chris = Jaap Hinderink) an agent, and the operator MAURITS (Jaap Beekman). At approximately 0500 hrs we proceeded with with EVERT to a wood 1½ kms distant and bedded down in a shack which was EVERT's HQ (De Piksen).
Tuesday, 12 September, Major BRINKGREVE began his talks with EVERT and several of his local leaders, the distribution of arms slowly got under way and wheels were put in motion to obtain papers and pictures for PB's (Persoons Bewijzen) for the members of team 12.
On Wednesday, 13 September, our radio supplies began to arrive and we discovered we were the possessors of two Jed sets, two B2 sets, 2 S-Phones, 2 Eurekas plus one full container of receivers and batteries. MAURITS (Beekman) at this time had no radiocontact with London so team 12 became generous, made our first mistake by giving MAURITS one of the B2 sets. (Wat was hier zo fout aan? Zij hadden London toch meteen om nieuw materiaal kunnen vragen wat meegegeven zou kunnen worden bij de volgende dropping. Austin is niet in de problemen gekomen door het ontbreken van een set. Hij had gewoon pech)
We established contact with London and made our initial report on conditions in OVERIJSSEL.
From Dudley 1 of 13.9.44
One stop Arrived safely with all containers and equipment contact made leader RVV district Overijssel available approx five zero zero (500) men in eighteen groups of varying strength arms and equipment none send supplies eight containers C seven two H three pistols ten Kremado two hundred pistols cigarettes and tea sam de zwart love Aappy Hank Bunty stop
The distribution of supplies was badly organised. Nearly all of the content of the six containers we had at the HQ still being present. By this time we had dicovered that EVERT had no second in command, no organisation and knew nothing of the German troops in the area nor of enemy supplies or depots in the area.
On Thursday, 14 September, two KP leaders, JOHANNES (ter Horst) and COR (Hilbrink), arrived to talk with us and the conference was held without EVERT's approval. As a result of this talk it became apparentthat much, if not all, of the operations EVERT had claimed had been done by these and their groups. At this time EVERT suggested a daylight drop claiming it was entirely feasable - We asked London but of course the operation was rejected, nowever, the suggested field Stegerveld was accepted for nightdrops.
From Dudley of 14.9.44
Please clarify ruling on RC FIOSAJRART now skeleton RC on field nightly XWAD twenty one hours to two hours GBH (GMT) following orders HQ RVV stop This compromises field can we move MIGE for Groote Jan or Henk Radio Belgium as arranged with Dutch section S-Phone Eureka available on your request arms needed now not repeat not rifles like US carabines stop
On Friday, 15 September, only one container had been disposed of and we were quite concerned over the arms and explosives in the woods but were reassured by EVERT and all was OK. On Friday evening several trucks came in the woods and the HQ was in a turmoil. Later it was discovered that some NSKK had stolen two or three trucks and hid them in the woods claiming they were going to turn them over to the underground. The presence of these men made the HQ untenable, the operator was sent to a new safehouse in Daarle and plans were made to move north. The move was accomplished the night of 16/17 September being made with all containers, blankets, lanterns, etc on a farm cart.
We were lucky - met no patrols on or roadblocks and arrived at our destination at 0900 hrs Sunday morning. Sunday was spent evading KK patrols and we received word from London of allied parachute landings at ARNHEM, NIJMEGEN and GRAVE and were issued instructions to keep the roads clearedof civilians and protect the bridges in our area to facilitate the rapid allied advance. This order was easily fulfilled as the allies have not reach the north banks of the Rhine to this date.
Monday, 18 September, Major BRINKGREVE and myself hid in the nearby woods as there were rumors of 'Razzias' in the area. On Tuesday, JOHANNES and COR came again and a conference was held with EVERT, COR, JOHANNES and Major BRINKGREVE and several RVV men. At this time we felt we had seen enough of EVERT's work and in as much as his HQ in VELUWE had ordered us to proceed west of the IJSSEL to which EVERT had replied he could not get us across, we decided to go the KP HQ and see how they were operating. COR and JOHANNES went back to their HQ by motorcycle, returning in the evening with a driver and another gunner in a 1941 Lincoln to transport us to their headquarters. The first part of this journey was eventful although we were held up several times by German convoys none of which challenged us. However, at Enter we were ordered to halt at a roadblock manned by SS personnel. The driver crashed the road block and COR and JOHANNES fired several bursts from their Stens killing or wounding five Germans. The remainder of the journey proceeded according to schedule and we arrived without futher incident at the Villa Lidounna (Lidwina), their headquarters. About fifteen minutes after our mishap at Enter another car of similar make also passed through the road block. This car was attacked with grenades and machine guns and it was found next morning that an SS officer, an SD officer and the driver had been killed.
At the KP HQ we found everything running smoothly, several guards on duty, electric warning systems, a car park containing several motor cars and motorcycles, and a well organised intelligence system. Wednesday, one of the KP boys, DOLF (Fleer), was sent to Arnhem to contact the allies, give available information and give an idea of what the allies could expect by way of help from the 'underground' in OVERIJSSEL. DOLF left the afternoon of the 20th and was not heard of for some time but was successful in getting to Arnhem and had a telephone conversation with Capt. STAAL of the Dutch Army who was at this time in NIJMEGEN. (Staal maakte ook deel uit van een Jedburgh team, genaamd EDWARD)
On Thursday, 21 September, GERARD the KP leader of Zwolle (Andries Kalter) and the Northeast Polder arrived at HQ as did JULES of Hengelo, DIRK of Almelo and several other small group leaders. After lengthy discussion it was decided that the KP's would accept the leadership of Col. GUIZINGA (Huizinga), a former Colonel in the Royal Dutch Army having seved in the Dutch East Indies. (Kolonel Hotz). He was an OD from Zwolle but as he had no troops or arms, only radio connection with London, he was delighted to join our HQ. A meeting was arranged for Sunday, 24 September, where all KP, RVV and OD leaders in OVERIJSSEL were to attend, each having demonstrated his willingness to join the HQ except EVERT who was afraid he was "too Busy".
Friday, 22 September, there were more conferences and much heavy traffic passed back and forth on the radio. In the later afternoon JOHANNES (Johannes ter Horst) left for Almelo by motorcycle to visit one of the boys who had been wounded while engaged in sabotage several nights before. In Almelo JOHANNES was stopped by the SS who picked up his motorcycle. He was not searched but was placed in a small room for questioning. An SS Hauptmann arrived to question him during which questioning JOHANNES shot the officer and escaped. After running for several moments down the street he returned to get his motorcycle, got it started off and was wounded in the leg by machine pistol fire. He was treated at the German hospital and Friday evening the SD began to torture and interrogate him. Within 20 minutes of the shooting we knew of the incident at HQ and decided to vacate immediately. We took only such items as could be carried under an overcoat as we had to walk some distance down the main road. KOON, HENK (Brinkgreve), Sgt. AUSTIN and I left with the B2 and a Jed set and were billeted in a nearby farm. Nothing further happened Friday night except an unsuccesful attempt to liberate JOHANNES. However, the building in which he was prisoner was completely surroundedby SD and SS troops with machine guns guarding all approaches. It was impossible to free him. Saturday morning, 23 September, DAAN (Daan Hillenaar), the KP intelligence officer and KOON (Coen) returned to LIDOUENA (Lidwina) as did several others to pick up all remaining material such as PB's, coupons, Reichskommissar's records which had been picked up in a raid Wednesday night, any remaining kit, etc. Just as everything was loaded in cars several truck loads of SD raided the house. In the ensuing battle KOON (Coen Hilbrink), DICK (Dirk Cornelis Ruiter) and COR's father (Sietse Hilbrink) were killed, the first two immediately but the old man was tortured and died of bayonet wounds late Saturday evening.
Two of the girls (Jo Krabbenbos & Hermina Ter Horst-Scheurs) were badly beaten up but were allowed to go free and DAAN and COOS and several others made good their escape. Team 12 with TOOM (Toon Kroeze) and KLAAS proceeded by bicycle approximately 10 kms to a new safe address after spending a bad half hour in the ammunition hiding place of the area. Fortunately, none of the SD checked this area nor were road blocks put up and the journey was made wothout event. Saturday night was spent in a deserted barn and on Sunday (24 September) COR arrived. We were very much relieved as het had taken command upon JOHANNES arrest and had all of the contacts of the area. Sunday evening we proceeded to another safehouse east of Almelo - Hengelo and north of Oldenzaal. This farm was a very good one and we were treated the very best. These farmers already had three Germans, one railroad striker, one Jewess in addition to several other illegal persons so were very well versed in sheltering hunted people and were also expert in the black market slaughtering (Familie Juninck, Saasveld)
During the week of September 24 - October 1 all old contacts were re-established, several fields began to operate and the conference to get all groups together was set for 1st October. We regained radio contacts with London at this time and things began to seem a bit better, however, on Wednesday (27 September) we found the badly mutilated body of JOHANNES and were reminded that this was not a Milton-Hall scheme, although in may respects the likeness was unmistakable. During this week of 24 September - 1 October contacts were completed with all important towns in OVERIJSSEL and it was found that approximately 3500 men could be trusted for immediate action with a possible 12 to 15000 that would be available upon the arrival of the allied troops. Also during this period a small paper was prepared to guide the units in collecting and sifting intelligence as they had no idea of what was wanted nor what to look for while collecting data. It was during this period that many of the small groups was doing very good work, cutting the lines of communication and canals nightly. However, by 1st October the supply of material and increased activities of the SD, with resulting reprisals, caused us to call off activities for the time being, until the work could be of more use to an allied advance and not result only in short delays for the Germans and heavy losses to our own groups.
On Sunday, 1st October, Major BRINKGREVE, COR and I proceeded to the meeting for unification. Here we met EDUARD (Col. Guizinga) for the first time and plans were made for us to move west in the vicinity of Raalte where we would be joined by liaison officers of KP and RVV to establish the OVERIJSSEL HQ. Everyone was present but EVERT who sent a brief note saying his C.O. (Jan Thijssen?) in the VELUWE forbid him to accept any authority but RVV, to make no commitments except these OK'd by the RVV in the VELUWE and anyway he was too busy to come. We could never learn what he was too busy doing as he still could not supplu us with strength reports, number of arms received and distributed, any intelligence nor even designate a second in command in the event of his being captured. The journey back to the farm was uneventful and plans were immediately made to get contacts in the west for safe houses and the mechanics for moving 12 people 20 to 30 kms by cycle were put in motion.
On Monday, 2nd October we met more of the local leaders and prepared to move west, however, our plans were upset by unforseen development and we planned to move north to the German border near one of the drop fields. Nothing more happened until Thursday 5th October, when we received maps and intelligence of a large ammunition dump northeast of Oldenzaal. Thursday morning 16 freight cars of ammunition were processed in this dump and sent to Arnhem so we believed it important enough to be bombed. We passed all information available to our HQ but never heard of the dump being attacked.
Due to unusual activity of the SD we left hurriedly Thursday evening on our move north. We stopped over night about half way to our destination and learned in the meantime that the area we were moving to had been attacked and several members of the group shot. We then returned to our old safe house and remained there for four or five days. During this period we had no radio contact with London as it was impossible to send and they were not sending the messages blind. We had additional pictures taken for new PB's and began our move west on Thursday, 12th October. Our new HQ was near Enter and here we were joined by GERARD of Zwolle (Dries Kalter), other liaison officers and two girls (one as cook and one as typist).
During our stay in this HQ all our contacts were re-established. We met FOP (Gerard Buunk) a Dutch Intelligence Officer, JOHAN of DEVENTER (...) and other leaders. Col. GUIZINGA came to this HQ several times to check our work and help formulate future plans. The radio operator (John Austin) moved west on Tueday, 17 October, and the new courier line Enter-Heeton (Heeten) began to operate daily. Intelligence began to come in from all units at this time. We received the detailed plans of the defences of Zwolle and a card index of 200 towns and communities was set up for intelligence purposes. On Monday 23rd October the HQ made a move to Heeton (Heeten). During this trip the out-riders were stopped by an SS patrol and took off into the woods. The remainder of the party became detached and we all proceeded to the new safe house by different routes. Those who had been caught in the woods convinced the SS they were OK and were allowed to continue their journey. This turned out to be a fortunate occurance as Major BRINKGREVE had all the local group strengths, arms, stores, etc in his possession and Major OLMSTED had all the intelligence data including maps and overlays of all German troops in OVERIJSSEL in his possession; neither could have passed this controle had they been stopped.
At Heeton (Heeten) the work proceeded at a good pace. All courier routes were operating well and contacts were established with the KP in Drente and the KP and RVV in the Achterhoek, independent groups in Deventer and contacts through Deventer and Apeldoorn to the Veluwe. we were receiving exellent intelligence at this time from our units as well as from group ALBRECHT and FOP's Intelligence Centrum Oost. These contacts were established by daily conferences with GERARD (Kalter), COR (Hilbrink), EDOUARD (Hotz), DAAN (Hillenaar)and Major BRINKGREVE always in attendance. During this period Major BRINKGREVE was very busy and the only force that kept this 'underground' in this area more or less united. Major OLMSTED at this time was working largely on intelligence, and completed overlays of all troops, supply dumps, lines of communications, etc in the area and we had procured the detailed defences of Zwolle, Deventer and the IJssel line.
By 1st November it became apparent that little or no more activity could be carried on until there was some sort of Allied military pressure brought to bear on the area. It was decided that one of the team should attempt to carry our information to allied HQ and also contact Prince BERNHARD's HQ and give the situation of the 'underground' in the area of OVERIJSSEL. It seemed impossible to arrange an air landing operation so the plan was given up for the time being. During this period we had arranged payment of railroad strikers and received 50.000 guilders which was handled very efficiently by the unit set up for such payment. Also we arranged for money from London (200.000 guilders) to pay for machinery and men to be used in closing gaps in the dike of the northeast POLDER which had been mined by the Germans. At a conference early in November Major BRINKGREVEmet reprensentatives from the ACHTERHOEK and VELUWE and found that an ecape party of the first British Airborne Division, RAF and USAAF personnel as well as several Dutchmen were to cross the lines to friendly territory and preliminary arrangement were made for Major OLMSTED to join the party.
On 14/15th November Major BRINKGREVE made a trip to Amsterdam (Mogelijk heeft Henk Brinkgreven Tobias Biallosterski hier opnieuw ontmoet)to contact 'underground' headquarters there and talk about the problems posed by DELTA C (Henri Koot), GRUNE (De Groenen uit Zwolle) and other 'underground' organisations, and see if they could be ironed out. On Thursday, 16th November, Major OLMSTED proceeded under orders of Col. Guizinga (Hotz) to Ede by bicycle and auto car where he contacted PETE of ARNHEM (Piet van Arnhem = Piet Kruyff) and MARTIN (Maarten = Joos Cohen Tervaert) the dutch liaison officers who was making arrangements for the escape party, Capt. KING of the SAS was also helping and the drops for supplies and arms were arranged for and received by MARTIN and Capt. KING. On Friday, 17th November we proceeded to the initial concentration area and there met Major EAGUIRE the intelligence officer of the British Airborne Division who was to command the escape party. Here we received British battle dress, some received new boots, and approximately 48 Stens were issued to the party. The plan for escape was made according to 2nd Army directives and we moved out at 0400 on 18th November for the 1st RV. As it was very cold and rainy German sentries were not alert and we moved without incident to the RV. Here we laid up in the woods all day practising several times for the formation for our movement through the lines . The formation was to be two Dutch guides, Major MAGUIRE, an interpreter, a fine man protective section armed with Stens, the remaining Dutch guides, medical personnel of the 1st British Airborne Division, Dutch civilians, Major OLMSTED, RAF and USAAF personnel (all unarmed except for two Stens) followed by 33 men of the Airborne Division all armed with Stens, under command of Major COKE of the British 1st Airborne Division -- a total of 119 people. There was considerable discussion as to the advisablility of having all arms at the rear of the column, but there was no change and we left the area at approximately 17.30 hrs. We walked for 1½ hrs without incident when a single round of Sten was fired which caused a change in plans and from then on the guides could never agree as to the exact route to be followed. However, we proceeded without further incident until just short of the Ede-Arnhem highway which is off limits to everyone except German personnel. We were halted by a single German sentry, the entire group dashed into the woods, the sentry returned to the sentry box and evidently called his HQ. We attempted to collect the party and proceededfor 150 to 200 yds where we were halted and a check made. A small party returned to try and contact the remainder of the group and we were again challenged by the sentry. One man answered "Kamarad" and was immediately shot down. He was not killed at once as he was heard to ask for a doctor then more shots were fired. The party returned without making contact and we proceeded to the road where we were halted by the guides who shortly returned and said there were two sentries on the road but we were going to make the crossing any way. The entire group, about 35 at this time, began the crossing and were, of course, challenged by the sentries. A light was flashed down the road by the sentries and they firing machine pistols into the group. As far as was known no-one was hit on the road. Here I contacted Col. WARNGROVE, the division surgeon of the 1st Airborne Division who said he was going to remain in the woods, but several of us went on and came out on an open field south of the woods. By this time several trucks had been unloaded at the road block and there was heavy machine gun and machine pistole fire into the woods. As we were unarmed, several of us decided to go south and were in the open field when the first very light went up. We immediately received machine gun and rifle fire but no-one was hit to my knowledge at the time. As we were on the ground waiting for the light to go out, I contacted two other boys and we ran on until more lights were shot off. We received, at this time, very heavy automatic fire, several were slightly wounded. We heard a challenge to our left following by more machine pistol fire, so veered to the right and entered a wood where we remained all night. During the last firing the brief case containing the intelligence was shot away. In the morning I dicovered I was with an RAF Flight Sgt and a lance corporal of the 1st Airborne Division. We waited in the woods all day during which time there was a heavy firefight to the north. The Airborne platoon must have given a good account of itself as we heard firing all day and the Germans finally were forced to use mortars and some type of light field gun to which we always heard a short Sten reply. Approximately 15.30 hrs we began to crawl south and at 16.15 hrs we heard many Germans coming through the woods. At the time we thought they were looking for us and the paratrooper and I decided we should give up and shout to the approaching Germans as we were shure we would be shot immediately upon dicovery if they came on to us unawares. However, we saw a small path in the woods at right angles to our line of advance and decided to check first and see if there were machine guns on this path. When we checked the path there was no German personnel present at all so we got the RAF man and took off. We ran until exhausted and then as the Germans had sent up several red warning signals we decided to lay up until dark. We were not bothered again and moved off as soon as dusk fell. During the night we passed many artillery positions and sentry boxes but as it was raining and very cold the guards were not very alert and we had no difficulty - its too bad we had no knives or silent weapons as it would have been very easy to add to the score as we proceeded south. The Arnhem-Amsterdam railroad was not too heavily guarded and we crossed without incident but landed in a supply depot and artillery position. This took time to go through but the Germans were not alerted and we proceeded on to the first village. Here we ran into barbed wire, trenches, and several German patrols none of which challenged us. We arrived at the Rhine at day break on Monday 20th November, laid up all day in slit trenches and began flashing our signals as soon as it was dark. The lance corporal was the signalman and had the red flashlight but had not been briefed as to the letter, however, I had read the orders at underground HQ so the proper letter was sent was sent and we were picked up by a patrol from the American 101st Airborne Division. We were sent to the hospital at Nijmegen where we were interrogated, gave gun positions to the parachute artillery. The corporal and I offered to go back across the Rine with a patrol but were ordered to bed by the doctor. Out of the 119 that began the escape trip we had only heard of 7 that had crossed the Rine by Friday, 24th November.
As to our job, Major BRINKGREVE, has done an excellent piece of work under the most trying conditions, as has Sgt. AUSTIN and I highlt commend them both the Dutch Government as worthy of some recognition for their continued and excellent work. During the perios 11th September - 24th Novemver we livedcontinuously in civilian clothes and were forced to move our HQ 12-15 times. When I left the area we had approximately 1200 men armed, arms in stores for enough more to make a total of 3800 men, and with an allied advance could have had 12-15.000 men in the area OVERIJSSEL. It was too bad all of the team did not speak Dutch (Brinkgreve ook niet, of deed hij als of hij geen Nederlands sprak), both for our communication with the Dutch, and our peace of mind when confrontated by the Hun. I enjoyed very much working with these people and hope things will turn out better for all concerned in the near future. Our job was definitely not a Jed type as known in France, but was very interesting to say at least.
JOHN M. OLMSTED
Boerderij van de familie Juinck?