SOE WAR DIARIES OCTOBER 1944.
                                                                                                                                                                  I  -  GENERAL

POSITIONS IN THE FIELD

The RVV, KP and OD continued to be active in extremely difficult conditions. Although there still appeared to be differences of opinion between the three
groups it was felt that these were confined to the leaders, who were jockeying for position, and did not affect the active members of the rank and file (1).


DELIVERY OF STORES

Weekly records for the period September 25th to October 30th, give the following figures for stores delivered to the Field:
Week ending:
2nd  October   414 containers  14 packages
9th   October   123 containers  11 packages
16th October    99 containers  17 packages
23rd October  294 containers  39 packages
30th October  372 containers  35 packages

Delivers for the first four weeks of this period total 930 containers and 81 packages, compared with 351 containers and 25 packages for the preceding four
weeks




                                                                                                              II - RESISTANCE GROUPS


PODEX, RUMMY & CRIBBAGE             (Contact with CS-6 and RVV)

PODEX - W/T Traffic

Eisenhower Counsels Caution

PODEX (Mulholland) cabled the location of ammunition dumps in Kummersdorf and Sparenberg-Schöneberg. He also gave details of military transport cars
in the woods and country around Oranienburg and Kremmen (2). London cabled (3) that PODEX should not yet make attacks on the Port of Rotterdam
since no naval or airborne assistance could be given. London had tried the dropping ground Marmotte three times. The pilot had reported that there was
no reception. PODEX should make certain that the reception committee had been there and was using strong enough lights. Would he give the source of
his German intelligence (4)? PODEX reported the presence of 67 ammunitions dumps around Mahlsdorf, near Berlin (5). The village Berkel had been partly
burnt by the Grune Polizei following the discovery that dropping operations had been taken place on the ground Whisky in the neighbourhood (6).

(1)  Monthly Review dated 1st November, 1944
(2)  From Podex Srl B2218/65 and B2221/66 of 2.10.44
(3)  75 to Podex of 2.10.44
(4)  76 to Podex of 4.10.44
(5)  From Podex Srl B2269/6 of 3.10.44
(6)  72 from Podex via Tees of 5.10.44

London cabled (7)  message to all resistance groups in Rotterdam from General EISENHOWER. Supreme      Headquarters  was grateful for the assistance
which these groups had given but did not wish them to risk their lives at present. They should take only such action as was consistent with safety.


Resistance warned of SD Agents.        

A message was sent (8) to resistance groups in Rotterdam from the Admiralty conveying appreciation of the excellent work of sinking the three blockade
ships, and thereby denying their use to the enemy. PODEX reported (9) that the German intelligence was provided by people who had recently returned
from Germany. The Schönfels at Wilton-haven in Rotterdam had been sunk by saboteurs (10). PODEX (Mulholland) was asked (11) to warn the DRIEHOEK
that the Germans would send trained provocateurs to large cities and to farms. These agents would attempt to penetrate underground groups by
pretending to be British or Allied parachutists. They would probably have identity papers belonging to soldiers of the Dutch Brigade Irene who had been
killed or captured. All resistance groups should be warned at once. These men were being trained by an SD School at Hoogeveen, Drenthe.


Reception Failures Disappoint RAF

London sent a message to the RVV via PODEX (12) that the RAF “was not feeling happy” about the poor results of dropping operations. It was urgent that
an investigation should be made of all dropping grounds and a report given indicating from which grounds reception could be guaranteed from dusk till
dawn, with strong lights. Successes had averaged less than fifty per cent. The pilots were convinced that they had been over the dropping points. It was
essential that reception committees should keep the lights on when the aircraft was heard, and for two runs. London advised PODEX (13) that according
to air reconnaissance the Borneo was now at Königshaven and showed no sign of damage. The Noordam, incorrectly reported as the Westerdam, was at
Königshaven and also showed no sign of damage. The Axenfels was at Rotterdam dry dock, and showed a heavy list. Would PODEX investigate and report
in view of his earlier message reporting sinking?


Block Ship Sinkings Confirmed

PODEX cabled (14) that the question of the block ships had been investigated. The Borneo was sunk in the Wilhelmina Kade, Königshaven. The Zuiderdam,
Axenfels and Schönfels were also sunk. The Germans were trying to salvage these two last vessels but without success, since the Axenfels had now been
sabotaged a second time. The Westerdam was on the east side of the Merwehaven, but it was inaccessible to the resistance forces. This information was
a hundred per cent reliable.

(7)   78 to Podex  of 4.10.44
(8)   80 to Podex of 6.10.44
(9)   74 from Podex via Tees of 25.10.44
(10)  From Podex Srl B2528/28 of 10.10.44
(11)  To Podex 89 of 10.10.44
(12)  92 to Podex of 14.10.44
(13)  93 to Podex of 14.10.44
(14)  From Podex Srl B2794/26 of 17.10.44


PODEX (Mulholland) was asked (15) to warn everyone of the infiltration of German agents and Dutch provocateurs who claimed to come from other areas
and asked to be helped through the lines or wanted to join local resistance groups. PODEX was requested (16) to do everything possible to prevent the
remaining blockade ships leaving Rotterdam, including a large vessel in the Merwedehaven. The width of the channel of the Maas Sluis was now only 325
ft. and any one vessel could now block the Nieuwe Waterweg.


Scattered Containers:  Committees Complaints

PODEX reported (17) many complaints had been received from reception committees that containers were falling over a widespread area. Some burst in
the air and in other cases the parachutes did not open. Packages had been located at a considerable distance from the dropping ground. Would London
please inform RAF pilots that the Germans were trying to mislead them by putting out false reception committee lights. Could London indicate (18) in which
areas dropping grounds might be acceptable? He was feeling hopeless because all his grounds had been refused.

(15)  101 to Podex of 20.10.44
(16)  111 to Podex of 30.10.44
(17)  100 from Podex of 31.10.44
(18)  1 from Podex via Fal of 31.10.44



Rotterdam told to Wait

PODEX (Mulholland) was told (19) to ask all commandants of resistance groups to concentrate on planning for the protection of bridges which would assist
the rapid advance of Allied troops. PODEX reported (20) that there were about 800 or 900 men in Rotterdam who could be provided with arms. He was
awaiting orders from London to commence armed actions. London replied (21) that no armed action should be taken in Rotterdam until a special code
message had been broadcast by the BBC. PODEX reported (22) that the Germans were loading the Westerdam with sand and stones. If they managed to
sink this ship properly the damage would be incalculable. 




RUMMY  -  W/T Traffic

RAF Dissatisfied

RUMMY (Bert de Goede), who was working in Rotterdam, reported (23) that the KP had now about 400 armed men. They were completing their training
and would be ready to receive orders the following week. Grüne Polizei had arrived in Rotterdam (24). Their numbers were not known. London advised
RUMMY (25) that six dropping grounds had been tried the previous night without success. It was urgently requested that RUMMY should investigate
these failures as the RAF was very dissatisfied. He should advise London which grounds could guarantee reception from dusk till dawn, with strong lights.


Case for the Defence

The resistance forces fully understood that the RAF was feeling dissatisfied with the unsuccessful reception; they shared this feeling. Resistance greatly
appreciated the efforts which the RAF was making. Would London please remind them that Holland was an extremely difficult country for dropping
operations at the moment, since SD and Gestapo activity was even greater than usual. The committees were doing their utmost and RUMMY (Bert de
Goede) would advise HQ shortly which grounds guarantee receptions (26). Would London please keep trying, as the underground forces needed the arms
very badly?


Allies Asked not to Attack Foodships

Many ships loaded with food for the resistance groups were hidden among the waterways of the Biesbosch area. RUMMY requested that firing on these
ships should be stopped. London replied (27) that the request to refrain from bombing food ships in the Biesbosch area had been passed on to the Air
Ministry. The Ministry would do everything it could but needed further details about the ships and their approximate location in view of possible other
enemy activity in the area.

(19)  112 to Podex of 31.10.44
(20)  3 from Podex via Fal of 31.10.44
(21)  113 to Podex of 31.10.44
(22)  4 from Podex via Fal of 31.10.44
(23)  57 from Rummy via Tees of 7.10.44
(24)  65 from Rummy via Tees of 12.10.44
(25)  81 to Rummy via Tees of 14.10.44
(26)  Srl B2772/86 from Rummy of 15.10.44
(27)  96 to Rummy via Tees of 20.10.44



Utrecht Prepares for Rail Sabotage

RUMMY cabled (28) that resistance forces were ready to sabotage all railway lines in the province of Utrecht. Daily transports of German munitions on
these lines made action essential. All the RAF attempts to bomb the railway lines north of Utrecht had been unsuccessful. They were waiting for a
message from HQ to attack these targets. London cabled that RUMMY’s new wireless operator would be ready to leave for the field at the end of the
current week (29). He would assist RUMMY and should be kept in Rotterdam. This would help THEODORE (CRIBBAGE), who was overworked.


Underground Becomes Careless

London agreed (30) to RUMMY’s project to sabotage railway lines in the province of Utrecht. He should bear in mind however that no demolitions should be
attempted which might take Allied troops too long to repair. London cabled (31) that according to a report from an independent source, underground
organizations in Friesland, Drenthe and Groningen were becoming imprudent in their use of arms and material. Would RUMMY please warn them to be
careful since otherwise mass arrests might follow.


CRIBBAGE - W/T Traffic

CRIBBAGE (van Duyn) cabled (32) that we would stop sending for a few days as ‘they were making it a bit hot for him’. He reported (33) that he was
changing his address. The situation was very difficult and people were frightened of  the SD, who had killed members of resistance groups and burned their
houses. The remainder of CRIBBAGE’s messages were concerned  with the technicalities of transmission.





SCULLING & TURNIQUOITS                            (Contacting LO)


SCULLING  W/T Traffic

Partisans take to the woods

SCULLING (Sjeerp Postma) reported (34) that because of the enormous razzias the Germans were now making, he and his comrades now had their HQ in
the woods ‘like Tito’. The Germans had killed dozens of civilians in Apeldoorn (35) and thrown their bodies on the streets marked ‘Terrorists’. Inland
communications were very difficult. The Germans were transporting 10.000 men from Apeldoorn to the IJssel (36). Up a few days ago the resistance forces
had attacked railway communications every night, but now the Germans burned down the nearest village and put to death the people held responsible.

(28)  Srl B3279/80 from Rummy of 24.10.44
(29)  103 to Rummy of 26.10.44
(30)  104 to Rummy of 26.10.44
(31)  110 to Rummy of 30.10.44
(32)   4 from Cribbage of 30.10.44
(33)   5 from Cribbage of 31.10.44
(34)  2 from Sculling of 1.10.44
(35)   4 from Sculling of 2.10.44
(36)   4 from Sculling of 3.10.44




Brutal German reprisals

SCULLING (Postma) further reported (37) that the Germans had burned 50 houses in the village of Putten and arrested 1200 inhabitants, including many
women and children, as a reprisal for the disappearance of two SS men. Active resistance had therefore ceased for the time being, but a special
information service was being organized. In the event of an Allied advance to Apeldoorn, SCULLING offered (38) to be dropped again behind the German
lines. He was in touch with several men skilled in demolition work who were willing to be dropped in uniform behind the German lines.


Dutch Quisling’s Hide-out Revealed

SCULLING cabled (39) the location of two munition trains in Apeldoorn and (40) the homes and headquarters of SEYSS INQUART and MUSSERT in al villa
in Polberg.


A Technical Error

London advised SCULLING (41) that his last two messages had been encoded on the same indicator group on the same sked. The Germans might
therefore have decoded these messages and the two dropping grounds he had given were therefore not safe. He apologized (42) for his mistake which was
due to working in candlelight. Would London please drop “damned quickly” on all other fields since the Germans planned to stop all civilian traffic from the
following Tuesday. It was therefore absolutely essential that dropping operations should be carried out the following night on the remaining fields. London
cabled (43) that an operation had been attempted on one of SCULLING’s grounds on the previous night. The pilot had reported no reception seen, but
another attempt would be made the following night.


TURNIQUIOTS  -  W/T Traffic

There were no incoming messages for this period.

(37)    6 from Sculling of 4.10.44
(38)   10 from Sculling of 6.10.44
(39)   11 from Sculling of 6.10.44
(40)   12 from Sculling of 6.10.44
(41)   16 from London of 27.10.44
(42)   17 from Sculling of 28.10.44
(43)   19 from London of 31.10.44

From the telegrams we know now that Postma and Reisiger were in Apeldoorn from at least October 1th, but probably earlier. Maarten Cieremans went to
Apeldoorn on the 26th of September. He (Cieremans) stated that Postma and Reisiger were already there before he arrived.

SHOOTING, HUNTING & CHARADES                                                 (Contact with RVV)


SHOOTING  -  W/T Traffic

SHOOTING (Luykenaar) reported (44) that he had been working as an instructor in the Veluwe. He had since transferred to Rotterdam where he was doing
similar work. He had blown up the railway Amersfoort - Apeldoorn three weeks ago (45). This had derailed a train and caused a two days delay. In the
course of that operation he took one German prisoner who was standing in front of his house. He was laying low for a couple of days (46) as the SD were
probably on his track.


CHARADES  -  W/T Traffic

CHARADES (Jaap Beekman) asked (47) whether a camp at Ommen might be destroyed by the RAF. At the moment there were only State Police and
Germans there who were behaving “in a wild beasty manner”. He also reported (48) the presence of a heavily camouflaged and fully loaded train on the
railway line Ommen - Marienberg. London asked CHARADES (49) whether he could give any information regarding EVERT’s claim to have been nominated
Commander of the resistance in Overijssel by PRINCE BERNHARD via CHARADES W/T contact.





DRAUGHTS (second mission) & BACKGAMMON                        (Contacts with RVV and OD)

DRAUGHTS - W/T Traffic

Gestapo Agent “Not at home”

DRAUGHTS reported that SCULLING and TURNIQUITS were in Apeldoorn. JOSEPHINE (TIDDLYWINKS) was still in hospital in Haarlem (50). Her leg had
been broken again but her general condition was satisfactory. London advised DRAUGHTS (51) that the ‘DRIEHOEK’ in Rotterdam did not want GUUS
(ROWING). Would DRAUGHTS give  London an address to which GUUS could be sent in Amsterdam where he could be given further instructions?
DRAUGHTS had received a message (52) from the LO that 40 Canadians had arrived in the Lek area on their way to Amsterdam. Could London advise him
what to do in these connection? London replied (53) that he should have nothing to do with them but should pass back to HQ any particular which he
might know concerning these men. He should be careful because the whole thing might be a German ruse. DRAUGHTS cabled (54) that after searching the
Weteringschans they had been unable to find the Gestapo agent at the address given. (This Gestapo agent was Irma Seelig)

(44)  1 from Shooting of 7.10.44
(45)  2 from Shooting of 13.10.44
(46)  7 from Shooting of 16.10.44
(47)  Srl B2417/92 from Charades of 6.10.44
(48)  Srl B2613/10 from Charades of 11.10.44
(49)  19 to Charades of 23.10.44
(50) 38 from Draughts via Plym of 2.10.44

38. Your nrs 22 and 23 and 24. Give details tomorrow. Please some more pistols and Vickerarm. Strong machine guns. Send guns or Frans to Alkmaar, van
der Ploeg and van Rooyen are in Apeldoorn (Postma & Reisiger)

From Draughts via Plym.
41. Josephine is at present still in hospital Haarlem. Her leg has been broken again condition at present rather UOOGXXXXX UOOD (Good?)

(51) 27 to Draughts via night Plym of 2.10.44
Guus rpt Guus was instructed to go to Rotterdam Driehoek but they did not want him. Give us an address to which we can send him in Amsterdam from
where you can give him instructions for Alkmaar. Peeters friend of de Vet has been told by Frank of LSC rpt LSC to contact you in Amsterdam. You can
send him to Alkmaar if you wish.

(52) 46 from Draughts via Plym of 3.10.44
46. We got message from LO rpt LO. Forty Canadians are arrived area Lek rpt Lek with destination Amsterdam. If this is right please answer as soon as
possible POBULYA C rpt C. Douwe rpt Douwe arrived safe here and will work with me as second operator. Frans or Guus tomorrow to Alkmaar. Yours nr 26
UEKNN.

(53) 28 to Draughts via night Plym of 3.10.44
28. Your 46 re Canadians suggest you have nothing rpt nothing do with them but if you have any details you may send them to us. Be careful because
Germans may be up to some tricks. Ground Eva rpt Eva accepted.

(54) 67 from Draughts via Plym of 8.10.44
67. Your telegram no 18. After searching Weteringschans rpt …… no more text visible.

(55) 38 to Draughts via night Plym of 8.10.44
38. Your 68 regarding Rogers. He may be known to you as Snuitkever rpt Snuitkever. Situation central command not clear who commands Delta Centrum
and who commands top Driehoek? Which organization is commanded by the regular officer appointed by GAC rpt GAC. Please explain complete set up. Best
wishes to Josephine but what does she require as word mutilated. Mette rpt Mette both ears up.

From Draughts via Plym of  October 5th 1944                                                                                                 
Will Robert KIEK rpt Robert KIEK be very careful with reports Radio Oranje. This was one of the reasons why Dora rpt Dora was not on because
connections now difficult.

Snuitkever is Frans Theodoor DIJCKMEESTER, BI agent liaison with RVV, training name ROGERS. I think he was also known as Frans 6 (Frans Six)
because he worked for Six.



Resistance leadership clarified

London told DRAUGHTS (55) that the position regarding the central command of resistance in Holland was not clear. We commanded the Delta Centrum
and the top ‘DRIEHOEK’ which organization was commanded by the regular Army officer. Would DRAUGHTS explain the complete organization? DRAUGHTS
replied (56) that the Commander of Delta Centrum was the same as the Commander of the ‘DRIEHOEK’. His cover name was ‘DC’ and he was an ex-regular
army officer. DRAUGHTS was acting as DC’s liaison officer.
(The officer mentioned is Henri KOOT.)


Dropping Ground Affray

DRAUGHTS reported (57) that there had been a fight at the dropping ground Lobster between the reception Committee and the Landwacht. He would
send further details later. He reported further (58) that two of his men had been killed and two wounded in this affray. A farmer and his son had been killed
and a load of stores was in German hands. The Germans threatened to burn down the local village. Nothing further should be sent to this area until the
local resistance forces had be re-organized.
DRAUGHTS passed on a report from the Delta Centrum (59) that the Germans were making a big round-up of men between the ages of 15 and 50 from
Utrecht, Zeist and Amersfoort. The men were taken in groups of a thousand to vissershaven Huizen. From there they were being taken over the IJsselmeer
in barges.

SD prepares new drive
DRAUGHTS reported (60) that telephone contacts between Utrecht and Nijmegen had been cut off. London replied (61) That in this connection the
Intelligence Service was being asked to arrange something through the internal wireless network. Although this was not officially part of Draughts mission,
HQ would consider using Bezique for this work if the efforts of the Intelligence Service were not successful.
DRAUGHTS reported (62) from the Delta Centrum that with the assistance of two Allied pilot officers, Dutch underground troops were fighting in Noord
West Brabant. They requested London to drop arms and medical supplies. DRAUGHTS submitted a dropping ground for this operation. He also advised
London (63) that the SD had ordered great activity in Amsterdam against underground forces and  illegal leaders, based on information now in their
possession. It was expected that this action would begin on the following Monday. If London did not undertake the operation which had been requested it
would be too late.
(Bombing the SD HQ in Amsterdam)


(56) 72  from Draughts via Plym of 9.10.
Don’t have this telegram

(57) 87 from Draughts via Plym of 12.10.44
87. Tuesday night there was a fight at Lobster rpt Lobster between our people and Landwacht. Soon more news. Best wishes for Karel.

(58) 88 from Draughts via Plym of 13.10.44
88. In the morning of the 7th at 04.30 enemy attacked our section rpt section near Rustenburg. Our loses rpt losses two man killed two wounded. Arms
store attacked farmer and son killed. Load in German hands. Village Ursum rpt Ursum threatened with burning. No new sending until our people are
reorganized.


(59) srl. B2689/12 from Draughts via Torridge of 13.10.44
Delta zelfde meedeling groote aantallen mannen 15 tot 50 uit Utrecht, Zeist en Amersfoort in groepen van duizend gevankelijk geleid naar vissershaven
Huizen. Vandaar in aken over IJsselmeer rpt IJsselmeer weggevoerd. De DC rpt DC our 89.

(60) 106 from Draughts via Plym of 18.10.44
106. text is not visible.

(61) 62 to Draughts via Plym of 18.10.44
62. Reference break down communications between Utrecht and Nijmegen we are asking Intelligence Service try to arrange something possibly through
internal wireless network. This not officially your mission but if their efforts fail we will consider your using Frans rpt Frans.

(62) 116 from Draughts via Plym of 20.10.44
116. Special announcement Delta C rpt C with assistance of two Allied pilots officers Dutch underground troops are fighting in North West Brabant. They
request you drop soon guns machine guns and if possible silent stens with ammunition and medical supplies first aid including narcotics for wounded with
shot wounds through stomach and lungs. Ground Denmark rpt Denmark letter D for Denmark BBC: ‘Niet iedereen loopt in de sloot’
2000 from havenhoofd Drimmelen 4100 voormalige Lunette Geertruidenberg 8400 kop van het land. Biesbosch rpt Biesbosch. Please can you answer me during sked Major?

(63) 122 from Draughts via Plym of 21.10.44
122. text is not visible.


Rail Raids Fail

The Delta Centrum urged (64) that in order to prevent removal of stolen goods from Holland the Sluice Oosterhoogebrug should be bombed. In this way
the water level of the Eems canal would be lowered and navigation hindered. All goods transported over the Ijsselmeer and Den Helder followed these
route. The underground forces could do little. Enkhuizen was now also a depot for stolen goods.
London would be sending an efficient W/T operator to DRAUGHTS at the earliest possible moment (65) because it was desired that BEZIQUE should
remain in The Hague. DRAUGHTS cabled (66) that the air raids on railway targets at Deventer, Hengelo, Zutphen and Utrecht had caused ‘much damage
and sorrow’. There had been little damage to military objectives. He earnestly requested the RAF, on behalf of the Delta Centrum, not to make such
attacks on towns.


Captured Russians ready to revolt

DRAUGHTS reported (67) that since the beginning of September he had been in contact with a group of 1100 Georgians stationed - together with 350
Germans - in the area of Noordwijkerhout and IJmuiden, and with 1250 Turkestania who, together with 250 Germans, were stationed in the area of Bergen
aan Zee, 2 kilometres south of Den Helder. Both groups were prepared to annihilate their German comrades on receipt of instructions from HQ. London
requested the Delta Centrum (68) through DRAUGHTS, to find out if possible the whereabouts or HQ of Field Marshal MODEL, who was reported to be
personally issuing orders for savage reprisals against the Dutch population. London cabled (69) that the question of the Georgians and Turkestanis was
being examined but in view of international complications DRAUGHTS should take no action without advise from HQ.


SD-HQ Delta Centrum urge attack

London advised the Delta Centrum that precision bombing of the SD headquarters in Amsterdam was not possible. The targets could be attacked by
normal bombing methods and this would possibly involve serious civilian losses. Would the Delta Centrum give its opinion immediately? The Delta Centrum
replied (70) that if precision bombing was impossible, a normal attack should be carried out even though serious losses might be incurred. The
bombardment should be carried out between 11.30 and noon when the men were dining. The Delta Centrum could advise London every morning at 08.30
whether all the men would be in for dinner or on duty.
London cabled (71) that a special message in German as requested by DRAUGHTS, would be broadcast to the Turkestanis and Georgians. This would be
done in order to establish DRAUGHTS’ bona fides to the Russians but did not imply their recognition as Allied troops. Would DRAUGHTS advise London of
agreed code messages which with broadcast would be signal for mutiny? No action should be taken until these messages were heard.
In reply to London’s question DRAUGHTS reported (72) that the HQ of Field Marshal MODEL was probably in Praest, near Emmerich, in Germany.


(64) srl. B3047/54 from Draughts via Plym of 21.10.44
123. Delta Centrum second announcement of October 21. To prevent removal of stolen goods from Holland bombardment sluice Oosterhooge brug rpt
Oosterhooge brug map 7.14,75. 5821 very important. This way watermark Eemskanaal lower and navigation hindered. All goods transported over
IJsselmeer and Den Helder go along here. Underground forces can do little. Enkhuizen now also depot for stolen goods. The DC rpt DC.

(65) 72  to Draughts via night Plym of 23.10.44
72. Will send you soonest efficient WT operator because we want Frans rpt Frans to stay in The Hague. Urgent you tell us at what ground we can drop
him. Love from Demark and Mette.

(66) 134 from Draughts via Torridge of 24.10.44
134. Delta Centrum 20th announcement of October 23. Air raids on railway targets at Deventer, Hengelo, Zutphen and Utrecht caused much damage and
sorrow. Little military result. I request you earnestly if possible not to MAPMESCH attacks in towns. The DC rpt DC.

(67) 132 from Draughts via Torridge of 24.10.44
My one three two stop Are in contact since beginning of September with group of 1100 Georgians with 350 Germans in same units IO AING
Noordwijkerhout Zuiderpier IJmuiden and a second group of 1250 TUJKESTTNS with 250 Germans in same units in line Bergen aan Zee Grooteketen two km
south Den Helder. Both groups are prepared exclusively on instruction A HQ rpt A HQ to annihilate German comrades. For further contact they wish to
avoid provocation following messages by Russian BBC on October 26, 27 and 28 for the first group quote’ Koshkanekulaetsabakl’ unquote The cat does not
bite the dog and for the second group quote ‘Winowkrsnpe’ unquote The wine tastes well. If you accept I will send the message agreedupon for the hour
of mutiny to you. The DC rpt DC.

(68) 74 to Draughts via night Plym of 24.10.44
74. Please ask DC rpt DC to find out if possible the whereabouts or HQ of Field Marshal MODEL rpt MODEL reported personally issuing order savage reprisals
Dutch population. He is possibly not in occupied territory. Any information you can give will be appreciated.

(69) 78 to Draughts via night Plym of 25.10.44
78. Reference your message Georgians and Turkestans. Matter is being examined but in view international please take no action unless we advise you.

(70) 144 from Draughts via Plym of 26.10.44
144. Your 79. Special announcement Delta. If precision bombardment not possible based on the following details and change in proposal. Bombardment to
be executed between 11.30 and noon GMT when dining. We can advise you every day at 08.30 GMT when all in for dinner or out on duty. Can you provide
communication via Hans rpt Hans. Are you aware hardly any Flak available only any 2 cm guns on ships on the IJ rpt IJ. If no precision  then eventual
normal bombardment in spite of serious losses urgently required. The DC rpt DC.

(71) 83 to Draughts via night Torridge of 27.10.44
83. Your message Turkestans and Georgians we will broadcast on German rpt German BBC programme at 20.00 hours GMT rpt 20.00 hours GMT on 28, 29
and 30th . Message will be one quote “Die Katze beisst den Hund nicht‘ unquote, two quote Der Wein schmeckt gut‘ unquote. For your own information this
does not rpt not inply recognition of these Russians as Allied troops. Advise us action message for mutiny but no action to be taken unless they are
broadcast.

(72) srl. B3442/32 from Draughts via Torridge of 27.10.44
146. HQ of Field Marshal MODEL rpt MODEL the 22th of October probably in Proest rpt Proest near Emmerich.





DUDLEY - W/T Traffic                                 (Jedburgh liaison with RVV)


Subsistence for Dutch Strikers

DUDLEY (73) reported that resistance in the Zwolle area urgently needed weapons for 600 men. He gave details of a suitable dropping dropping ground in
the Noord-Oost Polder. The “Driehoek” urgently needed (74) 150.00- Guilders to support striking railworkers, civil servants and other ‘onderduikers’. This
would be paid out as subsistence at the rate of 100 Guilders per family per month in the area of Twente and Overijssel. Communications and canals were
being cut nightly (75). If arming continued at its present rate, between 3500 and 5000 men would be under arms when the Allied troops arrived. London
cabled (76) that DUDLEY’s request for Guilders would be granted.


Savage German Reprisals

DUDLEY reported (77) that the SS, SD and Grune Polizei were still in great strength and very active. There were many shootings. One village (Putten)
population of 1500 had been moved to Germany and the village demolished as a reprisal for ‘resistance activities’. London asked (78) what movement
control over troops and civilians was exercised by the Germans behind their lines, with particular reference to assembly points of broken up units and
stragglers. DUDLEY replied (79) that Enschede and Coevorden were said to be the areas used for concentration of stragglers and the re-forming of units.
VON RUNDTSTEDT was reported to be staying in the hotel Lammers in Terborg, 5 kilometers east of Doetichem.


Losses among resistance leaders

DUDLEY reported (80) that his work was becoming very difficult. The leaders of the OD in Apeldoorn, Groningen and Drenthe had been killed or captured;
the leaders of the KP in Apeldoorn had escaped at the last moment. There were rumours of a leakage or treason in the top ranks of the RVV. DUDLEY
would contact them on arrival in Overijssel if possible. Casualties in his own ranks had been heavy. They were now working entirely as agents.

(80) 35 from Dudley of 10.10.44
From Dudley
35. Work getting very difficult top OD rpt OD Apeldoorn, Groningen Drenthe killed or captured top LKP rpt LKP Apeldoorn escaped last moment. Rumours of
leakage or treason in top RVV rpt RVV. Will contact them on arrival in Overijssel if possible. Causalities in our own HJBUXUP (KP group) heavy. Working now
entirely as agents. Sgt Kustins (Austins?) PC and rank might be reconsidered.

(73)  Srl B 2201/00 from Dudley of 1.10.44
Driehoek very satisfactory exept for Evert he plays alone stop New field in Zwolle area urgently needs weapons for six hundred men stop Field in NE
repeat NE Polder field Gerard bearing fifty five hist nine km church Urk bearong one eight one distance fifteen km church Lemmer bearing two two five
distance thirteen from church Kuinre stop BBC message De gootsteen loopt over letter K for King stop

(74)  Srl B 2219/01 from Dudley of 2.10.44
Driehoek urgently needs one hundred fifty thousand Guilders to support striking rail workers civil servants and other under divers stop As ord subsistence
one hundred guilders per family per month area Twente and Overijssel stop You indicate field and we will protect for drop stop

(75)  Srl B 2239/03 from Dudley of 2.10.44
Communication and canals cut nightly please send priority targets stop Upon arrival Allied troops will have thirty five hundred to five THOR (thousand) men
under arms if arming continues as at present stop

(76)  19 to Dudley via direct of 3.10.44
19 stop SAS repeat SAS wish to drop a party of six men for intelligence work can you arrange reception stop Please advise which ground stop Your
request for Guilders repeat Guilders has been agreed and we are now obtaining these stop Advise which ground most suitable for you to receive stop We
will put the money into container and mark with white cross stop

(77)  31 from Dudley of 4.10.44
SS, SD and Grune Polizei still in great strength and very active many shootings stop One village pop fifteen hindred moved to Germany village demolished
for reprisal thirty plus RRS (rail road sections) cut since sept tenth and five major canals stop Ersatz clothes very cold how about speeding up advance
stop

(78)  22 to Dudley of 7.10.44
What movement control is exercised by Germans behind their lines over troops and civilians with particular reference to assembly points for units broken up
stragglers ETM stop

(79)  34 from Dudley of 9.10.44
34 stop Von Runstedt reported in Hotel Lammers in Terborg five kms E of Doetichem stop Following figures represent enemy strength in small area stop
Wierden one seven zero WM (Wehtmacht) plus seven seven zero Landwachters seven hundred cavalry eighty SS Bornebroek sixty WM seventy LW Rijssen
one hundred WM plus forty LW Goor one hundred WM plus forty LW stop More detailed reports on larger area follow soonest Oldenzaal apparently
important supply centre stop Enschede Coevorden reported CONC (main) areas for stranglers and reforming units stop

(80)  35 from Dudley of 10.10.44
35 stop Work getting very difficult stop Top OD rpt OD Apeldoorn Groningen Drenthe killed or captured stop Top LKP rpt LKP Apeldoorn escaped last
moment stop Rumors of leakage or treason in top RVV rpt RVV stop Will contact them on arrival Overijssel if possible stop Casualties in our own  HJBUXUP
(KP group) heavy stop Working now entirely as agents stop Sgt Kustins (Austins) PC and rank might be reconsidered stop




Rocket Fuel Attack Suggested

London advised DUDLEY that reports had been received (81) that liquid oxygen for the propulsion of German long range rockets was being transported by
rail from Germany, possibly via the Utrecht area, towards the western coast of Holland. The container was housed in what looked like a steel hut mounted
on a twenty-one meter chassis with four wheel bogies at each end. There was also an open steel stand for a sentry at one end, and control valves at the
other. In order to ruin the liquid oxygen it would be necessary to penetrate the internal copper vessel, but owing to the lagging protection it was feared
that small arms fire would be ineffective. It was suggested that a bazooka rocket, or else an explosive charge on the control valves, should be used.
Would DUDLEY please find out if these containers were being transported and if he could do anything about them?


More Internal rivalry

DUDLEY stated (82) that the RVV leader Evert (Lancker) who was only a contact for the rural part of Overijssel, was causing trouble by refusing to co-
operate. He claimed to have been nominated head of resistance in Overijssel by PRINCE BERNHARD’s HQ via the radio contact MAURITS (CHARADES =
Beekman) The HQ of Overijssel was formed some weeks ago with a Colonel in command (Hotz). The HQ was divided into four districts two of which were
commanded by former KP chiefs, and two by RVV men, of whom Evert was one.


Bid to Save Polder

DUDLEY asked London to send him 200.000 Guilders for preparations to save the Noord Oost Polder which the enemy intended to flood the following week.
The money would be needed to place drag lines two kilometers south of De Lemmer where the dyke was being mined, and to concentrate men and
material. He had sufficient money for the railway strikers in Overijssel to last until December 1st . His plans were made by engineers of the Noord Oost
Polder and his chance of success were good. London replied (83) that his proposition was under consideration but it was doubtful whether the money
would be ready in time. HQ would do its damndest in any case


Resistance propose big bank robbery

DUDLEY reported (84) that he had been asked by leaders of the KP in The Hague whether he could rob two banks in Almelo where 150 million guilders
were being kept by the Germans. Resistance forces needed several million guilders most urgently for railway workers on strike. Would London agree to this
measure?
London replied (85) that the KP did not require authority from HQ for any action other than that dealing with matters of a military nature. If the banks at
Almelo were attacked it was, however most important for obvious economic reasons that the 150 million Guilders should not go into circulation. The KP
should stipulate what amount would be used for illegal work. The remainder should be safely disposed of or destroyed. Obviously neither DUDLEY nor the
leaders of the KP should participate in this action. With further reference to the liquid oxygen tanks London understood (86) that these were situated in a
park north-west of Sneek. Could he arrange with the KP to destroy these and also prevent the special railway truck containers reaching the rocket
launching sites?



(81)  30 to Dudley of 14.10.44
Reported that liquid oxygen for propulsion German long range rockets is transported by rail from Germany possible via Utrecht area towards western coast
of Holland stop Container is housed in what looks like a steel hut mounted on twenty one meter chassis with four wheel bogies each end, also open steel
stand for sentry one end and control valves other end stop In order to ruin necessary penetrate internal copper vessel but owing to to lagging protection
fear small arms no good stop Suggest bazooka rocket or else explosive charge on control valves stop Please find out if these containers are being
transported and if you can do anything about them stop

(82)  41 from Dudley of 21.10.44
41 stop RVV leader EVERT who actively only controls middle rural part of Overijssel and causes continuous trouble through lack of cooperation claims to be
nominated Commander resistance Overijssel by HQ Prince Bernhard via radio contact Maurits HQ Overijssel which is extending now into Drenthe and
Achterhoek has been formed some weeks ago with Colonel ex leader OD Overijssel in command and four districts two of whom commanded by former KP
chiefs and two by RVV men of which Evert is one stop

(83) 41 to Dudley of 29.10.44
41. Your five three will cancel Black Widow giving you priority that area stop Your proposition Noord Oost Polder under consideration stop Doubt if money
will be ready in time for Tuesday night or Wednesday night but will do our damndest good luck stop

(84) 56 from Dudley of 30.10.44
56 stop Top KP Almelo has asked us if we can rob two banks in Almelo where 150 million guilders are being kept by Huns. They need several million guilders
most urgently for rail workers on strike. Do you agree or can you take up contact and send money to Veluwe grounds?

(85) 43 to Dudley of 30.10.44
To Dudley via direct.
43. KP do not require our authority for action other than dealing with matters of military nature. If banks Almelo are attacked it is however most important
that the 150 million guilders should not go into circulation for obvious reasons. KP should stipulate what amount will be used for illegal and the remainder
should be safely disposed of or destroyed. Obviously you or top KP should not participate in action. Your project North-East Polder agreed by government
money will be sent to you later on we will advise when.

(86)  44 to Dudley of 30.10.44
Reference liquid oxygen understand tanks are situated in only park north-west of Sneek stop Can you arrange with KP to destroy these and also prevent
special railway truck containers reaching the area or elsewhere to rocket launching sites stop


Civil War a possibility

DUDLEY reported (87) that a certain JOHAN, a leader of an underground movement in Deventer who claimed to have radio contact with London, said that
there were 450 communists, partly armed by London HQ , in Deventer who planned to take over the town after liberation. JOHAN wanted to prevent this
with his own group of 300, which would mean civil war. JOHAN pointed to the example of Nijmegen where the communists started a reign of terror. He
claimed to have communication with London on this matter. Could London give DUDLEY some information in this connection?

(87)  From Dudley of 31.01.44
59 stop Johan leader Deventer who claims radio contact with London says in Deventer four hundred fifty communists partly armed by you plan to take over
town after liberation stop He wants to prevent this with his own group of three hundred which means civil war stop He points to example Nijmegen where
communists started reign of terror and he claims to have communicated with you on this matter stop Could you give us some dope stop





FOUR   JEDBURGH TEAMS                                                                  (Contact with RVV)

CLARENCE (later re-named STANLEY)  -  W/T Traffic

CLARENCE reported (88) that he was now in telephonic communication with large towns in enemy hands. So far this facility had not been used for
operations but only for information. London cabled (89) that it was very difficult to drop food and medical supplies north of Arnhem. If he could arrange a
dropping ground London would do its best but could make no promises owing to other air commitments. CLARENCE reported (90) that relations between the
underground troops and the British Army were now very good.

(88)  Srl B 2517 from Stanley of 9.10.44
(89)  4 to Stanley of 12.10.44
(90)  13 from Stanley of 20.10.44




MONOPOLY, CUBBING, COUSING & BOATING                                            (Contact with DRIEHOEK)

COURSING W/T Traffic


COURSING (Hoogewerff) cabled (91) that he had taken charge of weapons and demolition material in Rotterdam. He was also arranging for all training and
instructions. This was being done in agreement with LEO (RUMMY). Co-operation with the KP was rather difficult. DOUWE’s (BOATING =Paul Peters)
attitude was rather disappointing. (Why?)

COURSING (Hoogewerff) and MONOPOLY (Stoppelaar) had been personally training 200 KP and 100 RVV men in Rotterdam with all weapons (92). For the
defence of the Maas Bridge in Rotterdam They needed 6 Bren machine guns and 6 bazookas. The defence would probably be undertaken by an organized
group Marines who did the same job in 1940 (93).

Rotterdan SD in action
There had been an increased activity by the Sicherheitsdienst in Rotterdam during the previous week. About 25 people had been caught and ten probably
shot. Among these latter, where important KP men. A few resistance groups, especially those in the south of Rotterdam, where now rather disorganized. The
head group was still intact however, and all the work was going on.



BOATING  -  W/T Traffic

BOATING (Peters) reported (94) that according to reliable information 8.000 Grune Polizei had arrived in Amsterdam for an extensive general round-up. In
view of this BOATING might find it necessary to discontinue his W/T traffic for the time being. In reply London advised him (95) to make no contacts other
than those absolutely necessary.


(91)  Srl.  B2216 from Coursing of 2.10.44
(92)  4 from Cousing of 23.10.44
(93)  5 from Coursing of 29.10.44

(94)  15 from Boating via Torridge of 9.10.44
15 stop Bram and Douwe operating in A’dam stop According to reliable information eight thousand Grune Polizei arrived here for extensive general round up
stop We may not come up for safety reasons stop Seven

(95)  13 to Boating via night Torridge of 15.10.44
In view heavy Gestapo activity important you make no contacts other than those absolutely necessary stop




DRAUGHTS II  -  W/T Traffic


Rockets from The Hague

DRAUGHTS II (Cor van Paaschen) reported (96) the presence of 1200 prisoners of war from the first Airborne Division at Apeldoorn. He advised HQ (97) that
on the previous Saturday a notice had appeared in an Amersfoort paper announcing stern reprisals against railway strikers as from October 2nd . It appeared
that these reprisals would consist of taking families as hostages or, if nobody was at home, removing the furniture or burning it. Preparations were being
made (98) for the firing of rockets at Wassenaar. Rockets were being fired off near The Hague (99).

BEZIQUE  -  W/T Traffic

BEZIQUE (Jan Steman) messages were concerned exclusively with the technicalities of transmissions.

(96) Srl B 2174/71 from Draughts-2 via Teifi of 1.10.44
63 stop In Willem Drie Kazerne te Apeldoorn repeat Apeldoorn zijn twaalf honderd krijgsgevangenen van First airborne division stop Onder andere Colonel
Marrable komma surgeon CROED EENST Matthews Vickerage stop Door het Roode Kruis zijn zij van medicament verbandstoffen voorzien stop Verzoeke n… te
bomabarderen stop

(97) Srl B 2214/80 from Draughts-2 via Teifi of 2.10.44
67 stop In Amersfoortsche krant zaterdag avond advertentie spoorwegen met aankondiging felste represailles tegen stakers ingaande twee October stop
Verluidt dat deze bestaan uit quote Gijzeling gezin stop Bij afwezigheid in beslagneming of verbranden van inboedel stop Lager personeel meestal nog thuis
stop Verzoeke hierover heden nog radio speech stop Voor geld en huisvesting wordt gezorgd stop

(98) Srl B 2235/22 from Draughts-2 of 2.10.44
68 stop Ontving uw nr twee en veertig zie hiervoor mijn twee en twintig betreft foto Koningin zij verscheen alzoo voor slagzin in Augustus en September
bladen voor zoover uitgekomen stop Opnieuw voorbereidingen afschieten rockets Wassenaar stop Nadere gegevens volgen stop

(99) From Draughts-2 via Teifi of 4.10.44
70 stop Guus started for Amsterdam to see HANS repeat Hans stop Several rockets are fired close near The Hague stop




BOATING - W/T Traffic

BOATING reported (94) that according to reliable information 8000 Grune Polizei had arrived in Amsterdam for an extensive general round up. In view of this
BOATING (Paul Polak) might find it necessary to discontinue his W/T traffic for the time being. In reply London advised him (95) to make no contacts other
than those absolutely necessary.

(94) 15 from Boating of 9.10.44
From Boating via Torridge.
15. Bran and Douwe operating in A’dam. According to reliable information 8000 Grune Polizei arrived in here for extensive genral round up. We may not come
up for safety reasons. Seven

(95) 13 to Boating of 15.10.44
To Boating via night Torridge.
In view heavy Gestapo activity important you make no contacts other than those absolutely necessary.


  



                                                                                                                                               1 - MISSION TO HOLLAND

NORTHAW

Railway Strike to be Continued

London informed NORTHAW (Prince Bernhard) (100) that the Dutch Government had decided to continue the railway strike. NORTHAW replied (101) that
continuation was definitely the best solution as re-starting work partically, or even totally, would result in the large scale murder of railway personnel living
underground. It was suggested that London should ask Dutch railway directors for their opinions.

BERNHARD Versus BBC: Dutch Advise Climb-Down

The Dutch Prime Minister informed BERNHARD (102) that the BBC continued to press a public statement regarding BERNHARD’s interview. It was suggested
that BERNHARD should send a letter to the BBC in the following terms: - “In a recent press report of an interview with correspondents in Belgium it was
stated that PRINCE BERNHARD had alleged that the BBC had been responsible for the death of Dutch patriots by broadcasting premature reports that Allied
troops had entered Holland. The Netherlands Government, with PRINCE BERNHARD’s concurrence, have assured the BBC that this statement was incorrect,
and could be attributed only to mis-understanding.
BERNHARD replied (103) : “I agree. Please say: "Allegations were entirely incorrect, and probably malcious’ ”.


A piece of this war diary has been weeded out. Has probably to do with Prince Bernhard.


Differing Views on OD

London had advised the OD (105) that their dropping grounds would be used only those of the RVV and KP because, firstly the OD did not know the dropping
conventions and secondly other organizations were primarily concerned with active resistance which could not be said of the OD. This action had been taken
because no t with standing London’s repeated requests, the OD had continued to offer their grounds in a manner which made it impossible to consider them.
The Delta Centrum had replied to this message pointing out that hundreds of OD members had been executed, and thousands were in concentration camps,
thus proving that the OD too was an active resistance group. It was suggested that a message should be sent stating that those OD members who were
prepared to fight actively should immediately volunteer to join the KP or RVV

(100) 154 to Northaw of 2.10.44
(101) 115 from Northaw of 3.10.44
(102) 164 to Northaw of 4.10.44
(103) 120 from Northaw of 4.10.44
(104weeded
(105) 188 to Northaw of 9.10.44


Bernhard Bluffed by German Agent

NORTHAW reported (106) that LINDEMANS alias KING KONG had reported in their HQ that day. They had “Decided that he was good”.

Rest of this part has been weeded out as well. Telegram 107 is missing.



Germans robbing starving Amsterdam

NORTHAW (Prince Bernhard) reported (108) that instead of transporting food to the starving Amsterdam, the Germans were confiscating it, and taking it by
ships to Germany from Amsterdam via the IJsselmeer, Lemmer and Groningen. It was most important that military transport on this route should be attacked.

To bomb ….
Bernhard cabled to the Dutch Prime Minister (109) that with regard to the bombing of the SD HQ in Amsterdam the strongest pressure had been applied on
him by the resistance groups. If the attack was delayed or cancelled, the mass arrests and shooting which would immediately result would be the
responsibility of the Prime Minister, and this fact must be communicated to the resistance forces at once.


Gestapo “onderduiker”

NORTHAW cabled (110) that it appeared that George van Vliet had been in Brussels four days after the liberation. Since then he had disappeared.
NORTHAW was informed (111) that the Delta Centrum had stated that the request for the bombing of the SD HQ had in view, apart from the deaths of SD
personnel, the destruction of records which involved members of the underground movement who were still free, and against whom action might be taken at
any moment. As precision bombing was impossible, the Delta Centrum was dropping this request for the time being.


King Kong Arrested

London advised NORTHAW (112) that according to Security Chris Lindemans alias KING KONG had been working for Abwehr III for a long time.
NORTHAW replied (113) that Lindemans now had been arrested. There was evidence that he had collaborated with the Germans since March 3rd so that he
had probably caused the arrest of the Boeschoten party. (FARO, PING-PONG, CRICKET, CURLING)

or not to bomb
London cabled (114) that the Air Ministry advised against an attack of the SD HQ with Mosquitos, as it was not possible to place all the bombs within a
radius of 150 metres from the target. The ministry suggested an attack with fighter bombers, using only 500 lb incendiaries. Would NORTHAW (Prince
Bernhard) please take up this question with SHAEF? If SHAEF considered the attack feasible, then the Dutch Government would make an official request to
the Air Ministry. London advised NORTHAW (115) that the matter should be taken up not with SHAEF, but with the 21st Army Group.

(107) weeded
(108) 142 from Northaw of 18.10.44
(109) 163 from Northaw of 24.10.44
(110) 166 from Northaw of 25.10.44
(114) 277 to Northaw of 29.10.44
(115) 278 to Northaw of 30.10.44


                                                                                          5 - AGENT’s REPORT

BRUTUS

This part will be done later.

w.mugge@home.nl