SOE WAR DIARIES NOVEMBER 1944 part 1C.
DUDLEY (Jedburgh Liaison with RVV)
Threat of civil war
DUDLEY (Henk Brinkgreve) was asked (93) whether he could give any further information about “JOHAN of Deventer”. In any case the cable continued, it was suggested he should take no action which would incur civil war. London latter suggested (94) that DUDLEY should cut contact with JOHAN in case there anything wrong. DUDLEY cabled (95) that reception work in his area was difficult. They had changed the reception committees ‘from local boys to KP men with more guts’.
Fake Bombing Requested
Referring to his scheme for the preservation of the North East Polder (Noord-Oost Polder) he (Brinkgreve) requested (96) a light bombing of the dyke on the north west corner of the polder, causing little damage, so that the materials which he wished to concentrate there would not be regarded with suspicion by the Germans, but would be thought to be repair material for the bomb damage. DUDLEY requested London (97) to send soap, Gillette razors and blades, civilian clothing and boots, cigarettes, tobacco and pipes, chocolate, 50.000 Guilders and some coffee and tea.
RAF Bombing Resistance Barges
DUDLEY asked (98) that the RAF be requested to refrain from shooting up or bombing barges and ships in the North East Polder or on their way from thepolder to Zwolle. They were used either for the supply of food to the population or by resistance for the transport of arms from the Polder to the south.
Van Vliet again
He (Dudley) reported (99) that he was still investigating the credentials of JOHAN of Deventer. So far had no evidence that he was not genuine. JOHAN said his contact for dropping grounds was (?CVMKOOS) VAN VLIET. The Communists in Deventer were reported to have wireless communication with Moscow; they did not want contact with the resistance groups. DUDLEY was still trying to contact them. Apart from occasional clashes between JOHAN and the Communists, there had been no trouble in his area so far.
Van Vliet was an alias for Anton van der Waals a notorious traitor and Gestapo agent. He was executed after the war.
4000 Partisans in Overijssel
In reply to a question from London, DUDLEY reported (100) that there were 4000 shock troops in Overijssel, of whom 1500 were armed. Neither Deventer nor the Achterhoek were included in this figure. These two areas were being organized under his (DUDLEY) control, since the RVV leader of the Achterhoek had been “kicked out” by his sub-commander. DUDLEY said (101) that if his W/T set did not come up, traffic should be sent to him blind, as there were plenty of Huns about and he could not always transmit.
(93) to Dudley of 1.11.44
To Dudley via direct.
46. Can you give further information about Johan of Deventer as not known here under that name stop In any case suggest he should take no action which would incur civil war stop Main object is kicking out the Germans and not fighting among themselves stop No news of SAS party in Drenthe since two three October stop Have you any news stop
(94) 47 to Dudley of 1.11.1944
47. Suggest you cut contact immediately with Johan in case there is anything wrong stop
(95) 165 from Dudley of 05.11.44
REGEHARD stop Your five one and our six two stop Eureka OK we changed reception committee from local boys to KP with more guts stop They know BBC message stop As long as front stationary and SD (G) REEN police
Landwacht have no other worries reception work in this area is difficult stop
(96) 41 from Dudley of 5.11.1944
(97) 73 from Dudley of 05.11.44
Could you send new one time pads stop Our second pads were lost on September 23 together with all uniforms and equipment except radio stop Would also appreciate some soap Gilette razors and blades warm civy clothing and boots cigarettes tobacco two pipes chocolate five thousand guilders and some coffee and tea thanking in advance stop
(98) Srl No B 4565/12 from Dudley of 14.11.1944
(99) 84 from Dudley of 14.11.44 Can’t find this telegram about Johan of Deventer.
(100) Srl No B 4596/16 from Dudley of 14.11.1944
(101) 86 from Dudley of 14.11.44
If you do not hear us please send traffic blind this is outstation with plenty of Huns about cannot always send but am always listening do not send QSP
then VA stop “Communists” a German Ruse? London cabled (102) that there was every evidence that JOHAN was genuine. HQ was not happy about the Communist story. This was believed to be a
German attempt at penetration, as similar methods had been employed elsewhere. JOHAN should not contact the Communists, either should he worry about their activities.
Dudley versus Evert
EVERT was still being “ a damned nuisance” (103) He recognized only RVV control and not the commander accepted by the NBS (Dutch Forces if the Interior). He considered himself Commander of the Stoottroepen Overijssel, for which he was not fit. He controlled in fact only a small area, and his HQ organization was primitive. He tried to make contacts in areas already organized.
His radio contact MAURITS (Beekman) CHARADES was scared to go out and investigate matters himself. DUDLEY had just received word (104) that EVERT had been trying to contact the Communists at Deventer, so far without success. DUDLEY was meeting the Communists that day, but the situation was already sticky enough without EVERT’s interference.
Bank Hold-up Succesful
He had just heard (105) that the attack on the bank at Almelo had been successful. They had probably secured 46 million Guilders. He was hiding the money until the situation was quieter.
But More Money Needed
He still, therefore, needed money to be sent to him for his project to save the North East Polder. London replied (106) that this would be sent as arranged. DUDLEY (Brinkgreve) cabled (107) that the money for his North East Polder project was now urgently needed.
Bribery Scheme Condemned
They were in contact, via a wine merchant (Jan Willem Siebrand) in Kampen, with the German Commander at De Lemmer who was responsible for the demolition of the dyke. The chances of bribing him looked good, but could they promise him a free conduct if he requested? London warned DUDLEY (108) that his proposal to bribe the German Commander should be used only as a last resort. Similar cases had occurred in the past, with the result that “somebody got a nice packet of money”, and the Germans usually backed out at the last minute.
(102) 68 to Dudley of 15.11.1944
(103) 89 from Dudley of 16.11.1944
89 stop EVERT still damned nuisance recognizes only RVV control not commander agreed by BNBS considers himself commander Stoottroepen Overijssel for which he is not fit because in fact he controls only small area and his HQ organization is primitive stop He tries however to get contact in areas already organized and advertises with arms meant for his own area and radio contact MAURITS who is too scared to go out and investigate matters himself stop
(104) 91 from Dudley of 17.11.1944
From Dudley of 17.11.1944
91 stop Just got word EVERT is trying to contact Communists Deventer so far without success with object IJsselbrug stop Am meeting Communists today but situation already sticky enough without EVERT’s interference stop
(105) 94 from Dudley 18.11.44
Just got word that attack bank Almelo has been successful stop We got probably forty six million stop No further details yet available stop Send money to POLDER ANYWAY because money bank is being hidden away till situation quiet again stop
(106) 72 to Dudley via direct of 18.11.1944
Thanks new attack bank await further news in due course stop Sending money as arranged to Polder stop Plan Mars was tied up with RVV before you went and EVERT was instructed by RVV on our behalf to cut communications East of IJssel stop He has been told since not to continue but to plan for a repeat in conjunction with Allied activity stop Your views have been communicated to PRINCE and we await decision stop
(107) 93 from Dudley of 18.11.1944
93 stop Bombing dyke NE Polder OLRSEVY stop When does money arrive this is urgent stop We are via Wine Merchant Siebrand in Kampen in contact with Hun Commander De Lemmer who is responsible for demolition dyke stop Chances of bribing him look good but can we promise him free conduct if he asks stop
(108) 76 to Dudley via direct of 20.11.1944
Your project with Wine Merchant should only be used as a last resort stop Similar cases have occurred in the past with result that someone got a nice packet of money and Germans usually backing out at the last minute stop Please reply to our previous message requesting particulars bombing of dyke as engineers wish work out project stop
Dudley - Evert Feud: London’s Plea for Tact
On the question of EVERT, London considered (109) that he should operate only in his own area, and he should be instructed accordingly. It was suggested, however that DUDLEY should use tact in his dealings with him. All major actions would be confided to DUDLEY, but it was important that friction should be avoided, otherwise conditions would become chaotic. DUDLEY was asked (110) who was in command of the KP and OD in the province of Overijssel. An independent report - not from EVERT - stated that there was uneasiness about security in DUDLEY’s area. Too many people were aware of his activities. London hoped that this report was exaggerated.
(109) 77 to Dudley via direct of 20.11.1944
Re EVERT consider he should operate in his own area which is Salland we will instruct him accordingly but suggest you use tact stop All major action will be confined to you but important all friction should be avoided otherwise conditions chaotic stop
(110) 79 to Dudley via direct of 22.11.1944
Who is in command KP and OD province Overijssel stop Independent report but not from EVERT states worried about security your area owing too many people knowing what is going on stop Hope this report overrated stop Glad to advise OLMSTED arrived safely good work stop
MONOPOLY, CUBBING, COURSING & BOATING (Contact with Driehoek)
Resistance leadership penetrated
CUBBING reported (111) that there was a possibility that the leadership of resistance in Holland had been penetrated. He hoped that that was not true, but London’s other agents should be asked to watch the leaders with whom they were in contact. After the capture of the resistance leaders in central Holland and of our district commanders and DIRK, two further district commanders has disappeared at different places. At resent CUBBING was in contact only with the acting commander for central Holland - a man called SIEM - whose security was perfect.
Rauter holds court martial
CUBBING added (112) that the cases of nearly all the other resistance leaders arrested with him were in the hands of RAUTER, the chief of all the SD in Holland, who was personally holding a special court martial at which the prisoners were to be interrogated about the dropping of arms.
(111) srl No. B 533/73 of 29.11.44 from Cubbing
(112) Daily summary No. 87 of 30.11.44
Marines to Counter German “Scorching”
COURSING (Hoogewerff) (113) that he had been in contact with the Commandant of a group of 50 Marines who were at present engaged on fireguard duties. They were anxious to undertake the protection of the Maas bridge, if this task was considered more important than their present job. London suggested (114) that COURSING should discuss this matter with RUMMY. It was considered that the Marines would be more valuable as fireguards to prevent German scorching.
Position in Rotterdam
COURSING cabled (115) that everything was progressing satisfactorily. Up to then LUDO (de Stoppelaar) and he had personally trained about 500 men in Rotterdam and the surrounding district. The total number of armed men in Rotterdam was about 1000. They were mainly members of the RVV. The KP was still greatly hampered by the activity of the Sicherheitsdienst.
No extra activities
BOATING was informed (116) that London was not interested in details about SD personnel. These must be preserved until after the liberation. His only mission was, and would remain until further orders, the dispatch of telegrams for HANS. For security’s sake he must restrict his contacts to an absolute minimum. The remainder of the traffic for BOATING was concerned with the technicalities’ of transmission.
(116) 22 to Boating 0f 19.11.44
To Boating via night Torridge.
Van Majoor stop Stellen geen belang in toezending van opgaven SD personeel stop Deze moeten worden bewaard tot na de bevrijding stop Je enige opgedragen taak is en blijft tot nader order het zenden van telegrammen voor Hans stop Om veiligheidsredenen moet je je contacten tot een minimum beperken stop
NECKING & BOBSLEIGH
NECKING’s training name was TAZELAAR. His name in de field would be TONY. BOBSLEIGH’s training name was FOKKER. He would be known in the field as DON (117).
(117) Orders for Necking and Bobsleigh, undated.
In the Friesland and Drenthe areas there were a considerable number of KP , RVV and OD groups, and it was said that some 2000 men in Friesland required arms. They would go to the contact address given in their orders and would explain that their mission was to give assistance in the reception of stores, and instruction in the use of arms and explosives. NECKING (Peter Tazelaar) and BOBSLEIGH (Faber) would organize W/T contact with London and instruct local groups on the correct reception procedures. The two agents should report to London all sabotage targets which could be attacked, and HQ would let them know what action to take. The present policy, although one of harassing the Wehrmacht, was rather one of protecting vital installations and preventing German scorching methods, and in general facilitating rapid advances. On the first favourable night during the October/November moon period, NECKING and BOBSLEIGH would be dropped to a reception committee at a point which would be indicated prior to their departure. The question of residence would be left to their own discretion, but it would be best for them to put themselves in the hands of their contact, who would be asked to
arrange a safe house. NECKING and BOBSLEIGH would each have 5000 Guilders for their own use, and they would also take 10.000 Guilders for their work in connection with resistance. NECKING and BOBSLEIGH were successfully dropped to the field on November 1st , 1944.
(Friesland, near Haskerhorne, ground INGRAM, H124) Necking is Peter Tazelaar, the real ’Soldaat van Oranje’, Bobsleigh is Lijkele Faber, Bobsleigh was his second mission, his first mission was being a W/T operator in a Jedburgh team with codename DANIEL II, dropped near Son, Noord-Brabant)
NECKING - W/T TRAFFIC
Strength of Resistance in Friesland
NECKING reported (118) that there were 1500 armed and 800 unarmed men in Friesland. He did not know the figures for Groningen as he had lost his contacts there, the resistance being repeatedly liquidated by the enemy. The situation in Drenthe was bad, but better than in Groningen. He also stated (119) that in Friesland the KP, RVV and OD had been absorbed into one force, the NBS They no longer existed as independent organizations. It was expected that this load would be followed by other provinces in the near future.
Germans Round-Up NBS
NECKING cabled (120) that during the previous week important members of the NBS in Friesland had been rounded up by the Germans. Confessions extracted from them would be fatal for resistance in the district, and it was therefore essential that these men should be freed . If possible Leeuwarden prison should be bombed. London replied (121) that the bombing of this prison could not be guaranteed, but would NECKING send details such as the location, colour and type of building.
Evacuees and V-2 site
NECKING cabled (122) that the V-2 site at Gaasterland should not be attacked as the installations had now been removed. The place was now being used as a camp for evacuees. He reported that a Wachtmeester of the Dutch Marechaussee (Mounted Police) named Bertrand FARIDEAN, now in liberated Holland, had maltreated Jews in Westerbork concentration camp. He confirmed (123) his compliance with HQ orders to break contact with resistance. He would contact HQ once a week, but asked that London should continue listening to his transmitter. Would London tell him what was going on “so that he knew what he was up to”?
BOBSLEIGH - W/T TRAFFIC
Night Work Impossible
BOBSLEIGH requested (124) that his broadcasts should in future be transmitted at 19.00 hours. Receiving at 12.30 at night was impossible owing to the
cold, and also disturbed the family with which he was staying.
(118) Srl No B 4890/77 from Necking of 18.11.1944
(119) Srl No B 4893 from Neccking of 18.11.1944
(120) Srl No B 28/63 from Necking of 21.11.1944
(121) 8 to Necking of 21.11.1944
(122) Srl No B 176/24 from Necking of 23.11.1944
(123) Srl No B 603/20 from Necking of 28.11.1944
(124) 2 from Bobsleigh of 16.11.1944
TRAPPING (Second W/T operator to Rotterdam KP)
TRAPPING’s training name was BOB. He would be known in the field as EDU (125).
LEO (de Goede), GERARD (Mulholland) and THEODORE (van Duyn) were installed in Rotterdam and were London’s liaison officers with the KP and RVV. THEODORE was handling all the wireless communications, and all required an additional wireless operator. He would ask his reception committee to put him into touch with LEO, who would look after him and arrange safe houses for transmission. He would be dropped on the first favourable night during the October/November moon period to a KP reception committee who would arrange for his transport to Rotterdam. He would ask the committee to look after his wireless equipment and arrange for it to be forwarded at a convenient time, but he should take care of his codes, plan and crystals.
TRAPPING was sent to the field on November 1st, 1944. The operation was successful.
(Near Benthuizen, Zuid-Holland, Ground RITA, H134) Trapping is Richard Barme, he was detected and arrested on February 2th, 1945. Was shot on March 8th 1945 as a reprisal on the attack on Rauter.)
TRAPPING - W/T TRAFFIC
TRAPPING reported his safe arrival in a message dated 12th November (126). London sent its congratulations on the same day (127).
(125) Orders for Trapping, undated
(126) 1 from Trapping of 12.11.1944
(127) 1 to Trapping of 12.11.1944
SNOOKER (Liaison with KP)
SNOOKER’s training name was De BEER, he would be known in the field as “WITTE PIET” (128). SNOOKER would return to LEO (de Goede) and carry out such instructions as were given him. He would hand to LEO for FRANK of the KP a microprint of PRINCE BERNHARD’s message to the field setting out
the duties to be performed by the KP, RVV and OD. He would also hand to LEO a camouflaged package containing documents and microprints. When LEO told London that these had been received he would be instructed regarding delivery. SNOOKER would take with him a special short-range wireless, plan,
codes and crystals to enable FRANK (van Beijnen) to have direct contact with PRINCE BERNHARD’s HQ. He would be dropped to a LEO reception Committee north of Rotterdam, together with a load of containers and packages. His W/T communication would be trough LEO and THEODORE (van Duyn).
SNOOKER was successful dropped to the field on November 10th, 1944.
(near Nieuwkoop, Zuid-Holland, Ground BUTTERFLY, H127)
(128) Orders for Snooker, undated.
III- CLANDESTINE PRESS
DRAUGHTS II W/T TRAFFIC
Dutch dragged from houses
DRAUGHTS-2 reported (129) that the articles of clothing from the Dutch people were being carried off over the railway bridge at Zwolle. He cabled (130) that the result of the razzias in The Hague were poor, according to the first estimates. The figure varied, but were certainly under 10.000. The victims were being taken to Delft. Few people had voluntarily reported to the authorities (131). Most of those taken had been dragged out of their houses. The food situation was difficult. He was asked (132) whether he was still in touch with Dutchmen in Germany. Contacts were required to which agents could be sent.
(129) Srl No. B4047/45 from Draughts II of 05.11.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
Ontving uw nrs five four and five five stop Contactadres kranten ANNEMIE AARTS Willem straat negen een Den Haag stop Over spoorbrug Zwolle wegvoering
van geroofde goederen stop Spoorbruggen Deventer en Zutphen uitsluitend gebruikt voor militaire doeleinden stop Mijn nummer negen negen stop (This telegram is about stolen goods, clothes are not mentioned.)
(130) Srl No. B80/43 from Draughts II of 22.11.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
Elf uur dertig vangst razzias naar eerste raming gering stop Cijfers varieren stop Zeker onder 10.000 stop Bewegingsvrijheid met meldingsplichtingen weer toegestaan stop Straatcontrole stop Alle wijken nog niet afgewerkt stop Slachtoffers naar Delft stop Een een zes stop
(131) Srl No. B116/12 from Draughts II of 22.11.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
Ondanks bedreiging scherpe represailles weinig melders, meesten uit huis gehaald stop Na huidige betrekkelijke rust verwachten scherpe actie stop QEININ van razzia MU CDI stop Voedsel voorziening gestremd stop Mijn een een acht stop
(132) 65 to Draughts II of 25.11.44
To Draughts via night Teifi.
Plan BONZO bestaat er nog verbindingen met Hollanders in Duitschland. Verlangen geode contact addressen narr wie agenten kunnen worden gezonden stop Veel liefs van SPHINX stop Hoe is MIA stop
(Sphinx is Jos Gemmeke who was in England at the time, don’t know who Mia is. Think she was pregnant and
gave birth to a baby girl named Marie Jose (telegram 124 from Draughts via Teifi).
Bezique’s telegrams dealt with the technicalities of transmission.
IV- MISSIONS TO HOLLAND
Gas Training for Germans
PRINCE BERNHARD requested (133) that Jedburgh teams should be fully informed of his orders to the field concerning general organization and tasks, otherwise they might give orders and organize things in a different way, and this might cause confusion. London cabled (134) that a report had been received from the DELTA Centrum that on October 15th a secret meeting had been held in Rotterdam by high German officers, and that as a result all officers in occupied Holland had been given a secret document containing directions for the use of gas.
Cribbage Under Control?
NORTHAW cabled (135) that CRIBBAGE message was considered to be “somewhat strange”. Did London feel that he was being controlled? London replied (136) that CRIBBAGE (van Duyn) messages had been watched for some time but apart from grammatical errors there was no indication of anything wrong.
Why had NORTHAW raised the question? NORTHAW replied (137) that the text of the message sounded unreal. How did CRIBBAGE know, for example, that GERARD (Mulholland) was trying to escape? NORTHAW did not assert that anything was definitely wrong, but felt suspicious.
German Spies in Brabant
London cabled (138) that an SD agent in Amsterdam had reported that 1000 SD agents had been left behind as Red Cross personnel in Brabant. They were returning to occupied Holland. Their HQ was at Eindhoven from where they had been distributed to Nijmegen and Tilburg. A courier went twice weekly to Hauptsturmfürher BOERDEIN in Rotterdam.
London quoted (139) a message from EVERT (Lancker) saying that he had taken temporary command of the area east of Ijssel, from the Achterhoek up to and including S. Drenthe. EVERT requested that “attempts at re-organisation now being made by outsiders should cease”. Two days later London forwarded (140) a further message from EVERT stating: “I am leaving the Forces of the Interior. Many thanks for the ‘help’ and ‘trust’ which I have been given”.
SOE - SIS Confusion
NORTHAW complained (141) that SIS had sent an agent … (name removed) to FREEK at Rooterdam without advising NORTHAW that this step was to be taken. It was not understood why they were not informed when couriers were sent by SIS to resistance leaders. By giving no preliminary warning SIS was to create confusion, and ran the risk of having their agents killed.
(133) 106 from Northaw of 3.11.1944
(134) 309 to Northaw of 9.11.1944
(135) 222 from Northaw of 13.11.1944
(136) 322 to Northaw of 13.11.1944
(137) 223 from Northaw of 14.11.1944
(138) 325 to Northaw of 13.11.1944
(139) 356 to Northaw of 25.11.1944
(140) 365 to Northaw of 27.11.1944
(141) 258 from Northaw of 28.11.1944