SOE WAR DIARIES NOVEMBER 1944.
I - GENERAL
POSITIONS IN THE FIELD
Bernhard Condemns Underground Rivalry
In November, SNOOKER (WITTE PIET, Piet de Beer) who had been brought to England and given parachute training, was dropped in Holland with a message
(1) from PRINCE BERNHARD for FRANK (van Beijnen) of the KP. It was in the following terms:-
“I strongly condemn the endless reproaches and accusations among resistance groups. As far as I am concerned there is no difference in patriotic feeling
or will to resistance, but only in a suitability for organization and for the execution of different tasks. It is only on this basis that there should be any
differentiation in leadership. I have, therefore, decided that:
1) The Chief of Staff of the OD, FRANK of the KP and KAREL ( … ) of the RVV will personally sit on the Delta Centrum instead of sending
2) The Commandant of the Delta Centrum will not act as military adviser, but will have a decisive vote in case of disagreement among the Delta
members. All decisions on operational and organizational matters must be made in consultation and co-operation, and personal or group interests
must be placed to one side;
3) The preparation and execution of specific sabotage and guerilla work on a smaller scale must be left in the hands of the KP and RVV, assisted if
necessary by suitable volunteers from the OD. Experienced leaders must be allotted for these special operations;
4) The preparation and execution of armed operations on a larger scale, which I may order in support of Allied Army operations, must be placed in the
hands of the armed section of the Forces of the Interior under the leadership of the best men of the OD with military experience, whatever their rank
or their age;
5) The Delta Centrum must take steps to eradicate local rivalries and to this end, should if necessary, change the local leadership.”
From this time onwards the DRIEHOEK or TRIANGLE was no longer a mere liaison between the KP, RVV and OD, but Nominally at least, a personal
triumvirate of the three leaders under command of VAN OEVER (Henri Koot).
(1) Appendix to Orders for Snooker, undated.
KP distrust new ‘Driehoek’
FRANK (van Beijnen) of the KP was suspicious of the reorganization, and in no way inclined to accept the authority of the Delta Centrum. He particularly
disliked the arrangement whereby a liaison officer (DRAUGHTS) and his W/T operator had been dropped to Delta C at the beginning of September as liaison
to Prince Bernhard. FRANK therefore, asked LEO (RUMMY) (Bert de Goede) to move with him to Amsterdam,
solely in the purpose of having an independent channel of communication to London. This, however,
LEO (Bert de Goede) refused to do, remaining in Rotterdam to carry out his proper function of the supply of arms and explosives to the KP.
Further difficulties arose through the fact that Delta C, through DRAUGHTS, was responsible to the Prince in Belgium, whose instructions on more than one
occasion were contrary to those received by RUMMY in Rotterdam from London (2).
By the end of the month the KP had in fact divorced itself from both Delta Centrum and the two organizations and was carrying out its own plan of action
from Rotterdam through RUMMY.
Change in the RVV leadership
The RVV although nominally commanded by LANGE JAN (Jan Thijssen) was in reality organized by his assistant FREEK (Gerben Wagenaar), a far less
impetuous and more intelligent man. At the beginning of November differences broke out in the Triumvirate which ended in the dismissal of LANGE JAN and
his replacement by FREEK.
Podex caught in German razzias
On November the 14th PODEX (Mulholland) in Rotterdam was picked up in a razzia and subsequently deported to Germany for forced labour. His real identity,
however was not discovered by the Germans, but his loss necessitated his replacement by his former courier TILLY, who had acted as RVV liaison to
PODEX’s operator CRIBBAGE (van Duyn).
Towards the end of the month, the SD were successful in arresting eight prominent members of the NBS (Dutch Forces of the Interior) in the province of
Utrecht. They were subsequently taken to Amersfoort Prison. This prison now held a number of prominent members of the NBS.
On November 27th FRANK (van Beijnen), together with a certain PAUL (Samuel Esmeijer), who was then Commander of the underground forces in
Rotterdam, reconnoitered the Prison in person to attempt a liberation. Unfortunately FRANK and PAUL were surprised by a patrol and in the ensuing fight
PAUL was killed and FRANK was so badly wounded that the later died. The Germans realizing that an attempt against the prison was envisaged,
immediately shot 21 underground members who were in captivity there.
This strange, the whole thing took place in Apeldoorn and not in Amersfoort. Not only FRANK and PAUL lost their lives, SCULLING ( Sjeerp Postma) was one
among the 21 who were executed.
As a result of FRANK’s death, PETER NOORD took FRANK’s place as KP representative on the Triumvirate or ‘Driehoek’.
At the same time further recruits received from London were becoming active. An organisor WITTE DIRK (SCULLING) (Postma) who was later to replace
PETER NOORD, was working as liaison officer to the Utrecht area.
(2) Security report on SOE organizations in Holland, August 1944 - February 1945.
During November EDU (TRAPPING) (Richard Barme) was sent to Rotterdam to act as a second W/T operator to RUMMY (Bert de Goede). NECKING (Peter
Tazelaar) and his W/T operator BOBSLEIGH (Faber) were dropped in NE Holland to build up resistance groups in Friesland. WITTE PIET (SNOOKER, Piet de
Beer), who had come out of Holland through the lines, was dropped on the night of November 10th to a KP reception committee north of Rotterdam with
special instructions from Prince Bernhard and with a wireless plan for direct contact between Rotterdam and Prince Bernhard’s HQ, to be used only in
connection with an Allied advance in that direction.
Delivery of stores
During this month 841 containers and 91 packages were successfully dropped (3).
II - RESISTANCE GROUPS
BOWLS ** (? GERMAN CONTROLLED)
London asked “BLANKE” to confirm whether his contact address in The Hague was still safe (4). London had not been communicating with him because of
the security difficulties to which he had refferred. He should not be discouraged, as it was fully intended that his services should be used at the earliest
** Johan Blanke, the self styled German renegade operating on Bowl’s set.
(1) Montly review, December 4th 1944
(2) Srl No BB 797 to Bowls of 25.11.1944
PODEX, RUMMT & CRIBBAGE (Contact with CS-6 and RVV)
Plan to Protect Bridges
PODEX (Mulholland), referring to a message sent on October 31st asking for bridges to be protected, reported (5) that his men had been arranging for the
protection of several bridges in Rotterdam, including railway bridges providing eastward communications. He was asked (6) to advise London as soon as
possible of the number of armed men in the main centres of Holland or in areas with which he was in contact. HO wish to give the Allied Command a
description of the present situation. He should indicate where possible whether the men belonged to the RVV or OD.
RAF Miss Target
PODEX cabled (7) that the General Staff of the German 15th Army were in a fortification in the Oranje Park, Dordrecht. He later reported (8) that the 15th
Army HQ had been bombed, but the fortification in which the General Staff were lodged had not been damaged.
PODEX CAUGHT IN RAZZIA
The last message to be received from PODEX read (9) : “WILL PROBABLY BE CAUGHT BY THE GERMANS TO-DAY FOR LABOUR WORK. IMPOSSIBLE TO GET
OUT OF IT. DO NOT WORRY, SHALL TRY TO COME OUT OF IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. MESSAGES CAN STILL BE SENT BECAUSE MY WORK WILL BE IN THE
HANDS OF A RILIABLE PERSON WHO HAS BEEN HELPING ME ALL THE TIME. IF THERE ARE URGENT MESSAGES SHE WILL SEND THEM TO YOU”
London replied (10) : “SORRY ABOUT GERARD (PODEX, Mulholland). TELL US WHETHER YOU STILL HAVE CONTACT WITH HIM. ALSO, WHETHER YOU ARE IN
TOUCH WITH RVV. WHAT IS YOUR NAME
Tilly Takes Over
PODEX’s assistant replied (11) that she was in touch with RUMMY’s contacts. She had heard nothing about GERARD (Mulholland). Her name was TILLY.
Tilly was Jantje Sissingh, in 1948 she married Maarten Cieremans.
PODEX’s contact reported (12) that GERARD had still not returned to Rotterdam. Dropping operations could be resumed and for this purpose a new ground
was submitted. They especially required hand-grenades, tyre bursters, an old black coat and remedies for bronchial asthma.
London acknowledged this message (13) stating that in view of Gestapo activity, it was thought advisable not to carry out any dropping operations for a
short time, at least until things quietened down. TILLY was asked to indicate with which organizations she was working, and to what extent the razzia had
affected her organization.
(3) Srl No B 3794/90 from Podex of 1.11.1944
(4) 117 to Podex of 4.11.1944
(5) Srl No B 4064/100 from Podex of 5.11.1944
(6) Srl No B 4329 from Podex of 10.11.1944
(7) Srl No B 530/99 FROM Podex of 13.11.44
(8) 131 to Podex of 14.11.1944
(9) 17 from Podex of 16.11.1944
(10) 19 from Podex of 28.11.1944
(11) 132 to Podex of 28.11.1944
TRAPPING’s Safe Arrival
RUMMY (Bert de Goede) reported (14) that the new operator EDU (Richard Barme) TRAPPING was safe in Rotterdam. London was delighted with the news
(15). EDU would give RUMMY a new list of reception conventions which he could commence using at once.
Officer to Infiltrate Allied Troops
RUMMY reported (16) that the resistance groups in the Biesbosch and in Dordrecht could assist from 2000 to 3000 Allied troops to infiltrate from
Drimmelenacross the Brabantsche Biesbosch to the Zuid Hollandsche Biesbosch where they could stay for some days unobserved. Transport by river craft
could be arranged to carry the troops from the Zuid Hollandsche Biesbosch across the Nieuwemerwede to Tongeplaat, south of Dubbeldam. He could provide
further detailed information if required. He was asked (17) to confirm the position of the Brabantsche Biesbosch and the Zuid Hollandsche Biesbosch.
SD and TRAPPING
In an obscure message dated November 4th (18) he (Rummy) asked for an attack on the Sicherheitsdienst building, but did not give its location. It was
presumed to be in Rotterdam. A repeat was requested, and in reply he stated (19) that the SD had arrested men of the underground movement, and he
feared that they had a photograph of TRAPPING. RUMMY was asked (20) to give the location and details of the SD building.
With regard to the proposal to ferry Allied troops to the Zuid Hollandsche Biesbosch, RUMMY was asked (21) to indicate as soon as possible at what
pinpoint he proposed to pick up the troops, and what route they would take to the Tongeplaat. Did he propose to do this at night, and also, what flash
signal would he give? How many men could he ferry at a time?
Maas Tunnel Scheme
RUMMY (Bert de Goede) reported (22) that he no longer had any contact with the Biesbosch groups. The Biesbosch was now a prohibited area, and it was
impossible for RUMMY and his men to get out of Rotterdam owing to large-scale German razzias. He had completed a plan for the protection of the Maas
Tunnel. His groups would remove the charges laid by the enemy. He had no plan ready for the protection of the Maas bridges. This was impossible owing to
the number of German troops in Rotterdam. They would do their best but this would depend on the situation when the Allied army approached Rotterdam.
(14) 95 from Rummy of 2.11.1944
(15) 119 to Rummy of 2.11.1944
(16) 100 from Rummy of 4.11.1944
(17) 137 to Rummy of 6.11.1944
(18) Daily summary No 65 of 8.11.1944
(19) 103 from Rummy of 6.11.1944
(20) 140 to Rummy of 6.11.1944
(21) 143 to Rummy of 6.11.1944
(22) Srl No B 4487/76 from Rummy of 12.11.1944
Rummy Non-Committel on Tilly
London cabled (23) that the last message received from GERARD (PODEX) (Mulholland) stated that he expected to be deported, and was giving his codes
to TILLY (Jantje Sissingh). Did RUMMY know her, and was it worth while putting her in touch with GERARD’s contacts? RUMMY replied (24) that TILLY
had been a courier for the KP but had agreed to work for GERARD (Mulholland). London could judge her W/T work better than he could. He did not know
anything about her contacts with the RVV.
Proposed move to Amsterdam
RUMMY reported (25) that he had been asked by FRANK to go with him to Amsterdam. RUMMY was not anxious to do this as “ he did not like their politics
their”. RUMMY reported (26) that he was moving the following week to Amsterdam . He stated that HQ would be kept in touch with the KP and OD groups
in Rotterdam by COURSING (Hoogewerff ) and with the RVV groups by TILLY (Jantje Sissingh). He believed that the RVV in Rotterdam had been broken up.
The enemy had found their arms dumps. Several men had been arrested or deported, and the SD was now looking for the commanders. The RVV operation
centre was no longer in Rotterdam.
Decline to “Lie-Low”
RUMMY was advised (27) to keep quiet and give the Germans the impression that the razzias had broken the resistance forces. RUMMY reported (28) that
he tried several times to sink the Westerdam but without success. Although HQ had asked him to lie low for a while, he could not cease to work hard for he
now had opportunities for sabotage which might not occur later.
(23) 154 to Rummy of 16.11.1944
(24) 124 from Rummy of 18.11.1944
(25) 116 from Rummy of 18.11.44
(26) 129 from Rummy of 21.11.44
(27) 160 to Rummy of 20.11.1944
(28) Srl No B 274/31 from Rummy of 25.11.1944
Mystery of the Polish Courier
RUMMY reported (29) that a man had arrived in Rotterdam who claimed to be a special courier from the Polish Division at Moerdijk. He wanted to know the
number of resistance groups, their plans and other details. They did not trust this man and had arrested him. Would London reply as soon as possible?
London replied (30) that they had no knowledge of such a courier from the Polish Division. Investigations would be made, but in the meantime RUMMY
should cut contact, since this might well be a German attempt at penetration.
Rummy to stay in Rotterdam: London’s Praise
London cabled (31) that since razzias were expected to take place in Amsterdam, it was considered that he and THEODORE (Arie van Duyn) should remain
in Rotterdam for the time being unless they considered themselves to be in danger. RUMMY replied (32) that he had discussed the matter with THEODORE
(CRIBBAGE) (van Duyn) and that they both had decided not to go to Amsterdam in view of the forthcoming razzias. They considered they could do better
by remaining in Rotterdam and continuing their work with the local resistance groups. They were working hard and were fighting for their Queen and country
rather than thinking about a good job after the war. (This is quite a statement !!) London was glad (33) that RUMMY had decided to remain in Rotterdam
and appreciated his loyalty and that of his commanders. It would not be forgotten. RUMMY cabled (34) that WITTE PIET (SNOOKER) (de Beer) was no
longer working for the KP. They did not like him, or his ideas. He was now working for RUMMY. Would London please order him to remain in Rotterdam?
Big round-up in Rotterdam
CRIBBAGE (van Duyn) reported (35) that the Germans were taking all men from the ages of 17 to 40 in house-to-house searches in Rotterdam. He himself
had a narrow escape. GERARD (PODEX) (Mulholland) had been taken by the Germans, but was doing his best to escape. The captured men were being
driven by his house like cattle. He added (36) that the Germans had netted over 50.000 men in Rotterdam. On November 4th CRIBBAGE cabled (37): “
GERARD SAFE, NOT KNOW WHERE HE IS” CRIBBAGE had refused to go to Amsterdam, and asked London’s opinion (38) London replied (39) that since
large razzias were expected in Amsterdam any day, it was agreed that he should remain where he was.
(30) 170 to Rummy of 25.11.1944
(31) 171 to Rummy of 25.11.1944
(32) 143 from Rummy of 27.11.44
(33) 172 to Rummy of 27.11.1944
(34) 148 from Rummy of 30.11.1944
(35) 12 from Cribbage of 12.11.1944
(36) 14 from Cribbage of 18.104.22.168
(37) 2 from Cribbage of 23.11.1944
(38) 23 from Cribbage of 25.11.1944
(39) 30 to Cribbage of 25.11.1944
SCULLING & TURNIQUIOTS (Contacting LO)
Pulling together …
Referring to London’s recent admonition SCULLING (Sjeerp Postma) cabled (40) that there need to be no misgivings about the resistance forces in his
area. The various groups were working well together. He reported (41) that he was planning to save bridges in co-operation with airborne troops. He
could prevent the demolition of the bridges south of Vianen and could delay the demolition of the bridges across the Lek for about half an hour. London
asked (42) what he could do without the co-operation of airborne troops, as this could not be guaranteed.
… Falling apart
Later SCULLING (WITTE DIRK) (Sjeerp Postma) cabled (43) that the protection of the Lek bridge was doubtful owing to the open nature of the
country. He could however prevent the destruction of the canal bridge south of Vianen. Internal dissension had again broken out in his area (44). He
requested that in the interests of unity, COR should be appointed Utrecht regional commander. His (Sculling) plans for protection of the bridges could
be effective only under a young commander such as COR.
W/T sets found by farmers
Material dropped to the ground PARIS had fallen outside the dropping area and had been found by farmers (45) Through being “stupidly hidden” the
material had got wet and only one of the four sets and one receiver could be used. Would London please drop again very soon on Paris? All the Dutch
Police in that area were working with the resistance, and considered it impossible that the Germans should have put out false reception lights.
SCULLING reported (46) the presence of a complete SS Panzer Division near Barneveld. He now had a telephone link between Utrecht and
Nijmegen (47) . Could London drop penicillin and apparatus for making gramophone records of the BBC news?
(40) 10 from Sculling of 4.11.1944
(41) 12 from Sculling of 5.11.1944
(42) 27 to Sculling of 5.11.1944
(43) Srl. No B4165/13 of 7.11.44 from Sculling.
(44) Srl. No B4215/21 of 8.11.44 from Sculling.
(45) 23 from Sculling of 9.11.44
(46) 24 from Sculling of 9.11.44
(47) Srl. No B4296/29 of 9.11.44 from Sculling
Strenght of Resistance in Utrecht
London asked SCULLING (Postma) (48) to give the approximate strength of the resistance forces in Utrecht, and state how many of the men were
armed. He replied (49) that there were about 7000 “real partisans” and many saboteurs, and their numbers were growing. The armed strength,
however was only about 2000. In Central Holland perfect unity had now been achieved by “melting together” the KP, RVV and OD under a single
Plan to Safe Power Station
SCULLING again asked (50) that more care be taken with dropping operations. One container had exploded in the air, and another had fallen a
kilometer away from the dropping point, and had been found by the Germans. He submitted a plan (51) to save the PEGUS power station. This was the
only source of electricity supply for the whole of Central Holland.
SCULLING and CUBBING arrested
TURNIQUOITS, SCULLING’s W/T operator( Gerrit Reisiger), reported (52) the arrest in Utrecht of SCULLING (Postma), CUBBING (Cieremans), COR
and 13 district commanders, all of whom were taken at a meeting. On November 27th TURNIQUOITS cabled (53) on SCULLING’s code that he would
probably ask for the bombing of the prison where SCULLING and the resistance leaders were confined. All resistance would be impossible if these key
men were not liberated.
Cubbing (Cieremans) was never arrested he and a resistance member called Ome Jan had been hiding in the building where the arrest took place on
top of a large cupboard on the attic.
Escape after arrest
TURNIQUOITS cabled (54) that he had escaped after arrest. He had been hiding for 24 hours. He would do his utmost to save all the wireless
material. He still did not know the reason for his arrest. It was possibly that WITTE DIRK (SCULLING) had been wounded. London congratulated him on
his escape ( 55). No more material would be sent until the situation had improved. No further contacts should be made for the time being.
(48) 47 to Sculling via Waveney of 18.11.1944
(49) 22 from Sculling via Waveney of 18.11.1944
(50) 24 from Sculling via Waveney of 19.11.1944
(51) Srl No B 104/90 of 22.11.1944 via Waveney from Sculling
(52) Daily Summary No. 80 of 23.11.44
(53) Srl. No B 385/95 from Turniquoits of 27.11.44
(54) 1 from Turnquoits via Waveney of 20.11.44
(55) 10 to Turniquoits via Waveney of 26.11.44
SHOOTING, HUNTING & CHARADES
Bribes German soldier
SHOOTING (Luijkenaar) reported (56) that he had bribed a German soldier to take him to a safe place while the razzia was being held in Rotterdam.
GERARD (PODEX, Mulholland) had been picked up. Two men had been shot, and one taken by the SD. Many were still in hiding. SHOOTING had been
buying food for them, but could not keep this up with the money he had at present. Would London send some money as soon as possible? The food
situation was “getting hopeless” .
CHARADES (Jaap Beekman) reported (57) that 300 trucks had been derailed on the line Almelo-Coevorden. Several of these were carrying tanks. The
trucks were plainly visible from the air. In a further message (58) he reported the presence of a prison camp in Ommen. This was a danger to the
underground movement as the prisoners were frequently “made to talk”. CHARADES forwarded (59) a message from EVERT (Kapt. Lancker) reporting
that telephone traffic east of the IJssel had been entirely crippled by the efforts of his group. How long was this to continue?
Advised to cease action …
In reply, London congratulated EVERT on his good work, but suggested that for security, and to prevent reprisals, no further action should be taken
at present. HQ would, however, like a repetition of this attack in conjunction with an Allied advance. If this was possible would EVERT advise the
earliest date by which he would be prepared to make a similar attack, and the BBC message which should be broadcasted as a signal for action.
… And Contract
London cabled (60) that it was preferable that EVERT should control a small well-organized group rather than a large one, which would inevitably be
penetrated sooner or later. This request did not mean that EVERT was being “sabotaged” by DUDLEY. It was a question of safety.
(56) 12 from Shooting of 27.1.44
(57) Srl No B 2936/59 from Charades via Wesun of 5.11.1944
Can’t find this telegram.
(58) Srl No B 4389/15 from Charades via Wesun of 11.11.194
Opgave kamp Ommen stop Huis Eerde is het hoofdkwartier van de Sicherheitsdienst en Veldgendarmerie stop Barakken kamp BEST HMERB ZRG bevat
enkele gevangenen doch deze zijn een gevaar voor ons daar zij herhaaldelijk tot spreken gebracht worden stop Om dit barakkenkamp woont het
controle commanda in houten huisjes stop Noordelijk van Huis Eerde is een BE UHD voor Duitschers stop
(59) Srl No B 4618/33 from Charades via Wesun of 15.11.1944
61 stop Rapport van Evert stop Telefoonverkeer oost van IJssel geheel gestremd door onze actie stop Hoe lang voortzetten vraagteken stop
(60) 42 to Charades via Wensun of 24.11.1944
42 Voor Evert stop Geen kwestie van sabotage door Dudley maar wel een kwestie van veiligheid stop Hebben liever kleine groep maar veilig dan een
groep die te groote omvang neemt en die onvermijdelijk vroeger of later gepenetreerd zal worden stop Laten deze kwestie natuurlijk in van BNBS maar
dit was doel mijn bericht stop
DRAUGHTS (second Mission) & BACKGAMMON (Contact with RVV and OD)
DRAUGHTS was warned (61) that the Germans were putting out false lights, and as some of his reception committees were not using the correct
lighting system, he should take steps to rectify this at once since pilots were being warned not to drop unless the everything was in order.
British admonish rival leaders
DRAUGHTS was given the following message (62) to all resistance forces in Holland: “IT IS WITH GRAVE MISGIVING THAT WE HAVE FOLLOWED THE
EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES RELATING TO THE DISUNITY WHICH APPARENTLY EXSISTS BETWEEN CERTAIN UNDERGROUND ORGANISATIONS. WE THE
BRITISH, HAVE BEEN DOING OUR BEST TO SUPPLY YOU WITH ARMS, WITH THE OBJECT OF YOUR HELPING US TO KICK THE GERMANS OUT OF YOUR
COUNTRY WHEN THE RIGHT TIME COMES. BY THEIR PRESENT ATTITUDE, UNDERGROUND ORGANISATIONS ARE DOING EXACTLY WHAT THE GERMANS
WOULD LIKE THEM TO DO. THEY ARE WASTING VALUABLE TIME. PLEASE GET TOGETHER, AND LONG LIVE THE QUEEN. FROM YOUR BRITISH ALLIES”.
Russians to be dispersed
DRAUGHTS reported (63) that the Russians near the coast of North-Holland would be split up into small groups among German Divisions throughout
the country. They wanted to resist and according to DRAUGHTS’ contact, were willing and able to destroy the Germans now with them, and could
defend their area against the enemy. They had supplies which would enable them to hold out for about a month. This would be of great value if the
Russians could take the fortress of IJmuiden, and prevent the destruction of the harbour. London regretted (64) had the Russians were to be split up,
but the Allied High Command emphasized that no mutiny should take place until called for by them.
British message: DC’s reply
The Commander of the Delta Centrum replied via Draughts (65) to London’s appeal for unity in the following terms: “AS COMMANDER OF RESISTANCE
FORCES IN HOLLAND IN THE NAME OF THEM ALL I THANK YOU FOR YOUR EARNEST ADMONITION WHICH IS ISSUED TODAY VERBATIM AS AN ORDER OF
THE DAY TO MY FORCES. YOUR AUTHORITATIVE APPEAL WILL BE THE (REDEEMING?) WORD TO BRING FORTH THE INDISPENSABLE UNITY IN OUR
(61) 96 TO Draughts of 1.11.1944
To Draughts via night Torridge
96. We believe Germans putting out false lights and as some of your receptions are not using correct system please instruct your committees make
sure correct lighting system and correct signals are used because pilots being warned not to drop unless all correct.
(62) 98 to Draughts of 2.11.1944
To Draughts via night Plym.
Same text as in telegram as in diaries.
(63) Daily Summary No, 61 of 4.11.1944
(64) 102 to Draughts of 3.11.1944
To Draughts via night Torridge
102. Regret your news about Russians but Allied High Command stress importance that no mutiny should take place until called for by them.
(65) 181 from Draughts of 4.11.44
From Draughts via Torridge
Same text as in telegram as in diaries.
Gas training for German officers
DRAUGHTS reported (66) that on October 15th a secret meeting had been held in Rotterdam by high German officers as a result of which all German
officers in occupied Holland had been given detailed directions on the use of gas.
London advised DRAUGHTS (67) that special medical kits for use by doctors working with resistance forces were being prepared. Each kit contained
sufficient medical supplies for 500 men for one month. If DRAUGHTS was in touch with suitable doctors would he indicate the names of dropping
grounds where it would be convenient to receive these packages.
Call for airborne troops
The Delta Centrum reported (68) that 300 German troops had been sent to Den Oever in North-Holland. It was expected that they would put the
sluices out of commission. This would cause a daily rise of between one and three centimeters in the level of the IJsselmeer, with catastrophic
consequences for the surrounding country. The underground forces were probably incapable of preventing this action. Would London take into
consideration the dispatch of airborne troops to this point?
And RAF action
DRAUGHTS reported (69) that razzias were now taking place in Rotterdam. Thousands of Dutchmen were being transported to Germany. He asked
London to destroy completely the railways directly east of Amersfoort, and Utrecht and North and east of Haarlem. The Delta Centrum reported (70)
that the enemy were removing Dutch streamline, diesel and electric rolling stock to Germany. Strong guards prevented action by resistance forces. It
was suggested that the RAF should destroy railway bridges near Groningen, Zuidbroek and Nieuweschans.
Weapons stored in ship
DRAUGHTS had 15 tons of his weapons safely stored in a ship in Amsterdam (71). London advised DRAUGHTS (72) that in order to safeguard security
resistance cells should not exceed 100 men. DRAUGHTS was told (73) that it was unlikely that airborne co-operation could be arranged to prevent the
proposed German demolition of the locks at Den Over. DRAUGHTS should plan to do what he could, and keep London closely advised of all
developments. DRAUGHTS cabled (74) that in case of big razzias in Amsterdam he would try to carry on with his work, but if this was not possible, he
hoped London would not mind if he closed down for a few days. London agreed (75) that DRAUGHTS should “take things easy” to enable him to take
stock of the general situation.
(66) 199 from Draughts of 9.11.44
From Draughts via Plym.
199. On October 15 a secret meeting has been held in Rotterdam by German top officers with the result that to all officers in occupied Holland
GEKADOST has been given stop This document contains directions for use of gas in 15 parts stop GEKADOST means Geheim Kommandos Aachen stop
Details about origin of this news will follow stop The DC stop
(67) 127 to Draughts of 11.11.44
To Draughts via night Torridge.
Same text as in telegram as in diaries.
(68) 204 from Draughts of 11.11.44
From Draughts via Plym.
(69) 209 from Draughts of 12.11.44
Don’t have this telegram.
(70) 210 from Draughts of 14.11.44
From Draughts via Plym.
210. Last few days our electric train material being taken to Germany behind German engines stop Long rows of steam line and diesel trains and
electric material of line Amsterdam Rotterdam stop Transport over Nieuwerschans and cannot be prevented on account of heavy guarding stop
Request you destry first Groningen Waterhuizen near Groningen second Rvijzwam bridge near Zuidbroek third railwat bridge direct east of
Nieuwerschans stop The DC stop
(71) 211 from Draughts of 14.11.44
From Draughts via Plym.
211. Ship with 15 ton weapons safe in Amsterdam stop No news about aircraft which is missing stop I think shot down above Frisian Island or
(72) 132 to Draughts of 14.11.44
Don’t have this telegram.
(73) 137 to Draughts of 16.11.44
Don’t have this telegram.
(74) 225 from Draughts of 18.11.44
From Draughts via Torridge.
225. In case of BDG razzias in Amsterdam I will try to go on with our duty but if not possible I hope you don’t mind if we close for a few days stop
(75) 142 to Draughts of 18.11.44
To Draughts via night Torridge.
142. Your 223 level IJsselmeer not complete looks as if some figures are missing stop Reference maximum level not clear because if enemy prevent
sluicing entirely level would automatically increase until overflow occurs stop Agree you should take things easy to enable you to take stock of general
situation stop Should we stop operations for a while.
Containers on glass-houses
DRAUGHTS reported (76) that a load had been received on the ground Sally on the previous night, but the dropping had not been correctly carried out.
The containers had fallen nearly 800m. from the pinpoint and damaged some hot-houses. 19 containers had been retrieved. How many had been
Huge razzia planned
DRAUGHTS reported (77) that the Germans, during discussions with the Dutch authorities, had let it be known that in a very short time all Dutchman
from 17 to 40 years would be deported to Germany. No more than 2000 exemption permits would be granted in Amsterdam, and those only to people
employed in factories working for the enemy. DRAUGHTS expected razzias in Amsterdam to begin on November 22nd.
Only Propaganda - London
London cabled (78) that 21 containers had been dropped on the ground Sally. It was pointed out to DRAUGHTS (79) that although further razzias were
expected it was felt in London that a lot of it might be German propaganda to intimidate the resistance forces. DRAUGHTS should not become
disheartened; London would do what it could.
DRAUGHTS replied (80) that he was “hardly relieved” by London’s view of the situation concerning razzias. The arrest of more than 40.000 men in two
days in Rotterdam meant to him something more than German intimidation or propaganda.
Approximately one-third of the RVV and OD members had been rounded up in the razzia, but practically no KP men had been taken.
London warned DRAUGHTS (81) that Christiaan Lindemans alias KING KONG, now in allied hands, was a confessed traitor. DRAUGHTS should cut
contact with any of his known associates.
(76) 229 from Draughts of 20.11.44
From Draughts via Torridge.
229. Sally received load last night but dropping was not correct nearly 800 metres from pinpoint and damaged some hothouses stop 19 containers in our
hands how many did you drop stop Reception Oliver was not on because of German activity stop
(77) 230 from Draughts of 20.11.44
From Draughts via Torridge.
Don’t have this telegram.
(78) 144 to Draughts of 20.11.44
To Draughts via night Torridge.
144. Saturday night Sally aircraft did not take off because of engine trouble stop Oliver pilot saw Sally reception and dropped 21 containers stop Sorry
about this and will change Oliver BBC message and signal as per your request stop Await your further news before dropping to Sally again stop
(79) 145 to Draughts of 20.11.44
To Draughts via night Torridge.
Same text as in telegram as in diaries.
(80) 228 from Draughts of 22.11.44
From Draughts via Plym.
Same text as in telegram as in diaries.
(81) 151 to Draughts of 22.11.44
To Draughts via Torridge.
Same text as in telegram as in diaries.
RAF urged to disorganize razzias
“DC” cabled (82) via DRAUGHTS that he regarded the mass deportations now in progress in Holland as a most serious blow against Dutch man-power.
The resistance forces were doing everything possible - for example, sabotaging the railways, helping the men to escape and giving them instructions to
hide. This was not sufficient however, and he suggested a system whereby he would give through his W/T notice of the whereabouts of large marching
columns in order that London should send fighter aircraft to intimidate the German guards, thus making possible mass escapes. He hoped to be able to
give advance notice of the razzias in Amsterdam, which were expected to bring in 85.000 men. It was suggested that London should send fighters to
shoot up the soldiers making the closing ring around the city in the early morning before the razzias started. In the later stage the planes could dive
down and bewilder the soldiers at the gathering points, thus preventing the formation of orderly columns of civilians. The fighters would give a deadly
fright to the enemy, and in his opinion would disorganize any large razzias.
All agents to break contacts
DRAUGHTS I, DRAUGHTS II, RUMMY, NECKING, TURNIQUOITS, CHARADES, and DUDLEY were instructed (83, 84) this that in the view of the
extensive razzias and penetration it was considered that for security and as temporary measure, (a) They should break away from the resistance forces.
HQ would advise them when to resume contact, which would be as soon as possible, consistence with safety; (b) they should reduce W/T traffic to a
minimum, merely keeping HQ informed of the latest situation; (c) all heads of groups should break contact with each other, and reduce contact with their
subordinates to a minimum; (d) activity of resistance forces should be limited in order to reduce contacts between cells. It was realized that these
measures would be difficult but it was essential that they and their communications should not be caught in Gestapo drives. It was emphasized that the
measures were temporarily, to meet the existing dangerous situation.
Draughts to stay in Holland
DRAUGHTS stated (85) that he would like to get back to England for a few days to talk things over, but he was told (86) that unless he considered he
was in danger. HQ would prefer him to remain where he was. It was extremely difficult to get through the lines, added to which were the additional
dangers and delay of getting back by land or air.
(82) 254 from Draughts of 24.11.44
From Draughts via Plym
254. I regard mass deportation of men now in progress in this country as most serious… no more text visible.
(83) 162 to Draughts of 25.11.44
To Draughts via Torridge, direct.
162. Owing to extensive razzias and penetration which is going on at present consider it essential that in the interest of all concerned resistance should
strictly observe the following temporary measures stop Firstly all heads of resistance groups should break off contact with each other and reduce
contact with their subordinates to a minimum until the situation improves stop Secondly limit all activity to reduce contact between cells stop Thirdly
reduce wireless traffic to a minimum stop We consider these measures vital in order not to lose your valuable support in the future stop
(84) 163 to Draughts of 25.11.44
To Draughts via night Torridge
163. Further to our nr 162 stop Latest information makes it essential you break off contact with resistance but remain in WT contact with us stop Keep
us informed or local situation stop We are watching closely our end and will advise you when the time has come to resume contact stop Realize this will
be difficult for you but consider in interest of resistance that you and your communications should not be caught up in Gestapo drive stop Emphasize this
is temporary measure to meet dangerous situation stop Contact will be resumed at soonest date consistent with safety stop
(85) 266 from Draughts of 27.11.44
From Draughts via Plym
266. Your 165 stop More or less a joke but would yet like to be back a few days to talk things over stop Euterpe Straat well done each building a direct
hit but only a few Germans killed stop Losses civilians not too high stop We think razzias starting Monday morning stop Take a drink for me Olly stop
(86) 167 to Draughts of 27.11.44
To Draughts via Torridge.
167. Glad to hear bombing successful stop Operations have only been stopped temporarily and will be resumed when things quieten down stop Unless you
consider you are in danger would prefer you remain where you are stop It is extremely difficult to get through the lines now added to which are the
additional dangers and delay of getting back by land or air stop Glad you are taking all necessary precautions stop Our message was not meant to be a
joke but we do have the complete picture and it was sent in the interest of all stop Rotterdam asks if you will take message for Frank stop
No razzias raids
The Delta Centrum were informed (87) that their request for fighter attacks on German soldiers taking part in razzias could not be granted, because (a)
the weather was a doubtful factor; (b) the unavoidable time lag between the report of the target and the possibility of attack; (c) other commitments
which the RAF were likely to have at that time; (d) the danger to the civilian population. The Delta Centrum cabled (88) that they would follow London’s
orders to restrict the activity of the underground forces as far as possible
(87) 168 to Draughts of 28.11.44
To DC stop Reference your 254 this target not feasible for following reasons firstly weather secondly time lag between report of target and possibility of
attack thirdly other commitments which Air Force likely to have at that time fourthly dander to civilians population stop We cannot think of any effective
way in which we can help you from outside but will consider any other suggestion you put forward stop
(88) 273 from Draughts of 29.11.44
From Draughts via Torridge.
No text visible.
Disagreement on W/T security
BACKGAMMON complained (89) that two of his crystal frequencies were identical with those of DOUWE (BOATING). These frequencies were, therefore
dangerous and London must change them as soon as possible. London cabled (90) that HQ was well aware that plans worked by BACKGAMMON and
BOATING had two identical frequencies allocated to them. This was quite in order and he could cease to worry. BACKGAMMON replied: “ Thanks for
your helpful advice but I do not care about BOATING or anybody except the Gestapo. Perhaps you are aware that crystals identical with these have
been captured by the Germans (91). In a joint message (92) HANS (DRAUGHTS), DOUWE (BOATING) and BACKGAMMON disagreed with London’s
crystal security arrangements. They proposed an immediate change of all their frequencies. They could not change their addresses, and they were
transmitting from the same place all the time. They thought a signal plan with nine different crystals for the next three months highly advisable, since
frequency changes were the only security measures they could apply.
(89) 31 from Draughts of 24.11.44
From Backgammon via Plym.
31. Reference AHIRAJ (thirty?) two of Douwe stop My frequencies one comma four and five same as Douwe stop These frequencies thus also dangerous
stop Change them soonest and send two of the new frequencies each stop Two BREX
(90) 15 from Backgammon of 24.11.44
To Backgammon via night Torridge.
Your 31 stop We are well aware that plans worked by you and Douwe have two identical frequencies allocated to them this is quite in order so you may
cease to worry stop
(91) 33 from Backgammon of 25.11.44
From Backgammon via Plym.
Thanks for your helpful advice but I do not mind Douwe or anybody except Gestapo stop Perhaps you are also aware these identical crystals are
captured by Germans stop This must be QCEETIQO HHXURAL though you did not mention Germans at all seven … no more text visible.
(92) 34 from Backgammon of 30.11.44
From Backgammon via Plym.
From Hans, Douwe and Bram stop We do not agree with your crystal security arrangements stop We propose immediate change of all our frequencies
stop We cannot change our addresses and are transmitting from one place all the time stop We think signal plan with nine different crystals for next
three months highly advisable stop Many frequency changes are only security we can apply stop Frequencies we are using now are partly in German
hands partly much used from places we are using stop We hope you see our difficulties stop When possible all different crystals for Douwe and me stop
Please send also one of your excellent steam generators and one wind charger with two accumulators type three BCZ thirteen mark one stop Send also
winter clothing and rubber soled shoes six seven stop No joke but security stop Message Hans two seven two arranges reception requirements Douwe
and me including crystals stop
DUDLEY (Jedburgh Liaison with RVV)
Threat of civil war
DUDLEY (Henk Brinkgreve) was asked (93) whether he could give any further information about “JOHAN of Deventer”. In any case the cable continued,
it was suggested he should take no action which would incur civil war. London latter suggested (94) that DUDLEY should cut contact with JOHAN in
case there anything wrong. DUDLEY cabled (95) that reception work in his area was difficult. They had changed the reception committees ‘from local
boys to KP men with more guts’.
Fake Bombing Requested
Referring to his scheme for the preservation of the North East Polder (Noord-Oost Polder) he (Brinkgreve) requested (96) a light bombing of the dyke on
the north west corner of the polder, causing little damage, so that the materials which he wished to concentrate there would not be regarded with
suspicion by the Germans, but would be thought to be repair material for the bomb damage. DUDLEY requested London (97) to send soap, Gillette razors
and blades, civilian clothing and boots, cigarettes, tobacco and pipes, chocolate, 50.000 Guilders and some coffee and tea.
RAF Bombing Resistance Barges
DUDLEY asked (98) that the RAF be requested to refrain from shooting up or bombing barges and ships in the North East Polder or on their way from the
polder to Zwolle. They were used either for the supply of food to the population or by resistance for the transport of arms from the Polder to the south.
Van Vliet again
He (Dudley) reported (99) that he was still investigating the credentials of JOHAN of Deventer. So far had no evidence that he was not genuine.
JOHAN said his contact for dropping grounds was (?CVMKOOS) VAN VLIET. The Communists in Deventer were reported to have wireless communication
with Moscow; they did not want contact with the resistance groups. DUDLEY was still trying to contact them. Apart from occasional clashes between
JOHAN and the Communists, there had been no trouble in his area so far.
Van Vliet was an alias for Anton van der Waals a notorious traitor and Gestapo agent. He was executed after the war.
4000 Partisans in Overijssel
In reply to a question from London, DUDLEY reported (100) that there were 4000 shock troops in Overijssel, of whom 1500 were armed. Neither
Deventer nor the Achterhoek were included in this figure. These two areas were being organized under his (DUDLEY) control, since the RVV leader of the
Achterhoek had been “kicked out” by his sub-commander. DUDLEY said (101) that if his W/T set did not come up, traffic should be sent to him blind, as
there were plenty of Huns about and he could not always transmit.
(93) to Dudley of 1.11.44
To Dudley via direct.
46. Can you give further information about Johan of Deventer as not known here under that name stop In any case suggest he should take no action
which would incur civil war stop Main object is kicking out the Germans and not fighting among themselves stop No news of SAS party in Drenthe since
two three October stop Have you any news stop
(94) 47 to Dudley of 1.11.1944
47. Suggest you cut contact immediately with Johan in case there is anything wrong stop
(95) 165 from Dudley of 05.11.44
REGEHARD stop Your five one and our six two stop Eureka OK we changed reception committee from local boys to KP with more guts stop They know BBC
message stop As long as front stationary and SD (G) REEN police
Landwacht have no other worries reception work in this area is difficult stop
(96) 41 from Dudley of 5.11.1944
(97) 73 from Dudley of 05.11.44
Could you send new one time pads stop Our second pads were lost on September 23 together with all uniforms and equipment except radio stop Would
also appreciate some soap giletterazors and blades warm civvy clothing and boots cigarettes tobacco two pipes chocolate five thousand guilders and
some coffee and tea thanking in advance stop
(98) Srl No B 4565/12 from Dudley of 14.11.1944
(99) 84 from Dudley of 14.11.44
Can’t find this telegram about Johan of Deventer.
(100) Srl No B 4596/16 from Dudley of 14.11.1944
(101) 86 from Dudley of 14.11.44
If you do not hear us please send traffic blind this is outstation with plenty of Huns about cannot always send but am always listening do not send QSP
then VA stop
“Communists” a German Ruse?
London cabled (102) that there was every evidence that JOHAN was genuine. HQ was not happy about the Communist story. This was believed to be a
German attempt at penetration, as similar methods had been employed elsewhere. JOHAN should not contact the Communists, either should he worry
about their activities.
Dudley versus Evert
EVERT was still being “ a damned nuisance” (103) He recognized only RVV control and not the commander accepted by the NBS (Dutch Forces if the
Interior). He considered himself Commander of the Stoottroepen Overijssel, for which he was not fit. He controlled in fact only a small area, and his HQ
organization was primitive. He tried to make contacts in areas already organized. His radio contact MAURITS (Beekman) CHARADES was scared to go out
and investigate matters himself. DUDLEY had just received word (104) that EVERT had been trying to contact the Communists at Deventer, so far
without success. DUDLEY was meeting the Communists that day, but the situation was already sticky enough without EVERT’s interference.
Bank Hold-up Succesful
He had just heard (105) that the attack on the bank at Almelo had been successful. They had probably secured 46 million Guilders. He was hiding the
money until the situation was quieter.
But More Money Needed
He still, therefore, needed money to be sent to him for his project to save the North East Polder. London replied (106) that this would be sent as
arranged. DUDLEY (Brinkgreve) cabled (107) that the money for his North East Polder project was now urgently needed.
Bribery Scheme Condemned
They were in contact, via a wine merchant (Jan Willem Siebrand) in Kampen, with the German Commander at De Lemmer who was responsible for the
demolition of the dyke. The chances of bribing him looked good, but could they promise him a free conduct if he requested? London warned DUDLEY (108)
that his proposal to bribe the German Commander should be used only as a last resort. Similar cases had occurred in the past, with the result that
“somebody got a nice packet of money”, and the Germans usually backed out at the last minute.
(102) 68 to Dudley of 15.11.1944
(103) 89 from Dudley of 16.11.1944
89 stop EVERT still damned nuisance recognizes only RVV control not commander agreed by BNBS considers himself commander stoottroepen Overijssel for
which he is not fit because in fact he controls only small area and his HQ organization is primitive stop He tries however to get contact in areas already
organized and advertises with arms meant for his own area and radio contact MAURITS who is too scared to go out and investigate matters himself stop
(104) 91 from Dudley of 17.11.1944
From Dudley of 17.11.1944
91 stop Just got word EVERT is trying to contact Communists Deventer so far without success with object IJsselbrug stop Am meeting Communists today
but situation already sticky enough without EVERT’s interference stop
(105) 94 from Dudley 18.11.44
Just got word that attack bank Almelo has been successful stop We got probably forty six million stop No further details yet available stop Send money to
POLDER ANYWAY because money bank is being hidden away till situation quiet again stop
(106) 72 to Dudley via direct of 18.11.1944
Thanks new attack bank await further news in due course stop Sending money as arranged to Polder stop Plan Mars was tied up with RVV before you
went and EVERT was instructed by RVV on our behalf to cut communications East of IJssel stop He has been told since not to continue but to plan for a
repeat in conjunction with Allied activity stop Your views have been communicated to PRINCE and we await decision stop
(107) 93 from Dudley of 18.11.1944
93 stop Bombing dyke NE Polder OLRSEVY stop When does money arrive this is urgent stop We are via Wine Merchant Iebrand in Kampen in contact with
Hun Commander De Lemmer who is responsible for demolition dyke stop Chances of bribing him look good but can we promise him free conduct if he asks
(108) 76 to Dudley via direct of 20.11.1944
Your project with Wine Merchant should only be used as a last resort stop Similar cases have occurred in the past with result that someone got a nice
packet of money and Germans usually backing out at the last minute stop Please reply to our previous message requesting particulars bombing of dyke as
engineers wish work out project stop
Dudley - Evert Feud: London’s Plea for Tact
On the question of EVERT, London considered (109) that he should operate only in his own area, and he should be instructed accordingly. It was
suggested, however that DUDLEY should use tact in his dealings with him. All major actions would be confided to DUDLEY, but it was important that
friction should be avoided, otherwise conditions would become chaotic. DUDLEY was asked (110) who was in command of the KP and OD in the province
of Overijssel. An independent report - not from EVERT - stated that there was uneasiness about security in DUDLEY’s area. Too many people were aware
of his activities. London hoped that this report was exaggerated.
(109) 77 to Dudley via direct of 20.11.1944
Re EVERT consider he should operate in his own area which is Salland we will instruct him accordingly but suggest you use tact stop All major action will
be confined to you but important all friction should be avoided otherwise conditions chaotic stop
(110) 79 to Dudley via direct of 22.11.1944
Who is in command KP and OD province Overijssel stop Independent report but not from EVERT states worried about security your area owing too many
people knowing what is going on stop Hope this report overrated stop Glad to advise OLMSTED arrived safely good work stop
MONOPOLY, CUBBING, COURSING & BOATING (Contact with Driehoek)
Resistance leadership penetrated
CUBBING reported (111) that there was a possibility that the leadership of resistance in Holland had been penetrated. He hoped that that was not true,
but London’s other agents should be asked to watch the leaders with whom they were in contact. After the capture of the resistance leaders in central
Holland and of our district commanders and DIRK, two further district commanders has disappeared at different places. At present CUBBING was in
contact only with the acting commander for central Holland - a man called SIEM - whose security was perfect.
Rauter holds court martial
CUBBING added (112) that the cases of nearly all the other resistance leaders arrested with him were in the hands of RAUTER, the chief of all the SD in
Holland, who was personally holding a special court martial at which the prisoners were to be interrogated about the dropping of arms.
(111) srl No. B 533/73 of 29.11.44 from Cubbing
(112) Daily summary No. 87 of 30.11.44
Marines to Counter German “Scorching”
COURSING (Hoogewerff) (113) that he had been in contact with the Commandant of a group of 50 Marines who were at present engaged on fireguard
duties. They were anxious to undertake the protection of the Maas bridge, if this task was considered more important than their present job. London
suggested (114) that COURSING should discuss this matter with RUMMY. It was considered that the Marines would be more valuable as fireguards to
prevent German scorching.
Position in Rotterdam
COURSING cabled (115) that everything was progressing satisfactorily. Up to then LUDO (de Stoppelaar) and he had personally trained about 500 men in
Rotterdam and the surrounding district. The total number of armed men in Rotterdam was about 1000. They were mainly members of the RVV. The KP was
still greatly hampered by the activity of the Sicherheitsdienst.
No extra activities
BOATING was informed (116) that London was not interested in details about SD personnel. These must be preserved until after the liberation. His only
mission was, and would remain until further orders, the dispatch of telegrams for HANS. For security’s sake he must restrict his contacts to an absolute
minimum. The remainder of the traffic for BOATING was concerned with the technicalities’ of transmission.
(116) 22 to Boating 0f 19.11.44
To Boating via night Torridge.
Van Majoor stop Stellen geen belang in toezending van opgaven SD personeel stop Deze moeten worden bewaard tot na de bevrijding stop Je enige
opgedragen taak is en blijft to nader order het zenden van telegrammen voor Hans stop Om veiligheidsredenen moet je je contacten tot een minimum
NECKING & BOBSLEIGH
NECKING’s training name was TAZELAAR. His name in de field would be TONY. BOBSLEIGH’s training name was FOKKER. He would be known in the field
as DON (117).
(117) Orders for Necking and Bobsleigh, undated.
In the Friesland and Drenthe areas there were a considerable number of KP , RVV and OD groups, and it was said that some 2000 men in Friesland required
arms. They would go to the contact address given in their orders and would explain that their mission was to give assistance in the reception of stores,
and instruction in the use of arms and explosives. NECKING (Peter Tazelaar) and BOBSLEIGH (Faber) would organize W/T contact with London and
instruct local groups on the correct reception procedures. The two agents should report to London all sabotage targets which could be attacked, and HQ
would let them know what action to take. The present policy, although one of harassing the Wehrmacht, was rather one of protecting vital installations
and preventing German scorching methods, and in general facilitating rapied advances. On the first favourable night during the October/November moon
period, NECKING and BOBSLEIGH would be dropped to a reception committee at a point which would be indicated prior to their departure. The question
of residence would be left to their own discretion, but it would be best for them to put themselves in the hands of their contact, who would be asked to
arrange a safe house. NECKING and BOBSLEIGH would each have 5000 Guilders for their own use, and they would also take 10.000 Guilders for their
work in connection with resistance. NECKING and BOBSLEIGH were successfully dropped to the field on November 1st , 1944.
(Friesland, near Haskerhorne, ground INGRAM, H124) Necking is Peter Tazelaar, the real ’Soldaat van Oranje’, Bobsleigh is Lijkele Faber, Bobsleigh was his
second mission, his first mission was being a W/T operator in a Jedburgh team with codename DANIEL II, dropped near Son, Noord-Brabant)
NECKING - W/T TRAFFIC
Strength of Resistance in Friesland
NECKING reported (118) that there were 1500 armed and 800 unarmed men in Friesland. He did not know the figures for Groningen as he had lost his
contacts there, the resistance being repeatedly liquidated by the enemy. The situation in Drenthe was bad, but better than in Groningen. He also stated
(119) that in Friesland the KP, RVV and OD had been absorbed into one force, the NBS They no longer existed as independent organizations. It was
expected that this load would be followed by other provinces in the near future.
Germans Round-Up NBS
NECKING cabled (120) that during the previous week important members of the NBS in Friesland had been rounded up by the Germans. Confessions
extracted from them would be fatal for resistance in the district, and it was therefore essential that these men should be freed . If possible Leeuwarden
prison should be bombed. London replied (121) that the bombing of this prison could not be guaranteed, but would NECKING send details such as the
location, colour and type of building.
Evacuees and V-2 site
NECKING cabled (122) that the V-2 site at Gaasterland should not be attacked as the installations had now been removed. The place was now being
used as a camp for evacuees. He reported that a Wachtmeester of the Dutch Marechaussee (Mounted Police) named Bertrand FARIDEAN, now in liberated
Holland, had maltreated Jews in Westerbork concentration camp. He confirmed (123) his compliance with HQ orders to break contact with resistance. He
would contact HQ once a week, but asked that London should continue listening to his transmitter. Would London tell him what was going on “so that he
knew what he was up to”?
BOBSLEIGH - W/T TRAFFIC
Night Work Impossible
BOBSLEIGH requested (124) that his broadcasts should in future be transmitted at 19.00 hours. Receiving at 12.30 at night was impossible owing to the
cold, and also disturbed the family with which he was staying.
(118) Srl No B 4890/77 from Necking of 18.11.1944
(119) Srl No B 4893 from Neccking of 18.11.1944
(120) Srl No B 28/63 from Necking of 21.11.1944
(121) 8 to Necking of 21.11.1944
(122) Srl No B 176/24 from Necking of 23.11.1944
(123) Srl No B 603/20 from Necking of 28.11.1944
(124) 2 from Bobsleigh of 16.11.1944
TRAPPING (Second W/T operator to Rotterdam KP)
TRAPPING’s training name was BOB. He would be known in the field as EDU (125).
LEO (de Goede), GERARD (Mulholland) and THEODORE (van Duyn) were installed in Rotterdam and were London’s liaison officers wth the KP and RVV.
THEODORE was handling all the wireless communications, and all required an additional wireless operator. He would ask his reception committee to put him
into touch with LEO, who would look after him and arrange safe houses for transmission. He would be dropped on the first favourable night during the
October/November moon period to a KP reception committee who would arrange for his transport to Rotterdam. He would ask the committee to look after
his wireless equipment and arrange for it to be forwarded at a convenient time, but he should take care of his codes, plan and crystals.
TRAPPING was sent to the field on November 1st, 1944. The operation was successful.
(Near Benthuizen, Zuid-Holland, Ground RITA, H134) Trapping is Richard Barme, he was detected and arrested on February 2th, 1945. Was shot on March
8th 1945 as a reprisal on the attack on Rauter.)
TRAPPING - W/T TRAFFIC
TRAPPING reported his safe arrival in a message dated 12th November (126). London sent its congratulations on the same day (127).
(125) Orders for Trapping, undated
(126) 1 from Trapping of 12.11.1944
(127) 1 to Trapping of 12.11.1944
SNOOKER (Liaison with KP)
SNOOKER’s training name was De BEER, he would be known in the field as “WITTE PIET” (128). SNOOKER would return to LEO (de Goede) and carry out
such instructions as were given him. He would hand to LEO for FRANK of the KP a microprint of PRINCE BERNHARD’s message to the field setting out
the duties to be performed by the KP, RVV and OD. He would also hand to LEO a camouflaged package containing documents and microprints. When LEO
told London that these had been received he would be instructed regarding delivery. SNOOKER would take with him a special short-range wireless, plan,
codes and crystals to enable FRANK (van Beijnen) to have direct contact with PRINCE BERNHARD’s HQ. He would be dropped to a LEO reception
Committee north of Rotterdam, together with a load of containers and packages. His W/T communication would be trough LEO and THEODORE (van
Duyn). SNOOKER was successful dropped to the field on November 10th, 1944.
(128) Orders for Snooker, undated.
SNOOKER (Liaison with RVV)
SNOOKER’s training name was DE BEER. He would be known in the field as WITTE PIET. SNOOKER (Piet de Beer) was successfully dropped to the field on
November 10th , 1944.
(near Nieuwkoop, Zuid-Holland, Ground BUTTERFLY, H127)
III- CLANDESTINE PRESS
DRAUGHTS II W/T TRAFFIC
Dutch dragged from houses
DRAUGHTS-2 reported (129) that the articles of clothing from the Dutch people were being carried off over the railway bridge at Zwolle. He cabled (130)
that the result of the razzias in The Hague were poor, according to the first estimates. The figure varied, but were certainly under 10.000. The victims were
being taken to Delft. Few people had voluntarily reported to the authorities (131). Most of those taken had been dragged out of their houses. The food
situation was difficult. He was asked (132) whether he was still in touch with Dutchmen in Germany. Contacts were required to which agents could be sent.
(129) Srl No. B4047/45 from Draughts II of 05.11.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
Ontving uw nrs five four and five five stop Contactadres kranten ANNEMIE AARTS Willem straat negen een Den Haag stop Over spoorbrug Zwolle wegvoering
van geroofde goederen stop Spoorbruggen Deventer en Zutphen uitsluitend gebruikt voor militaire doeleinden stop Mijn nummer negen negen stop (This
telegram is about stolen goods, clothes are not mentioned.)
(130) Srl No. B80/43 from Draughts II of 22.11.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
Elf uur dertig vangst razzias naar eerste raming gering stop Cijfers varieren stop Zeker onder 10.000 stop Bewegingsvrijheid met meldingsplichtingen weer
toegestaan stop Straatcontrole stop Alle wijken nog niet afgewerkt stop Slachtoffers naar Delft stop Een een zes stop
(131) Srl No. B116/12 from Draughts II of 22.11.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
Ondanks bedreiging scherpe represailles weinig melders, meesten uit huis gehaald stop Na huidige betrekkelijke rust verwachten scherpe actie stop QEININ
van razzia MU CDI stop Voedsel voorziening gestremd stop Mijn een een acht stop
(132) 65 to Draughts II of 25.11.44
To Draughts via night Teifi.
Plan BONZO bestaat er nog verbindingen met Hollanders in Duitschland. Verlangen geode contact addressen narr wie agenten kunnen worden gezonden stop
Veel liefs van SPHINX stop Hoe is MIA stop Sphinx is Jos Gemmeke who was in England at the time, don’t know who Mia is. Think she was pregnant and
gave birth to a baby girl named Marie Jose (telegram 124 from Draughts via Teifi).
Bezique’s telegrams dealt with the technicalities of transmission.
IV- MISSIONS TO HOLLAND
Gas Training for Germans
PRINCE BERNHARD requested (133) that Jedburgh teams should be fully informed of his orders to the field concerning general organization and tasks,
otherwise they might give orders and organize things in a different way, and this might cause confusion. London cabled (134) that a report had been received
from the DELTA Centrum that on October 15th a secret meeting had been held in Rotterdam by high German officers, and that as a result all officers in
occupied Holland had been given a secret document containing directions for the use of gas.
Cribbage Under Control?
NORTHAW cabled (135) that CRIBBAGE message was considered to be “somewhat strange”. Did London feel that he was being controlled? London replied
(136) that CRIBBAGE (van Duyn) messages had been watched for some time but apart from grammatical errors there was no indication of anything wrong.
Why had NORTHAW raised the question? NORTHAW replied (137) that the text of the message sounded unreal. How did CRIBBAGE know, for example, that
GERARD (Mulholland) was trying to escape? NORTHAW did not assert that anything was definitely wrong, but felt suspicious.
German Spies in Brabant
London cabled (138) that an SD agent in Amsterdam had reported that 1000 SD agents had been left behind as Red Cross personnel in Brabant. They were
returning to occupied Holland. Their HQ was at Eindhoven from where they had been distributed to Nijmegen and Tilburg. A courier went twice weekly to
Hauptsturmfürher BOERDEIN in Rotterdam.
London quoted (139) a message from EVERT (Lancker) saying that he had taken temporary command of the area east of Ijssel, from the Achterhoek up to
and including S. Drenthe. EVERT requested that “attempts at re-organisation now being made by outsiders should cease”. Two days later London forwarded
(140) a further message from EVERT stating: “I am leaving the Forces of the Interior. Many thanks for the ‘help’ and ‘trust’ which I have been given”.
SOE - SIS Confusion
NORTHAW complained (141) that SIS had sent an agent … (name removed) to FREEK at Rooterdam without advising NORTHAW that this step was to be
taken. It was not understood why they were not informed when couriers were sent by SIS to resistance leaders. By giving no preliminary warning SIS was to
create confusion, and ran the risk of having their agents killed.
(133) 106 from Northaw of 3.11.1944
(134) 309 to Northaw of 9.11.1944
(135) 222 from Northaw of 13.11.1944
(136) 322 to Northaw of 13.11.1944
(137) 223 from Northaw of 14.11.1944
(138) 325 to Northaw of 13.11.1944
(139) 356 to Northaw of 25.11.1944
(140) 365 to Northaw of 27.11.1944
(141) 258 from Northaw of 28.11.1944
V- AGENTS’ REPORTS
CRICKET (Tony Cnoops)
Arrival in Amsterdam
On the 31st March, 1944 I was dropped in Holland (near Slootpolder, Wieringermeer) together with BOB SIPMA (Huub Sanders) (CURLING) my W/T, BOB
CELOSSE (FARO), who had to bring me in contact with the RVV, and his assistant HARRY SCHOUTEN (Johan Seijben) (PING PONG). His W/T lost control of
his nerves coming over Holland and refused to jump. This was directly the cause of my arrest because I could not break off connection with FARO as he had
to use my W/T. The rest of us landed safely, and we arrived at our destination - a village - just after sunrise. FARO arrange with a cattle driver to take us
along to Amsterdam where we arrived without any interference. FARO took us to a lady made her living by letting rooms. He learned very quickly that his
whole organization (CS-6), except for a few, had been arrested.
First Contact with RVV
Soon afterwards FARO found a safehouse from which CURLING contacted England. At the same time he brought me in contact with the RVV. This contact
was not with KAREL the head, but with one of his men in a meeting place in Amsterdam. Men came here every day and night from the LO and OD and there
were several independent men, always ready for a scrap and to give help. I was very anxious to break with FARO and I expected that as we had been
dropped on the first day of the moon period another W/T would have followed in the same period. As soon as we made contact with England they could have
told us where to pick him up, but this was not done. After CURLING had made contact with England, in one of my first telegrams I said that I was anxious to
break with FARO and that a W/T operator should be sent for him, but the second moon period passed without anyone coming.
Just after I had made good contacts and was practically working day and night, things started to happen. The first indication was that PING-PONG had been
arrested. FARO got information that he was last seen drunk. I talked to PING-PONG in the concentration camp and he denied that he had been drunk and I
believe him. FARO’s wife (Miep Celosse) had a nervous breakdown and he needed someone to run his house and to take messages over the telephone and
so on. One of his most trusted men sent someone along and said that he would be guaranteed. Who was the traitor. His name was KLAAS. When I was
introduced to him, I disliked him and told FARO so, but he would hear nothing against him.
Cricket Meets Karel
In the meantime, FARO (Celosse) and I had a meeting with KAREL in Hilversum. On the 19th of May I met KAREL and talked with him about dropping points, I
went with one of his men in a “road control” car to the Biesbosch. I found what I thought to be a suitable point. The chap with me knew the farmer, and
after some talk, I told him what I wanted and he promised to give all possible help.
Returns to Amsterdam
It was there that I made a fatal mistake. I had a very strong feeling that I should not go back to Amsterdam, but against that feeling I went, on account of
appointments with resistance leaders. On Friday evening then I returned to Amsterdam and went to FARO’s house. A telegram from England was waiting, but
CURLING had received it badly as usual and after three hours work had not been able to decipher it.
I then made up my last telegram about the dropping points in the Biesbosch. When I had put it in code I went to bed about 3 a.m. At 8.30 next morning
when I was still in bed KLAAS opened my bedroom with a pair of cleaned boots in his hand. My revolver was lying on the floor next to the bed. He said: “I
have cleaned your boots”, put them down and grasped my revolver and at the same moment, two SD men hurled themselves on to me. KLAAS must have
made a duplicate key, waited until FARO was away and come in silently. I was taken by surprise, but fought desperately. I had no chance being still half
under the blanket. I was handcuffed and stripped from my pyamas. They dressed me, after searching every piece of clothing before allowing me to put it on.
When I was dressed, the bell rang. It was CISKA, our cut-out, bringing flowers for me (it was my birthday) KLAAS and one of the SD went to the door and
left me alone in the bedroom with the other SD. When I heard the frontdoor open, I jumped from my chair and tried to kick the SD between the legs, but he
saw me coming and knocked me down. When CISKA was tied up, the other SD came back and I was tied to the bed with a another pair of handcuffs. They
also put a towel loose around my neck, and every time someone rang the bell, they wung the towel so that I was gasping for breath and could not make a
sound. After CISKA came MIES, FARO’s wife. They were put with me sitting on the bed. Then came FARO. When KLAAS opened the door, I heard him say:
“So, are you back again” I heard a hard struggle and then KLAAS came into the bedroom and reported to the SD who was guarding me, that everybody was
First interrogation (Cnoops was arrested May 19th 1944)
We were first taken to the SD HQ Lutherpoort and then, after a long wait, to Haaren, where we arrived at 12.30 that night, without having had a bite or a
drink all day. I was led straight away to a room still handcuffed. My interrogator was Obersturmgrupfuhrer HAUBROCK. He put plenty of cigararettes in front
of me and seated himself behind his typewriter. He said: “Well Tony, you were dropped on the 31st March in the Wieringermeer and we know everything.
Just tell me your name and everything to check up”. I said to him: “You got me all right, but if you know everything, then you should also know that I am no
traitor and that I do not talk. You are a German officer fighting for your country; I am a Dutch officer fighting for mine, that’s all”. Then another German came
in with my revolver and asked me if it was mine. I said: “Yes”. “I am sure that you would not have used it” he said, smiling . I said: “Give me a goddamned
chance and I will show you”. I thought he was going to hit me, but HAUBROCK motioned to him to go away. Then another came in with my telegram and
asked if I had changed already the first and last group. (this must have been May) So they knew all about that! He wanted to know what the chances
was. At first I refused, but al last I gave him 2 over 4, 3 over 5, hoping that England would notice the hint straight away. As long as I was in Haaren from
26th May until August 4th , I was never hit or hurt. They gave me the name of TIGER.
A Birthday Treat
When having a shower one day, I looked through a hole at the side and saw MIES (FARO’s wife) and she saw me. I also saw CISKA in HAUBROCK’s office
and I was allowed to talk to her for five minutes in German in the presence of HAUBROCK, CISKA was looking well - it was her birthday. I told her that the
invasion was going fine; HAUBROCK pulled a face but did not say anything. CISKA seemed relieved. I kissed her goodbye and that was the last I ever saw of
her. That she had been allowed to see me was meant as a kind of birthday present for her; she had asked for it. She told me that she had been in hospital
for a fortnight with ear trouble and that she had been well treated.
Treachery in England?
One day HAUBROCK said there was no difference between my work and his. I was fed up and told him that was a lot of difference, that the only way he
worked was with traitors. He jumped up and shouted furiously : “That is a lie. We only got a message FROM ENGLAND three days after you had been
dropped, telling us where you were”. That proves that there was a leak in England.
(Again this seems to prove that Haubrock and Mey knew much more than the captured agents realized, certainly the code expert Mey knew a lot about
On the 4th August, I was brought by car from Haaren to the concentration camp in Vught. In Haren the food was good and sufficient, but in Vught the food
was very bad and far too little - really hunger rations. The last four weeks in Vught were especially horrible. Every day men were taken out of their cells at
random and put on the square. Half the cells looked out on the square and the men in them what happened and passed the information on to us. The men on
the square were beaten and kicked around for one or two hours and then loaded into a closed van. We could follow the sound of that van and when it
stopped he heard machine gun fire and then as many single shots as there had been men on the square.
We left Vught on the 6th September for Sachsenhausen in Germany. When we left, everyone had to give his name. I changed mine to TONY TIGER to make
enquiries about me more difficult. There were eight of us in a cattle truck. There I was told by a man who knew FARO very well that FARO had been on the
square the last day before we left and gave him a message. “Tell MIES and TONY not to worry. I wish them the best of luck”.
When I heard that, I broke down. In that short time we had become great friends. He had an enormous amount of courage and I had grown fond of him.
Next day, after we had arrived at Sachsenhausen our hair was shaved off and we got a pair of throusers and a jacket, but no underwear. We had to run to
Heinkel, about an hour’s distance. The men who were too slow were beaten with butts of rifles. In Heinkel the food was bad and there was a lot of beating.
In October we were sent back to Sachsenhausen and in November I was drafted to Brandenburg and worked there in the SS Bekleidungs Lager. The food was
very bad and there was not enough. The work was very hard and I stole food from the SS to keep alive. On April 23rd we started walking back to
Sachsenhausen with SS guards. On the 25th I and another Dutch prisoner escaped together in the evening; it was easy.
Half an hour afterwards, the Russians came near. We were laying flat in a field under a small bush. Shells and machine gun fire passed over us, but we did not
care any more. We were exhausted and fell asleep. Sat Three o’çlock in the morning, somebody was poking a light machine gun in my stomach. Not a
particularly nice way to wake anyone up. It was a German Patrol, but not SS; just the Army. We were dragged along for three days and it was not so bad.
When nobody was looking, we got some cigarettes or bread from many a German soldier - not a bad lot. A Soldier was guarding us, with his hand in his
pocket, rifle on his shoulder and a cigarette in his mouth. A sergeant major swore at him and he threw the cigarette away and took his hand out of his
pocket. I went up to the same barking Sergeant Major and asked for food. He wanted to know why I had been in a concentration camp. I told him that it was
because I did not like Hitler and above all, was a Dutchman, would remain a Dutchman and therefore had worked against them. He looked me up and down
and grinned. Five minutes later, he brought me half a loaf of bread and half a tin of bully beef. If you knew the German mentality, you could do a lot and say
a lot, but if you showed that you were afraid you were lost.
Between Two Fires
We were brought to Kyrits, 50 km from Waterberg, where I crossed the Elbe. We were here for three days in jail and then put in a big shed with only one man
to guard us. That same evening, the Germans came along, at top speed running from the Russians. My friend and I were tired and went to sleep. Ar four
o’clock the shooting started but we stayed on. At five o’clock, a single German tank drew up next to the shed and the officer barked to defend to the last.
That was too hot for me and I scrammed, running very fast to a nearby farm. Two Russian prisoners of war were with me. They ran past this farm were cut
to pieces by machine gun fire. We went on to the farm yard. We were caught between two fires and I did not feel very happy. Then two German soldiers ran
past us and after them came two Russian soldiers, one covered in blood.
Trek to the West
An hour afterwards, the fire ceased and off we went into Kyrits and looted food - rice, butter, potatoes, flour and sugar. From that day on refugees of all
nationalities came to Kyrits. We were told by the Russians Commander to stay in Kyrits. After three weeks, we were to move to a camp ten miles to the east.
There were, by that time, about 5000 refugees, comprising ex prisoners of war and foreign workers. The Russian s put guards on the roads leading to the
west. I did not like that idea and started working North and to the West and crossed the Elbe on the 20th May. On the same day I was transported to
Luneburg, after that to Hamburg. I went by car to Brussels and landed at Groydon on the 31st May 1945.