SOE WAR DIARIES JULY 1944 - SEPTEMBER 1944 PART IB.
PODEX, RUMMY & CRIBBAGE (Contact with CS-6 and RVV)
PODEX (Len Mulholland) training name was SANDERS. He would be known in the field as GERARD (65). Information had reached London concerning several underground movements in Holland. The aspect of these organizations changed frequently - often weekly - and part of them might have been penetrated by the enemy. PODEX would be sent to Holland for the purpose of establishing contacts with underground movements there and reporting to London on their security and requirements.
(65) Orders for Podex, dated June 27th, 1944
PODEX (Len Mulholland) would be given an address through which he could get into touch with CS-6 and the RVV. In addition he would carry out the mission to MULDERS which had been unsuccessfully attempted last May (66). The aircraft in which POKER (Dekkers) and FOOTBALL (Kuenen) had been sent had not returned and it was presumed that these two men had been lost. PODEX should be careful however, in the case of the two men had not been killed but had fallen into German hands. They might then have disclosed details of their mission and contacts. PODEX position was one of importance and should not be endangered by the contacts which he might make with one of these organizations. His address should be kept secret from all members of underground movements. He had been given “side contacts” with these organizations, thereby enabling him to communicate with them should he wish to do so - bearing in mind however that every security precaution should be taken in case these “side contacts” had been penetrated. It was imperative that he should establish contact with HQ in London as soon as possible and give the fullest possible information on the state of Dutch resistance. He should regard his work as a security mission and his reports would enable London to check information received from other sources. (Who were those source? Most likely SIS agents)
He (Mulholland) was authorized to build up a small organization of his own, but it was imperative that even the members of his own organisation should not be aware of his private address or addresses. Decisions which he would take should be discussed jointly with RUMMY (de Goede). Both PODEX and RUMMY had the same orders and these should be carried out in close collaboration. It was most important however that they should not travel or walk together. Should either of them hear of other agents of the London organization they should make no attempt to contact them directly. Should they wish to get in touch with them, this should be done through a cut-out (in-between). As soon as possible after arrival PODEX should arrange for at least three post boxes through which other organizations would be able to send messages for London in their own codes through PODEX’s W/T operator (van Duyn). It was important that this system should be contrived in such a manner that the arrest of PODEX or his operator would not be possible in the event of post boxes falling into enemy hands. It might be possible for PODEX to give information concerning enemy movements. He should, however, bear in mind that this was not his primary mission. He would take steps to organize a reception committee te receive such stores as he might need. He would be dropped on the first favourable night of the July moon period together with LEO (RUMMY) and THEODORE (CRIBBAGE) - his W/T operator. PODEX and RUMMY would then make the necessary contacts. In the meantime PODEX would arrange for his W/T operator to go to a safe address and he should keep in touch with him through a system of cut-outs. It would be well if neither knew where the other was living. PODEX should remember that CRIBBAGE (van Duyn) had not been in Holland for a considerable time. He would therefore give him every assistance in establishing himself and would see that he was taken care of until he became thoroughly acclimatized and was confident of being able to live in the country without drawing attention to himself.
(66) See page 181.
PODEX and RUMMY would have at their disposal the sum of 25.000 Guilders for setting up their own organization. PODEX, RUMMY and CRIBBAGE would each have 5.000 Guilders for their personal use. In addition each would take 2.500 French Francs and 2.500 Belgium Francs for use in an emergency. All the personal baggage and material of PODEX, RUMMY and CRIBBAGE would be in one package which would be parachuted with them. The W/T equipment would also be included in this single package, the equipment being in two cases packed together. One of these suitcases had a double bottom, the construction of which had been explained to PODEX. PODEX would take with him a one-time-pad for his own use, and would do all the encoding and decoding of his messages, which should be kept as short as possible and limited to important information connected with his mission. Records of messages exchanged should not be kept. On the first, second and third days and the two Sundays following his landing a special message known to PODEX would be broadcasted by the BBC. This would serve to prove his bona fides.
RUMMY’s training name was GORT. He would be known in the field as LEO (67). RUMMY’s orders were identical with those of PODEX.
CRIBBAGE’s training name was DUVEEN. He would be known in the field as THEODORE (68). CRIBBAGE would go to Holland as W/T operator with his two organizers, PODEX and RUMMY. He would take orders from them on all matters of mutual concern, but would have authority to use his discretion with regard to his W/T work. No-one would interfere with any measures which he might consider necessary to safeguard his channel of communication . CRIBBAGE (Arie van Duyn) would have his own code which he would use only for messages concerning technical matters or for acknowledging messages from the Home Station. He would be shown the prefixes to be used by PODEX (Len Mulholland) and RUMMY (Bert de Goede) so that he would know which messages were destined for them and which for himself. CRIBBAGE would judge the days on which he would transmit and he would inform PODEX and RUMMY if he considered their messages too long or too numerous for safe handling.
PODEX, RUMMY and CRIBBAGE went to the field on the night of July 5th, 1944.
The operation was successful. (DZ Tongerse Heide, H-70 near Epe)
PODEX - W/T Traffic
PODEX (Len Mulholland) reported (69) that everything was in order. His contacts had been made. The forged identity cards were bad. London congratulated him (70) and asked what was wrong with the identity cards. PODEX reported (71) that four containers with 200 pistols, stens, grenades and incendiaries were required on the dropping ground Yew. He had made contact (72) with his old friends who appeared to be head men of the KP, which was quite separate from the LO. Could London give instructions regarding the disposal of three American pilots? London reported (73) that the material requested for the ground Yew were being prepared. London advised PODEX (74) that the LO was prepared to receive a saboteur and operator through a special contact. With what organization was PODEX officially working? He should indicate its strength and approximate location. The RVV had reported his arrival but appeared to be annoyed. What was the trouble? PODEX replied (75) that he was in contact with all organizations except CS-6. He was helping them all with the organization of dropping grounds. For security reasons he did not wish to know the whole of the leadership of the RVV, but only one person who could give him the information he required. The RVV had asked him to work for them. This was not in his orders and therefore he had refused .London cabled (76) that he should tell the RVV that he was not sent to them because other men were already standing by (who ?) to go to the RVV but were held up by bad weather. London would do everything possible to arrange delivery of supplies during the current moon period (77) but ground mists over the aereodromes were hampering operations. Could the Dutch underground organizations do anything to prevent German demolition in Dutch ports? How many men had they got for this purpose? PODEX (Mulholland) reported (78) that the KP consisted of 130 men in the west; 200 in the south; 100 in the east and 100 in the north. These men were carrying out attacks on ration offices. London regretted (79) that it had not been possible to arrange operations during the moon period which had just ended. The two men (who ?) destined for the RVV had tried once but had n had to return owing to bad visibility.
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Would it be possible for PODEX (Mulholland) to be London’d chief liaison officer for the RVV and for his friend to carry on with the other organizations? PODEX expressed his readiness to act as liaison officer with the RVV (80) Would he now have to give up his leadership of a KP sabotage group of 600 men in Brabant (81) ? PODEX reported (82) that the ration coupons which he had been issued were now obsolete; an entirely different issue had been distributed on August 5th.
Signal for Rail offensive
London cabled details (83) of a broadcast message which would be sent over the Flemish news. If this was heard than underground organizations must immediately dislocate railway lines by the best possible means according to the following priority: -
1) Bentheim, Hengelo, Zutphen, Arnhem, Nijmegen, Den Bosch, Tilburg, Breda, Roosendaal, Eeschen.
2) Venlo, Helmond, Neerpelt.
3) Roermond, Weert, Neerpelt.
4) Roermond, Maastricht
5) Tilburg, Turnhout
London instructed PODEX (84) to advise the RVV that an attempt had been made to deliver material on the grounds Evert, Gerrit and Hendrik on the night of August 8th . The pilots who went to grounds Evert and Gerrit had reported that no reception lights had been seen. Would he ask the RVV way this had happened? The aircraft sent to the ground Hendrik had not returned. Had this material been received and had three men arrived at their point of contact near the dropping ground Hendrik (28/29 .8.44, Appelse Heide, Voorthuizen, Beekman, Hinderink and Luykenaar?)?
New Task for Resistance - Anti Demolition
PODEX was informed (85) that the following targets should be protected against German demolition: -
a) Electric power stations, sub-stations and transmission lines;
b) Public water installations, especially in the Rotterdam area;
c) Rotterdam, Amsterdam and IJmuiden port installations and locks;
d) State coal mines and coke plants;
e) Broadcast transmitters and PTT wireless stations;
f) Telecommunications, central telephone exchanges and repeater stations.
PODEX (Mulholland) replied (86) that the underground organizations would do everything possible tp protect the installations mentioned, but this would be very difficult owing to the shortage of arms.
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Role of Resistance at Arnhem
PODEX (Len Mulholland) was advised (87) that parachute troops had landed on the bridges at Arnhem, Nijmegen and Grave. Reinforcements would quickly follow. Dutch resistance should give every possible assistance to these Allied troops so that the bridges over the Rhine, de Neder Rijn, and the Maas canal should not be destroyed. Resistance groups inside the area should provide guides, give intelligence information and supply labour. Resistance groups outside the area but within a radius of 20 kilometer would give the same assistance but should also try to prevent enemy troops from approaching the air-head. Resistance groups outside the 20 kilometer radius should interfere with enemy movements towards and from the airhead and destroy enemy patrol and ammunition dumps.
Bombed Centre of Rotterdam Proposed as Dropping Ground
PODEX asked (88) whether it would be possible to drop paratroops in the Rotterdam area. About 300 fighting men were needed to help prevent German demolitions. London replied (89) that the dispatch of paratroops to Rotterdam could not be guaranteed. Tugboats should not be allowed to leave the Rotterdam area and should be immobilized, but not seriously damaged. London informed PODEX (90) that an attempt might be made to drop arms by daylight in the open space which now existed in the centre of Rotterdam, but this could be done only when the main German forces had withdrawn. PODEX should advise London immediately the Germans withdrew and also state whether this suggestion was feasible. PODEX should instruct reception committee (91) to arrange lights for the non-moon period on all grounds. A large electric light or motor-car headlamp which could turn a complete circle would be suitable for the centre light instead of a bonfire. It was regretted that bad weather and flak had prevented operations in the Rotterdam area. PODEX should advise London which grounds would be standing by for non-moon period deliveries (92) It was planned to send an unlimited supply of arms by land through the enemy lines at a later stage.
Reception Minus Commitees
PODEX (Mulholland) asked (93) that containers should be put down on the dropping grounds even if no reception was seen providing the ground could easily be recognized. There was no risk of loads falling into the hands of the Germans. London reported (94) the delivery of containers to the ground Evert (Stegerenveld, Ommen) on the previous night. An attempt would be made to deliver four more Allied parachutists together with containers on the ground Bertus (De Piksen) that night (11.9.44, team Dudley). Blockade ships should be sunk (95) in their present berths in Rotterdam than that they should be used as block ships. The loss of berths by sinking vessels at the quay-side was not so serious as the difficulties which would be caused by blocking of harbor entrances. PODEX should keep London advised and report successes.
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London advised PODEX (96) that the RVV were discontented because the KP were receiving more arms than they were. PODEX (Len Mulholland) should explain that this was a question of dropping grounds and not policy. With reference to the sinking of blockade ships (97) London would send Limpit charges to the dropping ground Carrot as soon as possible. In addition attacks should be made on cylindrical tanks containing liquid das and on black rubber cables on rocket sites. PODEX should warn resistance groups (98) to be extra careful against penetration. It was understood that 2.000 Sicherheits Polizei had just arrived at The Hague. PODEX reported (99) the location of rockets storage dumps and firing sites in the Geertruidenberg area. He was instructed (100) to warn river pilots and dock personal to go into hiding since the Germans might attempt to transport them to Germany as they had done in other ports. PODEX reported (101) that the ground Rhododendron had not received its load. The containers had been dropped about three kilometers from the pin-point and were now in the hands of the Germans. PODEX was instructed (102) to inform the Driehoek (triangle) of the RVV, the KP and the OD that arms would be sent as soon as possible. The German headquarters which controlled the rockets was situated at No 67 and 69 Brinkgreverweg, Deventer. Could he arrange to attack and kill the personnel and cut all communications to the headquarters? PODEX should inform the Driehoek (103) that LIEUTENANT HANS, (DRAUGHTS-1) who was in touch with the Driehoek at Amsterdam, had been appointed liaison officer for that area by PRINCE BERNHARD.
Block-ships Sunk at Berths
The Brigade Commander at Rotterdam (104) had reported the sinking by sabotage of the blockade ships Westerdam, Borneo and Axenfels. If this was the work of PODEX (Len Mulholland) then London was delighted, but would he please confirm this and send any further details he had for the Admiralty. A further supply of Limpits would be sent in two containers with the next delivery on the RVV ground Carrot. PODEX confirmed (105) the news of the sinking of the Westerdam, Borneo and Axenfels. London cabled (106) that the headquarters of the rocket personnel had been moved. The attack should therefore be cancelled. A traitor from CS-6 named IRMA SEELICH (107) was living at Weteringschans 293, Amsterdam. She was a very dangerous Gestapo agent. She should be arrested immediately and if possible held, but otherwise she should be eliminated. PODEX reported (108) that the Germans had demolished the port facilities on the south side of Rotterdam on the previous day.
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RUMMY - W/T Traffic
RUMMY (Bert de Goede) reported (109) that he had made his initial contact, but that MULDERS had died the previous week. London congratulated RUMMY (110) and asked whether MULDER’s death would affect his work. RUMMY gave (111) two dropping points and stated that his work was not affected by the death of MULDER (112). Everything was arranged (113) for the reception of material. London asked (114) for details of the names of the organizations with which RUMMY was in contact, the areas they covered and the number of men each had at his disposal. RUMMY replied (115) that he was working with sabotage organizations in the northern provinces. Further details would follow. RUMMY asked (116) whether attacks on communications could now be made at Roosendaal and Bentheim. When attacking such targets he would appreciate air raids at the same time to create disorder. London had suggested to GERARD (Mulholland) (117) that he would work for the RVV. Could RUMMY take over the Knok Ploegen from GERARD? He should keep his contacts to a minimum as the Gestapo were very active. London hoped everything had been received safely at the dropping ground Yew (118). The pilot reported the reception lights were weak and were set out in a triangle instead of a straight line. The pilot for the dropping ground Acacia reported no reception seen. Was the committee there?
Official Recognition of Dutch Resistance
London sent the following message to RUMMY (Bert de Goede) on September 1st , 1994 (119): -
“THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT REQUESTS US TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT: THE RECOGNITION OF ACTIVE DUTCH RESISTANCE GROUPS AS FORMING PART OF THE OFFICAL DUTCH FORCES IS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION. PRINCE BERNHARD WILL TAKE COMMAND OF THESE DUTCH FORCES. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD RECEIVE AN ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE FROM ACTIVE RESISTANCE GROUPS IN HOLLAND THAT THIS LEADERSHIP IS ACCEPTED AND THAT ALL ORDERS AND TARGETS WILL BE MOST STRICTLY CARRIED OUT IN ORDER TO MAKE THIS RECOGNITION POSSIBLE. WILL YOU PLEASE CONSULT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH THE LEADERS OF THE RVV AND OD CONCERNING THE UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTATION OF THESE CONDITIONS, A REPLY MUST BE GIVEN BY RETURN. THIS MESSAGE MUST NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE UNDERGROUND PRESS AS IT IS VERY SECRET.”
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Gestapo papers to be held for Allied Investigation
RUMMY (Bert de Goede) was informed (120) that at the moment of entry by the Allies of important towns, premises used by the German Intelligence Services should be closed and guarded and no documents touched before the building was handed over to the Allied authorities. RUMMY must give as soon as possible a dropping ground where Allied personnel in uniform could be received and looked after by the Knok Ploegen. RUMMY reported (121) that the Acacia committee was on the spot but there had been fighting with the Grune Polizei. All the reception committee men, except the leader, had been either killed or arrested. Everything had arrived safely on the dropping ground Yew and the pigeons had already been dispatched. He had asked the KP to co-operate with the RVV. RUMMY was asked (122) to pass on to the Knok Ploegen a list of targets to be protected against German demolition (123). If any resistance groups requiring arms became isolated during the moon period (124) and RUMMY could give London their dropping grounds they should be told to use the correct lighting system and flash the letter “A”. During the non-moon period the same system should be used except that the middle light should be a large bonfire. RUMMY reported (125) that the RVV, the KP and the OD accepted the conditions laid down by the Netherlands Government and transmitted by London. Sten guns and men in uniform (126) could be dropped on the grounds Cherry and Yew. Everything had been received safely on ground Acacia.(Acacia was raided by the Grune Polizei and everybody was arrested or killed (121) and now everything was received safely (126)?)
Task Set for Dutch Resistance
London advised RUMMY (127) that the Schiehaven and Parkhaven road tunnel under the Maas, and electrical power plants including those at Galliliestraat and Schiehaven should be protected from German demolition. Resistance should also try to: -
a) Provide pilots for river craft and dock personnel;
b) Protect Soesterberg, Valkenburg and Schiphol airfields;
c) Preserve railway administrative building at Utrect;
d) Guard important buildings at The Hague;
e) Patrol the road from The Hague to Rotterdam
f) Protect the bridges and railway lines between Rotterdam, Utrecht, Arnhem and Wessel;
g) Guard the bridges at Nijmegen.
RUMMY reported (128) that the mission for the destruction of railways had been completely executed by the Knok Ploegen. London advised RUMMY (Bert de Goede) of the airborne operation at Arnhem (129) and gave him instructions to be passed to the local resistance groups.
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(123) See page 203
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SS Troops in Dropping Ground Area
An attempt would be made to deliver material to RUMMY (130) on Saturday night on seven of his grounds. The dropping of parachutists in the Rotterdam area could not be guaranteed. Tugboats should not be allowed to leave the Rotterdam area. They should be immobilized but not seriously damaged. RUMMY cabled that his dropping ground two miles from Venlo (131) had been cancelled owing to the presence of SS troops in the area. London cabled (132) that if nothing had been delivered by Monday night than reception committees should arrange non-moon lighting at all grounds. A big electric light or motor-car lamp which could turn a complete circle could be used instead of a bonfire if necessary. It was regretted that bad weather had prevented operations. Would he give as soon as possible the approximate number of men willing to bear arms in the provinces of Utrecht and Gelderland (133)?
The Hague: German Security Reinforcement
RUMMY was advised (134) that loads had been delivered on two of his grounds on the previous night. RUMMY gave the location of a German transmission station (135) near Roermond and also the Headquarters of 112 German officers in the same area. RUMMY should warn resistance groups (136) to take extra precautions against penetration. It was understood that 2.000 Sicherheits Polizie were arriving at The Hague.
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Attack Planned on V-2 Plant
An urgent message was sent to RUMMY (137) asking if he could sabotage three liquid oxygen plants at Schiedam if suitable material was sent to him. Vital parts to attack were the compressors, expansion engines and fraction column. He could make a reconnaissance and if necessary ask the RVV for assistance. RUMMY replied that he could sabotage the three liquid oxygen plants (138) at Schiedam, provided the necessary materials were delivered. A message was sent to the Driehoek of the RVV, KP and OD (Triangle) via RUMMY (139) that London would try to send arms as soon as possible. RUMMY had made a reconnaissance of the oxygen factories (140) at Schiedam. They were not working hard for the Germans and it would be possible to sabotage them. RUMMY was warned (141) that Germans and traitors in liberated areas were using red and green recognition signals in connection with the dropping of parachute agents behind Allied lines.
RUMMY was advised (142) that London would be sending two containers with Limpits to the dropping ground Whisky (DRAUGHTS-1 also had a ground named Whisky).
These were for sinking blockade ships. In addition there would be two containers marked with a red cross, with material for attacking liquid oxygen plants. These attacks should be discussed with the Driehoek to ensure success.
London transmitted to RUMMY (143) a message from PRINCE BERNHARD to the Driehoek in which he asked for details of the number of active members of all organizations who were prepared to carry arms. Their task would not be to wage war but to aid the Allied troops and protect vital objectives against demolition by the enemy in so far as such action might be ordered by himself. RUMMY reported (144) the safe reception of stores on the ground Whisky. RUMMY was asked (145) to inform the Driehoek that LIEUTENANT HANS (DRAUGHTS-1), who was in touch with the Driehoek in Amsterdam, had been appointed liaison officer by PRINCE BERNHARD for that Area. In case of misunderstanding HANS had been dropped on the ground Mandrill. Containers and two men (146) (who) would be dropped (which ground) on September 30th. The reception committee should assist these men to get to Groningen as soon as possible. (van der Stok and Wiedemann were both SIS/BI agents. Wiedemann was W/T operator, ST. LEONARD. Dropping ground was near Middenmeer North-Holland. Couldn’t find telegrams about the dropping of those men sent by BACKGAMMON or received by DRAUGHTS-1)
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SCULLING / TURNIQUOITS (Contacting LO)
SCULLING’s training name was PLOEG but he would be known in the field as (Witte) DIRK (149). Messages had been received from the LANDELIJKE ORGANISATIE and the RAAD VAN VERZET to the effect that they were prepared to undertake resistance activities, in particular disruption of the Dutch railways and sabotage at the Volkel aereodrome. Although the LO might be safe there was doubt regarding the general security of the RVV and the OD. Directives from SHAEF were sent to the RVV in may and from that time onwards everybody in Holland appeared to be aware of those directives. The RVV had suggested certain sabotage plans, such as blowing up the power station at Dordrecht, and sabotaging the locks at Vreeswijk, but then they were told to undertake this they had produced excuses. This led to the belief that: -
1) The organization had been penetrated and the Gestapo were aware of their plans;
2) Communications channels were enemy-controlled;
3) The organizations were too large and widespread.
(149) Orders for Ploeg, dated July, 1944.
SCULLING (Sjeerp Postma) would get in touch with the LO through a contact given in his orders. He would explain to them that although it might be desirable politically to for the various organizations to work together, it was most important that the sabotage side should be kept separate from the political and intelligence groups. Failure to do this would lead to misunderstanding, penetration and a total failure of sabotage plans. Acts of sabotage should not be discussed with other groups. SHAEP alone would decide whether or not they were to be carried out. It would be SCULLING’s mission to collaborate with the LO. If the reports sent through his W/T operator were satisfactory, arrangements would be made to send sabotage instructors and operators. When established with the LO he would ask them to give their reports on the security of the RVV. If they considered the RVV to un-penetrated he would request them to ask the RVV for a special contact address to which sabotage instructors and W/T operators could be sent. SCULLING should make no contacts outside his own mission. Personnel previously sent to the field did not heed their instructions and in consequence were now in enemy hands. He would take with him 25.000 Dutch Guilders for delivery to the LO and a further 25.000 Guilders together with some propaganda material which he would hand to his initial contacts for delivery to the clandestine press. SCULLING would be dropped during the July/August moon period together with his W/T operator, KAREL Gerrit Reisiger). He would be responsible for installing his W/T operator in a safe house and later arranging safe houses from which he could transmit.
TURNIQUOITS’ training name was ROYEN. He would be known in the field as KAREL (150). He would go to Holland as W/T operator for DIRK (SCULLING) and would use his own discretion in all matters concerning his W/T work. DIRK had his own code and would be responsible for encoding and decoding his own messages. KAREL (Reisiger) would use his code only for reports relating to wireless matters and for the acknowledgement of broadcast messages. As he had not been in Holland for a considerable time (like Arie van Duyn), DIRK (Postma) would give him every assistance in establishing himself, and would see that he became thoroughly acclimatized and felt able to live on his own in the country without drawing attention to himself.
SCULLING and TURNIQUOITS were sent to the field on the night of August 7th, 1944 It was a blind drop and the operation was successful.
SCULLING - W/T Traffic
SCULLING sent his first message on August 31st, 1
On the first favourable night during the August/September moon period SHOOTING, HUNTING and CHARADES would be dropped together at a point to be explained prior to departure. The organization to which they were being sent would be responsible for installing them is a safe house and later, providing the W/T operator with safe houses from which he could transmit, each agent would carry 5.000 Dutch Guilders and 2.500 Belgian Francs for his own use. In addition SHOOTING and CHARADES would carry 25.000 Dutch Guilders to be handed over to their contacts. (All three were dropped near Voorthuizen, Gelderland on ground H79)
SHOOTING (Luijkenaar) would take a one-time-pad for his own use and would do all his own encoding and decoding. Messages should be kept as short as possible.
On the first, second and third days and the two Sundays following arrival in the field the BBC would broadcast a special message known to SHOOTING. By this means he would prove his bona fides. He would take with him a pigeon by which he could advise London of his safe landing.
HUNTING’s training name was MULDERS. He would be known in the field as KRIS (155). Together with SHOOTING (Luijkenaar) and CHARADES (Beekman), HUNTING (Hinderink) would be placed at the disposal of the RVV as a saboteur instructor. Material would be delivered as soon as satisfactory messages were received. HUNTING would take a one-time-pad for his own use and would encode and decode all his own messages.
CHARADES’ training name was BARENDS. He would be known in the field as MAURITS (156). CHARADES (Beekman)would bury his wireless sets on landing. They should be concealed at a spot which could be easily recognized, so that they could be collected by a fourth party if necessary. If he wished he could bury his revolver with the W/T sets. CHARADES would establish W/T contact with London as soon as he considered it safe to do so. He should always destroy immediately that part of his one-time-pad which had been used for a previous message. If he did this without exception the Gestapo would never be able to discover his security check. Records of messages exchanged with London should not be kept. He alone would judge the days on which he would transmit, He would also inform SHOOTING and HUNTING if he considered their messages too long or too numerous for safe handling.
(155) Orders for Hunting, dated August 24th , 1944.
(156) Orders for Charades, dated August 23rd , 1944
SHOOTING - W/T Traffic
Resistance Urged to Protect Vital Bridges
London cabled (157) details and instructions regarding the airborne operations at Arnhem. An order from PRINCE BERNHARD stated (158) that the bridges at Zaltbommel, Hedel, Den Bosch, Vechel, Breugel, Best and all bridges over the Wilhelmina canal and sluice gates at Culemborg and Vreeswijk were of great importance and must be kept open. The guards should be overpowered if possible and everything should be done to gain control of the bridges. It was realized that the underground movement was short of material, but the Allied High Command would like them to do everything within their power. All minefields should be clearly marked out with warning signs and the Allied troops should be supplied with all the information they desired. The same order was being sent to the RVV and the OD. SHOOTING (Luijkenaar) was asked (159) to cable London his exact location and to keep Headquarters informed of any changes. If run-over by Allied troops he should report as soon as possible to PRINCE BERNHARD’s Headquarters.
CHARADES - W/T Traffic
In his first message (160) CHARADES (Beekman) reported his safe arrival. His own set was broken, but he had received a B Mk II set from DUDLEY (Austin). He was working for the dropping ground Groote Jan (161) (Ground Groote Jan is situated near river Vecht between Ommen and Marienberg).
LODEWIJK (Luijkenaar) was helping at the ground Kleine Jan;
KRIS (Hinderink) was in Twente. London gave details (162) of the broadcast plan for the following three months. CHARADES reported (163) that he could not find the Home Station nor could he pick up any broadcasts. He asked for 500 Stens on the dropping ground Groote Jan (164). He was operating an S-Phone himself but doubted whether the apparatus was working properly. Would London send a supply of pistols?
(157) 1 to Shooting via Wensum of 17.9.44
(158) 2 to Shooting via Wensum of 17.9.44
(159) 3 to Shooting via Wensum of 18.9.44
Sein onmiddellijk waar u zich bevindt en houdt ons op de hoogte van veranderingen stop Indien u of uw medewerkers aan militaire afdeelingen of brigades verbonden bent komma sein wie en aan welke afdeelingen of brigades verbonden punt Indien localiteit waar u bent bevrijd wordt komma moet u zich spoedigst melden bij hoofdkwartier Prins Bernhard stop
(160) Charades via Wensum 1 of 15.9.44
1 stop Alles OK stop Eigen zenders kapot stop Ontving B mark two van Dudley stop Groeten aan familie Maurits Vroomshoop Overijssel stop
(161) Charades via Wensum 2 of 27.9.44
(162) 3 to Charades via Wensum of 28.9.44
Your number three stop We will broadcast to you during October, November and December as shown in your microprint of night plan at nought nought three three nought repeat nought nought three three nought hours GMT using frequencies three five six two repeat three five six two and four two two seven point five repeat four two two seven point five Kcs stop Indicator that message is intended for you is five Robert seven repeat five R for Robert seven stop Confirm is all now clear stop
(163) Charades via Wensum 3 of 28.9.44
3 stop Kan jullie niet vinden en ontving geen berichten per broadcast stop
(164) Charades via Wensum 4 of 1.10.44
Frequentie zes drie negen vijf is kapot stop Ben zelf S-Phone operator doch betwijfel of onze Phone goed werkt stop Stuur tevens pistolen stop