SOE WAR DIARIES JULY 1944 - SEPTEMBER 1944 PART I.
I - GENERAL
A THIRD MISSION TO THE FIELD
Since the beginning of 1944 information had been accumulating in London concerning an organization known as the LO (Landelijke Organisatie) which had started in 1940 as a group aiding escaped prisoners of war, and as there were available in London three men who had been working for the RVV in touch with the LO, a third mission was prepared to contact this side of the RVV and at the same time establish a link with the Dutch underground press (1).
State of the underground movement in the summer of 1944.
In spite of the high level penetration of the OD (Orde Dienst) in 1941 and 1942, this organization continued to function in various towns during the following years. Although its original purpose was the establishment of a secret army, it later developed into a more passive organization drawn from the intellectuals and ex-Army officers. Its objectives were to embarrass the enemy during their retreat and to establish order during the transition period which would follow.
The RVV had expanded and developed during the winter of 1943-1944 and it was in contact with the OD and also with the Centrum Sabotage 6 (CS-6) - a small but active sabotage organization of which little has been heard since the middle of 1944.The RVV was also in touch with the LO. In Addition it had connections with another indigenous sabotage organization known as the KP (Knok Ploeg).
Quite independently of these organizations, the Dutch underground press “Trouw” and “Vrij Nederland” had been functioning throughout the early years of the occupation, but by 1944 had been approached by the other resistance groups, who were of assistance in supplying money in return for co-operation.
Departure of the third mission.
It was in this intermingled complex of underground movements that the three SOE agents, Known as PODEX (Mulholland), RUMMY (de Goede) and CRIBBAGE (van Duyn), were infiltrated in August 1944. This third mission found on arrival a fairly extensive organization in the west and south-west of Holland, and they therefore set about re-organizing it to fit with Allied plans. The leader of the team was RUMMY, a young man who, before escaping from Holland in February 1944, had been in touch with underground press organizations in Rotterdam and The Hague. PODEX, before escaping from Holland had been in touch with the KP in Holland and through them with the RVV. The three agents were therefore instructed to contact the RVV in the Rotterdam area.
(1) Security report on SOE organizations in Holland, August 1944 - February 194
Achievement of unified control.
In view of the considerable uncertainty which existed in London concerning German knowledge of Dutch resistance, the mission was dropped blind at Ede near RUMMY’s home. During September PODEX successfully set up his link with the RVV and saw that RUMMY would serve a more useful purpose in Rotterdam as a KP liaison officer, as it was clear that from SOE’s point of view the KP would produce the most valuable dividend.
Their W/T operator, CRIBBAGE (van Duyn), was therefore recalled from The Hague and was almost immediately placed in contact with FRANK (Johannes van Beijnen), who was the leader of the KP. RUMMY (de Goede) discovered that the three organizations were functioning in Rotterdam; - the OD, which still existed rather passively under the charge of VAN SANTEN ( J.P. Six); the RVV which was better organized, but ill-led by a person named LANGE JAN (Jan Thijssen); and the KP which under FRANK’s leadership was well organized and had among its members a number of able enthusiasts who were, however, more men of action than of brains. To this, however, FRANK was an exception. He realized that to undertake any co-ordinated effort the three organizations should be amalgamated. At meetings between the three bodies, attended by RUMMY and CRIBBAGE, a provisional agreement for a merger was formulated, but owing to intense internal rivalry no decision was reached as to who should be the leader.
Finally, at the end of September, courier was sent to PRINCE BERNHARD, who was established as head of the NORTHAW mission in liberated Holland, setting out the results of the discussions. The courier was WITTE PIET ( Piet de Beer, SNOOKER). Almost immediately a reply was received from the Prince authorizing FRANK to be the joint leader. This however was not acceptable either to the RVV or the OD, and the latter organization, probably because of its higher intellectual character, won the day and themselves chose a leader, a man of military experience named VAN DEN OEVER (Henri Koot). Both LANGE JAN (Thijssen) and FRANK (van Beijnen) agreed to this nomination and VAN DEN OEVER, under the title of Delta C, established himself in Amsterdam. He renamed the combined movement the “Nederlandse Binnenlandse Strijdkrachten” (the NBS), but his amalgamation did not prevent each group retaining its individuality at low levels, or reduce jealousy.
THE UNDERGROUND MOVEMENT APPEALS FOR ARMS
The following telegram was received from the field through SIS (BI) channels: -
“OD KP AND RVV AGAIN PRESS THE URGENCY OF SENDING WEAPONS ON ACCOUNT OF THE TOTAL ABSENCE OF SUITABLE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION STOP ALSO TO PREVENT THE CATASTROHICAL DESTRUCTION PREPARED BY THE ENEMY AND IN ADDITION FOR THE EXECUTION OF SABOTAGE PROJECTS HIGH COMMAND IT IS VITAL WE RECEIVE WEAPONS NOW STOP WE COLLECTIVELY PASS TO THE GOVERNMENT THIS GREAT RESPONSEBILITY”
Arrangements were made (2) to supply arms to Dutch resistance by means of normal air operations, and by special landing operations to Brussels.
(2) MG/4057 of 21.9.44
Normal air operations were limited, since for various reasons Bomber Command was unable to agree to aircraft based at Tempsford operating to Holland during the non-moon period, and 38 Group was available only to a very limited extend owing to Airborne commitments. Nevertheless it was expected that 30 sorties per week would be carried out to Holland. Arrangements had been made for two tons of stores a day to be sent to Army Maintenance depots at Brussels, commencing on September 23rd, 1944 By this means Dutch resistance groups, when overrun, could be supplied from these forward dumps and would then be able to assist the Army in guarding its flanks or its lines of communications. It was hoped to increase the rate of supply of these arms. Even if unlimited aircraft were available to supply resistance in Holland these could not be use owing to limitations of reception. In the whole of Holland reception would limit operations to some 80 sorties per week, of which, in the area of Rotterdam, sorties would be limited to 16 per week. Thus, were the aircraft available, it would still be impossible to send sufficient arms to Dutch resistance to enable it to prevent the catastrophical destruction prepared by the enemy, either in Rotterdam or in the remainder of Holland.
Weekly reports for the period July - September give the following record of stores deliveries to the field: July - nil, August - nil. Weeks ending September 4th 36 containers, 7 packages - September 12th 60 containers, 8 packages - September 18th 42 containers, 3 packages (3) - September 25th 213 containers, 7 packages.
RETURNED FRENCH AGENT IDENTIFIES DUTCH PRISONERS IN SILESIAN CAMP.
CAPTAIN ROUSSET, a French agent who had been confined in a prison camp at Rawicz, in Selesia, from April 19th to May 12th, 1944, was interviewed in London by CAPTAIN MILLS of the Dutch Country Section on September 12th, 1944 (4). During the time he was in the camp, CAPTAIN ROUSSET saw at least 50 Dutchmen who were imprisoned there together with French, British and Polish agents. Although imprisonment involved almost solitary confinement, there were occasions when prisoners were marched round a square for 15 minutes exercise and ROUSSET, apart from recognizing several Dutchmen whom he had met at training schools here, was able to identify several more from photographs shown to him by MILLS. Conditions in the camp, which was an old penitentiary building, were very bad. For some reason the Dutch were treated better than the others, whilst, as usual, the Poles were treated worst. The Dutch seemed to be in reasonably good spirits, though naturally ROUSSET never had any opportunity of conversing with them freely.
(1) 18 containers and 2 packages were later reported by Rummy to have fallen into German hands.
(2) N/KU/1083 of 6.10.44
It is of interest to note that all prisoners were dressed alike, irrespective of nationality or rank. Their dress was blue, consisting of a sort of blouse and throusers, vaguely similar to a battle dress. On the right arm there was a large ”I” whilst on the back of the blouse was shown the prisoner’s number. Prisoners were told that, so far as status was concerned they could expect to be treated as prisoners of war, but ROUSSET very much doubted whether this convention would be observed. From the photographs shown him - which covered all SOE Dutch agents, apart from those too recently sent to be of any possible interest - ROUSSET identified the following as being at this camp Rawicz:
| Andringa, L.
| Arendse, P.A.
| Beukema toe Water, K.W.A.
| Boogaard, P.C.
| Buizer, J.J.C.
| Dane, J.C.
|| CUCUMBER A
| Drooglever-Fortuyn, C.
| Grün, J.
| Hofstede, J.
|| TOMATO A
| Jambroes, G.L.
| Kist, J.
| Koolstra, M
|| CELERY A
| Lauwers, H.M.G.
| Macare, H.M.
|| CELERY C
| Mink, A.B.
| Os, van G.
|| van Oostrom
| Pals, M
| Rouwerd, F.W.
| Ruseler, G.L.
| Steeksma, H.R.
|| CELERY B
| Steen, van
|| van Sittard
|Wilden, van der P.
|Wilden, van der W.
In concentration camp Mauthausen in Austria the following agents arrived on September 7th 1944.
This according to the Konzentrationslager Mauthausen Schutshaftlinglagerschreibstube:
|| RAS, Gozewindt
|| ANDRINGA, Leo
|| TACONIS, Thijs
|| JAMBROES, Georg
|| MINK, Anton
|| OS van, Heyrard
|| STEEKSMA, Horst Reinhold
|| UYTVANCK van, Ivo
|| RUSSELER, George
|| SEBES, Hendrik
|| KAMPHORST, Pieter
|| KOOLSTRA, Meindert
|| BOOGEART, Peter
|| EMMER, Jan
|| HAAS de, Johannes
|| DROOGLEVER-FORTYUN, Cornelis
|| BUKKENS, Joseph
|| BUIZER, Johannes
|| PALS, Michel
|| DANE, Johannes
|| WILDEN van der, Willem
|| KLOOSS, Barend
|| PUNT, Lorenz
|| BAATSEN, Arnoldus
|| HULSTEYN van, Cornelis
|| BEUKEMA toe WATER, Karl
|| ARENDSE, Pieter Arnoldus
|| JONGELIE, Roelof Christiaan
|| BOR van der, Klaas
|| WEGNER, Antonius
|| BRAGGAAR, Cornelis Carel
|| HOFSTEDE, Jan
|| KRUYFF de, Ari Johannes
|| WILDEN van der, Pieter
|| BREY de, Georges
When the group arrived at Mauthausen, they had to write these numbers on torso, legs and arms, they did't know why at the time.
This became very clear after the first part of the group had been executed by machine-gun fire.
II - RESISTANCE GROUPS
CRICKET - GERMAN OPERATED Cricket& Curling were arrested on the 19th May, 1944
London reminded CRICKET (Tony Cnoops) (5) that his contact address was still awaited. As a special exception would he have any objection to seeing a Russian officer who was serving with the German forces? London believed him to be trustworthy but CRICKET would have to take extra precaution in case of trickery by the Gestapo. The Russian would give the password “Baku” and CRICKET would reply “Birmingham”. The Russian would explain everything.
(1) 24 to Cricket via Swale of 4.7.44
CRICKET (Tony Cnoops) must ensure (6) that his operator (Huub Sanders, CURLING, plan Swale) did not handle too much traffic. His dropping grounds were now being considered and details of operations would be sent the following day. What was the condition and morle of the German troops in Holland? London understood from other sources that this was declining rapidly elsewhere. CRICKET sent (7) two dropping points and a contact address in The Hague. HENK (who is he?) understood London’s objections to forming new groups. He would not therefore start anything for the time being but nevertheless he would be in a position to form one or two groups in the coastal area should Headquarters wish this to be done. HENK’s groups were absolutely reliable (8). Those in Leeuwarden en Groningen wished to receive supplies and were many strong patrols and observation posts in the area north and west of Leeuwarden. CRICKET was prepared to follow London’s instructions regarding the Russian officer (9) and would take all necessary precautions. Minefields had been laid recently along both sides of the entrance to IJmuiden Harbor (10), even far out at sea. The mines were carried along the canal in ordinary canal boats. The population of North-Brabant was being forced to erect logs in the province of Zeeland (11). These logs were from ten to twenty five centimeters thick and up to four meters high. They were intended to give protection against landing of planes. The guards on the road between The Hague and Utrecht had been strengthened during the last few days. Soldiers in observation posts continually watched the sky and horizon with field glasses (12). London replied (13) accepting CRICKET’s grounds numbers three and four. The reception committees should stand by from 8th to the 10th July inclusive, from midnight until 2 am CRICKET reported (14) that a special German pioneer section was stationed at Heelsum near Wageningen. The officers had their quarters in the local hotels in one of which a large number of rubber boats was stored.
CRICKET would see (15) that the reception committees were standing by at the appropriate times. A reinforced concrete bunker with walls two meters thick had been build (16) in the vicinity of Driebergen railway station. This was to become the battle headquarters of a general.
London regretted (17) that the stores dropping operation had been cancelled another the crack signal had gone out, owing to weather conditions at base. Another attempt would be made on the next night - the last opportunity in the current moon period. CRICKET (Tony Cnoops) reported (18) “great movements” of troops along the Dutch coast. New forces were being brought up from the Reich. He would not judge whether these were for relief or reinforcement.
(6) 26 to Cricket via Swale of 4.7.44
(7) Cricket via Swale 50 and 51 of 4.7.44
(8) Cricket via Swale 52 of 4.7.44
(9) Cricket via Swale 53 of 4.7.44
(10) Cricket via Swale 54 of 4.7.44
(11) Cricket via Swale 56 of 5.7.44
(12) Cricket via Swale 57 of 5.7.44
(13) 27 to Cricket via Swale of 6.7.44
(14) Cricket via Swale 58 of 7.7.44
(15) Cricket via Swale 59 of 7.7.44
(16) Cricket via Swale 60 of 8.7.44
(17) 29 to Cricket via Swale of 9.7.44
(18) Cricket via Swale 61 of 10.7.44
HENK and his men were rather agitated as weapons were badly needed (19). CRICKET asked London to do their best for that night. London “regretted” (20) that the aircraft for ground three had been unable to take off at the last minute. The pilot for the ground four operation reported that no lights had been seen. Had the reception committee been there or had something gone wrong? London appreciated HENK’s agitation but arms could not be delivered if his men were not there to receive them. He would now have to wait till the next period. CRICKET was thanked for his news of troops movements but in future he should give their markings whenever possible. CRICKET regretted (21) that he and HENK and his men had again waited in vain. They had expressed great disappointment and marked distrust. To smooth things over he would give to section commanders a course of special instruction in subversive activities until the next moon period. CRICKET reported (22) that the reception committees had been ready on both grounds. He had been on ground four. The agreed signals had been given when he heard aeroplane engines at agreat height. The plane had remained above the clouds so that the pilot had not been able to see the signals (*) CRICKET reported (23) that the following troops could be identified with certainty:- at Leiden the 506th Division; The Hague and Delft, SS forces; in the Dordrecht area, the 719th Division; at Tilburg and Breda, a new tank Division. The Russian officer had not presented himself so far (24) or perhaps he had called when nobody was at home. Could an approximate time for his call be stated so that he could find somebody at the contact address?
The V-1 was a “trump card” for the German soldiers (25) Their morale had not deteriorated and they did not take a critical attitude towards events. German tank crews in the Tilburg-Breda area were well disciplined. London reported (26) that the Russian officer should have contacted CRICKET (Tony Cnoops) by that time. The contact address and password had been sent to him while he was in France. He might have been delayed en route but in any case CRICKET should not contact him personally unless he was satisfied that everything was in order. He should advise London when he had seen the Russian.
CRICKET reported (27) that in the course of his instruction of HENK’s section commanders he had become convinced that it would be useful to place instructors from London at their disposal. Did London consider this a good idea?
(*) The reported presence of a plane above the dropping ground (if true) was naturally a coincidence, since no plane had of course been sent to this German-controlled reception committee.
(19) Cricket via Swale 62 of 10.7.44
(20) 30 to Cricket via Swale of 11.7.44
(21) Cricket via Swale 63 of 11.7.44
(22) Cricket via Swale 64 of 12.7.44
(23) Cricket via Swale 65 of 14.7.44
(24) Cricket via Swale 66 of 16.7.44
(25) Cricket via Swale 67 of 17.7.44
(26) 31 to cricket via Swale of 17.7.44
(27) Cricket via Swale 68 of 17.7.44
London was amazed (28) at CRICKET’s news regarding the German faith in their new toy, but this was understandable in view of the lies that they were told by their “misleaders”. He could truthfully tell his friend and HENK that the Allied war effort was unaffected and the military value of V-1 was nil. CRICKET was thanked for news regarding troop movements. CRICKET (Tony Cnoops) gave three new dropping points in his next two telegrams (29). London cabled (30) that it was obviously necessary for CRICKET to receive instructors in due course. How many did he require and for which areas? His dropping points were being examined and it was hoped to let him have a decision shortly. CRICKET replied (31) that he and his friends never believed that that “toy” had any military value. He was glad that London’s information confirmed theit opinion. HENK and his men could hardly wait for the beginning of the moon period, so eager were they to receive their material. CRICKET reported (32) an extraordinarily strong concentration of troops in the area of the Schelde estuary. He cabled details of troops stationed in the Antwerp area. CRICKET suggested (33) that London should first send four instructors - one for the Leeuwarden and Groningen groups; one for the Biesbosch groups; and two for the remaining areas. Would London let him know as soon as possible whether his pinpoints were suitable? This would leave him time to find others if necessary.
London closed the bluff traffic with the following telegram (34):
“WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR MESSAGE OF APRIL FIRST (35) WE HAVE TRIED YOUR AGENCY ONCE MORE BUT CONSIDER IT TO BE SO TERRIBLE INEFFICIENT AS TO WARRANT OUR CHANGING FOR GOOD STOP PLEASE DO NOT WORRY ABOUT ENTERTAINMENT AS THAT MATTER WILL BE IN OUR HANDS AND NOW HAVING A DETAILED LIST OF YOY ALL YOU MAY REST ASSURED THAT IT WILL HARDLY BE PINPOINTS.”
(28) 32 to Cricket via Swale of 17.7.44
(29) Cricket via Swale 69 & 70 of 19.7.44
(30) 33 to Cricket via Swale of 21.7.44
(31) Cricket via Swale 71 of 21.7.44
(32) Cricket via Swale 72 & 73 of 22.7.44
(33) Cricket via Swale 74 of 24.7.44
(34) 34 to Cricket via Swale of 24.7.44
(35) See page 174.
CURLING - GERMAN OPERATED
CURLING (Huub Sanders) complained (36) that the Home Station broadcast transmission was weak, but London replied (37) that this probably due to local disturbance. CURLING reported (38) that TONY (CRICKET - German operated) had waited in vain at the reception ground the previous night and hoped London would carry the operation through that night. CURLING was disappointed (39) that nothing had been done in the current moon period. He had therefore been unable to commence training his new operator.
London hoped (40) for better luck in the next period. CURLING said that the new W/T operator, whom he was training, was a little impatient (41) but otherwise he was ready and keen to start.
(36) Swale 24 of 4.7.44
(37) 17 to Swale of 5.7.44
(38) Swale 26 of 10.7.44
(39) Swale 27 of 14.7.44
(40) 19 to Swale of 15.7.44
(41) Swale 28 of 19.7.44
Huub Sanders (CURLING)
Tony Cnoops (CRICKET) escaped from Sachenhausen 25.04.1945
FIVERS, RAQUETS, BOWLS & HALMA (Contact with RVV)
This agent training name was PIETER KRANT. He would be known in the field as BAREND (42). The RAAD VAN VERZET was an organization which had played an active part in underground activities in Holland. Some of its cells had been penetrated from time to time but it was believed that the main executive was still sound. A mission had been sent to the field on April 1st, 1944 (43) to approach the RVV and give them Allied Commander’s directive for future action. The RVV were very security minded and would not interview our man until they had satisfied themselves that all was well. When they were eventually received by the RVV it was too late, because contrary to instructions, they had contacted several organizations, were known to the Gestapo and were arrested between May 17th and 20th. The RVV had reported the arrests, and had asked for a new man.
FIVES (Pieter Jacob Kwint) would establish contact with the RVV through an address given in his orders. The person at this address would put him in touch with the head s of the RVV. FIVES would inform them that his mission was to act as a saboteur instructor or reception committee leader, depending on their immediate requirements. He would always observe the security instructions given him by the RVV and in no circumstances would he reveal to anyone, other than his contacts, the fact that he had come from England. His cover story could always be that of an “onderduiker” but nothing more. He must never make contacts with other organizations or persons unless these were arranged by the RVV. The men who went to Holland on April 1st had all made these mistakes, hence their arrest. He should be patient, because the RVV would not tolerate mistakes through imprudence to the detriment of hundreds of other men. He would assist the RVV and advise them in all matters on which he had received instructions in this country.
He should insist that the RVV must arrange for his safe house in Holland. He should also see to it that the RVV set up their sabotage organization in such a way that it would never clash with other compromise their other activities. He should not overburden his W/T operator with messages, neither should he pass intelligence reports to London. If such information was required he would be asked for it.
(42) Orders for Fives, dated June 26th, 1944
(43) See page 174
July - September 1944, page 195
On the first favourable night in the July moon period FIVES, RAQUETS, BOWLS & HALMA would be dropped together by parachute in Holland at a point to be explained to them prior to their departure. They would each carry with them 5.000 Guilders for their personal use and als0 2.500 French Francs and 2.500 Belgium Francs for use in case of an emergency. In addition FIVES (Kwint) and RAQUETS (Verhoef) would each carry 25.000 Guilders. This total amount - 50.000 Dutch Guilders - was for the RVV. It would be handed over only when somebody from the RVV asked for it. Although he would be given 50.000 Guilders the man would ask for 50.001. This was simply a check to ensure that the money went to the right person. FIVES would have his own one-time-pad and would do all his encoding and decoding. He would not send his message direct to his W/T operator but would pass them through the RVV. He would never show his codes to anyone else and he would also destroy that part of his one-time-pad which had been used for past messages. If he did not do this and was caught by the Gestapo they would not only be able to decode his past messages but would also find out his correct secret number. Records of messages exchanged with London should not be kept. On the first, second and third days and the two Sundays following his arrival a message known to him would be broadcast by the BBC. This would serve to prove his bona fides. He would take with him a pigeon by which he could send a message advising London of his safe landing.
RAQUETS training name was L. VORSTMAN. He would be known in the field as EITJES (44).
RAQUETS (Pleun Verhoef) would establish contact with the RVV through the address given in his orders. He would then be put in touch with the heads of the RVV to whom he would state that his mission was to act as saboteur instructor, or reception committee leader, according to their immediate requirements. He would be dropped with FIVES (Kwint), BOWLS (Walter) & HALMA (Bockma)on the first favourable night in the July moon period. RAQUETS had been trained in the use of the Eureka set. Two Eureka’s were being dropped to an RVV reception Committee. It would be part of RAQUETS’ mission to claim these two sets from the RVV and put them into operation at pinpoints which would be cabled to him by London. Owing to his other activities it might be impossible for him to operate the sets continually throughout the moon period. He would therefore consult the RVV with a view to recruiting and training two men to do nothing else but operate the sets. The object of this special mission was to assist the RAF in its dropping operations in Holland and bombing operations in Germany. It might be necessary to have the sets switched on during every night of the moon period. Operators would therefore see that they had spare accumulators so that the Eureka’s could be in constant use if necessary.
(44) Orders for Raquets, dated June 6th, 1944
BOWLS’ training name was Johannes Albertus WEES. He would be known in the field as ALBERTUS (45). On establishing contact with the RVV BOWLS (Johannes Albertus Walter) would inform them that his mission was to act as W/T operator for their sabotage organization for all its communication with London. They must not involve him in their other activities and they must use only the special code on the one-time-pad which BOWLS would hand to them and teach them how to use. He must insist that the RVV arrange for his safe houses in Holland and houses from which he could transmit. The RVV were at present sending their messages through a separate organization called the RADIODIENST, but he would inform the RVV that all their messages relating to active resistance and sabotage should come through his channels and not those of the RADIODIENST. He would take with him an extra W/T plan and a small code for the use of a new operator, if either he or the RVV could find a man who was considered to be absolutely trustworthy. BOWLS could train him and advise London when he was ready to operate. BOWLS’ own messages would be confined to technical matters. In addition he would once a week send a short message giving the broadcast numbers of the messages he had received in the previous week. He would keep to his skeds in accordance with his W/T plan and would never ask for more contacts than was necessary. If he felt he was handling too much traffic he would inform the RVV immediately so that they could reduce the number or length of their messages. He would change his houses of transmission as frequently as possible.
(45) Orders for Bowls, date June 27th, 1944
HALMA’s training name was Jan BOREL. BOWLS (Jan Bockma) would be known in the field as HUBERTUS (46). He would inform the RVV that his mission was to act as W/T operator for their sabotage organization in all its communications with London. His own messages would be confined to technical matters. FIVES, RAQUETS, BOWLS & HALMA left for the field on the night of July 5th, 1944 Their aircraft did not return, and the four men were presumed to be dead (47). On July 28th, 1944, a message was received on BOWLS’ code and RIBBLE plan, purporting to be sent clandestinely by an anti-Nazi who had been forced to help the Gestapo in their counter-espionage work. He reported the deaths by drowning of FIVES, BOWLS and HALMA. The traffic was regarded by London (48) to keep it open. Although there was thought to be little chance of the man proving genuine, yet his cables might yield useful information.
BOWLS (? GERMAN OPERATED) - W/T Traffic (the SASKIA Game)
BOWLS cabled (49) as follows: -
“HAVE BEEN OVER 15 YEARS IN ARGENTINA AND USA WAS PRESSED INTO SERVICE WITH THE GESTAPO AT WAR BEGIN WHILE VISITING IN GERMANY AND AMONG OTHERS GOT TO BE ENTRUSTED WITH TRANSLATING YOUR AGRENTS MATERIALS REGISTERING AND FILING PICKED UP AGENTS SENDING SETS STOP HAVE SINCE LEARNED SIGS IN (GABI-THAVILDWU) BEEN LOOKING FOR A CONTCT CHANCE AS I GOT UTMOSTLY DISGUSTED WITH THIS DAMNED HITLERISM AND LIFE AMONGST THESE IDIOTS HAVE JUST BEEN TRANSLATING MATERIAL FROM THREE OF YOUR AGENTS WHO WERE FOUND DROWNED ON JULY 14 AT MAKKUM AM CONSIDERED STUPID ENOUGH TO BE HARMLESS SHALL SHOW THEM WANT TO HELP AND WORK WITH YOU GIVE ME A CHANCE PLEASE I SHALL PROVE MY SINCERITY STOP WHAT MUST YOU KNOW ABOUT ME TP PROVE MYSELF SHALL COME BACK THIRTY FIRST AT PRESCRIBED TIME AND AWAIT YOUR ANSWER THEN”
No checks were used in this message.
London asked (50) the operator of BOWLS’ set to supply his full name, date of birth and the dates of his residence in Argentina and the USA. Also required were the identity of the three agents found at Makkum, the number of the set on which he was transmitting, and details of arrested agents sent from England in the last six months. BOWLS should number his messages and keep them short. BOWLS replied (51) giving his name as JOHANN BLANKE. He was born on June 20th, 1904 in Leipzig. He had worked in Buenos Aires from 1922 to 1926 and in New York and Boston from 1926 to 1938. The dead agents were PIETER NIJHOF (FIVES), JOHANNES KAMP (BOWLS) and JAN BOERSMA (HALMA). Crystals but no sets had been found. Could it be arranged for him to send and receive between 13.00 and 15.00 hrs local time every second or third day as this would be more convenient? BOWLS (Johannes Blanke) cabled (52) that since he had been doing translation work he had heard of HENDRIK LETTEBOER (HEINTJE), arrested on February 3rd, 1944; GERARD van BOSSUM-BUISMAN (GERARD) arrested on February 5th; MARTIN VELDKAMP, arrested on May 8th; NICOLAAS CELOSSE (FARO), arrested on May 20th; JOSEPH ADRIAANSE, arrested on July 14th; and MICHEL (?JIDEMAM) arrested on July 18th.
(46) Orders for Halma, dated June 22nd, 1944
(47) BSS/KV/1660 of 4.8.44
(48) CX/22666/E33 of 11.8.44
(49) Bowls srl B2493/1 of 27.7.44
(50) 1 to Bowls via Ribble of 1.8.44
(51) Bowls via Ribble 2 of 1.8.44
(52) Bowls via Ribble 3 of 3.8.44
It was extremely dangerous to continue using his present set and code for any length of time as he would positively get caught at a sudden check up. Was there any chance of obtaining another set, code transmission plan and poem? London thanked (53) him for the names of the arrested men, but his list was not complete and in order to gain London’s confidence he should give particulars or code names of W/T sets working with London and which were known to be in Gestapo hands.
His dangerous position was appreciated and he should keep his transmissions to a minimum. When London was satisfied a scheme would be worked out for delivering new materials.
BOWLS (Johannes Blanke) pointed out (54) that his list was incomplete because he was not the only interpreter engaged on this work; he could name only those agents with whom he had been concerned. Their W/T sets were not being worked with London at the moment, though this had been the case a few months ago with LETTEBOER (survived) and van BORSSUM-BUISMAN. It was intended to work with CELOSSE (executed 5.9.44, Vught), but he proved too difficult. BOWLS would try to get information about other agents. London cabled (55) that recent reports suggested that death sentences had been passed on a large number of Dutch prisoners at Haren. Could he say when these executions were likely to take place and if any of the captives he had mentioned were included? Where did he get the Mark II set number 2838 and to what operator had it belonged? What did he mean when he said he was an interpreter? What did he think of the identity cards found on the man drowned at Makkum? Were there any faults and if so, what were they? BOWLS replied (56) that VAN BORSSUM-BUISMAN (escaped) and TONNET (escaped) had been sentenced to death. ADRIAANSE (executed 5.9.44, Vught) had exposed the agents ( ? ANDRIEKORS) and WEERING. Could he give no further details of three other arrested agents - VAN DER STOK (died in prison), SEIJBEN (PING PONG, survived) and PIET DE JONGE. The set in question belonged to CELOSSE, who stated that his operator (Aart Penning, SKITTLES) did not parachute (57) and that his reports were sent via the RADIODIENST of the RVV. The Gestapo was planning a “clean-up” stroke against this RADIODIENST and its chief JAN KAREL (Jan Thijssen) He would make investigations concerning the identity cards, which were rather damaged by water. London thanked BOWLS (58) for his information concerning the RADIODIENST and asked to be kept informed of ant German measures which might be taken or planned. Information regarding proceedings against the agents he had named would also be welcomed.
BOWLS (Johannes Blanke) stated (59) that the prisoners in Haaren had been removed to Germany on July 1st . He could not establish whether sentences had already been carried out. PIET de JONGE had been sentenced to death. Proceedings against the others had not yet been started. In what proceedings was London interested? He would inform London as soon as he heard of any action by the Gestapo against the RADIODIENST.
(53) 3 to Bowls via Ribble of 4.8.44
(54) Bowls via Ribble 5 of 9.8.44
(55) 4 to Bowls via Ribble of 11.8.44
(56) Bowls via Ribble 6 of 14.8.44
(57) See page
(58) 5 to Bowls via Ribble of 15.8.44
(59) Bowls via Ribble 7 of 19.8.44
London replied (60) that all trials were of interest. Why had proceedings not been taken against those men who had been arrested at the same time as BORSSUM-BUISMAN? With regards to the RADIODIENST he should if possible warn London before any German action was taken. In any case he should cable at once when any member of this organization had been arrested. Why had action not yet been taken against the RADIODIENST? An explanation on this point would be welcome. Had ADRIAANSEN betrayed everything at his interrogation or had information been gathered from the papers found on him?
(61) Bowls via Ribble 9 of 25.8.44
BOWLS (Johannes Blanke) stated (62) that he could give no further information regarding the identity cards found on the men washed up at Makkum. These cards had been so badly damaged by water that even the photographs were only partly recognizable. He had not yet been able to ascertain why no proceedings had been taken against the persons arrested at the time as BORSSUM-BUISMAN. He understood however that proceedings would be instituted in the near future. According to his information the Gestapo had agents in the RADIODIENST who presumably knew nothing about activities of London agents. ADRIAANSEN had betrayed the other agents. How had BOWLS learned to use the code he was now employing (63)? Would he give the name of the firm with which he worked in Buenos Aires? London appreciated his difficulty (63) in regard to the identity cards taken from the men washed up at Makkum. What, however, was his opinion of the identity cards taken out from England by other agents who had since been arrested? Where were the present SD Headquarters and who were the leading personalities of the various SD departments in Holland? BOWLS cabled (64) that he might have to spend about two weeks in Germany in the near future, If so he would get in touch with London again on his return,
(62) 7 to Bowls via Ribble of 28.8.44
(63) 8 to Bowls via Ribble of 28.8.44
(64) Bowls via Ribble 10 of 30.8.44
PODEX, RUMMY & CRIBBAGE (Contact with CS-6 and RVV)
PODEX (Len Mulholland) training name was SANDERS. He would be known in the field as GERARD (65). Information had reached London concerning several underground movements in Holland. The aspect of these organizations changed frequently - often weekly - and part of them might have been penetrated by the enemy. PODEX would be sent to Holland for the purpose of establishing contacts with underground movements there and reporting to London on their security and requirements.
(65) Orders for Podex, dated June 27th, 1944
PODEX (Len Mulholland) would be given an address through which he could get into touch with CS-6 and the RVV. In addition he would carry out the mission to MULDERS which had been unsuccessfully attempted last May (66). The aircraft in which POKER (Dekkers) and FOOTBALL (Kuenen) had been sent had not returned and it was presumed that these two men had been lost. PODEX should be careful however, in the case of the two men had not been killed but had fallen into German hands. They might then have disclosed details of their mission and contacts. PODEX position was one of importance and should not be endangered by the contacts which he might make with one of these organizations. His address should be kept secret from all members of underground movements. He had been given “side contacts” with these organizations, thereby enabling him to communicate with them should he wish to do so - bearing in mind however that every security precaution should be taken in case these “side contacts” had been penetrated. It was imperative that he should establish contact with HQ in London as soon as possible and give the fullest possible information on the state of Dutch resistance. He should regard his work as a security mission and his reports would enable London to check information received from other sources. (Who were those source? Most likely SIS agents)
He (Mulholland) was authorized to build up a small organization of his own, but it was imperative that even the members of his own organisation should not be aware of his private address or addresses. Decisions which he would take should be discussed jointly with RUMMY (de Goede). Both PODEX and RUMMY had the same orders and these should be carried out in close collaboration. It was most important however that they should not travel or walk together. Should either of them hear of other agents of the London organization they should make no attempt to contact them directly. Should they wish to get in touch with them, this should be done through a cut-out (in-between). As soon as possible after arrival PODEX should arrange for at least three post boxes through which other organizations would be able to send messages for London in their own codes through PODEX’s W/T operator (van Duyn). It was important that this system should be contrived in such a manner that the arrest of PODEX or his operator would not be possible in the event of post boxes falling into enemy hands. It might be possible for PODEX to give information concerning enemy movements. He should, however, bear in mind that this was not his primary mission. He would take steps to organize a reception committee te receive such stores as he might need. He would be dropped on the first favourable night of the July moon period together with LEO (RUMMY) and THEODORE (CRIBBAGE) - his W/T operator. PODEX and RUMMY would then make the necessary contacts. In the meantime PODEX would arrange for his W/T operator to go to a safe address and he should keep in touch with him through a system of cut-outs. It would be well if neither knew where the other was living. PODEX should remember that CRIBBAGE had not been in Holland for a considerable time. He would therefore give him every assistance in establishing himself and would see that he was taken care of until he became thoroughly acclimatized and was confident of being able to live in the country without drawing attention to himself.
(66) See page 181.
PODEX and RUMMY would have at their disposal the sum of 25.000 Guilders for setting up their own organization. PODEX, RUMMY and CRIBBAGE would each have 5.000 Guilders for their personal use. In addition each would take 2.500 French Francs and 2.500 Belgium Francs for use in an emergency. All the personal baggage and material of PODEX, RUMMY and CRIBBAGE would be in one package which would be parachuted with them. The W/T equipment would also be included in this single package, the equipment being in two cases packed together. One of these suitcases had a double bottom, the construction of which had been explained to PODEX. PODEX would take with him a one-time-pad for his own use, and would do all the encoding and decoding of his messages, which should be kept as short as possible and limited to important information connected with his mission. Records of messages exchanged should not be kept. On the first, second and third days and the two Sundays following his landing a special message known to PODEX would be broadcasted by the BBC. This would serve to prove his bona fides.
RUMMY’s training name was GORT. He would be known in the field as LEO (67). RUMMY’s orders were identical with those of PODEX.
CRIBBAGE’s training name was DUVEEN. He would be known in the field as THEODORE (68). CRIBBAGE would go to Holland as W/T operator with his two organizers, PODEX and RUMMY. He would take orders from them on all matters of mutual concern, but would have authority to use his discretion with regard to his W/T work. No-one would interfere with any measures which he might consider necessary to safeguard his channel of communication . CRIBBAGE (Arie van Duyn) would have his own code which he would use only for messages concerning technical matters or for acknowledging messages from the Home Station. He would be shown the prefixes to be used by PODEX (Mulholland) and RUMMY ( de Goede) so that he would know which messages were destined for them and which for himself. CRIBBAGE would judge the days on which he would transmit and he would inform PODEX and RUMMY if he considered their messages too long or too numerous for safe handling.
PODEX, RUMMY and CRIBBAGE went to the field on the night of July 5th, 1944.
The operation was successful. (DZ Tongerse Heide, H-70 near Epe)
PODEX - W/T Traffic
PODEX (Len Mulholland) reported (69) that everything was in order. His contacts had been made. The forged identity cards were bad. London congratulated him (70) and asked what was wrong with the identity cards. PODEX reported (71) that four containers with 200 pistols, stens, grenades and incendiaries were required on the dropping ground Yew. He had made contact (72) with his old friends who appeared to be head men of the KP, which was quite separate from the LO. Could London give instructions regarding the disposal of three American pilots? London reported (73) that the material requested for the ground Yew were being prepared. London advised PODEX (74) that the LO was prepared to receive a saboteur and operator through a special contact. With what organization was PODEX officially working? He should indicate its strength and approximate location. The RVV had reported his arrival but appeared to be annoyed. What was the trouble? PODEX replied (75) that he was in contact with all organizations except CS-6. He was helping them all with the organization of dropping grounds. For security reasons he did not wish to know the whole of the leadership of the RVV, but only one person who could give him the information he required. The RVV had asked him to work for them. This was not in his orders and therefore he had refused .London cabled (76) that he should tell the RVV that he was not sent to them because other men were already standing by (who ?) to go to the RVV but were held up by bad weather. London would do everything possible to arrange delivery of supplies during the current moon period (77) but ground mists over the aereodromes were hampering operations. Could the Dutch underground organizations do anything to prevent German demolition in Dutch ports? How many men had they got for this purpose? PODEX (Mulholland) reported (78) that the KP consisted of 130 men in the west; 200 in the south; 100 in the east and 100 in the north. These men were carrying out attacks on ration offices. London regretted (79) that it had not been possible to arrange operations during the moon period which had just ended. The two men (who ?) destined for the RVV had tried once but had n had to return owing to bad visibility.
(69) Podex via Tees srl B2821/6 of 1.8.44
(70) 1 to Podex via Tees of 1.8.44
(71) Podex via Tees 4 of 1.8.44
(72) Podex via Tees srl B2822/14 of 1.8.44
(73) 2 to Podex via Tees of 4.8.44
(74) 4 to Podex via Tees o f 8.8.44
(75) Podex via Tees 9 of 10.8.44
(76) 5 to Podex via Tees of 10.8.44
(77) 7 to Podex via Tees of 12.8.44
(78) Podex via Tees srl B3703/33 of 12.8.44
(79) 8 to Podex via Tees of 14.8.44
Would it be possible for PODEX (Mulholland) to be London’d chief liaison officer for the RVV and for his friend to carry on with the other organizations? PODEX expressed his readiness to act as liaison officer with the RVV (80) Would he now have to give up his leadership of a KP sabotage group of 600 men in Brabant (81) ? PODEX reported (82) that the ration coupons which he had been issued were now obsolete; an entirely different issue had been distributed on August 5th.
Signal for Rail offensive
London cabled details (83) of a broadcast message which would be sent over the Flemish news. If this was heard than underground organizations must immediately dislocate railway lines by the best possible means according to the following priority: -
1) Bentheim, Hengelo, Zutphen, Arnhem, Nijmegen, Den Bosch, Tilburg, Breda, Roosendaal, Eeschen.
2) Venlo, Helmond, Neerpelt.
3) Roermond, Weert, Neerpelt.
4) Roermond, Maastricht
5) Tilburg, Turnhout
London instructed PODEX (84) to advise the RVV that an attempt had been made to deliver material on the grounds Evert, Gerrit and Hendrik on the night of August 8th . The pilots who went to grounds Evert and Gerrit had reported that no reception lights had been seen. Would he ask the RVV way this had happened? The aircraft sent to the ground Hendrik had not returned. Had this material been received and had three men arrived at their point of contact near the dropping ground Hendrik (28/29 .8.44, Appelse Heide, Voorthuizen, Beekman, Hinderink and Luykenaar?)?
New Task for Resistance - Anti Demolition
PODEX was informed (85) that the following targets should be protected against German demolition: -
a) Electric power stations, sub-stations and transmission lines;
b) Public water installations, especially in the Rotterdam area;
c) Rotterdam, Amsterdam and IJmuiden port installations and locks;
d) State coal mines and coke plants;
e) Broadcast transmitters and PTT wireless stations;
f) Telecommunications, central telephone exchanges and repeater stations.
PODEX (Mulholland) replied (86) that the underground organizations would do everything possible tp protect the installations mentioned, but this would be very difficult owing to the shortage of arms.
(80) Podex via Tees 13 of 17.8.44
(81) Podex via Tees 15 of 17.8.44
(82) Podex via Tees 16 of 19.8.44
(83) srls B8418 and 8419 to Podex and Rummy of 28.8.44
(84) 17 to Podex via Tees of 29.8.44
(85) srl B8555 to Podex via Tees of 3.9.44
(86) Podex via Tees 22 of 5.9.44
Role of Resistance at Arnhem
PODEX (Len Mulholland) was advised (87) that parachute troops had landed on the bridges at Arnhem, Nijmegen and Grave. Reinforcements would quickly follow. Dutch resistance should give every possible assistance to these Allied troops so that the bridges over the Rhine, de Neder Rijn, and the Maas canal should not be destroyed. Resistance groups inside the area should provide guides, give intelligence information and supply labour. Resistance groups outside the area but within a radius of 20 kilometer would give the same assistance but should also try to prevent enemy troops from approaching the air-head. Resistance groups outside the 20 kilometer radius should interfere with enemy movements towards and from the airhead and destroy enemy patrol and ammunition dumps.
Bombed Centre of Rotterdam Proposed as Dropping Ground
PODEX asked (88) whether it would be possible to drop paratroops in the Rotterdam area. About 300 fighting men were needed to help prevent German demolitions. London replied (89) that the dispatch of paratroops to Rotterdam could not be guaranteed. Tugboats should not be allowed to leave the Rotterdam area and should be immobilized, but not seriously damaged. London informed PODEX (90) that an attempt might be made to drop arms by daylight in the open space which now existed in the centre of Rotterdam, but this could be done only when the main German forces had withdrawn. PODEX should advise London immediately the Germans withdrew and also state whether this suggestion was feasible. PODEX should instruct reception committee (91) to arrange lights for the non-moon period on all grounds. A large electric light or motor-car headlamp which could turn a complete circle would be suitable for the centre light instead of a bonfire. It was regretted that bad weather and flak had prevented operations in the Rotterdam area. PODEX should advise London which grounds would be standing by for non-moon period deliveries (92) It was planned to send an unlimited supply of arms by land through the enemy lines at a later stage.
Reception Minus Commitees
PODEX (Mulholland) asked (93) that containers should be put down on the dropping grounds even if no reception was seen providing the ground could easily be recognized. There was no risk of loads falling into the hands of the Germans. London reported (94) the delivery of containers to the ground Evert (Stegerenveld, Ommen) on the previous night. An attempt would be made to deliver four more Allied parachutists together with containers on the ground Bertus (De Piksen) that night (11.9.44, team Dudley). Blockade ships should be sunk (95) in their present berths in Rotterdam than that they should be used as block ships. The loss of berths by sinking vessels at the quay-side was not so serious as the difficulties which would be caused by blocking of harbor entrances. PODEX should keep London advised and report successes.
(87) 48 to Podex via Tees of 17.9.44
(88) Podex via Tees 24 of 8.9.55
(89) 28 to Podex via Tees of 8.9.44
(90) 30 to Podex via Tees of 9.9.44
(91) 34 to Podex via Tees of 10.9.44
(92) 37 to Podex via Tees of 11.9.44
(93) Podex via Tees 35 of 11.9.44
(94) 38 to Podex via Tees of 12.9.44
(95) 40 to Podex via Tees of 13.9.44
London advised PODEX (96) that the RVV were discontented because the KP were receiving more arms than they were. PODEX (Len Mulholland) should explain that this was a question of dropping grounds and not policy. With reference to the sinking of blockade ships (97) London would send Limpit charges to the dropping ground Carrot as soon as possible. In addition attacks should be made on cylindrical tanks containing liquid das and on black rubber cables on rocket sites. PODEX should warn resistance groups (98) to be extra careful against penetration. It was understood that 2.000 Sicherheits Polizei had just arrived at The Hague. PODEX reported (99) the location of rockets storage dumps and firing sites in the Geertruidenberg area. He was instructed (100) to warn river pilots and dock personal to go into hiding since the Germans might attempt to transport them to Germany as they had done in other ports. PODEX reported (101) that the ground Rhododendron had not received its load. The containers had been dropped about three kilometers from the pin-point and were now in the hands of the Germans. PODEX was instructed (102) to inform the Driehoek (triangle) of the RVV, the KP and the OD that arms would be sent as soon as possible. The German headquarters which controlled the rockets was situated at No 67 and 69 Brinkgreverweg, Deventer. Could he arrange to attack and kill the personnel and cut all communications to the headquarters? PODEX should inform the Driehoek (103) that LIEUTENANT HANS, (DRAUGHTS-1) who was in touch with the Driehoek at Amsterdam, had been appointed liaison officer for that area by PRINCE BERNHARD.
Block-ships Sunk at Berths
The Brigade Commander at Rotterdam (104) had reported the sinking by sabotage of the blockade ships Westerdam, Borneo and Axenfels. If this was the work of PODEX (Len Mulholland) then London was delighted, but would he please confirm this and send any further details he had for the Admiralty. A further supply of Limpits would be sent in two containers with the next delivery on the RVV ground Carrot. PODEX confirmed (105) the news of the sinking of the Westerdam, Borneo and Axenfels. London cabled (106) that the headquarters of the rocket personnel had been moved. The attack should therefore be cancelled. A traitor from CS-6 named IRMA SEELICH (107) was living at Weteringschans 293, Amsterdam. She was a very dangerous Gestapo agent. She should be arrested immediately and if possible held, but otherwise she should be eliminated. PODEX reported (108) that the Germans had demolished the port facilities on the south side of Rotterdam on the previous day.
(96) 43 to Podex via Tees of 14.9.44
(97) 44 to Podex via Tees o f 15.9.44
(98) 45 to Podex via Tees o f 15.9.44
(99) Podex via Tees 46 of 15.9.44
(100) srl B8768 to Podex via Tees of 16.9.44
(101) Podex via Tees srl B 1441/61 of 16.9.44
(102) 51 to Podex via Tees o f 18.9.44
(103) 62 to Podex via Tees o f 23.9.44
(104) 63 to Podex via Tees of 24.9.44
(105) Podex via Tees 53 of 25.9.44
(!06) 64 to Podex via Tees 53 of 25.9.44
(107) 67 to Podex via Tees of 26.9.44
RUMMY - W/T Traffic
RUMMY (Bert de Goede) reported (109) that he had made his initial contact, but that MULDERS had died the previous week. London congratulated RUMMY (110) and asked whether MULDER’s death would affect his work. RUMMY gave (111) two dropping points and stated that his work was not affected by the death of MULDER (112). Everything was arranged (113) for the reception of material. London asked (114) for details of the names of the organizations with which RUMMY was in contact, the areas they covered and the number of men each had at his disposal. RUMMY replied (115) that he was working with sabotage organizations in the northern provinces. Further details would follow. RUMMY asked (116) whether attacks on communications could now be made at Roosendaal and Bentheim. When attacking such targets he would appreciate air raids at the same time to create disorder. London had suggested to GERARD (Mulholland) (117) that he would work for the RVV. Could RUMMY take over the Knok Ploegen from GERARD? He should keep his contacts to a minimum as the Gestapo were very active. London hoped everything had been received safely at the dropping ground Yew (118). The pilot reported the reception lights were weak and were set out in a triangle instead of a straight line. The pilot for the dropping ground Acacia reported no reception seen. Was the committee there?
Official Recognition of Dutch Resistance
London sent the following message to RUMMY (Bert de Goede) on September 1st , 1994 (119): -
“THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT REQUESTS US TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT: THE RECOGNITION OF ACTIVE DUTCH RESISTANCE GROUPS AS FORMING PART OF THE OFFICAL DUTCH FORCES IS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION. PRINCE BERNHARD WILL TAKE COMMAND OF THESE DUTCH FORCES. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD RECEIVE AN ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE FROM ACTIVE RESISTANCE GROUPS IN HOLLAND THAT THIS LEADERSHIP IS ACCEPTED AND THAT ALL ORDERS AND TARGETS WILL BE MOST STRICTLY CARRIED OUT IN ORDER TO MAKE THIS RECOGNITION POSSIBLE. WILL YOU PLEASE CONSULT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE WITH THE LEADERS OF THE RVV AND OD CONCERNING THE UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTATION OF THESE CONDITIONS, A REPLY MUST BE GIVEN BY RETURN. THIS MESSAGE MUST NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE UNDERGROUND PRESS AS IT IS VERY SECRET.”
(107) 67 to Podex via Tees of 26.9.44
(108) Podex via Tees srl B2010/57 of 28.9.44
(109) Rummy via Tees srl B2828/78 of 1.8.44
(110) 1 to Rummy via Tees oo f 1.8.44
(111) Rummy via Tees 2 of and 3 and 4 of 6.8.44
(112) Rummy via Tees srl B3450/38 of 6.8.44
(113) Rummy via Tees 7 of 9.8.44
(114) 3 to Rummy via Tees of 9.8.44
(115) Rummy via Tees 8 of 12.8.44
(116) Rummy via Tees unnumbered of 16.8.44
(117) 7 to Rummy via Tees 18.8.44
(118) 11 to Rummy via Tees of 29.8.44
(119) 13 and 14 to Rummy via Tees of 1 and 2.9.44
Gestapo papers to be held for Allied Investigation
RUMMY (Bert de Goede) was informed (120) that at the moment of entry by the Allies of important towns, premises used by the German Intelligence Services should be closed and guarded and no documents touched before the building was handed over to the Allied authorities. RUMMY must give as soon as possible a dropping ground where Allied personnel in uniform could be received and looked after by the Knok Ploegen. RUMMY reported (121) that the Acacia committee was on the spot but there had been fighting with the Grune Polizei. All the reception committee men, except the leader, had been either killed or arrested. Everything had arrived safely on the dropping ground Yew and the pigeons had already been dispatched. He had asked the KP to co-operate with the RVV. RUMMY was asked (122) to pass on to the Knok Ploegen a list of targets to be protected against German demolition (123). If any resistance groups requiring arms became isolated during the moon period (124) and RUMMY could give London their dropping grounds they should be told to use the correct lighting system and flash the letter “A”. During the non-moon period the same system should be used except that the middle light should be a large bonfire. RUMMY reported (125) that the RVV, the KP and the OD accepted the conditions laid down by the Netherlands Government and transmitted by London. Sten guns and men in uniform (126) could be dropped on the grounds Cherry and Yew. Everything had been received safely on ground Acacia.(Acacia was raided by the Grune Polizei and everybody was arrested or killed (121) and now everything was received safely (126)?)
Task Set for Dutch Resistance
London advised RUMMY (127) that the Schiehaven and Parkhaven road tunnel under the Maas, and electrical power plants including those at Galliliestraat and Schiehaven should be protected from German demolition. Resistance should also try to: -
a) Provide pilots for river craft and dock personnel;
b) Protect Soesterberg, Valkenburg and Schiphol airfields;
c) Preserve railway administrative building at Utrect;
d) Guard important buildings at The Hague;
e) Patrol the road from The Hague to Rotterdam
f) Protect the bridges and railway lines between Rotterdam, Utrecht, Arnhem and Wessel;
g) Guard the bridges at Nijmegen.
RUMMY reported (128) that the mission for the destruction of railways had been completely executed by the Knok Ploegen. London advised RUMMY (Bert de Goede) of the airborne operation at Arnhem (129) and gave him instructions to be passed to the local resistance groups.
(120) 15 to Rummy via Tees of 1.9.44
(121) Rummy via Tees 14 of 2.9.44
(122) 17 to Rummy via Tees of 3.9.44
(123) See page 203
(124) 18 to Rummy via Tees of 3.9.44
(125) Rummy via Tees 17 of 4.9.44
(126) Rummy via Tees 18 of 4.9.44
(127) 19 to Rummy via Tees of 5.9.44
(128) Rummy via Tees srl B876/2 of 5.9.44
(129) 39 to Rummy via Tees of 17.9.44
SS Troops in Dropping Ground Area
An attempt would be made to deliver material to RUMMY (130) on Saturday night on seven of his grounds. The dropping of parachutists in the Rotterdam area could not be guaranteed. Tugboats should not be allowed to leave the Rotterdam area. They should be immobilized but not seriously damaged. RUMMY cabled that his dropping ground two miles from Venlo (131) had been cancelled owing to the presence of SS troops in the area. London cabled (132) that if nothing had been delivered by Monday night than reception committees should arrange non-moon lighting at all grounds. A big electric light or motor-car lamp which could turn a complete circle could be used instead of a bonfire if necessary. It was regretted that bad weather had prevented operations. Would he give as soon as possible the approximate number of men willing to bear arms in the provinces of Utrecht and Gelderland (133)?
The Hague: German Security Reinforcement
RUMMY was advised (134) that loads had been delivered on two of his grounds on the previous night. RUMMY gave the location of a German transmission station (135) near Roermond and also the Headquarters of 112 German officers in the same area. RUMMY should warn resistance groups (136) to take extra precautions against penetration. It was understood that 2.000 Sicherheits Polizie were arriving at The Hague.
(130) 22 to Rummy via Tees of 8.9.44
(131) Rummy via Tees srl B1061/71 of 9.9.44
(132) 28 to Rummy via Tees of 10.9.44
(133) 29 to Rummy via Tees of 10.9.44
(134) 32 to Rummy via Tees of 12.9.44
(135) 28 to Rummy via Tees of 13.9.44
(136) 36 to Rummy via Tees of 15.9.44
Attack Planned on V-2 Plant
An urgent message was sent to RUMMY (137) asking if he could sabotage three liquid oxygen plants at Schiedam if suitable material was sent to him. Vital parts to attack were the compressors, expansion engines and fraction column. He could make a reconnaissance and if necessary ask the RVV for assistance. RUMMY replied that he could sabotage the three liquid oxygen plants (138) at Schiedam, provided the necessary materials were delivered. A message was sent to the Driehoek of the RVV, KP and OD (Triangle) via RUMMY (139) that London would try to send arms as soon as possible. RUMMY had made a reconnaissance of the oxygen factories (140) at Schiedam. They were not working hard for the Germans and it would be possible to sabotage them. RUMMY was warned (141) that Germans and traitors in liberated areas were using red and green recognition signals in connection with the dropping of parachute agents behind Allied lines.
RUMMY was advised (142) that London would be sending two containers with Limpits to the dropping ground Whisky (DRAUGHTS-1 also had a ground named Whisky).
These were for sinking blockade ships. In addition there would be two containers marked with a red cross, with material for attacking liquid oxygen plants. These attacks should be discussed with the Driehoek to ensure success.
London transmitted to RUMMY (143) a message from PRINCE BERNHARD to the Driehoek in which he asked for details of the number of active members of all organizations who were prepared to carry arms. Their task would not be to wage war but to aid the Allied troops and protect vital objectives against demolition by the enemy in so far as such action might be ordered by himself. RUMMY reported (144) the safe reception of stores on the ground Whisky. RUMMY was asked (145) to inform the Driehoek that LIEUTENANT HANS (DRAUGHTS-1), who was in touch with the Driehoek in Amsterdam, had been appointed liaison officer by PRINCE BERNHARD for that Area. In case of misunderstanding HANS had been dropped on the ground Mandrill. Containers and two men (146) (who) would be dropped (which ground) on September 30th. The reception committee should assist these men to get to Groningen as soon as possible. (van der Stok and Wiedemann were both SIS/BI agents. Wiedemann was W/T operator, ST. LEONARD. Dropping ground was near Middenmeer North-Holland. Couldn’t find telegram sabout the dropping of those men sent by BACKGAMMON or received by DRAUGHTS-1)
(136) 36 to Rummy via Tees of 15.9.44
(137) 37 to Rummy via Tees of 16.9.44
(138) Rummy via Tees srl B1473/11 of 17.9.44
(139) 43 to Rummy via Tees of 18.9.44
(140) Rummy via Tees 36 of 19.9.44
(141) 46 to Rummy via Tees of 19.9.44
(142) 47 to Rummy via Tees of 19.9.44
(143) 50 to Rummy via Tees of 21.9.44
(144) Rummy via Tees 40 of 22.9.44
(145) 55 to Rummy via tees of 23.9.44
(146) 62 to Rummy via Tees of 29.9.44
SCULLING / TURNIQUOITS (Contacting LO)
SCULLING’s training name was PLOEG but he would be known in the field as (Witte) DIRK (149). Messages had been received from the LANDELIJKE ORGANISATIE and the RAAD VAN VERZET to the effect that they were prepared to undertake resistance activities, in particular disruption of the Dutch railways and sabotage at the Volkel aereodrome. Although the LO might be safe there was doubt regarding the general security of the RVV and the OD. Directives from SHAEF were sent to the RVV in may and from that time onwards everybody in Holland appeared to be aware of those directives. The RVV had suggested certain sabotage plans, such as blowing up the power station at Dordrecht, and sabotaging the locks at Vreeswijk, but then they were told to undertake this they had produced excuses. This led to the belief that: -
1) The organization had been penetrated and the Gestapo were aware of their plans;
2) Communications channels were enemy-controlled;
3) The organizations were too large and widespread.
(149) Orders for Ploeg, dated July, 1944.
SCULLING (Sjeerp Postma) would get in touch with the LO through a contact given in his orders. He would explain to them that although it might be desirable politically to for the various organizations to work together, it was most important that the sabotage side should be kept separate from the political and intelligence groups. Failure to do this would lead to misunderstanding, penetration and a total failure of sabotage plans. Acts of sabotage should not be discussed with other groups. SHAEP alone would decide whether or not they were to be carried out. It would be SCULLING’s mission to collaborate with the LO. If the reports sent through his W/T operator were satisfactory, arrangements would be made to send sabotage instructors and operators. When established with the LO he would ask them to give their reports on the security of the RVV. If they considered the RVV to un-penetrated he would request them to ask the RVV for a special contact address to which sabotage instructors and W/T operators could be sent. SCULLING should make no contacts outside his own mission. Personnel previously sent to the field did not heed their instructions and in consequence were now in enemy hands. He would take with him 25.000 Dutch Guilders for delivery to the LO and a further 25.000 Guilders together with some propaganda material which he would hand to his initial contacts for delivery to the clandestine press. SCULLING would be dropped during the July/August moon period together with his W/T operator, KAREL Gerrit Reisiger). He would be responsible for installing his W/T operator in a safe house and later arranging safe houses from which he could transmit.
TURNIQUOITS’ training name was ROYEN. He would be known in the field as KAREL (150). He would go to Holland as W/T operator for DIRK (SCULLING) and would use his own discretion in all matters concerning his W/T work. DIRK had his own code and would be responsible for encoding and decoding his own messages. KAREL (Reisiger) would use his code only for reports relating to wireless matters and for the acknowledgement of broadcast messages. As he had not been in Holland for a considerable time (like Arie van Duyn), DIRK (Postma) would give him every assistance in establishing himself, and would see that he became thoroughly acclimatized and felt able to live on his own in the country without drawing attention to himself.
SCULLING and TURNIQUOITS were sent to the field on the night of August 7th, 1944 It was a blind drop and the operation was successful.
SCULLING - W/T Traffic
SCULLING sent his first message on August 31st, 1
SHOOTING, HUNTING & CHARADES (Contact with RVV)
SHOOTING’s training name was LEESTENMAKER. He would be known in the field as LODEWIJK (154). In April 1944 two men had been sent to Holland to contact the RVV and two men to CS-6, but owing to their impatience on their part while the RVV was checking up on them they made contact with other people and organizations with the result that the Gestapo very soon traced them . It was known that BOB (Celosse) TONY (Cnoops) and his W/T operator ( Sanders) had been arrested between May 17th and May 20th . The RVV had reported their arrest. They also gave contact addresses and dropping grounds, and asked for saboteur instructors and W/T operators. Four men (FIVES, RAQUETS, BOWLS & HALMA) had been sent to contact the RVV. In the last moon period but the aircraft failed to return and as the RVV had not reported their arrival it was presumed that an accident had happened before they reached their pinpoint. The RVV had repeated their earlier request for men and material and all messages had been received via the RADIODIENST. Communication with the RVV was very slow and it took anything up to 15 days to get a reply. The RADIODIENST was not direct in contact with the Dutch Section but worked through the Intelligence Service of MAJOR SOMER (Bureau Inlichtingen/SIS). In order to ascertain whether the RVV was reliable it had been decided to give SHOOTING a separate and outside contact supplied by the new Dutch Minister of Justice (van Heuven-Goedhart). He would proceed to this contact and ask to be put in touch with one of the leading members of the RVV. He would explain that his mission was to assist them in giving sabotage instruction and supervising their reception committee arrangements. He would hand them 25.000 Dutch Guilders and a microprint of the Supreme Allied Commander’s directives. He would explain that it was feared in London that in view of increased Gestapo activity, penetration might occur in the RVV, the OD or the RADIODIENST. It appeared in any case that too many people knew what was the rest of the organization. SHOOTING (Joop Luijkenaar) would pace his W/T operator (CHARADES, Jaap Beekman) and the other saboteur instructor (HUNTING, Jaap Hinderink) at their disposal. If satisfactory messages were received from his, material would be delivered at the earliest possible moment. He would ask the RVV to send London, as soon as possible, passwords and new contact addresses to which agents could be sent. The RVV might report to London possible sabotage targets which they were prepared to attack. Headquarters would then convey to them the Supreme Allied Commander’s wishes. If only a select few were aware of these plans the measure of success in a surprise attack would be much greater. London also expected a report by W/T from the RVV of the approximate member of men they had at their disposal and in which parts of the country they were situated. The RVV had asked for 1.000 Sten guns. These would be seni in loads of 50% explosives and 50% stens.
(154) Orders for Shooting, dated August 23rd , 1944.
On the first favourable night during the August/September moon period SHOOTING, HUNTING and CHARADES would be dropped together at a point to be explained prior to departure. The organization to which they were being sent would be responsible for installing them is a safe house and later, providing the W/T operator with safe houses from which he could transmit, each agent would carry 5.000 Dutch Guilders and 2.500 Belgian Francs for his own use. In addition SHOOTING and CHARADES would carry 25.000 Dutch Guilders to be handed over to their contacts. (All three were dropped near Voorthuizen, Gelderland on ground H79)
SHOOTING (Luijkenaar) would take a one-time-pad for his own use and would do all his own encoding and decoding. Messages should be kept as short as possible.
On the first, second and third days and the two Sundays following arrival in the field the BBC would broadcast a special message known to SHOOTING. By this means he would prove his bona fides. He would take with him a pigeon by which he could advise London of his safe landing.
HUNTING’s training name was MULDERS. He would be known in the field as KRIS (155). Together with SHOOTING (Luijkenaar) and CHARADES (Beekman), HUNTING (Hinderink) would be placed at the disposal of the RVV as a saboteur instructor. Material would be delivered as soon as satisfactory messages were received. HUNTING would take a one-time-pad for his own use and would encode and decode all his own messages.
CHARADES’ training name was BARENDS. He would be known in the field as MAURITS (156). CHARADES would bury his wireless sets on landing. They should be concealed at a spot which could be easily recognized, so that they could be collected by a fourth party if necessary. If he wished he could bury his revolver with the W/T sets. CHARADES would establish W/T contact with London as soon as he considered it safe to do so. He should always destroy immediately that part of his one-time-pad which had been used for a previous message. If he did this without exception the Gestapo would never be able to discover his security check. Records of messages exchanged with London should not be kept. He alone would judge the days on which he would transmit, He would also inform SHOOTING and HUNTING if he considered their messages too long or too numerous for safe handling.
(155) Orders for Hunting, dated August 24th , 1944.
(156) Orders for Charades, dated August 23rd , 1944
SHOOTING - W/T Traffic
Resistance Urged to Protect Vital Bridges
London cabled (157) details and instructions regarding the airborne operations at Arnhem. An order from PRINCE BERNHARD stated (158) that the bridges at Zaltbommel, Hedel, Den Bosch, Vechel, Breugel, Best and all bridges over the Wilhelmina canal and sluice gates at Culemborg and Vreeswijk were of great importance and must be kept open. The guards should be overpowered if possible and everything should be done to gain control of the bridges. It was realized that the underground movement was short of material, but the Allied High Command would like them to do everything within their power. All minefields should be clearly marked out with warning signs and the Allied troops should be supplied with all the information they desired. The same order was being sent to the RVV and the OD. SHOOTING (Luijkenaar) was asked (159) to cable London his exact location and to keep Headquarters informed of any changes. If run-over by Allied troops he should report as soon as possible to PRINCE BERNHARD’s Headquarters.
CHARADES - W/T Traffic
In his first message (160) CHARADES (Beekman) reported his safe arrival. His own set was broken, but he had received a B Mk II set from DUDLEY (Austin). He was working for the dropping ground Groote Jan (161) (Ground Groote Jan is situated near river Vecht between Ommen and Marienberg).
LODEWIJK ( Luijkenaar) was helping at the ground Kleine Jan;
KRIS (Hinderink) was in Twente. London gave details (162) of the broadcast plan for the following three months. CHARADES reported (163) that he could not find the Home Station nor could he pick up any broadcasts. He asked for 500 Stens on the dropping ground Groote Jan (164). He was operating an S-Phone himself but doubted whether the apparatus was working properly. Would London send a supply of pistols?
(157) 1 to Shooting via Wensum of 17.9.44
(158) 2 to Shooting via Wensum of 17.9.44
(159) 3 to Shooting via Wensum of 18.9.44
Sein onmiddellijk waar u zich bevindt en houdt ons op de hoogte van veranderingen stop Indien u of uw medewerkers aan militaire afdeelingen of brigades verbonden bent komma sein wie en aan welke afdeelingen of brigades verbonden punt Indien localiteit waar u bent bevrijd wordt komma moet u zich spoedigst melden bij hoofdkwartier Prins Bernhard stop
(160) Charades via Wensum 1 of 15.9.44
1 stop Alles OK stop Eigen zenders kapot stop Ontving B mark two van Dudley stop Groeten aan familie Maurits Vroomshoop Overijssel stop
(161) Charades via Wensum 2 of 27.9.44
(162) 3 to Charades via Wensum of 28.9.44
Your number three stop We will broadcast to you during October, November and December as shown in your microprint of night plan at nought nought three three nought repeat nought nought three three nought hours GMT using frequencies three five six two repeat three five six two and four two two seven point five repeat four two two seven point five Kcs stop Indicator that message is intended for you is five Robert seven repeat five R for Robert seven stop Confirm is all now clear stop
(163) Charades via Wensum 3 of 28.9.44
3 stop Kan jullie niet vinden en ontving geen berichten per broadcast stop
(164) Charades via Wensum 4 of 1.10.44
Frequentie zes drie negen vijf is kapot stop Ben zelf S-Phone operator doch betwijfel of onze Phone goed werkt stop Stuur tevens pistolen stop
III - CLANDESTINE PRESS DRAUGHTS’ REPORT ON THE UNDERGROUND PRESS
DRAUGHTS, who arrived back in England on July 8th (223) , gave the following account (224) of the state of the clandestine press in Holland in the early part of 1944: -
The underground Press covered the country in such a way that every patriot could and usually did receive a copy of at least one of the Underground Papers. The names of the larger papers were: -
A) TROUW This paper was printed in different parts of the country and there was a time in the summer and autumn of 1943 when it had a circulation of from 70.000 to 80.000 copies Owing to recent arrests this had been somewhat reduced. Its scope was very wide, for it included in its excutive both Catholics and Protestants of every shade of political opinion, though the leadership was definitely Conservative. In addition to the publication of the paper the organization also dabbled in other matters. It is known to have organized raids on Food Offices and had been instrumental in securing the liquidation of some traitors. The organization also had an escape route, though DRAUGHTS had no knowledge of its activities.
B) HET PAROOL DRAUGHTS worked with this paper in Holland on the technical side and also to some extent in the distribution before he came he came to England for the first time. At this time Parool had a circulation of approximately 25.000 and the whole of the organization was handled by four or five men. The editorial staff saw nearly every underground paper as it was issued and had a very good information department. Its records were frequently made available to other underground papers, especially the smaller ones.
C) CHRISTOPHOOR a big Catholic paper with its circulation chiefly in South Holland, which is the most Catholic part of the country; this paper had grown very much from a small beginning.
D) JE MAINTIENDRAI The larger papers were all printed, but the majority of Communist papers were stenciled and duplicated.
A communist organ called SIGNAAL, a small stenciled paper, made a somewhat sporadic appearance. There was another very small paper called VOD which circulated only through the hands of Underground workers and which gave a resume of news from the BBC and descriptions of members of the SD and Gestapo. DRAUGHTS had seen one copy of DE STEM VAN VRIJ NEDERLAND, a new paper with a small circulation. There was also another paper called DE PLOEG, which started business in the autumn of 1943 and was sponsored by the party of Doctor COLIJN; it had a fairly large circulation.
(223) See report, pages 182-183.
(224) Report by Biallosterski, alias Bruin, alias Draughts, on the Underground Press in Holland, dated July 25th, 1944
DRAUGHTS II - W/T Traffic
DRAUGHTS II (van Paaschen) reported (225) the arrival of GUUS and JOSEPHINE (ROWING and TIDDLYWINKS). JOSEPHINE had broken her leg and landing but the package was safe. London asked (226) whether the Queens photograph had been received. He should be on his guard against penetration and break contact with ST. JUDE (of SIS).
DRAUGHTS II reported (227) that ROWING’s code was almost illegible. Would London send him a further one-time pad? The Queen’s photograph was lost but he had received one from Bert de Goede (Rummy). London promised (228) to send new codes for ROWING and TIDDLEYWINKS. Would DRAUGHTS II give details of important arrest among resistance organizations? DRAUGHTS II would be glad (229) to receive two Eurekas and two S-Phones, pistols and cycle tyres in the next delivery. London would be sending (230) propaganda material for German soldiers in Holland and for distribution in Germany according to the BONZO plan. London pointed out (231) that the situation in France was not very clear and that micro-photos should therefore be sent by Switzerland or else in duplicate or triplicate by pigeons.
(225) Draughts II via Teifi 21 of 19.8.44
21 stop Guus en Josephine aangekomen stop Josephine brak been bij landing stop Pakket in veiligheid stop Is vliegtuig teruggekeerd stop Felicitaties HANS met huwelijk stop Laatst ontvangen bericht was nr acht ontvangen nr zeventien TM een en twintig stop Met Frans en mij alles OK stop
(226) 10 to Draughts II via night Teifi of 21.8.44
10 stop Is foto Koningin met onderschrift goed ontvangen stop Kunt u nog telegrafisten opleiden zoo ja dan zenden wij meer sets stop Verdeel geld niet via Nat. Comite stop Een onzer agenten was op weg naar HOLLA doch blijkbaar nog steeds niet aangekomen (Sjeerp Postma) stop Pas dus op voor penetratie stop Verbreek alle contracten met ST. JUDE (Herman Leus van BI/SIS) stop
(227) Draughts II via Teifi srl. B4610/72 of 22.8.44
Code Guus bijna onleesbaar stop Zend hem nieuwe TP herhaal TP en voor mij een prefix nummer SUGPMYNAR twee en twintig stop Tulip nog steeds OK en verwachten dus nog een zending FL daar materiaal ontvangen MISSEVHTER gegevens voor BONZO gaarne hierover bericht stop Foto Koningin verloren doch ontving een exemplaar van Bert de Goede stop
(228) 11 to Draughts II via night Teifi of 23.8.44
Terrein Tulip ondertusschen geweigerd stop Zoekt ander terrain ongeveer vijf herhaal vijf kms zuid oost van Tulip stop Geef belangrijke arrestaties onder vermelding naam organisatie stop Goed werk en bedankt van HANS stop Zenden twee pakken en duiven naar nieuwe grond Tulip also ok nieuwe coden voor Guus en Josephine stop Wij gebruiken prefix Hans U heeft niets nodig stop
(229) Draughts II via Teifi 24 of 25.8.44
24 stop Met volgende zending ontvangen wij gaarne twee Eurekas en twee S-Phones, twee stens, vijf pistolen, negen duiven, twee Heren- en twee Dames horloges; twintig stel fietsbanden, kostuums voor Guus en Frans; een paar schoenen voor Frans stop Opgave Pers en Bonzo volgen spoedigst stop Twee broadcast receivers en een vibrator stop
(230) 12 to Draughts II via night Teifi of 25.8.44
RAF herhaal RAF vragen nieuw terrein Tulip ongeveer tien herhaal tien kilometers zuid of zuidwest van oude grond Tulip stop Verwachten spoedig antwoord stop Zenden ook materiaal voor Duitsche soldaten in Nederland en voor verspreiding in Duitsland volgens plan BONZO stop
(231) 13 to Draughts II via night Teifi of 26.8.44
Situatie in Frankrijk niet duidelijk en daardoor vrezen moeilijkheden voor koeriersters langs die weg stop Indien nog mogelijk zend microfotos via Zwitserland of anders per duiven in duplo of triplo stop Zenden 10 duiven deze periode naar nieuwe grond Tulip stop Microfotos T, herhaal T, van 1 tot 340 aangekomen stop
Request for Propaganda Material
DRAUGHTS II reported (232) that JOSEPHINE was making good recovery. Would London send copies of
‘Vrij-Nederland’ , the latest editions of ‘Wervelwind’ (the miniature magazine dropped by the RAF), The papers of social, political or economic interest, in order that the Dutch might get a broad view of Allied plans and preparations for the post-war period. Would London please send 5000 Guilders to meet the cost of technical apparatus? (233)
(232) Draughts II via Teifi 25 of 28.8.44
Josephine gaat goed vooruit stop Mijn nr25. Zend voor pers van Londensche ‘Vrij Nederland’ laatste zes uitgaven zoo ook van ‘Wervelwind’, ‘London Illustrated News’ The Economist en bladen met sociaal - politieke - en monetaire inhoud, zoodat wij een ruim inzicht krijgen in de geallieerde plannen en voorbereidingen voor de na-oorlogse tijd stop Verzoek al dit materiaal in 14 voudig te zenden Einde.
(233) Draughts II via Teifi 29 of 29.8.44
Het vorige geld is verdeeld via pers IERN waarin alle bladen zijn vertegenwoordigd en waarvan een als onze gevolmachtigde optreedt stop Mijn nr. 29. Zend 5000 Gulden kosten technisch apparaat en zoo mogelijk tabak en cigaretten stop
Wholesale Arrests in Underground Press
DRAUGHTS II reported that (234) the whole of the “Christophoor” organization had been arrested two weeks previously. An attempt at reconstruction was being made. Two members of the editorial staff of “Je Maintiendrai” and twelve couriers of other organizations had been also arrested. The consequences of this could not yet be assessed. “Je Maintiendrai” was still appearing normally. London advise DRAUGHTS II (235) of the proposal to give official recognition to the resistance groups in Holland. Could DRAUGHTS II give contact addresses with passwords for Noord and Zuid Holland for the last stage of the war (236)? Resistance groups should cease all sabotage and help the Allies as much as possible (237). Quislings should be arrested and valuable papers held until they could be passed to the Allies.
(234) Draughts-2 via Teifi 32 of 31.8.44
32 stop Twee weken terug warden gearresteerd zoo goed als geheele Christophoor organisatie stop Men is weer bezig met reconstructive voorts twee redactie leden “Je Maintiendrai” met twaalf koeriers stop Reorganisaties gevolgen nog niet overzichtelijk stop Je Maintiendrai verschijnt normaal verder stop De arrestaties van vele LO herhaal LO menschen in de afgelopen maanden is u vermoedelijk reeds bekend stop Zend voor Josephine Cheerio stop
(235) 16 to Draughts-2 via night Teifi of 1.9.44
Wij maken bij u bekend dat overwogen wordt om actieve Nederlansche verzetsgroepen bij krijgsverrichtingen te erkennen stop Zij zullen onder eenhoofdige Nederlandsche leiding staan namelijk onder Prins Bernhard stop Geven orders en aanwijzingen moeten met de meeste stiptheid worden opgevolgd teneinde erkenning mogelijk te maken stop Niet publiceren stop Zeer geheim einde
(236) 21 to Draughts-2 via Teifi of 4.9.44
Kunt u snel geven contact adressen met paswoord in Noord en Zuid Holland voor laatste stadium oorlog stop Verzetsgroepen moeten alle sabotage stoppen en de geallieerden zoo veel mogelijk helpen stop Alle NSBers en andere Quislings arresteren en vasthouden stop Alle waardevolle Sicherheits Dienst papieren moeten in beslag genomen worden en voor de geallieerden bewaard blijven stop
(237) srl B8585 to Draughts-2 via Teifi of 4.9.44 (zie 236)
Tense Atmosphere in The Hague
DRAUGHTS II (van Paaschen) should (238) make it known in Amsterdam and Rotterdam that it was preferable to sink ships rather than that the Germans should fill them with explosives and use them for sealing the ports. DRAUGHTS II was sent a message (239) outlining the immediate functions of resistance in Holland.
DRAUGHTS II was informed (240) of the landing of paratroops at Arnhem, Nijmegen and Grave and given instructions to pass on to resistance groups. DRAUGHTS II reported (241) that on Tuesday the atmosphere in The Hague was very strained. It was said that the Allies would arrive there the same evening and the Germans and NSB members made a hasty flight. The resistance movements were to go into action at 1 o’clock, but further information revealed that these rumours were incorrect. Action was suspended until further orders. DRAUGHTS II had heard that an agent had landed in Wieringermeer with a parcel for the Dutch underground press (242). Was this correct and if so why was he not informed in good time? DRAUGHTS II was informed (243) that the task of the resistance after the passing of Allied troops was to mop up enemy bodies and other Quislings who could be dangerous, such as snipers, etc. In case of need Allied troops could be called in to help.
DRAUGHTS II reported (244) that as from that day no more passenger trains were running between 10 and 16 hours. There were no steam trains running at any time. All ships had been undermined and were heavily guarded. Sinking was now only possible by Limpits. Would London send a supply of these?
(Who was this agent who was dropped in the Wieringermeer?)
Dutch Factories Making Rocket Parts
DRAUGHTS II gave the position (245) of a rocket firing point near Wassenaar. The firing point mechanism had been moved so that the resistance groups were unable to prevent the firing of the rockets. DRAUGHTS II gave details of (246) of factories which had been issued with secret orders and given priority for manufacturing parts of rockets. These factories were at Tiel, Amersfoort and Schiedam. DRAUGHTS II reported the evacuation of the following towns: Santpoort, Bloemendaal, IJmuiden, Velzen, Beverwijk , Heemskerk and Uitgeest (247).
(238) 22 to Draughts-2 via night Teifi of 8.9.44
Moet spoed bekend maken om in Amsterdam en Rotterdam over schepen te laten zinken door huidplaat weg te nemen dan dat Duitschers schepen en baggermolens vullen met explosieven en gebruiken voor afsluiten havens stop
(239) 23 to Draughts-2 via Teifi of 8.9.44
Targets to be protected stop Schiehaven en Parkhaven road tunnel under Maas stop Electrical power plants including those at Galliliestraat en Schiehaven stop Try to provide pilots river craft and dock personnel stop Protect railway administrative buildings Utrecht stop Guard important buildings The Hague stop Patrol road The hague Rotterdam stop Protect bridges and railway line Rotterdam Utrecht … no more text visible.
(240) 33 to Draughts-2 via Teifi of 17.9.44
(241) Draughts-2 via Teifi 37 of 8.9.44
37 stop Dinsdag stemming in Den Haag zeer nerveus stop Men zei dat geallieerden desavonds alhier zouden aankomen stop Haastige vlucht Duitschers en NSBers SS IDCAQS een uur zou verzetsbeweging actief worden stop Bij nadere informative bleken geruchten onjuist te zijn stop Men zag tot nadere order van actie af stop Alles normaal stop Spoorwegstaking gewenst stop Guus vraagt actieve instructies stop Hij is bij Hans verwachten geen zendingen meer stop
(242) Draughts-2 via Teifi 39 of 8.9.44.
Nr 39. Vernam in Wieringermeer agent geland met o.a. pakket voor Pers stop Klopt dit zoo ja waarom ons niet tijdig op de hoogte gebracht stop
(243) Srl B8036 to Draughts-2 via Teifi of 9.9.44
To Draughts-2 via night Teifi of 9.9.44
Instructies voor GUUS. Tracht in contact te komen met BERT DE GOEDE herhaal BERT DE GOEDE of RVV teneinde te helpen als instructeur voor Rotterdam wachten antwoord stop Voorlopig onmogelijk pers producten te zenden maar u moet trachten verbinding met Duitschland in te stellen in verband met BONZO herhaal BONZO deze zeer belangrijk voor later stop Agent Wieringermeer was bestemd voor LO herhaal LO producten waren voor pers bestemd Einde.
(244) Draughts-2 via Teifi srl B 1342/69 of 15.9.44
33 stop Geen burgertreinenloop meer vanaf heden tussen tien en zestien uur stop Stoomtreinen geheel niet meer stop
(245) Draughts-2 via Teifi srl B 1491/98 of 17.9.44
48 stop Centraal punt afvuring rockets wit Landhuis Wassenaar coordinaten drie en twintig zestig en zes en vijftig vijf en negentig kaart blad dertig uitgave negentien veertien stop Zoonet afvuur mechanism verplaatst maar verzetsgroepen niet meer in staat afvuren te verhinderen adviseeren militaire steun stop
(246) Draughts-2 via Teifi srl B 1674 of 21.9.44
Fabrieken voorzien met geheime orders en bevoorrading ter vervaardiging onderdeelen rockets stop NV Metalenfabriek Daaldrop te Tiel stop NV AMAF firma Huyget en Wessel Nijverheidsstraat Amersfoort stop ODARATODA Staalwerken voorheen H.J. van der Kamp te St. oedenrode stop Vloeibaar zuurstof komt uit Schiedam stop Fabrieken niets bekend stop Uw nrs drie en vier en dertig onmiddellijk doorgegeven stop
(247) Draughts II via Teifi srls. B1661/43 and B1668
Ontving uw nrs tot en met 38 stop
Mijn nr 52 stop Bevinden ons in Vredespaleis rpt Vredespaleis stop Een van ons in actief verzet stop Toestand Josephine niet zoo gunstig stop Ligt in Diakonessenhuis Haarlem stop Guus nog niet in staat naar Rotterdam te gaan stop Evacuatie bevolen VXR volgende plaatsen: Santpoort, Bloemendaal, IJmuiden, Velzen, Beverwijk, Heemskerk, Uitgeest stop
July - September 1944, page 229 III. Clandestie Press
BEZIQUE - W/T Traffic
London regretted (248) that operations had been impossible during the last moon period owing to bad weather, but someone would soon be sent with material to meet BEZIQUE at his contact address. HANS (DRAUGHTS) had arrived safely. Owing to BEZIQUE’s silence it was assumed by London that something was wrong with ST. JUDE (the SIS operator). BEZIQUE should therefore keep quiet until the new agent had arrived with the correct password. BEZIQUE asked London (249) to send material soon ‘for heaven’s sake, as he had no material for listening to broadcast. It was ‘bloody hopeless’ doing nothing all the time.
London cabled (250) a message for GUUS (ROWING) asking him what had happened to the Queen’s message. BEZIQUE was asked whether he had now received two new W/T sets. BEZIQUE replied (251) that these had arrived. He reported (252) that the latest launching site for flying bombs was in the Haagsche Bosch, near The Hague.
St. Jude (Herman Leus) was arrested December 1944 and executed March 8, 1945 as a reprisal on the attack on Rauter. He was dropped with BI agent Jan Faber 10 days after Draughts/Bezique. Faber survived the war, not being caught.
(248) 19 to Nidd of 19.7.44
To Nidd via night Nidd.
Regret operation last moon impossible owing bad weather but sending someone soon with material to contact you at your contact address. Hans arrived safely. Owing your silence presume something wrong with ST. JUDE therefore keep quiet until our contact arrives giving correct password.
(249) Bezique 29 of 5.8.44
Don’t have this telegram
(250) 21 of Bezique of 23.8.44
To Draughts via night Teifi.
Is foto Koningin met onderschrift goed ontvangen? Nr 10. Kunt u nog telegrafisten opleiden, zoo ja dan zenden wij meer sets stop Verdeel geld niet via Nat. Comite stop Een onzer (Sjeerp Postma) agenten was op weg naar Holla doch is blijkbaar nog steeds niet aangekomen stop Pas op voor penetratie. Verbreek contacten met
St. Jude stop
(251) Bezique via Teifi 31 of 26.8.44
Don’t have this telegram
(252) Bezique via Teifi 35 of 15.9.44
Don’t have this telegram
(253) Orders for Helder, dated July 25th, 1944.
From Draughts-2 via Teifi of 19th Augustus 1944. VIII/61
21 stop Guus en Josephine aangekomen stop Josephine brak haar been bij landing. Pakket in veiligheid. Is vliegtuig teruggekeerd? Felicitaties Hans met huwelijk stop Laatst ontvangen bericht was nr 8 ontvangen nr 17 TM 21 stop Met Frans en mij alles Oke stop
These telegrams I don’t understand, FRANS (Steman) had no W/T set but also no receiver! How was he able to send and receive messages from London after the latter ordered him to break contact with St. Jude. Or did he already received the two sets from Guus who was dropped in the night of the 9th of August. Was his first out going telegram sent on the 19th of August? Ten days after Guus was dropped?
ROWING / TIDDLEYWINKS (contact with clandestine press)
ROWING’s training name was HELDER. He should be known in the field as GUUS (Frank Hamilton) (253) .
HANS (DRAUGHTS) had contacted the illegal press in April 1944. He had given them money and delivered a special message from Queen Wilhelmina. Unfortunately he and his operator FRANS (Jan Steman) had lost their W/T material on landing. After completing his mission Hans had returned to this country to arrange delivery of new W/T material. While HANS was returning FRANS had sent us a few messages on another W/T operator’s set. An attempt had been made to send new material but the aircraft had been lost. FRANS had given particulars of a dropping ground called Tulip, but as this ground and the BBC message connected with it had been mentioned in a message from another organization, it was feared that it was no longer safe and might even be known to the Gestapo. HANS had left in charge a certain PIETER DEKKER (van Paaschen), but no message had been received from FRANS or PIETER since June 27th. The following were possible reasons:
1. The other organization, on instructions, had broken contact with FRANS. Leaving him without communication.
2. FRANS was in trouble.
3. The other organization had gotten into difficulties and FRANS had broken contact and was lying low or trying to make his escape.
GUUS (Frank Hamilton) together with his partner JOSEPHINE (Frankie Hamilton) would be sent to Holland to a person named in their orders. They would pass to him the above information and ask him to find out if PIETER DEKKER (van Paaschen) was still safe. If DEKKER was safe they should contact him and explain that HANS was in England and that they had been sent to re-establish contact and deliver propaganda material, 25.000 Dutch guilders and W/T apparatus for FRANS (Jan Steman). GUUS would tell PIETER that in addition to making these deliveries his mission was to act as reception committee leader ad that JOSEPHINE was to assist the Clandestine Press in their photographic work.
PIETER had asked for a quicker method of sending films to England. GUUS would explain the method of dispatch by pigeon and would point out that failing delivery of pigeons the films could be collected in Paris. The Clandestine Press should give an address and password in Paris where these films could be picked up. GUUS would transmit this intelligence through FRANS but failing W/T contact he would embody it in an innocent letter. GUUS would point out that as he and JOSEPHINE had not been in Holland for a considerable time PIETER should arrange for them to live underground in safe houses. He would make no contacts other than those arranged for him by PIETER. GUUS en JOSEPHINE would be dropped in Holland on the first favorable night in the July/August moon period. He and JOSEPHINE would each have 5000 Dutch guilders, 2500 French francs and 2500 Belgian francs for their own use. He would take a pigeon by which he could send a message advising London of his safe arrival.
TIDDLEYWINKS’ training name was HEMERIK. She would be known in the field as JOSEPHINE (254). She would be dropped in Holland in the July/August moon period together with her partner GUUS. FRANS would act as W/T operator for JOSEPHINE and GUUS, but the latter (Guus) would do all the encoding and decoding of their own messages.
ROWING and TIDDLEYWINKS were sent to the field on the night of August 9th, 1944. The operation was successful.
(254) Orders for Tiddleywinks, dated July 26th, 1944.
ROWING - W/T Traffic
ROWING’s first message (255) stated that he was hardly able to read his W/T plan since he had landed in a canal.
JOSEPHINE had had to destroy her codes and the Queen’s message before going into hospital. London replied (256) that new codes for JOSEPHINE and ROWING would be sent during the current moon period.
To Tiddlywinks via night Teifi of 21.8.44
Glad to hear you and Guus arrived and package now safe stop Exellent work stop We are all very sorry about your accident stop Hope you are getting on well stop Please keep us informed stop Long live Holland stop
(255) Rowing via Teifi 1 of 31.8.44
1 stop Can not find indicator of your first message to me stop Got message via Pieter stop Thanks greeting Sally stop My TP hardly readable because landed in canal stop Josehine had to destroy codes and Queens message before going to hospital stop In future used Pieters code stop Holland for ever stop
(256) 1 to Rowing via Teifi of 1.9.44
Glad to hear from you stop Josephine progressing stop Indicator our first message was for her stop Sending new codes for you and her this moon stop
July - September 1944, page 231 IV. Mission to Holland
IV - MISSION TO HOLLAND
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL W.B. SMITH, Chief of Staff of the US Army, in a letter to PRINCE BERNHARD (257) stated that since the area of active operations was beginning to move towards the frontiers of Holland, the Supreme Commander had decided that the time had come to regard members of the resistance movements in Holland as the “Netherlands Forces of the Interior”. PRINCE BERNHARD had been nominated by the Netherlands Government to lead the Netherlands Forces of the Interior under the command of GENERAL EISENHOWER. This would take effect forthwith. The Supreme Commander’s directives on the action required by the Netherlands Forces of the Interior would be issued from time to time to PRINCE BERNHARD who, assisted by a small staff, would continue to operate through the agency of the Commander. Special Forces. PRINCE BERNHARD and his staff proceeded abroad on September 7th . He was accompanied by a British officer (258) from the Dutch Country Section together with a W/T operator who could provide the Mission with direct communication to Special Forces Headquarters. This formed a nucleus for the subsequent mission to Holland after the liberation.
NORTHAW - W/T Traffic
The NORTHAW party reported safe arrival in its first telegram dated September 7th (259). They were spending the night in Douai and would go to Brussels the next day. London cabled (260) that in accordance with NORTHAW’s request instructions to the resistance groups outside the Arnhem airhead would be sent out at the same time as those to resistance inside the airhead. No orders would be issued before the airborne landing. There would be constant contact with GENERAL BROWNING. All JEDBURGH teams were standing by; they had been delayed by bad weather. NORTHAW cabled (261) that after the first airborne landing every effort should be made to save to save the bridges over the Wilhelmina canal. These were of the utmost importance. The orders regarding these bridges must be given after the airborne landing. In no circumstance should they be given before the operation had taken place (262). Further instructions to resistance could be given at London’s discretion over Radio Orange in PRINCE BERNHARD’s name. Further useful activities for resistance were the marking of minefields and the passing of information regarding German troop dispositions.
(257) SHAEF / 17240/ 28/Ops (C) of 31.8.44
(258) EEMF/2369 of 2.9.44
(259) Northaw srl B 936/7 of 7.9.44
(260) 2 to Northaw of 8.9.44
(261) Northaw 3 of 8.9.44
(262) Northaw 8 of 8.9.44
July - September 1944, page 232 IV. Mission to Holland
Resistance Movements Pleads for Arms
London transmitted (263) the following message from Dutch resistance to PRINCE BERNHARD, which had been received via PODEX (Mulholland):
“ON BEHALF OF RESISTANCE ORGANISATIONS I AM REQUESTING YOU TO DO EVERYTHING SO THAT THEY MAY RECEIVE WEAPONS AS OTHERWISE ARMED RESISTANCE WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE”
London advised NORTHAW (264) that the resistance movement was prepared to start a railway strike in Holland on receipt orders from London. The Airborne Division had been consulted and preferred that a strike should be ordered immediately following the launching of the Arnhem airborne operation.
(263) 5 to Northaw of 9.9.44
(264) 12 to Northaw of 9.9.44
July - September 1944, page 232 IV. Mission to Holland
Continued Rivalry Between Underground Groups
The RVV and the OD had indicated their willingness to serve under PRINCE BERNHARD’s orders (265). London transmitted to NORTHAW (266) a report from SIS that difficulties had arisen among the various groups in The Hague which were supposed to maintain order. Representatives of the Dutch Government and the OD were trying all these groups under OD control but the more important groups refused this leadership. A neutral leadership was suggested and it was requested that on liberation the police should be in charged with the maintenance of order and that they should be assisted by auxiliary police formed by the Knok Ploegen. Chaos would be result if the OD was charged with the maintenance of order. A further report from SIS which London transmitted (267) to NORTHAW was to the effect that the Knok Ploegen would not accept orders from leaders of a new sabotage groups formed from members of both the RVV and the KP. The KP also refused a single leadership of armed resistance movements in various places, such as Rotterdam.
(265) 13 to Northaw of 9.9.44
(266) 18 to Northaw of 10.9.44
(267) 21 to Northaw of 11.9.44
July - September 1944, page 233 IV. Mission to Holland
Bernhard as Referee
With regards to reports of lack of co[operation among the various underground organizations in Holland PRINCE BERNHARD pointed out (268) that no organization had any right to issue orders to any other. Orders came only from himself and all organizations had to co-operate in the truest sence and spirit. Any organization which did not loyally co-operate with others on an equal basis would not be helped from headquarters. SOE’s operators in the field were not leaders but were transmitting PRINCE BERNHARD’s orders. All this also applied to the RVV and the KP.
Bernhard versus the BBC
London Cabled (269) that under the headline “BERNHARD ATTACKS BBC” the Daily Mail had reported that PRINCE BERNHARD accused the BBC of broadcasting premature reports concerning the invasion of Holland and thus causing executions in that country. The BBC were very indignant and requested rehabilitation by means of a statement from PRINCE BERNHARD’s Headquarters. The BBC had merely quoted a statement from a broadcast by GERBRANDY on September 4th. Could London deny this story on PRINCE BERNHARD’s behalf? NORTAW replied (270) that PRINCE BERNHARD knew nothing of this report.
New Move for Unity
London cabled (271) a report received via SIS that the leadership of the sabotage forces of the Interior had been allotted to the “DRIEHOEK” (“TRIANGLE”) of the OD, RVV and KP.
In this manner it was it was hoped to attain unity of action. NORTHAW cabled (272) that with regard to the approaching airborne operation at Arnhem it was important that members of underground movements beyond a radius of 20 miles from the airhead should regard themselves as not liberated and work with necessary caution. PRINCE BERNHARD insisted that after the launching of the airborne operation a message should be broadcast to stay absolutely quiet and abstain from any action or demonstration until their liberation had been achieved. London reported to NORTHAW (273) via SIS that the leaders of the resistance were working satisfactorily and co-operation between the various groups could now be relied upon. All the groups were badly armed.
(268) Northaw 26 of 11.9.44
(269) 27 to Northaw of 12.9.44
(270) Northaw srl B1235/32 of 12.9.44
(271) 36 to Northaw of 13.9.44
(272) Northaw 31 of 14.9.44
(273) 43 to Northaw of 15.9.44
July - September 1944, page 234 IV. Mission to Holland
More premature publicity
London cabled that a report (274) from the Dutch correspondent KIEK concerning the liberation of Maastricht mentioned that the OD had been provided with weapons by the RAF. This was considered to be very dangerous and PRINCE BERNHARD was requested to stop this sort of thing immediately. PRINCE BERNHARD replied (275) that KIEK could be ‘figuratively shot’. NORTHAW (Prince Bernhard) must not be blamed for indiscretions by such people.
(274) 44 to Northaw of 15.9.44
(275) Northaw srl. B1415 of 16.9.44
Co-operation Not Yet Complete
London repeated to NORTHAW (276) a message received via SIS to the affect that the RVV in Rotterdam reported that a meeting had been held there of the OD, RVV, LO, KP and police representatives. Of all these groups only the RVV had a detailed plan of action. Nobody had any material. The KP had only 45 armed men but still they tried to do everything themselves. Notwithstanding objections on the part of the police they had tried to capture the water supply and sent 17 unarmed men to the electric power station. This resulted in plans for the protection of vital installations becoming known to the enemy.
Re-organisation of Underground Forces
The RVV reported on September 11th that they wished to substitute the previous division of the underground movement into districts by a normal military organization in brigades of some hundred men, the brigades to be named after their locations. This had now been done so that Allied High Command would be able to handle these units more easily (277).
All these brigades had been ordered to withdraw their mobile personnel before the German Army and to maintain communications by means of a relay system with the localities through which the Germans were withdrawing. Two men had been designated by each brigade to make contact with the Intelligence Officer of the Allied troops. For this reason these brigades should have normal military powers, such as billeting, requisitioning, etc. Would PRINCE BERNHARD please telegraph his approval? PRINCE BERNHARD cabled (278) that he fully agreed that the brigades should have some powers as the regular Dutch Army
London cabled NORTHAW (279) that the JEDBURGH STAAL (280), who had jumped with the airborne troops, r