STALKING, SKATING & FISHING              (Contact with RVV)


STALKING’s training name was MEYER. He would be know in the field as MARTINUS (165). STALKING’s orders were identical with those of SHOOTING
(166) except that STALKING, SKATING and FISHING would go to a different contact address, and would hand to the RVV the Supreme Allied
Commander’s directives but no money.

(165)  Orders for Stalking, dated August 24th , 1944
(166)  See page 212

STALKING (Jacky van der Meer), SKATING (Gerrit Kroon) and FISHING (Krijn Buitendijk) would be dropped on the first favourable night during the
August/September moon period. The RVV would be responsible for installing them in a safe house. Each would carry 5.000 Dutch Guilders for his own
use as well as 2.500 Belgian Francs for use in an emergency. On the first, second and third days after their arrival and the two following Sundays a
special message known to them would be broadcast. This would serve to prove their bona-fides.


FISHING’s training name was BOSMAN. He would be known in the field as KRIJN (167) It had been decided to send FISHING together with another
saboteur instructor (STALKING) and a W/T operator (SKATING) to the RVV The initial contact would be made by STALKING who would explain the
mission to one of the head members of the RVV. All three would be in possession of their own one-time-pads and would do all the decoding and
encoding of their own messages.


SKATING’s training name was KRAAI. He would be known in the field as PAULUS (168). It had been decided to send SKATING to the RVV as a W/T
operator together with two saboteur instructors STALKING and FISHING. STALKING would make the initial contacts and would arrange for SKATING a
safe house and later on to other houses from which he could transmit, His own messages would be confined to technical matters. He alone would judge
the days on which he would transmit. He would inform STALKING if he considered his message too long or too numerous for safe handling. If he,
STALKING or FISHING lost one another on landing they should meet at the address of their initial contact. STALKING (van der Meer), FISHING
(Buitendijk) and SKATING (Kroon)  were sent to the field on the night of August 28th , 1944. It was a blind drop. The aircraft did not return. (Plane of
161 Special Duties Squadron carrying  these three men crashed near Engelen,  Noord-Brabant. BUITENDIJK (Fishing) and VAN DER MEER (Stalking) were
able to get away, but KROON (Skating)  was seriously wounded and was arrested by the Germans)

(167)  Orders for Fishing, dated August 24th , 1944.
(168)  Orders for Skating, dated August 24th , 1944

DRAUGHTS & BACKGAMMON                                          (Contact with RVV and OD)

DRAUGHTS’ training name was BRUIN. He would be known in the field as HANS. BACKGAMMON’s training name was DE VET. We would be known in
the field as BRAM (169). The RVV were urgently in need of trained personnel to organize resistance and to maintain W/T communication with London.
They had given London a dropping point near Spanbroek, North-Holland, and were prepared to accept containers at this ground. DRAUGHTS and his
operator BACKGAMMON would contact the RVV at an address given in their orders and would arrange with them to have a reception committee
standing by to receive 12 containers of arms.
DRAUGHTS should inform London of the number of men held at his disposal for resistance purposes and also pass on military intelligence useful to the
Allied Command. If he had reason to believe that Allied troops were approaching the area in which he was operating he should send a courier to meet
them with all available intelligence. The password which the courier would give to the Brigade Intelligence Officer was “Telephone”.
He should also try to provide guides for the Allied troops.
DRAUGHTS would also contact the Chief of the OD at Broek op Langendijk and request his assistance in the provision of intelligence. He would advise
London of the local situation as soon as possible. He should wait for orders from HQ before acting. DRAUGHTS and BACKGAMMON would be dropped
together on the first favorable night of the current  moon period. Each would carry 5.000 Guilders. They would each own their W/T code and
DRAUGHTS would encode his messages to London. On the first three nights after the landing the BBC would send out a message known to DRAUGHTS
and BACKGAMMON, for the purpose of proving their bona-fides. DRAUGHTS was sent on his second mission, with BACKGAMMON, on the night of
September 7th, 1944. The aircraft did not return. (Crashed near the island Texel)

DRAUGHTS (second mission)  -  W/T Traffic

DRAUGHTS (Biallosterski) reported (170) a safe landing. (Special identity was present). London was delighted with the news (171) since the aircraft
had not returned. Did DRAUGHTS have reception and were the containers dropped? DRAUGHTS reported (172) that he was in Amsterdam and asked
for Stens and pistols to be sent to his dropping ground Mandrill.
Reception committee: Jan Schipper, Cor Schipper, Afra Schipper, Hil Schipper, Simon Laan, Dick Laan, Harry Heidekamp, Gerard Lips, Joop Hoebe and
Jaap Vriend. Dick Laan signaled the letter O by making circles with his torch instead of signaling the morse code for the letter O.

(169) Orders for Draughts and Backgammon, dated September 6th, 1944

.(170) Draughts via Plym srl. B 1090/87 of 9.9.44
Safe landing all MJEE is OK. BALDER shot two months ago. Love Eva.

(171) 1 to Draughts via night Plym of 9.9.44
Delighted with news because aircraft did not rpt not come back. Did you have reception and were containers dropped? Good luck.

(172) Draughts via Plym srl. B 1304/57 of 14.9.44
Here Amsterdam QSE one send to Mandrill stens and pistols this week with message you ACDIK now. Cheerio Win, love for Denmark, sorry for crew,
containers send to Zaan Streek, Balder shot two months ago.

V-1 from Wassenaar

A plane had been shot down near Limmen (173) in North-Holland. He (DRAUGHTS-1) was working in Amsterdam for the RVV, the LO and the OD. The
RVV had 500 men in Amsterdam. The Germans were using Wassenaar as a V-1 base. Would London send more material? London promised (174) to
deliver further material as soon as possible. Delivery in the Amsterdam area would be difficult but everything possible would be done. Any further
information on V-1 bases would be appreciated, and so would any action on his part to dislocate transport.
DRAUGHTS should warn resistance groups (175) with which he was in contact to be extra careful of penetration. It was understood that 2.000
Sicherheits Polizei were arriving in The Hague area. DRAUGHTS reported (176) that demolition parties formed the greater proportion of the troops in
Amsterdam. There was no electric current between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. Razzias were taking place (177) for all men between the ages of 16 and 50.
Would London send an organizer and W/T operator for Alkmaar? London advised DRAUGHTS (178) of the airborne operation at Arnhem, Nijmegen and
Grave and gave instructions which were to be passed on to the resistance movement.

(173) Draughts via Plym srl. B 1308/59 of 14.9.44
Don’t have this telegram

(174) 2 to Draughts via night Plym of 14.9.1944
Good work, delighted material was received safely. Will repeat operation soonest with message for Hans. Delivery of material Amsterdam area will be
difficult but will do what we can. Thanks information V-1, if you have any further information or can dislocate transport will be appreciated.

(175) 3 to Draughts via night Plym of 14.9.44
Thanks for information. Trying Mandrill with your additional ….ements as from Saturday listen to BBC message. Warn resistance groups to be extra
careful against penetration understand thousand Sicherheits Polizei arriving The Hague area. Barnet …. love.

(176) From Draughts via Plym srl. B1445/26 of 16.9.44
3 of 17. Mijn adres Zomerdijkstraat 28 name Geuns, Amsterdam Zuid. Most here demolition troops big activity SP (Sicherheits Polizei). 15 Stens are for
security Mandrill the rest on Monday start no current between 9 and 16.

(177) Draughts via Plym srl. B1449/27 of 16.9.44 See reference (194)
Don’t have this telegram

(178) 4 to Draughts via Plym of 17.9.44  See pages 203 / 204
Prins Bernhard geeft de volgende order: bruggen bij Zaltbommel, Hedel, Den Bosch, Vechel, Breugel, Best en alle bruggen over het Wilhelmina Kanaal en
sluizen Culemborg en Vreeswijk zijn van grootste belang en moeten opengehouden worden. Overmeester zoo mogelijk bewaking en doe al het mogelijke
om briggen te beheerschen. Wij weten dat U tekort aan materiaal hebt maar Allied High Command zou gaarne wenschen dat al het mogelijke gedaan
wordt. Alle mijnenvelden moeten van waarschuwingsteekens worden voorzien en alle gewenschte informatie moet aan geallieerde troepen worden
gegeven. Zelfde order  aan RVV rpt RVV en OD rpt OD gegeven.

(178) To Draughts via Plym.
Parachute troops have landed don the bridges at Arnhem, Nijmegen and Grave. Reinforcement will follow quickly. Give every possible assistance to
these Allied Troops so that the bridges over the Rhine, Neder-Rhine and the Maas canal are not rpt not destroyed. Resistance troops inside the area
should only provide guides give intelligence information and provide labour. Resistance groups outside the area but within 20 kms will give the same
assistance but also try to prevent enemy troops approaching the area. Resistance groups outside the 20 kms radius should interfere with enemy
movements towards and from the area but protect and preserve petrol rpt petrol dumps. Important that organizations outside the area should consider
themselves as not rpt not liberated and work with necessary caution.

(178) To Draughts via Plym.
Sein onmiddellijk waar u zich bevindt en houdt ons op de hoogte van veranderingen. Indien u of uw medewerkers aan militaire afdeelingen of brigades
verbonden bent, sein wie en aan welke afdeelingen of brigades. Indien localiteit waar u bent bevrijd wordt, moet u zich spoedigst melden bij
hoofdkwartier Prins Bernhard.

German Agents Dropped Behind Lines

DRAUGHTS reported (179) the presents of 700 SS in Den Helder and 300 men at the entrance to the Afsluitdijk (Zuider Dam). The north part of the
Anna Paulowna Polder was suitable for airborne troops. He held maps and details of the resistance. The railway strike was going well (180). The new
material sent on the previous night was ( ? safe) in Amsterdam there was contact with the OD commander in North Holland, the RVV, the LO and the
KP. London orders had been understood. The Germans intended to blow up the IJmuiden furnaces of the Royal Dutch Furnace and Steel Factory.
London warned DRAUGHTS (181) that Germans and traitors in liberated areas were reported to be using the following recognition signals in connection
with the parachuting of agents behind Allied lines; - A green Very light from the ground to which German aircraft replied with a red light followed by

(179) Draughts via Plym 10 of 18.9.44
Don’t have this telegram

(180) From Draughts via Plym 11 of 19.9.44
Railway strike OK. Nr 11. New material last night safe. Here Amsterdam contact with Commander OD in North-Holland, RVV, LO and KP your orders
clear. Germans are blowing up van Gelder IJmuiden soon Hoogovens.

(181) 7 to Draughts via Plym of 19.9.44   Don’t have this telegram

London cabled a message from Prince Bernhard to the Driehoek (182) outlining the task of the resistance movement.

V-1’s from The Hague

DRAUGHTS reported (183) that the Germans were sending V-1’s from Monster, south of The Hague. They were also blowing up the harbor of
Amsterdam. London would be glad to receive any further information he could get on the V-1 base at Monster (184). DRAUGHTS reported (185) the
movement of 1000 SS troops from Den Helder to Amsterdam. 600 Germans were reported in Enkhuizen. 1050 Mongols were willing to fight with the
Dutch in the Schagen area (186). London cabled (187) that experience had shown that the population of liberated towns and villages were, in their
enthusiasm, blocking roads and hindering the advance of the Allied troops. The resistance movements in towns and villages should organize armed
cordons to prevent this and also to prevent the entry of unauthorized persons into the areas.

(182) 10 to Draughts via Plym of 21.9.44  See page 209
Van Prins Bermhard voor Driehoek. Ik wil spoedigste opgaven hebben van aantallen actieve menschen van alle rpt alle organisaties die bereid zijn
wapenen te dragen gespecificeerd waar zij zich bevinden. Hun taak is niet rpt niet oorlogsviering doch hulp geven aan geallieerde troepen en
beschermen vitale objecten tegen demolitie door vijand voor zoover dit mijnerzijds gelast. U bent tot Liaison Officier benoemd.

(183) Draughts srl. B1788/44 of 22.9.44
Don’t have this telegram

(184) 13 to Draughts via night Plym of 23.9.44
Repeating Mandrill rpt Mandrill advise us when ready to receive fourth load. Any further information you can get on V-1 at Monster will be appreciated.
Reference Driehoek presume you mean mission and not commission but fail to understand their attitude we are confirming to them by different channel
your appointment by Prince Bernhard. Major wishes you good luck and understands Eva rpt Eva recently presented to your Queen rpt Queen.

(186) From Draughts via Plym srl. B1864/47 of 24.9.44
22.  Again train Den Helder Alkmaar. Thousand SS rpt SS from Den Helder to Arnhem. Enkhuizen 600 Germans now. Yours nrs: 12 and 13 do my best all
you ask.

(186) From Draughts via Plym srl. B1864/47 of 24.9.44
Please nrs 30 including 35 of the index table leave three for …. Demolition CISS Ijmuiden. Is Winnie still smiling? Area Schagen on .. 1050 Mongolen rpt
Mongolen will fight with us.

(187) 16 to Draughts via Plym of 25.9.44
Don’t have this telegram

Draughts warned of woman agent

DRAUGHTS reported (188) that he was in direct contact with Delta Centrum. London warned DRAUGHTS (189) of a traitor from CS-6 organization
named IRMA SEELICH, of Weteringschans 293, Amsterdam. She was a very dangerous Gestapo agent who would give important information. She
should be arrested immediately and if possible held, but if that could not be arranged then she should be eliminated. DRAUGHTS reported (190) that
the Germans intended to blow up the Hilversum radio station and transmitters. The studios would be left intact. Should there be a break-through near
Arnhem the German NSB broadcasting centre would be taken to Assen and later Oldenburg. The railway strike was complete (191) and inland traffic
was entirely held up apart from Wehrmacht trains carrying German personnel. DRAUGHTS reported (192) reception of a load of containers on the
Mandrill ground. The food rations were in a bad condition.
PETERS (BOATING), a friend of DE VET (BACKGAMMON), and one instructor (Cieremans) were in Rotterdam (193) but were not required there. Could
DRAUGHTS arrange to contact FRANK (van Beijnen) of the KP in Rotterdam and arrange for these two men  to be moved to Alkmaar, where they could
be used as requested (194).           

Irma Seelig was the Jewish girlfriend of one of the members of the CS-6 resistance group, she was arrested by the SD and under heavy pressure turned
by them and  betrayed a lot of resistance members.  Irma Seelig was arrested in 1948 and sentenced to 8 years in prison, she disappeared after she
was released.

(189) 18 to Draughts via Plym of 26.9.44
22 stop This afternoon meeting with Driehoek stop Mandrill is again ready at Thursday night stop Now straight contact with Delta.

(189) 18 to Draughts via Plym of 26.9.44
Don’t have this telegram

From Draughts via Plym.
25 stop We are working out your order arresting Irma Seelich and we will keep her stop Hope Kay is all right, love for Barnet,  how is Stokkers?

(190) Draughts via Plym srl. B1975/94 of 27.9.44
Don’t have this telegram

(191) Draughts via Plym srl. B2028/29 of 28.9.44
27 stop Antwoord op 189 stop Spoorwegstaking algemeen het binnenlandsche treinverkeer volledig opgehouden slechts enkele Wehrmacht  treinen met
Duits personeel de DC stop

(192) Draughts via Plym 30 of 29.9.44
Received load Tuesday at Mandrill stop Food rations were in bad condition stop One container with carabines was broken stop Why did you send
clothes stop Your 19 stop

(193) To Draughts via night Plym.
Peters,  friend of De Vet and one instructor are in Rotterdam but not rpt not required there stop Can you arrange contact with Frank rpt Frank LSC of
KP rpt KP Rotterdam for them to be moved to Alkmaar in view of your request stop

(194) See also above reference (177)
See 193.

SD housed in Amsterdam schools

DRAUGHTS cabled (195) that on account of increased SD activity the destruction of two schools north-west and south-west of the Van
Scheltemaplein, Amsterdam, was indispensable to prevent the SD from dealing a grievous blow to the underground forces. The presence of other
schools in the neighborhood would make it important to act after 5 p.m. or on a Sunday. London advised DRAUGHTS (196) that these targets were
under consideration, but he should send at once further details about this “grievous blow ”  to the illegal forces in order to add weight to London’s
request to the RAF for bombing. DRAUGHTS reported (197) an extension of German measures to break the railway strike. The position regarding coal
and food was growing worse daily and German terror was increasing apace.

(195) Draughts via Plym srl. B2116/10 of 29.9.44
On account of increased activity Sicherheitsdienst destruction by air east precision bombardment of SE centre two schools on NW and SE side Adema
van Scheltema Plein Amsterdam is indispensable to prevent SD to deal a grievous blow to illegal forces stop Children schools in immediate neighborhood
make it necessary to act after 17 hrs or on Sunday stop

(196) 22 to Draughts via night Plym of 30.9.44
Your bombing target under consideration stop Please give urgent details about grievous blow to illegal forces to add weight to our request stop

(197) From Draughts via Plym srl. B2154/53 of 30.9.44
36. Vele aanwijzingen voor uitbroeien Duitsche maatregelen om spoorwegstaking te breken voedsel en kolen positie dagelijks moeilijker stop Duitsche
terreur neemt hand over hand toe stop De DC.


BACKGAMMON reported (198) that conditions had improved and he was starting full working of his station. There was no electricity between the hours
of 9 a.m. and 6p.m. (199) Could London send accumulators and batteries? He asked (200) how the devil it was possible that the Home Station was
sending messages to other operators on his (BACKGAMMON’s) sked and frequency? In the meantime he was transmitting for the benefit of German
Direction-Finders. London advised him (201) to search on both sides of his frequency if he had any difficulty in contacting the Home Station.

(198) From Backgammon via Plym 2 of 15.9.44
…. Listen please rpt last night transmission stop Things …. arranged now start full working stop

(199) From Backgammon via Plym 3 of 17.9.44
QSL your 1 and 2. 1300 YKKT night MBCHQR MHEFE stop No electricity supply from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. send soonest two accumulators also light batteries
stop Are already cheering stop Zero

(200) From Backgammon via Plym 8 of 29.9.44
8 of 27 stop 5 Y per five. AB but still can’t explain 27 1200 heard on exactly Home Station calibration station QSA 5 using Home  Station callsign
procedure frequency changes with FI ID lecture only not using plan Plym stop GOTEO OEME please investigate thought this was Home making a mistake
stop Nine

(201) 5 to Backgammon via Plym of 29.9.44


It was required to dispatch one JEDBURGH team to the RAAD VAN VERZET in Holland in order to assist the leaders of that organization in their work; to
prevent enemy demolition as much as possible; and to provide an additional W/T link (204a). The team, which woul consist of MAJOR BRINKGREVE
(Dutch), MAJOR OLMSTED (American) and SERGEANT AUSTIN (British), would be dispatched as from the night of Tuesday, September 5th to contacts
of the RVV. The Dutch section would be responsible for the operation.

The team would be dropped in uniform to a reception Committee organized by the RVV or, if no reception was seen, the team would be dropped blind at
a point of which the details had been sent to London by the RVV.
The JEDBURGHS would be attached to the RVV, would remain under the direct command of the Dutch Section. They would immediately contact the
RVV with the help of the contact address provided. They would assist in recruiting men for intelligence purposes, forming resistance groups and
preventing enemy demolitions.
It was essential that the RVV should tell London immediately whether they and the OD had agreed to work together in accordance with the messages
sent to them The team would take two W/T sets and spare receivers, and would establish communication with the Home Station as soon as possible.
Headquarters Signals would arrange for signal and cipher briefs. Each member of the team would take with him 10.000 Guilders. The DUDLEY team was
sent to the field on the night of September 5th , 1944. The operation was successful.

DUDLEY  W/T Traffic

DUDLEY reported (202) the safe arrival of all containers and equipment. He had made contact with the leader
(Capt. Lancker) of the RVV for the Overijssel district. There were available approximately 500 men in 18 groups of varying strength, but with no arms
and equipment. Would London send eight containers with pistols and stens? London replied (203) that this operation would be arranged as soon as
possible. The choice of weapons (204) was very difficult, depending on which squadron did the operation. Owing to the urgency of the situation London
would send what was available rather than wait indefinitely and miss opportunities.

(202)   Dudley 1 of 13.9.44
One stop Arrived safely with all containers and equipment contact made leader RVV district Overijssel available approx five zero zero men in eighteen
groups of varying strength arms and equipment none send supplies eight containers C seven two H three pistols ten Kremado two hundred pistols
cigarettes and tea sam de zwart love Aappy Hank Bunty stop

(203)   1 to Dudley of 13.9.44
Good work stop Laying operation for Evert ground soonest listen for BBC message Bericht voor Grote Jan gefeliciteerd met je verjaardag stop Message
Henk Oranjehaven not repeat not suitable for BBC Flemish broadcast stop Confirm understood and that you will use non moon period lighting system

(204)   2 to Dudley of 14.9.44
Reference your three stop Committee should not repeat not be on ground unless they hear message Bericht voor Grote Jan gefeliciteerd met je
verjaardag on Belgian Flemish radio stop Offical non moon period stand by times twenty two hundred to two hours GMT repeat GMT stop If earlier take
off is expected will broadcast special bericht at the beginning of message stop Middle light for non moon period must be bonfire or strong car light which
can make complete circle stop Advise if using Eureka at your ground and what signal you will give stop Choice of weapons very difficult depending on
which squadron does the operation stop Owing urgency sending what we can than rather wait indefinitely and missing opportunities stop No operations
Thursday night owing mist stop                                              

(204a) Orders for operation “Poaching” (undated)

Dutch Forces to Dig German Defences

DUDLEY reported (205) that in Zwolle all men between the ages of 17 and 45 had been ordered to report for digging along the river IJssel. The general
situation was ”getting hot”. The Waal line was being fortified. DUDLEY was advised of the Arnhem airborne landing and given orders which were to be
passed to the underground (206). DUDLEY reported (207) that railway lines were being out nightly. He could organize a day dropping ground with 200
men to protect the field. London feared (208) that such daylight operations would not be feasible at the moment. DUDLEY reported (209) that active
OD groups in the Twente area were working under the KP during the fighting. Rivalry between the RVV and KP (210) still existed, however. He had
moved to the KP Headquarters in Zenderen, near Almelo. Three Huns had been killed and four wounded during the move, but they had had no casualties


An airborne force was being sent to Holland . Its object was to deny to the enemy and prevent the destruction of important bridges at Nijmegen and
Arnhem until the arrival of ground forces (211). Owing to the lack of communication it was not known what active resistance existed in this area, but
there were several resistance organizations in Holland, i.e. RAAD VAN VERZET, KNOK PLOEGEN, LANDELIJKE ORGANISATIE and the ORDE DIENST. The
RVV was spread throughout the country, but owing to the state of its security it was not known how many members it had at its disposal although
there were believed to be several thousand. It was thought possible that they had contacts in the operational area. Information had been received
that the KNOK PLOEGEN consisted of 500 active men spread out all over the country. Here again it was possible that they had some representation in
the operational area. No figures were available the OD. This organization had been principally concerned with the supply of intelligence. They might be
able to give some assistance. The LANDELIJKE ORGANISATIE had been supplying identity and ration cards for people living underground. The JEDBURGH
teams might be able to contact them.

(205)  Dudley srl Bk 452/7 of 16.9.44
Standrecht in Zwolle stop All men seventeen to forty five to report for digging along IJssel near Olst and Wijhe stop Hun rapidly increasing east of IJssel
stop XQ Christiansen reported soon in Denekamp will confirm stop Situation getting hot stop Waal line being fortified stop
(206)  3 to Dudley of 17.9.44

(207)  Dudley 22 of 19.9.44
Rail lines out nightly stop Re supply arms deplore stop Can organize day dropping stop Two hundred men armed to protect field over one thousand
unarmed stop Can protect roads in area if so armed stop One night drop urgently needed no confirmation HQ Christiansen as yet stop

(208)  8 to Dudley of 19.9.44
Information received from field states farmers area Epse rpt Epse two km south of Deventer have been instructed report with wagons for transport of
benzene rpt benzene opslagplaatsen stop Tried your new ground Monday night but no reception seen trying again Tuesday night regret early take off
stop Fear daylight operation not feasible at present stop Indicate more grounds if you can stop Teheran won …

(209)  Dudley srl B1637 of 20.9.44
Now lead ED to Twente active groups have put selves under KP during fighting stop In forest Epse is fortnight old depot Epse now full stop HQ
Christiansen at hotel Dinteloord one and one half kms south of Denekamp repeat Denekamp stop He lives at Singraven repeat Singraven one and half
kms east of Denekamp stop

(210)  Dudley srl B1626/93 of 20.9.44

(211)  Order Mission for Operation “Market” (undated)

Instructions to be Transmitted to Dutch Resistance by Jedburgh Teams

A) Inside the Airhead, Resistance inside the airhead would be directed to remain quiet and to take no action - unless directed to do so by the Allied
Forces- beyond; -
1) Providing guides
2) Obtaining intelligence
3) Providing labour
4) Possibly, providing guards and patrols
B) Outside the Airhead, Resistance outside, but within a radius to 20 kms of the airhead, would be instructed to provide the same assistance as
that ordered within the airhead. Resistance groups outside the airhead but within this radius would, in addition, be ordered insofar as their
armaments permitted, to interfere with and harass enemy columns. Approaching the airhead
C) In Areas other than in the Locality of the Airhead. In those parts of Holland not included in  a) and b) above, rsistance would be instructed: - I
To interfere with enemy movements towards the airhead. II To protect and preserve enemy fuel dumps. III To harass enemy attempts to
withdraw through Holland.
D) Immediately after the establishment of the airhead the RVV would be told by London that there were four JEDBURGH teams operating with the
Airborne Forces and instructed to order resistance groups in the area to co-operate. The OD would be instructed to infiltrate to the airhead
agents bearing intelligence reports.

Liaison missions consisting of four JEDBURGH teams representing Special Forces Headquarters and Dutch Resistance would be established with the
Airborne Corps. Mission would be attached as follows: -

Airborne Corps HQ                             EDWARD                            Mission HQ

Capt. STAAL (Dutch)
Capt. SOLLENBERG (American)
Sgt.   BILLINGSLEY (American)
Capt. MILLS (British)
2/Lt. WILLMOTT (British)

1 Air Tranport Division (BR)                  CLAUDE                            Sub-Mission

Capt. GROENEWOUD (Dutch)
Lt.      TODD (American)
Sgt.   SCOTT (American)
Lt.      KNOTTENBELT (Dutch)

82 Division                                      CLARENCE                          Sub-Mission

Lt.      VERHAEGHE (American)
Sgt.   BEYNON (American)

101 Division                                       DANIEL                            Sub-Mission

Major WILSON (British)
Lt.        DUBOIS (Dutch)
Sgt.     FOKKER (Faber) (Dutch)
Sgt.     MASON (British)

The JEDBURGH teams would advise Headquarters as to the possibilities of using resistance groups to understand specific task in support of Allied
operations in Holland. They would maintain liaison between the Airborne Force and SF HQ in London and they would assist in the identification of
members of recognized resistance movements when they were over-run. They would establish contacts with resistance groups within the airhead and
its vicinity for the purpose of ensuring that the services of these groups were made available to the Force Commander. The four JEDBURGH teams would
join the staff of Airborne Forces Headquarters or Divisions and would move with these formations when they proceeded to the airhead. Each party
would take with it the sum of 5.000 Guilers, with an additional 5.500 Guilders for the STAAL party. The EDWARD party would have a 24-hour W/T plan
which could be worked by two operators. The CLAUDE, CLARENCE and DANIEL parties would have their normal JEDBURGH plans for communication
with SF HQ London. The JEDBURGH teams EDWARD, CLAUDE, CLARENCE and DANIEL went to the field at 11.30 am on September 17th 1944. The
dropping operation was successful.
MONOPOLY / CUBBING / COURSING / BOATING                                                                 (Contact with “Driehoek”)

The training names of MONOPOLY, CUBBING, COURSING and BOATING were Sergeant STOPPELAAR, Sergeant CIEREMANS, Sergeant
HOOGEWERFF and Lieutenant POLAK respectively. They would be known in the field as LUDO, BEN, FRITS and DOUWE (212). Before the invasion
the RVV, KP and OD were the principe active resistance organizations in Holland, each working separately under its own leaders. In the present need for
united action, these three organizations had formed themselves into a “DRIEHOEK” (“Triangle”) for the purpose of offering unified resistance. Their
main task at present was to protect vital installations from German demolition and to generally assist the Allied advance. The four men would be
dropped to a KP reception committee north of Rotterdam. The reception committee would look after them and if they had any difficulties they should
contact the Burgomaster of Berkenwoude, with the password “Ik kom van VAN DER LINDEN”. This contact had been given to London by the RVV. A load
of containers would be dropped with the team, which would assist the DRIEHOEK in all its activities. They would be dropped by parachute on the night
of September 20th or on a subsequent night depending upon weather conditions. They would go in uniform with a military identity card, but each would
take with him a civilian suit for use in case of emergency. Communication would be through the W/T operator, who had a code, or through the
DRIEHOEK” transmitters. If over-run by the advancing Allied Armies they should report to the Headquarters of PRINCE BERNHARD. Each would take
with him 1.250 Guilders.

(212) Orders for Monopoly, Cubbing, Coursing and Boating, dated September 19th  1944.

(The actual drop took place on the night of the 21st - 22th  of September near Berkel en Roderijs, Drop Zone H99 )

BOATING - W/T traffic

BOATING (Paul Peters)  in his first telegram (213) reported that everybody has arrived safely. London sent their congratulations (214) and told
BOATING to ask the DRIEHOEK  to offer more reception grounds north of Rotterdam. BOATING  reported (215) that the situation in Rotterdam was
confused. The local leader (FRANK) of the KP was sending BEN (CUBBING, Cieremans) and himself to Apeldoorn to help on the underground telephone
network and also to give weapon instruction. BOATING’s work was taken over by THEODORE (CRIBAGGE, van Duyn). London replied (216) that it was
preferred that BOATING should maintain contact with the Home Station from Apeldoorn. His leader should recruit locally for the internal communications
network. BOATING should act according to circumstances but London preferred not to lose contact with him and would he advise Headquarters of the
final decision?

(213) Boating via Torridge 1 of 22.9.44
1 stop Alle vier goed aangekomen containers ontvangen stop HTSXY LXXXX

(214) 1 to Boating via night Torridge of 22.9.44
Congratulations good work stop Ask Driehoek to offer more reception grounds north of Rotterdam stop
(215) Boating via Torridge 3 of 23.9.44
3 stop Situatie in Rotterdam verward. Landelijke leider KP zenden Ben en mij morgen naar Apeldoorn voor Binnenlandsch e Phone station communicatie
en wapen instructeur stop Rotterdam heeft genoeg operators stop  Mijn werk wordt hier overgenomen door Theodoor stop HDR  DAAF echter mijn
skeds. Answer tonight. Home Station operator was zeer slecht Stop Seven XXX

(216) 3 to Boating via night Torridge of 24.9.44
Your 3. Prefer that you should maintain contact with Home Station from Apeldoorn if necessary. Your leader should be able to recruit locally for internal
communication. Consider 2 rpt 2 plans too much for Theodor. We leave you to act according to circumstances but prefer not to lose contact with you.
Advise us final decision.

Rotterdam short of arms

BOATING (Peters) cabled (217) that the Driehoek was (not) functioning in Rotterdam. All active resistance was being carried out by the KP and RVV
and they were cooperating well together. The leader of the LSC (Landelijke Sabotage Commandant = National Sabotage Commander) of the KP in
Rotterdam was FRANK. London replied (218) that BOATING should remain in Rotterdam with Frank of the LSC. LEO (RUMMY) (Bert de Goede) had only
one operator and it was therefore advisable for BOATING  to remain in contact with the LSC. BOATING reported (219) that at least a thousand stens
were needed for Rotterdam. These should be sent as soon as possible.

(217) Boating via Torridge srl. B1856/74 of 24.9.44
Driehoek bestaat niet in Rotterdam. Alle actief verzet door KP en RVV. Goede coördinatie tusschen hen. E JCBER FE kent landelijke sabotage
Commandant van KP S Frank in Rotterdam. Ik werk voor Landelijke Sabotage Commandant evenals Theodor en Karel. Mijn adres is DOKGELS BS. Stuur
mijn opdracht en voor Oosten des lands rechtstreeks naar Doorn. Ik sta dagelijks draadloos in contact met LSC. 4 . Nine

(218) 5 to Boating via night Torridge of 26.9.44
Important you should remain in Rotterdam with Frank of LSC. Leo has only 1 rpt 1 operator advisable you therefore remain in contact with and work for
them. Await your news OD. Send short report about conference Driehoek Amsterdam. Internal communications with east Holland is important but their
information should be sent to us through you if possible rpt if possible.

(219) Boating via Torridge srl. B1857/33 of 24.9.44
5 stop Bert is belast met reception ground LSSUOK ODAM (Rotterdam) heeft uiterst dringend tenminste duizend stens nodig. Stuur alleen stens en
feelenflug (vliegensvlug?). Geef volgende agenten volledige papieren  en kleeding mee.

OD appointed burgomasters: Dutch Government Intervenes

BOATING cabled (220) that the OD was preparing for the vacuum period which would commence after the Germans had left. They were appointing
Burgomasters and police in collaboration with the local Authorities but did not know to what extent London was backing them up. London transmitted a
message (221) from the Dutch minister of Home Affairs to the effect that the OD was not authorized to appoint Burgomasters for the transition period.
The National Commander for resistance in Amsterdam had asked for an operator and an instructor at Alkmaar. Could FRANK arrange to give BOATING a
contact address. BOATING replied (222) that the journey to Alkmaar was very difficult. He would answer the next day.

(220) Boating via Torridge 9 of 27.9.44
9 stop QRC nr six. OD prepares for vacuum after German quitting stop They are appointing burgomasters and police in collaboration with civil authorities
but do not know to what extend London backs them stop Ask Klijzing who will be police commandant for Rotterdam I expect after Germans QUIA stop
They think they will be given FXCOUS IJE FITH TXRTM when stop Ask GBQ to inform me about their position stop Why can not drop more weapons IMI.

(221) 7 to Boating via night Torridge of 28.9.44
OD rpt OD heeft ten aanzien bevelvoering Politie en Marechaussee als ook ten aanzien maatregelen tot uitschakeling of aanwijzing van bepaalde
politionele functionarissen generlei bevoegdheid van welken aard dan ook stop Verzoeke zulks op afdoende wijze aan leiding OD herhaal OD …. no more
text visible.

(222) Boating via Torridge srl. B2096/19 of 29.9.44
11 stop  Journey to Alkmaar very difficult. I answer tomorrow. Indien niet reeds geschied langs andere zend meer over positie OD in overgangstijd stop

                                                                                                                     III - CLANDESTINE PRESS                                                          


DRAUGHTS, who arrived back in England on July 8th (223) ,  gave the following account (224) of the state of the clandestine press in Holland in the
early part of 1944: -
The underground Press covered the country in such a way that every patriot could and usually did receive a copy of at least one of the Underground
Papers. The names of the larger papers were: -

A) TROUW This paper was printed in different parts of the country and there was a time in the summer and autumn of 1943 when it had a
circulation of from 70.000 to 80.000 copies Owing to recent arrests this had been somewhat reduced. Its scope was very wide, for it included in
its excutive both Catholics and Protestants of every shade of political opinion, though the leadership was definitely Conservative. In addition to
the publication of the paper the organization also dabbled in other matters. It is known to have organized raids on Food Offices and had been
instrumental in securing the liquidation of some traitors. The organization also had an escape route, though DRAUGHTS had no knowledge of its
B) HET PAROOL DRAUGHTS worked with this paper in Holland on the technical side and also to some extent in the distribution before he came he
came to England for the first time. At this time Parool had a circulation of approximately 25.000 and the whole of the organization was handled
by four or five men. The editorial staff saw nearly every underground paper as it was issued and had a very good information department. Its
records were frequently made available to other underground papers, especially the smaller ones.
C) CHRISTOPHOOR a big Catholic paper with its circulation chiefly in South Holland, which is the most Catholic part of the country; this paper had
grown very much from a small beginning.
D) JE MAINTIENDRAI The larger papers were all printed, but the majority of Communist papers were stenciled and duplicated.

Smaller papers

A communist organ called SIGNAAL, a small stenciled paper, made a somewhat sporadic appearance. There was another very small paper called VOD
which circulated only through the hands of Underground workers and which gave a resume of news from the BBC and descriptions of members of the SD
and Gestapo. DRAUGHTS had seen one copy of DE STEM VAN VRIJ NEDERLAND, a new paper with a small circulation. There was also another paper
called DE PLOEG, which started business in the autumn of 1943 and was sponsored by the party of Doctor COLIJN; it had a fairly large circulation.

(223)  See report, pages 182-183.

(224) Report by Biallosterski, alias Bruin, alias Draughts, on the Underground Press in Holland, dated July 25th, 1944


DRAUGHTS II (van Paaschen) reported (225) the arrival of GUUS and JOSEPHINE (ROWING and TIDDLYWINKS). JOSEPHINE had broken her leg and
landing but the package was safe. London asked (226) whether the Queens photograph had been received. He should be on his guard against
penetration and break contact with ST. JUDE (of SIS).
DRAUGHTS II reported (227) that ROWING’s code was almost illegible. Would London send him a further one-time pad? The Queen’s photograph was
lost but he had received one from Bert de Goede (Rummy). London promised (228) to send new codes for ROWING and TIDDLEYWINKS. Would
DRAUGHTS II give details of important arrest among resistance organizations? DRAUGHTS II would be glad (229) to receive two Eurekas and two S-
Phones, pistols and cycle tyres in the next delivery. London would be sending (230) propaganda material for German soldiers in Holland and for
distribution in Germany according to the BONZO plan. London pointed out (231) that the situation in France was not very clear and that micro-photos
should therefore be sent by Switzerland or else in duplicate or triplicate by pigeons.

(225) Draughts II via Teifi 21 of 19.8.44
21 stop Guus en Josephine aangekomen stop Josephine brak been bij landing stop Pakket in veiligheid stop Is vliegtuig teruggekeerd stop
Felicitaties HANS met huwelijk stop Laatst ontvangen bericht was nr acht ontvangen nr zeventien TM een en twintig stop Met Frans en mij alles OK

(226) 10 to Draughts II via night Teifi of 21.8.44
10 stop Is foto Koningin met onderschrift goed ontvangen stop Kunt u nog telegrafisten opleiden zoo ja dan zenden wij meer sets stop Verdeel geld niet
via Nat. Comite stop Een onzer agenten was op weg naar HOLLA doch blijkbaar nog steeds niet aangekomen (Sjeerp Postma) stop Pas dus op voor
penetratie stop Verbreek alle contracten met ST. JUDE (Herman Leus van BI/SIS) stop

(227) Draughts II via Teifi srl. B4610/72 of 22.8.44
Code Guus bijna onleesbaar stop Zend hem nieuwe TP herhaal TP en voor mij een prefix nummer SUGPMYNAR twee en twintig stop Tulip nog steeds OK
en verwachten dus nog een zending FL daar materiaal ontvangen MISSEVHTER gegevens voor BONZO gaarne hierover bericht stop Foto Koningin
verloren doch ontving een exemplaar van Bert de Goede stop

(228) 11 to Draughts II via night Teifi of 23.8.44
Terrein Tulip ondertusschen geweigerd stop Zoekt ander terrain ongeveer vijf herhaal vijf kms zuid oost van Tulip stop Geef belangrijke arrestaties onder
vermelding naam organisatie stop Goed werk en bedankt van HANS stop Zenden twee pakken en duiven naar nieuwe grond Tulip also ok nieuwe coden
voor Guus en Josephine stop Wij gebruiken prefix Hans U heeft niets nodig stop

(229) Draughts II via Teifi 24 of 25.8.44
24 stop Met volgende zending ontvangen wij gaarne twee Eurekas en twee S-Phones, twee stens, vijf pistolen, negen duiven, twee Heren- en twee
Dames horloges; twintig stel fietsbanden, kostuums voor Guus en Frans; een paar schoenen voor Frans stop Opgave Pers en Bonzo volgen spoedigst
stop Twee broadcast receivers en een vibrator stop

(230) 12 to Draughts II via night Teifi of 25.8.44
RAF herhaal RAF vragen nieuw terrein Tulip ongeveer tien herhaal tien kilometers zuid of zuidwest van oude grond Tulip stop Verwachten spoedig
antwoord stop Zenden ook materiaal voor Duitsche soldaten in Nederland en voor verspreiding in Duitsland volgens plan BONZO stop

(231) 13 to Draughts II via night Teifi of 26.8.44
Situatie in Frankrijk niet duidelijk en daardoor vrezen moeilijkheden voor koeriersters langs die weg stop Indien nog mogelijk zend microfotos via
Zwitserland of anders per duiven in duplo of triplo stop Zenden 10 duiven deze periode naar nieuwe grond Tulip stop Microfotos T, herhaal T, van 1 tot
340 aangekomen stop

Request for Propaganda Material

DRAUGHTS II reported (232) that JOSEPHINE was making good recovery. Would London send copies of
‘Vrij-Nederland’ , the latest editions of ‘Wervelwind’ (the miniature magazine dropped by the RAF), The papers of social, political or economic interest, in
order that the Dutch might get a broad view of Allied plans and preparations for the post-war period. Would London please send 5000 Guilders to meet
the cost of technical apparatus? (233)

(232) Draughts II via Teifi 25 of 28.8.44
Josephine gaat goed vooruit stop Mijn nr25. Zend voor pers van Londensche ‘Vrij Nederland’ laatste zes uitgaven zoo ook van ‘Wervelwind’, ‘London
Illustrated News’ The Economist en bladen met sociaal - politieke - en monetaire inhoud, zoodat wij een ruim inzicht krijgen in de geallieerde plannen en
voorbereidingen voor de na-oorlogse tijd stop Verzoek al dit materiaal in 14 voudig te zenden  Einde.

(233) Draughts II via Teifi 29 of 29.8.44
Het vorige geld is verdeeld via pers IERN waarin alle bladen zijn vertegenwoordigd en waarvan een als onze gevolmachtigde optreedt stop Mijn nr. 29.
Zend 5000 Gulden kosten technisch apparaat en zoo mogelijk tabak en cigaretten stop

Wholesale Arrests in Underground Press

DRAUGHTS II reported that (234) the whole of the “Christophoor” organization had been arrested two weeks previously. An attempt at reconstruction
was being made. Two members of the editorial staff of “Je Maintiendrai” and twelve couriers of other organizations had been also arrested. The
consequences of this could not yet be assessed. “Je Maintiendrai” was still appearing normally. London advise DRAUGHTS II (235) of the proposal to
give official recognition to the resistance groups in Holland. Could DRAUGHTS II give contact addresses with passwords for Noord and Zuid Holland for
the last stage of the war (236)? Resistance groups should cease all sabotage and help the Allies as much as possible (237). Quislings should be
arrested and valuable papers held until they could be passed to the Allies.

(234)  Draughts-2 via Teifi 32 of 31.8.44
32 stop Twee weken terug warden gearresteerd zoo goed als geheele Christophoor organisatie stop Men is weer bezig met reconstructive voorts twee
redactie leden “Je Maintiendrai” met twaalf koeriers stop Reorganisaties gevolgen nog niet overzichtelijk stop Je Maintiendrai verschijnt normaal verder
stop De arrestaties van vele LO herhaal LO menschen in de afgelopen maanden is u vermoedelijk reeds bekend stop Zend voor Josephine Cheerio

(235)  16 to Draughts-2 via night Teifi of 1.9.44
Wij maken bij u bekend dat overwogen wordt om actieve Nederlansche verzetsgroepen bij krijgsverrichtingen te erkennen stop Zij zullen onder
eenhoofdige Nederlandsche leiding staan namelijk onder Prins Bernhard stop Geven orders en aanwijzingen moeten met de meeste stiptheid worden
opgevolgd teneinde erkenning mogelijk te maken stop Niet publiceren stop Zeer geheim einde

(236)  21 to Draughts-2 via Teifi of 4.9.44
Kunt u snel geven contact adressen met paswoord in Noord en Zuid Holland voor laatste stadium oorlog stop Verzetsgroepen moeten alle sabotage
stoppen en de geallieerden zoo veel mogelijk helpen stop Alle NSBers en andere Quislings arresteren en vasthouden stop Alle waardevolle Sicherheits
Dienst papieren moeten in beslag genomen worden en voor de geallieerden bewaard blijven stop

(237)  srl B8585 to Draughts-2 via Teifi of 4.9.44 (zie 236)

Tense Atmosphere in The Hague

DRAUGHTS II (van Paaschen) should (238) make it known in Amsterdam and Rotterdam that it was preferable to sink ships rather than that the
Germans should fill them with explosives and use them for sealing the ports. DRAUGHTS II was sent a message (239) outlining the immediate functions
of resistance in Holland.
DRAUGHTS II was informed (240) of the landing of paratroops at Arnhem, Nijmegen and Grave and given instructions to pass on to resistance groups.
DRAUGHTS II reported (241) that on Tuesday the atmosphere in The Hague was very strained. It was said that the Allies would arrive there the same
evening and the Germans and NSB members made a hasty flight. The resistance movements were to go into action at 1 o’clock, but further information
revealed that these rumours were incorrect. Action was suspended until further orders. DRAUGHTS II had heard that an agent had landed in
Wieringermeer with a parcel for the Dutch underground press (242). Was this correct and if so why was he not informed in good time? DRAUGHTS II
was informed (243) that the task of the resistance after the passing of Allied troops was to mop up enemy bodies and other Quislings who could be
dangerous, such as snipers, etc. In case of need Allied troops could be called in to help.
DRAUGHTS II reported (244) that as from that day no more passenger trains were running between 10 and 16 hours. There were no steam trains
running at any time. All ships had been undermined and were heavily guarded. Sinking was now only possible by Limpits. Would London send a supply of
these? (Who was this agent who was dropped in the Wieringermeer?)
Dutch Factories Making Rocket Parts

DRAUGHTS II gave the position (245) of a rocket firing point near Wassenaar. The firing point mechanism had been moved so that the resistance
groups were unable to prevent the firing of the rockets. DRAUGHTS II gave details of (246) of factories which had been issued with secret orders and
given priority for manufacturing parts of rockets. These factories were at Tiel, Amersfoort and Schiedam. DRAUGHTS II reported the evacuation of the
following towns: Santpoort, Bloemendaal, IJmuiden, Velzen, Beverwijk , Heemskerk and Uitgeest (247).

(238)  22 to Draughts-2 via night Teifi of 8.9.44
Moet spoed bekend maken om in Amsterdam en Rotterdam over schepen te laten zinken door huidplaat weg te nemen dan dat Duitschers schepen en
baggermolens vullen met explosieven en gebruiken voor afsluiten havens stop

(239)  23 to Draughts-2 via Teifi of 8.9.44
Targets to be protected stop Schiehaven en Parkhaven road tunnel under Maas stop Electrical power plants including those at Galliliestraat en
Schiehaven stop Try to provide pilots river craft and dock personnel stop Protect railway administrative buildings Utrecht stop Guard important buildings
The Hague stop Patrol road The hague Rotterdam stop Protect bridges and railway line Rotterdam Utrecht … no more text visible.

(240)  33 to Draughts-2 via Teifi of 17.9.44

(241)  Draughts-2 via Teifi 37 of 8.9.44
37 stop Dinsdag stemming in Den Haag zeer nerveus stop Men zei dat geallieerden desavonds alhier zouden aankomen stop Haastige vlucht Duitschers
en NSBers SS IDCAQS een uur zou verzetsbeweging actief worden stop Bij nadere informative bleken geruchten onjuist te zijn stop Men zag tot nadere
order van actie af stop Alles normaal stop Spoorwegstaking gewenst stop Guus vraagt actieve instructies stop Hij is bij Hans verwachten geen
zendingen meer stop

(242) Draughts-2 via Teifi 39 of 8.9.44.
Nr 39. Vernam in Wieringermeer agent geland met o.a. pakket voor Pers stop Klopt dit zoo ja waarom ons niet tijdig op de hoogte gebracht stop

(243)  Srl B8036 to Draughts-2 via Teifi of 9.9.44
To Draughts-2 via night Teifi of 9.9.44
Instructies voor GUUS. Tracht in contact te komen met BERT DE GOEDE herhaal BERT DE GOEDE of RVV teneinde te helpen als instructeur voor
Rotterdam wachten antwoord stop Voorlopig onmogelijk pers producten te zenden maar u moet trachten verbinding met Duitschland in te stellen in
verband met BONZO herhaal BONZO deze zeer belangrijk voor later stop Agent Wieringermeer was bestemd voor LO herhaal LO producten waren voor
pers bestemd Einde.

(244)  Draughts-2 via Teifi srl B 1342/69 of 15.9.44
33 stop Geen burgertreinenloop meer vanaf heden tussen tien en zestien uur stop Stoomtreinen geheel niet meer stop

(245)  Draughts-2 via Teifi srl B 1491/98 of 17.9.44
48 stop Centraal punt afvuring rockets wit Landhuis Wassenaar coordinaten drie en twintig zestig en zes en vijftig vijf en negentig kaart blad dertig
uitgave negentien veertien stop Zoonet afvuur mechanism verplaatst maar verzetsgroepen niet meer in staat afvuren te verhinderen adviseeren
militaire steun stop

(246)  Draughts-2 via Teifi srl B 1674 of 21.9.44
Fabrieken voorzien met geheime orders en bevoorrading ter vervaardiging onderdeelen rockets stop NV Metalenfabriek Daaldrop te Tiel stop NV AMAF
firma Huyget en Wessel Nijverheidsstraat Amersfoort stop ODARATODA Staalwerken voorheen H.J. van der Kamp te St. oedenrode stop Vloeibaar
zuurstof komt uit Schiedam stop Fabrieken niets bekend stop Uw nrs drie en vier en dertig onmiddellijk doorgegeven stop

(247) Draughts II via Teifi srls. B1661/43 and B1668
Ontving uw nrs  tot en met 38 stop
Mijn nr 52 stop Bevinden ons in Vredespaleis rpt Vredespaleis stop Een van ons in actief verzet stop Toestand Josephine niet zoo gunstig stop Ligt in
Diakonessenhuis Haarlem stop Guus nog niet in staat naar Rotterdam te gaan stop Evacuatie bevolen VXR volgende plaatsen: Santpoort, Bloemendaal,
IJmuiden, Velzen, Beverwijk, Heemskerk, Uitgeest stop

BEZIQUE - W/T Traffic

London regretted (248) that operations had been impossible during the last moon period owing to bad weather, but someone would soon be sent with
material to meet BEZIQUE at his contact address. HANS (DRAUGHTS) had arrived safely. Owing to BEZIQUE’s silence it was assumed by London that
something was wrong with ST. JUDE (the SIS operator). BEZIQUE should therefore keep quiet until the new agent had arrived with the correct
password. BEZIQUE asked London (249) to send material soon ‘for heaven’s sake, as he had no material for listening to broadcast. It was ‘bloody
hopeless’ doing nothing all the time.
London cabled (250) a message for GUUS (ROWING) asking him what had happened to the Queen’s message. BEZIQUE was asked whether he had
now received two new W/T sets. BEZIQUE replied (251) that these had arrived. He reported (252) that the latest launching site for flying bombs was
in the Haagsche Bosch, near The Hague.
St. Jude (Herman Leus)  was arrested December 1944 and executed March 8, 1945 as a reprisal on the attack on Rauter. He was dropped with BI
agent Jan Faber 10 days after Draughts/Bezique. Faber survived the war, not being caught.

(248) 19 to Nidd of 19.7.44
To Nidd via night Nidd.
Regret operation last moon impossible owing bad weather but sending someone soon with material to contact you at your contact address. Hans
arrived safely. Owing your silence presume something wrong with ST. JUDE therefore keep quiet until our contact arrives giving correct password.

(249) Bezique 29 of 5.8.44
Don’t have this telegram

(250) 21 of Bezique of 23.8.44
To Draughts via night Teifi.
Is foto Koningin met onderschrift goed ontvangen? Nr 10. Kunt u nog telegrafisten opleiden, zoo ja dan zenden wij meer sets stop Verdeel geld niet via
Nat. Comite stop Een onzer (Sjeerp Postma) agenten was op weg naar Holla doch is blijkbaar nog steeds niet aangekomen stop Pas op voor penetratie.
Verbreek contacten met
St. Jude stop

(251) Bezique via Teifi 31 of 26.8.44
Don’t have this telegram

(252) Bezique via Teifi 35 of 15.9.44
Don’t have this telegram

(253) Orders for Helder, dated July 25th, 1944.
From Draughts-2 via Teifi of 19th  Augustus 1944.  VIII/61
21 stop Guus en Josephine aangekomen stop Josephine brak haar been bij landing. Pakket in veiligheid. Is vliegtuig teruggekeerd? Felicitaties Hans
met huwelijk stop Laatst ontvangen bericht was nr 8 ontvangen nr 17 TM 21 stop Met Frans en mij alles Oke stop
These telegrams I don’t understand, FRANS (Steman) had no W/T set but also no receiver! How was he able to send and receive messages from
London after the latter ordered him to break contact with St. Jude. Or did he already received the two sets from Guus who was dropped in the night of
the 9th of August. Was his first out going telegram sent on the 19th of August? Ten days after Guus was dropped?

ROWING / TIDDLEYWINKS                                                  (contact with clandestine press)

ROWING’s training name was HELDER. He should be known in the field as GUUS (Frank Hamilton) (253) .
HANS (DRAUGHTS) had contacted the illegal press in April 1944. He had given them money and delivered a special message from Queen Wilhelmina.
Unfortunately he and his operator FRANS (Jan Steman) had lost their W/T material on landing. After completing his mission Hans had returned to this
country to arrange delivery of new W/T material. While HANS was returning FRANS had sent us a few messages on another W/T operator’s set. An
attempt had been made to send new material but the aircraft had been lost. FRANS had given particulars of a dropping ground called Tulip, but as this
ground and the BBC message connected with it had been mentioned in a message from another organization, it was feared that it was no longer safe
and might even be known to the Gestapo. HANS had left in charge a certain PIETER DEKKER (van Paaschen), but no message had been received from
FRANS or PIETER since June 27th. The following were possible reasons:

1. The other organization, on instructions, had broken contact with FRANS. Leaving him without communication.
2. FRANS was in trouble.
3. The other organization had gotten into difficulties and FRANS had broken contact and was lying low or trying to make his escape.

GUUS (Frank Hamilton) together with his partner JOSEPHINE (Frankie Hamilton) would be sent to Holland to a person named in their orders. They
would pass to him the above information and ask him to find out if PIETER DEKKER (van Paaschen) was still safe. If DEKKER was safe they should
contact him and explain that HANS was in England and that they had been sent to re-establish contact and deliver propaganda material, 25.000 Dutch
guilders and W/T apparatus for FRANS (Jan Steman). GUUS would tell PIETER that in addition to making these deliveries his mission was to act as
reception committee leader ad that JOSEPHINE was to assist the Clandestine Press in their photographic work.

PIETER had asked for a quicker method of sending films to England. GUUS would explain the method of dispatch by pigeon and would point out that
failing delivery of pigeons the films could be collected in Paris. The Clandestine Press should give an address and password in Paris where these films
could be picked up. GUUS would transmit this intelligence through FRANS but failing W/T contact he would embody it in an innocent letter. GUUS
would point out that as he and JOSEPHINE had not been in Holland for a considerable time PIETER should arrange for them to live underground in safe
houses. He would make no contacts other than those arranged for him by PIETER. GUUS en JOSEPHINE would be dropped in Holland on the first
favorable night in the July/August moon period. He and JOSEPHINE would each have 5000 Dutch guilders, 2500 French francs and 2500 Belgian francs
for their own use. He would take a pigeon by which he could send a message advising London of his safe arrival.


TIDDLEYWINKS’ training name was HEMERIK. She would be known in the field as JOSEPHINE (254). She would be dropped in Holland in the
July/August moon period together with her partner GUUS. FRANS would act as W/T operator for JOSEPHINE and GUUS, but the latter (Guus) would
do all the encoding and decoding of their own messages.
ROWING and TIDDLEYWINKS were sent to the field on the night of August 9th, 1944. The operation was successful.

(254) Orders for Tiddleywinks, dated July 26th, 1944.

ROWING - W/T  Traffic

ROWING’s first message (255) stated that he was hardly able to read his W/T plan since he had landed in a canal.
JOSEPHINE had had to destroy her codes and the Queen’s message before going into hospital. London replied (256) that new codes for JOSEPHINE
and ROWING would be sent during the current moon period.

To Tiddlywinks via night Teifi of 21.8.44
Glad to hear you and Guus arrived and package now safe stop Exellent work stop We are all very sorry about your accident stop Hope you are getting
on well stop Please keep us informed stop Long live Holland stop

(255) Rowing via Teifi 1 of 31.8.44
1 stop Can not find indicator of your first message to me stop Got message via Pieter stop Thanks greeting Sally stop My TP hardly readable because
landed in canal stop Josehine had to destroy codes and Queens message before going to hospital stop In future used Pieters code stop Holland for
ever stop

(256) 1 to Rowing via Teifi of 1.9.44
Glad to hear from you stop Josephine progressing stop Indicator our first message was for her stop Sending new codes for you and her this moon stop
                                                                                       IV  -  MISSION TO HOLLAND    


LIEUTENANT-GENERAL W.B. SMITH, Chief of Staff of the US Army, in a letter to PRINCE BERNHARD (257) stated that since the area of active
operations was beginning to move towards the frontiers of Holland, the Supreme Commander had decided that the time had come to regard members of
the resistance movements in Holland as the “Netherlands Forces of the Interior”. PRINCE BERNHARD had been nominated by the Netherlands
Government to lead the Netherlands Forces of the Interior under the command of GENERAL EISENHOWER. This would take effect forthwith. The
Supreme Commander’s directives on the action required by the Netherlands Forces of the Interior would be issued from time to time to PRINCE
BERNHARD who, assisted by a small staff, would continue to operate through the agency of the Commander. Special Forces. PRINCE BERNHARD and
his staff proceeded abroad on September 7th . He was accompanied by a British officer (258) from the Dutch Country Section together with a W/T
operator who could provide the Mission with direct communication to Special Forces Headquarters. This formed a nucleus for the subsequent mission to
Holland after the liberation.

NORTHAW  -  W/T Traffic

The NORTHAW party reported safe arrival in its first telegram dated September 7th (259). They were spending the night in Douai and would go to
Brussels the next day. London cabled (260) that in accordance with NORTHAW’s request instructions to the resistance groups outside the Arnhem
airhead would be sent out at the same time as those to resistance inside the airhead. No orders would be issued before the airborne landing. There
would be constant contact with GENERAL BROWNING. All JEDBURGH teams were standing by; they had been delayed by bad weather. NORTHAW
cabled (261) that after the first airborne landing every effort should be made to save to save the bridges over the Wilhelmina canal. These were of the
utmost importance. The orders regarding these bridges must be given after the airborne landing. In no circumstance should they be given before the
operation had taken place (262). Further instructions to resistance could be given at London’s discretion over Radio Orange in PRINCE BERNHARD’s
name. Further useful activities for resistance were the marking of minefields and the passing of information regarding German troop dispositions.

(257)  SHAEF / 17240/ 28/Ops (C) of 31.8.44
(258)  EEMF/2369 of 2.9.44
(259)  Northaw srl B 936/7 of 7.9.44
(260)  2 to Northaw of 8.9.44
(261)  Northaw 3 of 8.9.44
(262)  Northaw 8 of 8.9.44

Resistance Movements Pleads for Arms

London transmitted (263) the following message from Dutch resistance to PRINCE BERNHARD, which had been received via PODEX (Mulholland):

London advised NORTHAW (264) that the resistance movement was prepared to start a railway strike in Holland on receipt orders from London. The
Airborne Division had been consulted and preferred that a strike should be ordered immediately following the launching of the Arnhem airborne

(263)   5 to Northaw of 9.9.44
(264)  12 to Northaw of 9.9.44

Continued Rivalry Between Underground Groups

The RVV and the OD had indicated their willingness to serve under PRINCE BERNHARD’s orders (265). London transmitted to NORTHAW (266) a
report from SIS that difficulties had arisen among the various groups in The Hague which were supposed to maintain order. Representatives of the
Dutch Government and the OD were trying all these groups under OD control but the more important groups refused this leadership. A neutral
leadership was suggested and it was requested that on liberation the police should be in charged with the maintenance of order and that they should
be assisted by auxiliary police formed by the Knok Ploegen. Chaos would be result if the OD was charged with the maintenance of order. A further
report from SIS which London transmitted (267) to NORTHAW was to the effect that the Knok Ploegen would not accept orders from leaders of a new
sabotage groups formed from members of both the RVV and the KP. The KP also refused a single leadership of armed resistance movements in various
places, such as Rotterdam.

(265)  13 to Northaw of 9.9.44
(266)  18 to Northaw of 10.9.44
(267)  21 to Northaw of 11.9.44

Bernhard as Referee

With regards to reports of lack of co[operation among the various underground organizations in Holland PRINCE BERNHARD pointed out (268) that no
organization had any right to issue orders to any other. Orders came only from himself and all organizations had to co-operate in the truest sence and
spirit. Any organization which did not loyally co-operate with others on an equal basis would not be helped from headquarters. SOE’s operators in the
field were not leaders but were transmitting PRINCE BERNHARD’s orders. All this also applied to the RVV and the KP.

Bernhard versus the BBC

London Cabled (269) that under the headline “BERNHARD ATTACKS BBC” the Daily Mail had reported that PRINCE BERNHARD accused the BBC of
broadcasting premature reports concerning the invasion of Holland and thus causing executions in that country. The BBC were very indignant and
requested rehabilitation by means of a statement from PRINCE BERNHARD’s Headquarters. The BBC had merely quoted a statement from a broadcast by
GERBRANDY on September 4th. Could London deny this story on PRINCE BERNHARD’s behalf? NORTAW replied (270) that PRINCE BERNHARD knew
nothing of this report.

New Move for Unity

London cabled (271) a report received via SIS that the leadership of the sabotage forces of the Interior had been allotted to the “DRIEHOEK”
(“TRIANGLE”) of the OD, RVV and KP.
In this manner it was it was hoped to attain unity of action. NORTHAW cabled (272) that with regard to the approaching airborne operation at Arnhem
it was important that members of underground movements beyond a radius of 20 miles from the airhead should regard themselves as not liberated and
work with necessary caution. PRINCE BERNHARD insisted that after the launching of the airborne operation a message should be broadcast to stay
absolutely quiet and abstain from any action or demonstration until their liberation had been achieved. London reported to NORTHAW (273) via SIS
that the leaders of the resistance were working satisfactorily and co-operation between the various groups could now be relied upon. All the groups
were badly armed.

(268)  Northaw 26 of 11.9.44
(269)  27 to Northaw of 12.9.44
(270)  Northaw srl B1235/32 of 12.9.44
(271)  36 to Northaw of 13.9.44
(272)  Northaw 31 of 14.9.44
(273)  43 to Northaw of 15.9.44

More premature publicity
London cabled that a report (274) from the Dutch correspondent KIEK concerning the liberation of Maastricht mentioned that the OD had been
provided with weapons by the RAF. This was considered to be very dangerous and PRINCE BERNHARD was requested to stop this sort of thing
immediately. PRINCE BERNHARD replied (275) that KIEK could be ‘figuratively shot’.  NORTHAW (Prince Bernhard) must not be blamed for
indiscretions by such people.

(274) 44 to Northaw of 15.9.44
(275) Northaw srl. B1415 of 16.9.44

Co-operation Not Yet Complete

London repeated to NORTHAW (276) a message received via SIS to the affect that the RVV in Rotterdam reported that a meeting had been held there
of the OD, RVV, LO, KP and police representatives. Of all these groups only the RVV had a detailed plan of action. Nobody had any material. The KP had
only 45 armed men but still they tried to do everything themselves. Notwithstanding objections on the part of the police they had tried to capture the
water supply and sent 17 unarmed men to the electric power station. This resulted in plans for the protection of vital installations becoming known to
the enemy.

Re-organisation of Underground Forces

The RVV reported on September 11th that they wished to substitute the previous division of the underground movement into districts by a normal
military organization in brigades of some hundred men, the brigades to be named after their locations. This had now been done so that Allied High
Command would be able to handle these units more easily (277).
All these brigades had been ordered to withdraw their mobile personnel before the German Army and to maintain communications by means of a relay
system with the localities through which the Germans were withdrawing. Two men had been designated by each brigade to make contact with the
Intelligence Officer of the Allied troops. For this reason these brigades should have normal military powers, such as billeting, requisitioning, etc. Would
PRINCE BERNHARD please telegraph his approval? PRINCE BERNHARD cabled (278) that he fully agreed that the brigades should have some powers
as the regular Dutch Army
London cabled NORTHAW (279) that the JEDBURGH STAAL (280), who had jumped with the airborne troops, reported making contact with the
resistance sub-leader at Groesbeek, where there were some 300 active men.

(276)  48 to Northaw of 16.9.44
(277)  49 to Northaw of 16.9.44
(278)  Northaw 40 of 17.9.44
(279)  57 to Northaw of 18.9.44
(280)  See Mission “EDWARD”, page 223

The population was co-operating excellently and the OD was giving every assistance. PRINCE BERNHARD stated (281) that the “TRIANGLE” command
was not to conduct the war but merely to nominate leaders when necessary and pass through his orders. The technical details connected with these
instructions should be left to local leaders. It should be emphasized that weapons would be distributed only to such persons as were able and willing to
use them. DRAUGHTS should contact the DRIEHOEK immediately and act as liaison officer.

Resistance Pleads for Anonymity

London transmitted to PRINCE BERNHARD a message from SIS sources in Holland (282) urgently requesting the Prince not to mention on the radio
names of organizations as this was dangerous for work in non-liberated areas. For this reason London had requested that the Prince recorded
proclamation should not be broadcast. NORTHAW was informed (283) that a message had been received from DRAUGHTS to the effect that the
various reports received from KAREL of the RVV with reference to the disputed commands were KAREL’s own views and not those of the DRIEHOEK.
DRAUGHTS recommended support for the DRIEHOEK, which was in line with the Prince’s own views. London had confirmed this to him and KAREL had
once more been instructed to subordinate himself to the DRIEHOEK.

(281)  Northaw 44 of 19.9.44
(282)  73 to Northaw of 21.9.44
(283)  74 to Northaw of 21.9.44

Bernhard Refuses to Cancel Broadcast

PRINCE BERNHARD complained (284) that FOCK of the Dutch SIS had repeatedly stopped messages from the NORTHAW mission which he had been
asked to pass on. This had to stop. FOCK must carry out the Prince’s orders as received. The Prince’s recording must be broadcast immediately over
Radio Orange. FOCK reported (285) that further confirmation had been received from the OD that the DRIEHOEK (which was now known as the Delta
Centrum) had achieved real unity. FOCK reported to PRINCE BERNHARD (286) that KAREL of the RVV had informed him that he followed the Prince’s
orders and had now taken a seat in the DRIEHOEK. KAREL (Jan Thijssen) assured the Prince that he had never intended to disregard his orders.
PRINCE BERNHARD cabled (287) that the underground movement should be informed by all possible channels that the DRIEHOEK was ordered by the
Prince only for the leadership of resistance. Local appointments should be filled not by the TRIANGLE or committee but by single commanders.

Rail Strike Threatens Food Supplies

London advised NORTHAW (288) of a message from the field to the effect that the OD, KP and RVV had requested an experienced regular officer (289)
to act as a central commander of the DRIEHOEK. He had been functioning since September 20th . A message from the Dutch War Minister to PRINCE
BERNHARD (290) asked the Prince to ascertain whether the 21st Army Group considered the continuation of the railway strike to be of military
importance. If not it was intended to inform the Dutch to make the best possible arrangements in order to maintain food supplies for the cities

(284)  Northaw 52 of 22.9.44
(285)  79 to Northaw of 22.9.44
(286)  95 to Northaw of 24.9.44
(287)  Northaw 74 of 26.9.44
(288)  127 to Northaw of 28.9.44
(289)  Van den Over (Henri Koot), see page 188
(290)  137 to Northaw of 30.9.55