SOE WAR DIARIES NOVEMBER 1944.
                                                                                                                                        I -  GENERAL


POSITIONS IN THE FIELD


Success of Rummy’s Mission
Until the end of 1944 LEO (RUMMY) was successful in supplying a considerable quantity of equipment to the KP. His activities were almost entirely
restricted to the province of South Holland and Utrecht. The only difficulties encountered by LEO came from the Communist Party, a number of whose
members were to be found in the KP. Although courageous and efficient resistance workers, their presence during parachute operations led to undiserable
losses in the material dropped, and it became clear that Party members were withholding material for their own private purposes (1). At about the time of
FRANK’s (van Beijnen)  death in November his chauffeur was arrested in Rotterdam through not having provided himself with a petrol authority, which had
that day become necessary for driving a car. He had in his possession a number of ration cards and papers connected with the underground organization.
These involved a member of FRANK’s staff called CORNELIS BITTER.


KP Captive Turns Traitor
Within a fortnight BITTER was arrested, and his arrest was almost immediately followed by that of other leading members of the Rotterdam KP. BITTER
was released in the middle of December 1944 and interrogated by the Security Section of the KP. It was decided that he was not a traitor and he was
permitted to rejoin the organization. Shortly afterwards, however there was first hand proof that while under arrest BITTER, dressed in SS uniform, had
been assisting the SD in interrogations, and had probably denounced KP members. He was subsequently shot by ROB of Rotterdam.


Cribbage Arrested
While this investigation was under way (the execution of a traitor called Cornelis BITTER), THEO (CRIBAGGE), RUMMY’s W/T operator was arrested on
December 21st . CRIBAGGE (Arie van Duyn) had recently become attached to a courier of the KP named TINE (Janny Sissingh) , who was acting as his
look-out when German troops surrounded the block in which he was transmitting. The pair were not unduly alarmed and concealed their W/T set in a
secure hiding place under the floor boards and were innocently engaged when an NCO entered the room, saying he was looking for a German officer.
Unfortunately there was also present a third person VOLKERT who had recently been released from prison, and his identity card, lying on the table,
showed him with a shaven head.
The NCO became suspiscious and bluffed VOLKERT into producing a second card. The room was then searched and further false ID card were found, as
the premises served a dual purpose for W/T transmission and forgeries. The SD were called in and discovering the wireless set, arrested CRIBBAGE, TINE
(Didi Gaazenbeek) and VOLKERT (Elsinga).
(This dual purpose of the building was really stupid)

PARR makes a mistake here, CRIBBAGE courier was DIDI GAAZENBEEK and not JANNY SISSINGH, see Attachment XIX.

(1) Security report on SOE organizations in Holland, August 1944 - February 1945.


“Talks” to SD
The following day RUMMY (Bert de Goede), who by a lucky chance had heard of these arrests, received through a postbox known to CRIBBAGE, and not
yet closed down, a message from the latter requesting a rendez vous for a meeting. It was clear that CRIBBAGE had started to “talk” to the SD. The KP
therefore took the necessary security precautions but in spite of this there were some further arrests.


NEW DIRECTIVE FOR DUTCH RESISTANCE
The following Directive (2) on the employment and development of resistance in Holland during the period following December 1st , 1944 was sent by
Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman to the Dutch Section on December 3rd.
Apart from the operation in the Venlo district, the Allied advance into Holland has stabilized, and at present of comparative lull prevails.

Division into zones
For the purpose of developing and executing the plans contained in this Directive unliberated Holland will be divided into six zones as follows:
I. Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe.
II. Overijssel and Achterhoek
III. Veluwe, up to and including River IJssel, province of Utrecht and Het Gooi.
IV. Betuwe.
V. Province of South-Holland and the regions of Haarlem and Amsterdam
VI. Holland Noorder Kwartier

Three Phases of Resistance
Phase One - During the Period of Lull
It is essential that resistance should remain clandestine and retain its integrity until the time comes for intensifying activity.


(2) MUS/1802/2205 dated December 3rd , 1944 by Birgadier Mockler-Ferryman

(II)  Maintaining order and keeping roads clear;
(III) Repairing war damage;
(IV) Providing labour and technical services;
(V)  Providing guides and intelligence.



DELIVERY OF STORES
As the resistance forces had been instructed to reduce activity and the general policy at this time was one of “laying low”, the delivery to the field during
December showed a sharp drop in comparison with the previous month. Two hundred and twenty-one containers and 25 packages were sent to the field.


                                                                     

                                                                                                                       II - RESISTANCE GROUPS



BOWLS   W/T TRAFFIC            (? GERMAN CONTROLLED)

London was arranging to deliver as soon as possible the material which BOWLS (Blanke) had requested (3). It was suggested that he should work out a
plan with his friend in Germany for maintaining contact and passing out intelligence.  Had BOWLS heard of any recent arrests?


PODEX, RUMMY & CRIBBAGE      (Contact with CS-6 and RVV)

RUMMY (Bert de Goede)

FRANK of KP reported killed
London cabled (4) that Amsterdam had reported the possibility of FRANK (van Beijnen) having been arrested. This was not certain, and RUMMY would be
kept advised of the situation. What were the difficulties between WITTE PIET (SNOOKER, Piet de Beer) and the KP? The RAF were keen to keep the SD
on the run (5) so RUMMY should inform London as to their movements. It had been reported that FRANK had been killed or wounded while driving between
Amersfoort and Apeldoorn.  RUMMY confirmed (6) that FRANK had probably been arrested or was dead.

(3) 12 to Bowls of 07.12.44
(4) 177 to Rummy of 01.12.44
(5) 178 to Rummy of 01.12.44
(6) 151 from Rummy of 01.12.44

He (RUMMY) was informed (7) that Queen Wilhelmina had again requested General Eisenhower to warn the Germans that captured members of the
NBS (Netherlands Forces of the Interior) must be treated as prisoners of war.

Politics before resistance - Rummy’s report
RUMMY cabled (8): “We are planning to coordinate all resistance groups in Rotterdam. Perhaps you thought this had already been done. Yes indeed in
theory but not in practice: At the moment in the whole of Holland, politics come first and resistance second. We want to reverse this order, and put
resistance first. Only you can help us to achieve order and co-ordinate. “We want to have one communication with you for the RVV, LO and KP in
Rotterdam so that when the time comes you, and nobody else, can give us orders. Therefore, we think it better that you should send us some military
person who can co-ordinate our operation and orders.  “Sometimes the people here seem to seem to be behaving like little children, all with beautiful
ranks. We tried several times to change this chaos, but they did not listen”. RUMMY asked London (9) to tell the RAF that they hit the SD building in
Rotterdam only with machinegun fire. One rocket came just in front of the main entrance. The remainder hit houses in the Robert Fruinstraat, behind the
SD building.


Threat to send C-in-C
London cabled (10) the following telegram from PRINCE BERNHARD to the Commander of the Zuid-Holland region: “Reports reaching me indicate disunity
in resistance owing to questions of political nature. I suggest that this ceased forthwith, and that all groups work together for the common cause. If the
present disunity continues, I shall be obliged to send an officer to take command of all active resistance. Please assure me that this will not be necessary
and that I may count on your united efforts”. London cabled to the Commander Zuid-Holland (11) details of the scheme to divide unliberated Holland into
six zones and outlined the limits of his own zone. Further messages would be sent through RUMMY giving details of special BBC broadcasts and the action
to be taken when these were heard. The texts of his action message should not be communicated to other zones, or to personnel from other zones. This
was most important in case of penetration.

(7)   179 to Rummy of 01.12.44
(8)   150 from Rummy of 01.12.44
(9)    Srl No. B838.710 from Rummy of 04.12.44
(10) 186 to Rummy of 05.12.44
(11) 195 & 196 to Rummy of 10.12.44


V-2 Fuel Report
RUMMY requested (12) the despatch of topical photographs for the underground press. This was important for the morale of the population since “the
press was the only thing they saw”. He reported (13) the position of an acid factory near Gorinchem. This factory was producing fuel for V-2 rockets. No
news had been received from GERARD (PODEX, Mulholland) (14)
He asked whether London was aware that Zuid-Holland was divided into two regions, each with its own commander. He had passed London’s message to
the commander of Zuid-Holland Zuid (15). The field needed the following articles very badly (16): Limpits; 100 fillers for Stens; 150 detonators for
handgrnades; 1000 sabotage detonators; 200 magazine for Brens; 150 carbines; 500 handgranades; commando knives; pistols; field dressings; and a few
silent Stens for a special operation. Would London drop for the next moon? All grounds were ready to receive.


Dutch Press Calls for Copy
RUMMY (Bert de Goede)  cabled a message (17) from the Rotterdam Press asking for recent editions of the “Vliegende Hollander” and the London “Vrij
Nederland” and newspapers of liberated Holland. Topical photographs and maps, especially of operations on German territory were badly needed. Ik took a
long time for these things to arrive in any case. Could some help be given? It was quite easy for London to do this. London promised RUMMY (18) the
material he has requested. It would go as a special load on the following week. Only the weather was delaying operations at the moment, so they should
keep their hearts high.


KP Chief Turns Traitor
On December 19th RUMMY cabled (19) as follows: “URGENT ! The former Chief of Rotterdam Zuid was arrested by the SD. He was now turned traitor and
is working for the enemy. He is very dangerous and has himself carried out arrests. At the moment he is on his way to liberated Holland. He started from
Rotterdam on the 16th of December. He knows a great many men of the former underground movements in liberated Holland, and they would all trust him.
His field name is KEES ZUID. His real name is CORNELIS BITTER. His father is a post-master”. On the same day RUMMY sent another urgent message
(20) asking Prince Bernhard to send PETER (Noord) to Rotterdam to succeed FRANK. He was badly needed there. At the present PETER was acting as
Commander of Stoottroepen ((Shock Troops) in South Rotterdam.

(13)  Srl No B1282/10 from Rummy of 13.12.1944
(14)  Srl No B1237/50 from Rummy of 12.12.1944
(15)  170 from Rummy of 12,12,1944
(16)  171 from Rummy of 13.12.1944
(17)  177 from Rummy of 15.12.1944
(18)  201 to Rummy of 16.12.1944
(19)  Srl No B1554/81 from Rummy of 19.12.1944
(20)  180 from Rummy of 19.12.1944


Rotterdam a Separate Region
RUMMY asked whether Rotterdam and its environment could be regarded as one special region. This would be the safest arrangement from the security
point of view in case of penetration. Rotterdam was most important, and for that reason they had to be extra careful. RUMMY was advised (21) that he
could split his region into many sub-regions as he liked.
It was only essential that the whole region should go into action at the same time. With reference to KEES ZUID, London asked (22) of what resistance
organization was he the chief, and when was he arrested?


Resistance racketeers
RUMMY cabled (23): “URGENT. Warn by Radio Oranje underground organizations in some parts of Holland not to lower themselves to the level of Germans
or black market men. At the moment you can put a great many persons of the underground on a level with Germans and black market men as regards the
food position. It is a big pity but it is the truth. Please ask the men of underground to look at the poor”.
He reported that CRIBBAGE (Arie van Duyn) was probably arrested or dead (24). He would send further information as soon as he received it.


Cribagge “talking”
RUMMY (Bert de Goede) cabled (25) that either CRIBBAGE (Arie van Duyn) or his courier (Dini Gaazenbeek) were “talking” to the SD. His courier was
going with the SD to all addresses she knew. RUMMY would continue his work with TRAPPING (Barme) as his W/T operator.


Commandant Told: “Prepare for Action”
London cabled (26) to the Commandant of Zuid-Holland, via RUMMY, details of “Phase Two” of the new Directive for Resistance. He should arrange at
once to put these activities into operation throughout the whole of his zone on receipt of a special BBC message. He should begin at once recruiting
suitable men to be sent with intelligence to the Allied Forces when the time came for action. Three men should be sent daily from his zone bringing
tactical information concerning concentrations of troops, particularly in villages; locations of minefields and field works; areas completely free of enemy
troops; and troop movement generally. In addition to this, plans should be made for other men with good local knowledge to remain hidden until overrun
by the Allied Forces. They would then give local tactical intelligence and act as guides.

(21)  205 to Rummy of 19.12.1944
(22)  206 to Rummy of 19.12.1944
(23)  183 from Rummy of 19.12.44
(24)  B1543/94 of 19.12.44
(25) B1629/43 of 21.12.44
(26)  215-220 to Rummy of 22.12.1944




One-man Torpedoes on the Move
London reported (27) that information had been received that about 60 one-man torpedoes or midget submarines were now being transported by road
from Germany, the destination probably being Rotterdam. HQ required the earliest possible information on the location and movement of these midget
submarines. Resistance should plan immediately the best method of destruction or sabotage.
The Admiralty believed that there was great German Naval activity in Dutch coastal areas, and would greatly appreciate any information which could be
sent.
RUMMY reported the presence of German paratroops on the Veluwe and at Baarn and Soest. Their targets were Brussels and Antwerp (28).


PODEX reported safe
London cabled (29) that three postcards had been received from Germany via Switzerland signed “LUKE”. It was believed that these had come GERARD
(PODEX, Luke Mulholland). There was nothing in the message beyond the indication that he was all right.

The pilot concerned had reported (30) that enemy fighters had been seen over the ground Lafayette on the previous night. Was everything all right
there?




CRIBBAGE

Islands Reported Inundated
CRIBBAGE reported (31) that all the Zuid-Holland islands were being evacuated by the Germans, and were probably being inundated. The remainder of
CRIBBAGE’s messages, up to the time of his arrest were concerned with the technicalities of transmission.

(27)  221 to Rummy of 23.12.1944
(28)  192 from Rummy of 22.12.1944
(29)  232 to Rummy of 22.11.1944
(30)  233 to Rummy of 29.12.1944
(31)  29 from Cribbage of 2.12.44
SCULLING & TURNIQUOITS                     (Contacting LO)

No further messages were ever received from SCULLING (Sjeerp Postma) and TURNIQUOITS (Gerrit Reisiger). SCULLING murdered, see page 303.




SHOOTING, HUNTING & CHARADES       (Contact with RVV)



SHOOTING

RAF  Urged to Save Waalhaven
SHOOTING (Luykernaar) forwarded (32) a message from the RVV at Rotterdam stating that a half sunken tanker was lying at the entrance to the
Waalhaven. There was a dry dock lying alongside the tanker to the south ready to be sunk to block the entrance. It was important that the dry dock
should be bombed in its present position before the Germans were able to sink it at the harbor entrance. Resistance forces could not tackle the job.


Containers Broken and Lost
He reported (33) that during a recent operation four containers had come to the ground completely empty. The bottom must have fallen out after they
had left the plane. It had also happened several times that the containers broke loose from the parachutes and sank in the swampy soil. In most cases
they were then lost. London regretted (34) the accidents to containers. The packing station had been informed, and it was hoped that this would not
happen again.


Tine a Traitress?
SHOOTING (Luijkenaar) cabled (35) that CRIBAGGE (Arie van Duyn) had been “picked up”. His female courier (TINE) (Dini Gaazenbeek) had been
arrested as well, and was riding about in an SD car pointing out the men she knew. SHOOTING had to be very careful as she knew him and LUDO
(MONOPOLY, de Stoppelaar) as well. Underground work was becoming more difficult still. Would London please send money as they could not camouflage
sufficiently for their job. If it could not be given, could they borrow it and sign for it?





CHARADES

Return of Evert
CHARADES (Jaap Beekman) reported (36) that “at the request of his troops, EVERT had withdrawn his resignation”.


Bernhard’s “Lay” Commandant
In a message dated December 6th (37) EVERT complained that PRINCE BERNHARD had appointed “a layman in the sphere of resistance” to be head of
the Netherlands Forces of the Interior. This man was, in turn, appointing inexperienced commandants. Because of this, friction was arising with the old
resistance leaders. The position in the Overijssel district was especially difficult because DUDLEY (Henk Brinkgreve) kept interfering in matters about
which he knew nothing.


Evert Praises Evert
EVERT’s territory supplied weapons for the whole province. Consequently, EVERT was able to keep in touch with resistance groups throughout Overijssel.
There had been some losses in personnel and arms but the EVERT-brigade was calmly going forward. EVERT had no political aims, and fully supported the
Government.

(32)  Srl No B1216/1 from Shooting of 12.12.1944
(33)  16 from Shooting of 12.12.1944
(34)  7 to Shooting of 12.12.1944
(35)  19 from Shooting of 30.12.44
(36)  78 from Charades of 30.11.1944
(37)  Srl No B919/15 and B290.119 of 06.12.1955


Charades Losing His Nerves
CHARADES complained (38) that it was absolutely impossible for him to increase his W/T work. The Sicherheitsdienst was becoming more active every
day.  “The situation is getting on my nerves”, he continued. “Please take me away by plane”! If London took him away now he would be prepared to
return to Holland in time for the spring offensive. A few days later CHARADES returned to the subject (39): “Can you fetch me away with a Lysander??
With a little co-operation from your side it would be a mere child’s play”. In reply London cabled (40) that it was not possible to arrange a Lysander
operation. It was suggested that as soon as the new W/T operators had started working, he should get away to liberated territory as best he could with
the co-operation of the RVV. Should the RVV not be in a position to arrange this, then London would try to put him in contact with an organization which
could do it.


W/T Plan in German Hands
CHARADES reported (41) that as a result of an attack on the DUDLEY group, a duplicate of his W/T plan WENSUN had fallen into German hands. He
was advised by London (42) not to send any more traffic on his main skeds but to transmit at other times. Orders for the planning of sabotage activities
were transmitted to the Commandants of the Noord-Oost Polder province, Overijssel and Achterhoek on December 23rd (43).


Escape Schemes Shelved
CHARADES reported (44) that the RVV knew of no means of escaping to liberated territory. He would, therefore, continue working for the time being.
They could receive a new W/T operator at EVERT’s dropping grounds. CHARADES would be present at the reception. London could therefore give to the
new agent any letters or orders which they had for CHARADES. If possible, the new operator should bring a bicycle with him.

(38)  Srl No B1199/113 from Charades of 12.12.1944
86 stop Absoluut onmogelijk om nog langetijd veilig door te werken stop Activiteiten van Sicherheitsdiest elken dag sterker stop Toestand werkt hevig op
mijn zenuwen stop Alstublieft haal mij per vliegtuig op stop Ben genegen om voor het voorjaars offensief weer naar bezet gebied terug te keren stop

(39)  Srl No B1545/150 from Charades of 19.12.1944
87 stop Hoop spoedig antwoord van DUDLEY te hebben stop Kunt u mij per Lysander ophalen want het is zelfmoord om van hieruit de Rijn rpt Rijn te
bereiken stop Met een beetje medewerking van uw kant is het met een Lysander slechts kinderwerk stop Wat moet KRIS rpt KRIS doen stop Hij was altijd
wapeninstructeur bij Brigade Evert rpt Evert doch is nu vrijwel werkloos stop

(40)  56 to Charades of 19.12.1944
Lysander onmogelijk door special opvatting geeischt door RAF stop Stellen zoodra nieuwe operators ingeschakeld dat u terugkeerd op best mogelijke
manier door RVV naar bevrijd gebied stop Indien RVV niet in staat is dit te regelen zullen trachten u in verbinding te stellen met organisatie die dit wel kan
doen stop

(41)  Srl No B1598/181 from Charades of 20.12.1944
89 stop Terrein Evert weer gereed voor ontvangst stop Slagzin is Het begint koud te worden stop Seinletter id B voor Bernard stop Duplicaat van plan
WENSUN in Duitsche handen gevallen tijdens overval op DUDLEY laatst ZOKER

(42)  58 to Charades of 21.12.1944
Do not send any more traffic on your main skeds stop From now on we will listen for you at the following times GMT stop On twenty second at ten
hundred hrs stop Twenty third at sixteen hundred hrs stop Twenty fourth twelve hundred hours stop Twenty fifth eight hundred hrs stop Twenty sixth
eight hundred hrs stop Twenty seventh eleven hundred hrs stop Twenty eight fifteen hundred hours stop Twenty ninth no skep stop thirtieth nine
hundred hrs stop Thirty first thirteen hundred hrs stop to be continued stop

(43)  60-64 to Charades of 23.12.1944
60 .Special order number two for Commandant North East Polder Province Overijssel and Achterhoek stop You should plan now to put into operation in
the future the following activities throughout the whole of your regions stop Action message will be given on BBC Belgian Flemish evening broadcast at
twenty thirty hours both your local time stop No action to be taken until receipt of action message stop One stop Combined railway and road sabotage
but no action to be taken which takes more than eight days to be repaired stop to be continued stop

61. Continuation order number two stop Two stop Sabotage and telecommunications but records of sabotage to be kept and records at repeater stations
to be saved stop Three stop Harassing attacks including attacks on isolated headquarters and detachments stop Four stop Passing intelligence stop This
means recruit now suitable men to be sent on receipt of action message through to the Allied Forces stop Three men should be sent daily from your
regions and bring tactical information concerning concentrations of troops particularly in villages and if concentrations have wireless masts stop To be
continued stop

62. Continuation special order number two stop Continuation four stop Locations of minefields and field works comma areas completely free of enemy
troops comma signs and symbols on vehicles reliefs and troops movements stop In all cases time date and sources of information should be given stop
Men should report to intelligence officer at brigades stop In addition to this plans should be made for other men with good local knowledge to remain
hidden until they are overrun by the Allied Forces they will then give local tactical intelligence and act as guides stop Passwords for them will be given
later stop To be continued stop

63. Continuation special order number two stop Five stop Prevention of demolition stop As enemy start to withdraw from region every effort should be
made to protect buildings and material useful to Allies stop If enemy are withdrawing and no action message is received then act on your own initiative
stop Six stop Protection of valuable technical personnel stop Warn them to lie low and report to Allies when liberated stop Following are action messages
for your region stop To be continued stop

64. Continuation special order number two stop Action messages stop One stop Railway and road sabotage: Die brief staat op poten rpt Die brief staat op
poten stop Two stop Sabotage telecommunications Geen haar op uw hoofd zal gekrenkt worden stop Three stop Harassing attacks De vader van Lucien
ging Zaterdag weg stop Four stop Passing intelligence Zij draagt een sierlijk schoen stop Five stop Prevention of demolition Jans huis is niet oud stop stop
Protection technical personnel Ik heb al de brieven van Leo ontvangen stop End special message stop

(44)  Srl No B1803/189 from Charades of 30.12.1944
91 stop RVV rpt RVV weet geen ontsnappingsweg naar bevrijd gebied stop Ik zal voorloopig blijven door werken stop Zullen nieuwe marconist op terrein
Evert ontvangen stop Ikzelf zal bij receptie aanwezig zijn stop U kunt dus brieven en orders voor mij meegeven stop Hij moet zoo mogelijk een rijwiel
meebrengen stop




DRAUGHTS

London asked (45) whether everything was now all right between the three sections of the DRIEHOEK.
DOUWE (BOATING) and BRAM (BACKGAMMON) said that they always transmitted from the same place. London considered this extremely dangerous,
even if they had several plans or frequencies. They should have transmitters at several houses to which they could go periodically.


Driehoek thanks RAF
DRAUGHTS cabled (46): “Very thankful for bombardment SD HQ Amsterdam. Buildings well hit and heavily damaged. Although only twelve SD killed, they
are all very important. Investigation in progress as to how far destruction of archives can be called complete. My personal compliment to crews for good
work. The Driehoek”. London cabled (47) that BERT (RUMMY, de Goede) was unhappy about the situation in Rotterdam, and felt that politics were
predominating over resistance. Had DRAUGHTS heard anything about this?


OD leads in Driehoek
He (Draughts) replied (48) that the relationship in the Driehoek was satisfactory, but since FRANK had gone the OD predominated. A small “accident” had
happened on the previous Thursday (  .12.1944) and one of the secretaries had been arrested, but the Driehoek had gone to a new office. London should
not worry about DOUWE and BRAM.


Rockets prescribed for SD
The Gestapo was still on the run. The SD with its archives had partly settled in the Roelof Hartplein. They were also dining there and were very nervous,
fearing a new attack. The Gestapo Chief LAGES said, “If on 25th they had continued machine gun fire, no one would have escaped alive”. DRAUGHTS
advised HQ to use only well directed rocket and machine gun fire, and no bombs. Could London ask Radio Oranje (49) to warn everyone living near military
or SD HQ to leave their homes?
He cabled (50) that big razzias were taking place in Haarlem. The Germans were driving people to the station. Please could London try to intimidate the
Germans or attack the railway?


RAF bombs razzia route
At  03.30 GMT (51) the Germans would transport thousands of men to Amsterdam. Could the RAF attack the Spaarne Bridge? There were no gun positions
neat this target. London replied later in the same day (52) that the RAF had attacked the bridge at Spaarne, but could not see the result owing to bad
weather. HQ would be glad to receive a report on the attack from DRAUGHTS.

(45)  174 to Draughts of 01.12.44
To Draughts via night Torridge.
Is everything alright now between DRIEHOEK or are there any more differences of opinion stop DOUWE and BRAM say they always transmit from the
same place we consider this extremely dangerous even if they have several houses to which they go periodically stop We appreciate your terrific
difficulties and must of course leave this o you stop Delighted hear BEN and SIEM not arrested keep us advised in case necessary to send someone from
the Prince to take command stop

(46)  284 from Draughts of 01.12.44
From Draughts via Plym.
Nr two eight four stop Very thankful for bombardment SD HQ Amsterdam stop Buildings well hit and heavily damaged although only SWELZ SD killed they
are all very impressed stop Details investigation in progress in how far destruction archived can be called complete stop My personal compliment to crews
for good work stop The DC stop

(47)  177 to Draughts of 02.12.44
To Draughts via night Torridge.
To DC stop Prince is interested in DUDOK group in Gooi stop Do you know if they have received any arms from us yet and if they are incorporated in the
resistance numbers in Utrecht stop Advise which grounds you are ready to again stop Bert is unhappy about the Rotterdam set up and feels politics is
predominating as against spirit of resistance stop Have you heard anything about this stop

(48)  286 from Draughts of 02.12.44
From Draughts via Torridge.

(49)  289 from Draughts of 03.1244
From Draughts via Plym.
Nr two eight nine stop Can you ask Radio Orange to warn every one living near military or SD quarters to leave their homes stop

(50)  Srl No. B935/22 from Draughts of 06.12.44
From Draughts via Plym.
Nr two nine eight stop Big razzia going on in Haarlem stop Germans are driving people to station stop Please can try to intimidate Germans or attack
railway stop

(51)  299 from Draughts of 06.12.44
Nr two nine nine stop At three thirty GMT Germans will transport with one engine thousands of men to Amsterdam in several transports during night stop
We will try to stop railway please can you attack Spaarnebridge no gun positions near target stop

(52)  190 to Draughts of 07.12.44
To Draughts via Torridge.
RAF attacked Spaarnebridge but could not determine accuracy owing bad weather stop Shall be glad to hear result from you stop
Parcel puzzle
London told DRAUGHTS (53) that “inside package no 3324 were two small parcels labeled “For DOUWE” and  “ For ASPASIA (Anita)”. The parcel labeled
for ASPASIA was for DOUWE, and the parcel labeled For DOUWE was not for DOUWE but for BRAM.
London advised the Driehoek (54) that disturbing evidence had recently been received of up-to-date German methods of listening to telephone
conversations. It was therefore strongly recommended that no information on resistance matters should be passed through the internal network, except
in cases of emergency.


Attempt to contact German agent
London cabled (55): “ We have contact with an SD man who pretends he wants to work for us and asks for a wireless plan, set, code and crystals to be
delivered to KUIJPER, 11 Anna Paulownastreet, The Hague. We do not trust him but he might be useful for other purposes. After you have received new
plans, would it be possible to deliver a complete set of one of your old plans and a microprint one-time pad, old type, without endangering anybody”?
DRAUGHTS replied (56) that he would deliver through a safe cut-out the things the SD needed.


Razzia raid fails
DRAUGHTS reported (57) that the attack on the Spaarne Bridge was not successful, but he thanked the RAF very much for the attempt. He confirmed
(58) that FRANK had died of his wounds on December 5th. He had been succeeded by PETER, the former Commander of the KP Group nr. 4.
London transmitted to the Driehoek (59) the new directive for resistance activities and details of the scheme to divide occupied Holland into six zones.
This scheme was in no way intended to curtail the authority of the Driehoek or to prevent it from sending suggestions for plans based on its greater
knowledge of the actual situation in the field.


Big round-up in Alkmaar
DRAUGHTS reported (60) that big razzias were going on in Alkmaar. Every man had to stand before the front door. Would it be possible in this weather
to bomb the railway yard at Alkmaar? (61) London regretted (62) that his request had arrived too late for bombing on that day. It was feared that too
many civilians would be killed if the target was bombed later. London was rather worried (63) about the mass of DRIEHOEK orders floating about.
Several had reached Eindhoven, and this seemed “mighty bad from the security angle”. Could this be redeemed?

(53)  184 to Draughts of 06.12.44
To Draughts via night Torridge.
Telegram is the same as text.

(54)  188 to Draughts of 07.12.44
To Draughts via night Torridge.
Telegram is the same as text.

(55)  189 to Draughts of  07.12.44
To Draughts via night Torridge.
Telegram is the same as text.

(56)  305 from Draughts of 09.12.44
From Draughts via Torridge.
Your one eight nine stop I will deliver through safe cut outs things he needs but it is not clear if he has a set stop

(57)  Srl No. B1056/87 from Draughts of 09.12.44
From Draughts via Torridge.
Nr three zero nine stop Your one nine zero stop Attack not successful but thanks very much indeed stop

(58)  310 from Draughts of 10.12.44
Don’t have this telegram

(59)  196 to Draughts of 10.12.44
To Draughts via Torridge.
Following for Delta Centrum stop One stop It is absolutely necessary for security reasons and for your own safety to decentralize resistance stop
Therefore Holland is being divided into six regions as follows stop Region one provinces of Friesland Groningen and Drenthe stop Region two North East
Polder Overijssel and all area east of river IJssel and including Achterhoek stop Region three Veluwe and province of Utrecht bounded on the east by the
IJssel on the south by the Neder Rhine and Lek and on the west by the line of floods running north to south from east of Amsterdam west of Utrecht and
down to Jaarsveld on the Lek stop To be continued

(60)  Srl No. B1220/11 from Draughts of 12.12.44
From Draughts via Plym.
Number three one eight Big razzias are going on in Alkmaar stop At eleven o clock MET every man has to stand for his front door stop Will keep you
informed stop

(61)  319 from Draughts of 12.12.44
From Draughts via Plym.
My three one nine, IMMEDIATE stop Would it be possible in this weather to bomb railway yard Alkmaar today stop

(62)  202 to Draughts of 12.12.44
To Draughts via night Torridge.
Reference bombing railway yard regret your message arrived too late for bombing today stop Afraid will kill too many civilians if attempted later stop
Veel liefs van Barnet stop

(63)  203 to Rummy of 12.12.44


“Zoning dangerous” - Driehoek
With reference to the scheme for decentralizing resistance into six zones (64), the DRIEHOEK thought that these alterations in the organization did not
increase the security of resistance forces. On the contrary, they would bring with them great difficulties and risk. The causes of arrests in the recent
months were mostly of a local nature, this order had been given on account of military secrecy or for any other military reason, then the DRIEHOEK
would accept these additional risks.


London’s  “Stand-By” warning
London fully appreciated the DRIEHOEK attitude to the new zoning scheme (65) HQ had no wish to interfere with internal resistance administration, but
a new regional organization was essential if resistance was to conform with military plans. When the time came it would be necessary to put resistance
in a whole region into operation at the same time, independent of other regions. London warned the DRIEHOEK (66) to plan to put into operation in the
near future throughout the whole of zones five and six the activities already outlined on December 10th.


RAF asked to spare food ships
DRAUGHTS cabled (67) that owing to the famine in Western Holland, he had been obliged to co-operate with a newly established shipping company
which brought food during the hours of darkness from the Northern Provinces over the IJsselmeer by permission of the German authorities.
On their return trips these ships were to transfer children to better-fed areas. It was suggested that the RAF should abstain from shooting up all
shipping traffic at night on the Ijsselmeer. As soon as the Germans began to abuse this nightly traffic, he would advise London.

(64)  325 from Draughts of 15.12.44
Telegram the same as text.

(65)  211 to Draughts of 15.12.44
Telegram the same as text.

(66)  221 to Draughts of 22.12.1944

(67)  353 from Draughts of 25.12.44
Telegram the same as text.




BACKGAMMON

BACKGAMMON was advised (68) that he and DOUWE (BOATING) should try not to stay on the air longer than forty minutes at a time. The remainder
of the messages were concerned with the technicalities of transmission.

(68)  17 to Backgammon of 09.12.44
To Backgammon via night Torridge.
For you and DOUWE stop Try not to stay on the air longer than forty minutes and arrange additional contact if necessary stop





DUDLEY               ( Jedburgh Liaison with RVV)

No further messages were received from DUDLEY after November 18th, 1994.




MONOPOLY, CUBBING, COUSING & BOATING


CUBBING

Germans throw corpes on streets
CUBBING reported (69) that at Apeldoorn the previous week, 30 political prisoners had been murdered by the Huns after inhuman treatment. Following
their usual practice the Germans had thrown 12 bodies into the streets. An effort had been made to identify them, but this was almost impossible. He
could not say for certain, but thought it probably that DIRK (SCULLING, Postma) and others were not included among these victims.


Many killed in razzia raid
Immediately after the Apeldoorn atrocities there have been a great razzia (70). A train carrying several thousand men who had been taken during this
razzia was attacked by Allied planes near Bocholt. Forty per cent of these men were killed, as the Germans shot them while they were sheltering. Men
taken during the last few razzias had not been sent to work for the Huns but transported to Germany as civilian prisoners of war.
The whole situation in occupied Holland was becoming more impossible every day, especially near the river IJssel. In the meantime resistance was doing
its upmost.


Containers dropped to Germans
CUBBING cabled (71) that on the night of December 6/7th a plane had dropped material rear Renswoude. The Germans had got everything and were
now waiting for more. How was this possible? London asked (72) whether he knew if the Germans had found the material, or if they had actually put out
a false reception committee? The material was not intended for CUBBING. IIt was possible that the pilot had made a mistake or there may have been a
false reception.


“Gestapo member” to contact Allies
He (Cubbing) advised London (73) that a resistance member JUUR “being also a member of the Gestapo” would come through the lines near Nijmegen on
the following Monday night with orders from the Sicherheitsdienst. He might have important news for Allied intelligence. Would London please confirm his
arrival. London replied (74) that the military had been advised to look out for JUUR. Was he dangerous and if sent by the Sicherheitsdienst, did
CUBBING know the contact address to which he was going? Did he intend reporting to the Allied troops or not? London sent to the commanders of
resistance in Utrecht (75) details of the plan dividing occupied Holland into zones, and of the new directive for resistance.

(69)  12 from Cubbing of 07.12.44
(70)   Srl No, B986/10 of  09.12.44
(71)  16 from Cubbing of 09.12.44
(72)   6 to Cubbing of 09.12.44
(73)   21 from Cubbing of 10.12.44
(74)   7 to CUBBING of 10.12.44
(75)   8 & 9 to Cubbing of 10.12.44


An unexpected find
With reference to the containers which had dropped into German hands, CUBBING reported (76) that they had come down one km from ground CLUTS.
Resistance forces in the Veenendaal district found some of them quite accidentally. They did not even know that any had been dropped in the district.
The remainder had been found by the Germans. Nobody had seen anything of false reception lights. CUBBING advised London (77) that JUUR would
report to Allied troops. He was a member of the resistance. It was up to Allied intelligence to find out whether he was dangerous.


Resistance waiting for arms
He was very pleased (78) to receive the special order (see above). Resistance in Central Holland was anxious waiting for the delivery of arms, and
hoping to get an opportunity of helping the Allies to liberate Holland. He was convinced that London’s orders would be strictly obeyed.


Sculling murdered
CUBBING cabled (79): “It has turned out that DIRK (SCULLING, Postma) died at Apeldoorn on December 1st, murdered by the SS. He died for his Queen
and country. God rest his soul. The Huns probably did not find out who he was”.


Bad weather delays Ops.
London regretted (80) that bad weather was delaying operations, but deliveries of material would be made as soon as possible. CUBBING stated (81)
that in the course of the next few nights TUNRIQUOITS (Gerrit Reisiger) and BERT, his assistant, would cross the Waal in the same convoy as JUUR.

(76)  25 from Cubbing of 11.12.44
(77)  26 from Cubbing of 13.12.44
(78)  27 from Cubbing of 13.12.44
(79)  34 from Cubbing of 20.12.44
(80)  23 to Cubbing of 23.12.44
(81)  47 from Cubbing of 26.12.44





COURSING

Petulance
COURSING (Hoogewerff) complained (82) that he had been doing his best in the field but London did not seem to consider it necessary to reply to his
messages. MONOLOPY (de Stoppelaar) and he were badly in need of clothes and shoes. London replied (83) that all he had asked for was already
packed, and it was hoped to drop as from the following Sunday night.


“Political Juggling” in Holland
He reported (84) that SHOOTING (Luykenaar), MONOPOLY and he had evolvedan instructional scheme for all in the Netherlands Forces of the Interior
in the Zuid-Holland province. They had trained twenty instructors to be sent out to other towns. These men would keep them informed of their
activities. The was “quite a lot of political juggling” going on in Holland now. In particular, the OD was struggling for supremacy in the NBS.





NECKING & BOBSLEIGH         (Resistance in Friesland)

NECKING

Safety first

NECKING (Peter Tazelaar) was told (85), in answer to a query as to whether or not he should resume contact with the underground movement, that he
should act as the situation demanded, but with caution. His position as the sol- contact in the north of Holland was one of great value.


Successful Prison Raid
He (Necking) stated (86) that the situation in his area was completely under control. “Any dangerous elements which may have been in Groningen have
been isolated”. NECKING reported (87)  the success of a raid on Leeuwarden Prison and the freeing of political prisoners. No further details were given.

(85)  Daily Summary No 89 of 2.12.1944
(86)  Daily Summary No 89 of 2.12.1944
(87)  Daily Summary No 100 of 13.12.1944






TRAPPING        (Second W/T to Rotterdam KP)

Santa Claus at HQ
TRAPPING (Barme) requested (88) that he should be sent his uniform and a heavy charger. Why did London never answer his messages in which he
asked for special articles? They were angry about that, but no doubt “St. Nicolaas would not forget the staff at the Dutch HQ in London”. London replied
(89) that his special requests always received careful attention, but delay was experienced in preparation, packing and dispatch. The fact that his
questions were not answered did not mean nothing was being done.

(88)  12 from Trapping 0f 5.12.1944
(89)  19 to Trapping of 5.12.1944

                             


                                                                                                    III - CLANDESTINE PRESS



DRAUGHTS II     W/T  Traffic


Long -term policy for rockets
DRAUGHTS II (van Paaschen) asked London (90) whether, if he were able to supply details of starting points for V-2’s, it would be possible to destroy
them means of unexpected air raids. These starting points were normally rather weakly guarded. Thanking him for his message (91), London told
DAUGHTS II they were working on a long-term policy, and trying to find an antidote to the V-2’s. If he could help in this connection it might be possible
to prevent V-2’s being used later against liberated areas.

V-2 train at Leiden
In a mutilated message (92), DRAUGHTS 1 reported the presence of 20 railway trucks with V-2 rockets at Leiden Station. He reported (93) that the
direction in which the V-2’s travelled was controlled by their gyroscopes, which revolved with a speed of between 40.000 and 50.000 revolutions per
minute. He reported

Leiden raid fails
DRAUGHTS II cabled (95) the result of the RAF raid on the station at Leiden. Bombs had landed 140 metres from the target. Many houses had been
damaged and 10 persons killed. He added (96) that the aircraft flew across the station instead of lengthwise and there was only a ‘minimum result’.
During the last two days only one rocket had been fired from The Hague. On previous days the average was six daily. AAs some bombs had fallen close
to the V-2 firing point in the Scheveningse Bosch, its position had now been changed. It was now in a prohibited area, and he could not give a pinpoint
(97).

(90)  129 from Draughts 2 of 02.12.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
Proposal re rockets stop If you know starting points is it not possible to surprise and destroy those points by means of air commands stop Air raids have
normally success stop Guard points rather weak stop

(91)    70 to Draughts 2 of 02.12.44
To Draughts via night Teifi.
Rockets stop Thanks for message stop We are working on long-term policy and trying find antidote that is why we asked you to get information on
possibility of radio being employed stop If you can help us on this we may be able prevent rockets being used later against liberated areas stop

(92)  135 from Draughts 1 of 07.12.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
Repetion and supplement one three zero stop Very busy troops -KY-M-O C-IAL transport from Leiden railway station to Mast (east?) and north SSXP at
TWE same station under bay roof circa twenty carriages loaded with rockets stop Bombing of whole emplacement -ID-  T-E-G  ..zmy LE Meer NT action
urgently desired stop

(93)  132 from Draughts 2 of 09.12.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
My one thirty still in ACRVE stop Direction rockets rpt rockets by three gyroscopes with turn speed between forty and fifty thousand per minute stop
Details about their working next message stop

(94)  134 from Draughts 2 of 09.12.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
IMPORTANT start point rockets is Cremerweg rpt Cremerweg Waterpartij rpt Waterpartij scheveningsebosch Den Haag stop If you coordinates etc of this
point I will send them next message stop

(95)  136 from Draughts 2 of 11.12.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
Bombs on Leiden rpt Leiden Haarlemmermeerstation one hundred fifty meters beside HR set stop Many houses damaged ten persons killed SRMP
RLWNMAS (bomb rockets) again stop

(96)  137 from Draughts 2 of 12.12.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
As aircraft X fled across instead lengthwise stations The Hague and Leiden result bombing minimal stop For example on station The Hague only one bomb
on emplacement stop Rest in houses stop Last two days only one rocket started from The Hague stop foregoing days an average six per day stop

(97)    Srl No. B1296/63 from Draughts 2 of 13.12.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
My one three eight stop Your seven two stop as some of your bombs fell close near stating point Cremerweg comma Germans changed position stop As
this new point is if Quote Sperrgebiet unquote we do not exactly know where stop



Rockets fail to take-off
He (Draughts 2) cabled (98) that the Katerveer bridge near Zwolle should be bombed as all plundered goods were leaving the country by this route. He
suggested (99) that the most effective way to hinder the supply to the west of rockets and fuel, would be to bomb the bridges over the Merwede canal
near Utrecht. Some rockets had been sent up from The Hague in the last few days (100), especially at twilight and during the night. Thirty per cent of
them had failed to take off properly.


Display of Nazi terror
DRAUGHTS II reported (101) that following the alleged shooting of a German soldier in the Nederlandsch Oost-Indielaan in The Hague, three houses
were blown up as a reprisal. A short time before the explosions, a few German officers of the Schutzpolizei took a small parade. After a talk to the
parade, the officers went into the houses, which they left after half an hour. The neighboring houses and the maternity home opposite were ordered to
open their doors and windows. At five o’clock six  explosions occurred.  At six o ‘clock a lorry arrived with 12 prisoners from Scheveningen. The firing
squad was on an island in the middle of the road, and the prisoners in the doorway of the wrecked houses. The salvoes were fired at them. Some were
still alive afterwards.


Germans starting scorching
The Germans were now putting out of action all machinery except the most vital electric power plant station equipment. (102) It would then only be
necessary for small parties to blow up power station machinery. In Delft they had damaged four out of five turbines. In Leiden certainly, and probably in
Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the same had happened. No action had so far been taken in The Hague.


Resistance takes ‘The Times’
He (van Paaschen) thanked London (103) for delivery to the underground press of topical maps, copies of ‘The Times’and the ‘Vliegende Hollander’ ( the
miniature Dutch newspaper dropped by the RAF. Could London send such articles regularly? They would like photographs of topical events, such as
scenes from liberated Holland, Churchill in Paris meeting De Gaulle, activities of Queen Wilhelmina, etc.


(98)    140 from Draughts 2 of 15.12.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
Re my one hundred stop Again asked bombs on bridge Katerveer Zwolle because all plundered goods are carried off via this bridge stop A tapped German
telephone call resulted coming days all robbed goods carried off via Hardenberg near Coevorden stop

(99)    141 from Draughts 2 of 15.12.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
For hindering supply to the west rockets and fuel it should be very urgently bombing railways bridges Merwede Canal near Utrecht direction Amsterdam
and Haque stop This should be more effective as bombing supply rail sections stop
(100)  1 from Draughts 2 of 16.12.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
Some more rockets from The Hague last two days specially twilight and night stop About thirty percent of started rockets fails stop

(101)  Srl No. B 1502/46 of 17.12.44 and B1540/60 of 19.12.44 from Draughts 2
From Draughts via Teifi
Volgens Duitsche beweringen zou eenige tijd geleden op Laan van N.O.Indië lid van DW rpt DW zijn dood geschoten stop Als represaille vrijdag aldaar drie
rpt drie huizen opgeblazen stop Zestien uur vijftien begin Laan stopt auto mer eenige Duitsche officieren korte tijd daarna eenheid Gru Polizei rpt Gru
Polizie wordt vervolgd stop Mijn een vier vier stop

Vervolg een vier vier stop Half vijf officieren nemen kleine parade af stop Daarna briefje afgegeven op nrs drie, vijf en zeven binnen half uur huis verlaten
hoog noodige meenemen stop Aangrezende huizen en overzijde waaronder Kraamvrouwenkliniek wordt aangevolen deuren en ramen open te zetten daar
ziemlich in der naehe gesprennt zal worden stop Kwart over vijf zes explosies huizen opgeblazen en belendende huizen loopen grote schade op stop
Wordt vervolgd Mijn een vier vijf stop

Vervolg van een vier vijf stop Zes uur vrachtauto arriveert met twaalf gevangenen uit Scheveningen stop Vuurpeloton opgesteld op vluchtheuvel
gevangen in deuropening verwoeste huizen neergezet stop Door duisternis geschiedde fusillade niet feilloos enkele leefden nog stop Einde mijn een vier
zes stop

(102)  Srl No. B1569/54 from Draughts 2 of 19.12.44
Same as text in diary.

(103)  149 from Draughts 2 of 21.12.44
From Draughts via Teifi.
Received your seven four stop Thanks for your five maps with types weekly times and Vliegende Hollander stop Can you send them regularly stop Like
types of actual events as fotos liberated Holland comma Churchill in Paris meeting De Gaulle Moskou our Queen etc stop
                                                                                       IV - MISSION TO HOLLAND

NORTHAW

Problems of the Big Towns

NORTHAW (Prince Bernhard) asked (104) whether London has considered putting the big towns under their own resistance commanders - as distinct from
regional commanders - in view of their large populations. London replied (105) that it was thought better for regional commanders to appoint local
commanders at their own discretion. While HQ favoured decentralization, it was not wished to extend it to such a degree as to make control difficult.
Furthermore, it was not desired to increase unduly the number of organizations which would need separate supplies and operational directions. The
remainder of the NORTHAW traffic for this period consisted of copies of W/T traffic from the field sent to NORTHAW for information, and cables relating to
domestic arrangements for arriving and departing officers.

(104)  279 from Northaw of 14.12.1944
(105)  400 to Northaw of 15.12.1944






                                                                                              V - AGENTS’ REPORTS





CRIBBAGE      Security Interrogation) (106)

The following note was prefixed to the report of CRIBBAGE (van Duyn) interrogation: “Now that this agent has returned to England it has been thought
necessary that he should undergo a security interrogation, in view of certain evidence which has been brought against him. **

**   From Rummy among others.

(106)  Interrogation report RAW/KV/3259 of 04.06.45
                          


CRIBBAGE forewarned
“In reading this report it should be borne in mind that it was impossible to interrogate CRIBBAGE thoroughly, because during the period which elapsed
between the liberation of Holland and his return to this country he got to know exactly what we knew about him


Weakness of his story
“The story which he tells is so exceedingly naïve as to be almost beyond belief. The theory that the reason underlying HAUBROCK’s good treatment of
CRIBBAGE was his wish to re-insure against the end of the war, hardly bears inspection, since it is quite unthinkable that he would have to re-insure only
with one or two agents, while still pursing the most active and successful enquiries into the resistance movement, and being responsible for the execution
of COR (Hoogewerff) and EDU (Barme).


Cribbagge on a German mission?
“It is not thought necessary to draw any deductions from this interrogation, and it is considered that the circumstances surrounding CRIBBAGE’s
imprisonment are sufficient to speak for themselves, the more so when the whole story is rounded off by his being the guest of the SD Headquarters on the
night after his liberation from prison. “It is not thought probably that CRIBBAGE (Arie van Duyn) has a long-term mission for the Germans in this country,
but it would appear advisable to show the interrogation report to the Dutch authorities for their own interest and information”.



THE INTERROGATION

Rough treatment
Immediately after his arrest CRIBBAGE was questioned very intensively by a Wehrmacht officer. He was handcuffed and hung on a pole between two
tables and severely beaten. At the same time TINE (Dini Gaazenbeek, courier) and VOLKERT (Elsinga, forgeries) were being interrogated in different rooms.
CRIBBAGE insisted that he was an electrical engineer and knew nothing of what happened in the building in which he was arrested. In spite of this his
interrogator showed him an identity card and asked him if he recognized the photograph. It was a new card which had been prepared for RUMMY (Bert de
Goede). CRIBBAGE’s denials were not believed and he was again severely beaten.


Cribbage  admits identity
CRIBBAGE now admitted his real name and also told the Germans that he was an agent who had come from England. When he said this the interrogation
was broken off and shortly afterwards STURMSCHARFUHRER HAUBROCK arrived from the SD. This officer immediately stopped the harsh treatment and
began to question CRIBBAGE in a friendly way.


HQ in Bakerstreet
First of all HAUOCK took the pencil from CRIBBAGE pocket and said he did not have to say he came from England, as the pencil would be quite enough to
show it, and if it was not there were always his clothes to give him the final check, since the clothes of British agents were the only ones that never bore
any name tabs. All this was perfectly true and made CRIBBAGE feel rather foolish. HAUBROCK then asked CRIBBAGE  whether headquarters of the
Organization were still in Baker Street (which was something CRIBBAGE did not know) and whether Major BINGHAM was keeping well.


Agent betrayed by a cigarette
During the interrogation, which never varied from its friendly level, HAUBROCK told many tales of how agents had been caught. On one occasion, he said,
he was having a drink in an hotel, wearing civilian clothes. He got into a conversation with a man and they started having drinks together. In a little while
this man offered HAUBROCK a cigarette which he immediately recognized as one of the “Black cigarettes’ which are sent from England in the blue packets.
The man by this time was getting fairly drunk and had no place to sleep for the night so Haubrock offered to put him up, driving him round to the SD flat in
his car and giving him a bed for the night. The next morning HAUBROCK put on his uniform and arrested his guest at breakfast. (Who was this agent).


More SOE blunders
He said further that many people had been arrested because of the stupid habit of the British authorities of sending their agents out with standard fountain
pens, knives, scissors and watches, which were immediately recognized by the SD. CRIBBAGE realized that he had one of each of these articles and again
felt foolish, the genuinely agreed with HAUBROCK when he said that he did not consider that it was fair on the agents.


Haubrock “a very nice man”
CRIBBAGE repeatedly stated what a very nice man HAUBROCK was and later in his report it will be seen that he had ample cause to think so. After this
interrogation CRIBBAGE met TINE (Dini Gaazenbeek)and VOLKERT (Elsinga) in the passage and found that they too had been well treated. He states,
rather curiously, that “somehow he knew that TINE knew that he had told the truth about himself”, which he had in fact done after being assured by
HAUBROCK that his family would not suffer from his arrest.


Difficulty of co-operation
In the afternoon of the same day CRIBBAGE was handed over to the Grunepolizei for his signals interrogation. The signals officer (May ?) asked CRIBBAGE
to work for the Germans. It was suggested that he should go back to his job and just carry on with it, working for the Germans at the same time.
CRIBBAGE explained that this was impossible because he only sent messages for RUMMY (Bert de Goede) and KOOS (Luke Mulholland) and he had no
other job.

Fantastic exchange scheme
To the many curious conversations which CRIBAGGE had with HAUBROCK must be added another: It appears that CRIBBAGE was often asked what he
thought of the SD, to which he had no hesitation in replying that they had always treated him very properly and well. HAUBROCH then said that they were
going to try to send him back to England in exchange for German prisoners in British hands, “and then he could tell the English how good the SD were”. This
fantastic scheme never came to anything because, so CRIBBAGE says, they received word that an exchange could not be effected for a Dutchman but
only for an Englishman.


Preferential treatment in prison
CRIBBAGE, who was all this time housed in the “Oranje Hotel” prison at Scheveningen, received a good deal of preferential treatment. He was allowed to
go outside the prison in the course of his duties and although always accompanied by a guard he often went quite far afield into Scheveningen and
sometimes took vegetables to the SD building in The Hague.


Cribbage freed: a guest in the SD flat
Finally on April 21st , HAUBROCK came into CRIBBAGE cell and told him that he was free. HAUBROCK warned CRIBBAGE that if he went to Rotterdam he
would probably be shot by the KP. It was then late in the evening, so HAUBROCK said CRIBBAGE might stay the night as a guest in the SD flat in The
Hague, which he did being given breakfast the next morning and allowed to make some pancakes before he left. CRIBBAGE said he tried to get into touch
with HAUBROCK again after the liberation of Holland, but when he went to The Hague he found the SD had been moved to Scheveningen and he never
heard what became of him.
              
w.mugge@home.nl