THE HUNTEMANN FILE, ANNEXURE IX.
Allied Agents arrested in Holland not connected with Nordpol.
Early 1941, a Dutch naval cadet whose name may have been Ter HAAK, or TER LAAK. Sometimes later VAN DER REIJDEN who agreed to act as a double agent, was played by the SIPO without succes. (Jo ter Laak en Willem van der Reijden)
DE JONGE (leader) & RADEMA (W/T operator), were arrested by the SIPO about May or June 1943. They had arrived by MTB at the beginning of 1943 and had landed near Katwijk. Their mission was purely espionage and Abwehr III-F with RADEMA's assistance tried to establish contact. London must, however, have been aware of what was happening since, after several schedules, the (radio) traffic was stopped.
ORTT (W/T operator), was caught bu R.D.F. (Radio Detection Finding) of the ORP on Whitmonday, 1942.
ALBAS (W/T operator), call sign TBO. Dutch cadet or Sub-lieutenant. Worked with success for a long time in Holland. All the efforts of the ORPO and SIPO were frustrated by his caution and skill. Was arrested in a trap set up by the SIPO in the house of his girl friend in The Hague. He did not give any information about his mission or the other members of his group and next to TACONIS was the best and most valuable agent whom London sent to Holland and who feel into German hands.
NIERMEIER (W/T operator), was arrested by the SIPO in Amsterdam after his address had become known through the Nordpol traffic. He had for several month frustrated the efforts of the ORP (R.D.F. and shadowing), who had brought special equipment to Holland for this purpose. (Was this an S-Phone, or a para-set?)
First Group (names no longer known), parachuted in September 1943 near Grave or Nijmegen. The drop took place in the early evening when it was still quite light, close to a road where there were a lot of people so that the agents who fell in a garden and on a roof, had to flee immidiately, leaving W/T set, codes and a case full of their personal effects.
(Bram Grisnigt en Piet Hoekman)
Second Group (names no longer known), landed in October/November 1943 near Grave. They were apparently expected by contacts of the first group (see above) who helped them to hide their equipment in a neighbouring farm. In some way however, troops in the neighbourhood got to hear of this and without informing the Abwehr Stelle or SIPO, occupied the farm. When later the agents returned to fetch their equipment, there was a fight, one being shot (Hoekman), whilst the other escaped. One of these agents may have been a certain SCHRINJKMAAKER (Schreinemachers) (Philips factory, Eindhoven) as his name was marked on the clothes found. (What a blunder by SIS and Bureau Inlichtingen!) (Jo van Alebeek en Rudi Schreinemachers)
HEINTJE I, II, III & IV. A group of agents arrested by the SIPO about February/March 1944 after HEINTJE II en HEINTJE III been captured in Amsterdam on consecutive days whilst transmitting (Hans van der Stok en Bram Grisnigt). Arrest were due to RDF. The SIPO tried to play them back ( the SIPO 'EGMONT' affair), but London closed this traffic after several weeks with a message referring to the last message send by Abwehr III-F in the Nordpol case.
BERGMANN, was found dead in a shot down aircraft in the Zuiderzee some time in the summer of 1943, had a large sum of money and a letter of introduction from Capt. Zomer (Somer) to a certain Bürgemeister in Holland. His companion saved himself on a Dutch ship and escaped. (Nout Bergmann & Piet Gerbrands)
HUNTEMANN now states that he thinks that these groups may heave been the same as HEINTJE I, II, III & IV.
(Henk Letteboer, Garralt van Borssum-Buisman, Bram Grisnigt en Hans an der Stok)
GISKES's knowledge of British Intelligence Services.
Abwehr Abt. III and later Leitstelle III West were in possession of a great deal of information and details of the training, personalities, etc of these services. As these books of reference were available, GISKES dod not bother to keep such information in his head, and therefore what he can give here is scrappy.
Exchange of information between the SIPO and III-F did not take place except occasionally, but GISKES does know that the SIPO had a great deal of information on agent's schools in the UK.
Names of personalities in SOE.
The only names recollected by GISKES are Lieut. Col. BLUNT and his successor Major BINGHAM, Miss BOND and Lieut. KNIGHT.
Schools known to GISKES.
a) Patriotic School (for vetting).
b) Parachute school in Ringway (four jumps, one by night)
c) Sabotage school on a small island off Scotland.
d) W/T and cipher school in London.
The Luftwaffe knew of two airfields from which aitcraft carrying agents used to leave the UK.
Funk-Horchdienst and Fluke-Horchdienst.
The funk-Horchdienst knew some of the call signs of aircraft carrying agents to the Continent. According to GISKES trial flights were made in the afternoon prior to the operation of that night, and it was in many cases possible to intercept practice traffic between the aircraft and its controlling station. When this traffic was reported to GISKES he concluded, and was generally right, that an operation would take place that night.
The Fluko-horchdienst were given special orders to plot the courses of single low-flying aeroplanes, and in this way from their reports GISKES was able to get a general picture of the scope of dropping operations.
Double Play and Spielmaterial.
Once contact had been made between Abwehr III-F and an Allied Intelligence Service, authority for maintaining this contact had to be given by Abwehr Abt. III Berlin. Information was devided into four classes:
Spielmaterial i.e. a stock of information which was kept always ready and as far as possible up to date for passing to the Allies, was supplied either by OKW-West or Abt. III-D, which supplied information on Germany of a political, military or economic nature.
b) Normal Routien Traffic.
GISKES had a free hand for the conduct of this and no authority was required from Abwehr III-D, but at the end of each month a copy of all signals depatched or received was sent to Abwehr Abt. III Berlin.
c) Answers to Specific Enquiries.
All enquiries from the Allies had to be reported immediately to Abt. III. GISKES was given authority tp prepare drafts for the relevant answers. These drafts were first submitted to the Headquarters concerned for their approval and then to Abwehr III-D. Information asked for on Germany was invariably supplied by Abwehr III-D.
The Intelligence Branches of the highest service authorities in the occupied countries couls pass to the relevant AST information for deception purpose, but in such cases, the onus of informing Abwehr III-D was on the orginator, i.e. Intelligence branch of the service concerned.
A Small section of the OKW at Berlin (Tirpitzufer) consisting of the Leiter, Oberst SCHÄFER, one technical Assistant and a woman secretary.
With the absorption of the Abwehr by RSHA, Abwehr III-D lost all significance and Spielmaterial off all descriptions was distributed entirely by the Ic branch of the Oberkommando der West and later Leitstelle III-West. GISKES states that the whole policy of Spielmaterial and Deception was never thoroughly clarified and with the absorption of Abwehr III-D by the RSHA, general confusion seemed reign.
One Source of Spielmaterial.
GISKES states that genuine seized espionage material was always a good source. The Dutch and Belgium Intelligence Services were in the habit of forwarding material in triplicate by three different means and it it could be established that copies of the seized material had already been sent through our own channels, the seized material, even if coorect, was passed through a German-controlled channel to inspire confidence.