THE HUNTEMANN FILE, ANNEXURE IX.
What are the details of the initial penetration by JOHNNY (den Droog) which enabled the Germans to shadow
CATARRH (Taconis) and to apply him the falese information e.g. the location of the German cruizer Prinz Eugen;
who was JOHNNY ander over what period was the penetration maintained?
The name JOHNNY is unknown to GISKES and HUNTEMANN. It is known however, that CATARRH was constantly
associating with the Dutch Captain of the Reserve, VAN DEN BERG, who had important connections with the port
authorities in Rotterdam. It is possible therefore, that VAN DEN BERG passed this information to CATARRH who in
turn passed it to EBENEZER (Lauwers) for onward transmissions. Both GISKES and HUNTEMAN deny that false
information of an 1a character was ever passed to VAN DEN BERG. RIDDERHOF first made contact with VAN DEN
BERG in December 1941. As far as GISKES and HUNTEMAN know, RIDDERHOF did not use the name JOHNNY.
RIDDERHOF was handel by Uffz. KUP (Willy Kup). (So who did pass this fake information about the Prinz Eugen?)
What are the details of the liaison between the ASTs in France, Belgium and Holland? What exchange of information
existed for the briefing of interrogation of captured agents? (AST, is Abwehr Stelle)
Initial interrogation by SCHREIEDER, and, when necessary, by GISKES, took place at the SD HQ at The Hague.
Subsequent interrogation on codes was carried out by Uffz. MAY (Ernst Georg May) at Haaren prison. MAY was
purely a code and cypher expert. Berlin, in 1942, directed that a regular exchange of data, based on information
received from the interrgations of captured agents should take place between ASTs in Holland, France and Belgium.
In addition each AST sent an individual report on each interrogation to Abwehr III-F Berlin. Reports consisted of
about one page of foolscap giving the following information:
a) Name and covername.
b) Controlling organisation of the agent.
d) Short summary of training.
e) Precis of the interrogation.
As far as is known to GISKES there was no similar interchange of information between the various SD Stellen.
Abwehr III-F issued, about every three months, a summary of British Intelligence activities in other countries, e.g. Middle-East, Africa, Crete, Scandinavia, etc.
Technical W/T interrogations were carried out by the Funk Abwehr who reported to their main office in Berlin; when the Funk Abwehr was withdrawn from Holland, these interrogations were conducted by the Fu-B-Stelle-ORPO, who reported the results to their main office. Abteilung Funk Abwehr Berlin, issued a monthly circular which incorporated the information from these two sources.
Information on new sabotage devices was forwarded to Abwehr Abteilung II, Berlin by the relevant Abteilung II Stelle in the countries concerned. Any matters of special interest were incorporated in the 3-monthly Abwehr III-F, Berlin summaries.
MAY, at the beginning of 1942, had no knowledge of SOE background and was compelled to build this up from his own interrogations. It is possible, however, that he may have received the results of interrogations of agents captured in other countries, through SIPO channels.
What were the details of the notional capture and deaths of MARROW (George Jambroes) and his W/T operator (Sjef Bukkens)?
Abwehr III-F 'captured an killed' MARROW and his W/T operator on 19-11-1942 (message no. 1 from CUCUMBER (Jan Dane, of Jacob Bakker) via TRUMPET (Han Jordaan) refers).
The Germans thought that the absence of casualties might cause suspision in London and as they were under the impression that London might be intending to exfiltrate MARROW, he and his operator were selected for notional extermination.
The reason for the sudden cessation of the SPINACH (Jo Buizer, radio link BONI) messages?
EBENEZER, in his signal nr. 3 of 7-4-1943, suspected BONI traffic mentioning suspected treason in 'VICTORY' circles. Koos VORRINK had been arrested shortly before this data and the Germans thought that news of this arrest would be bound to reach the UK; as SPINACH had been carrying this traffic they deemed it advisable to shut him down.
What did the Germans know of CARROT (Gerrit Dessing)?
On 15-5-1942, London, in CXG-17, told TRUMPET to make a rendezvous with CARROT. The address of this rendezvoud was sent in a complicated code which was broken by the Germans. The address of the rendezvous was Bodega, Leidsche Poort, Leidscheplein, Amsterdam. At this time ofcourse TRUMPET (Jordaan) was under control, as was also TURNIP. For some reason unknown to GISKES or HUNTEMANN, the SIPO, who handled this affair, decided that TURNIP (Leo Andringa)should keep the appointment. The latter, however was able to warn CARROT, that his two companions were plain-clothes police, and he was able to escape through a lavatery.
Prior to the receipt of the message quoted above, the Germans had no knowledge of CARROT's exsistence, nor did they succeed in arresting him after his escape.
The two Anton DE WILDE's ?
a) Anton DE WILDE aka ADRIAN was the name employed by Uffz. BODENS (Wilhelm Bodens) of Abwehr III-F AST-Niederland for his notional exflitration to the UK in May 1943. He was passed through to Paris by ARNO (see A-7 & A-8), where he was 'arrested' in a cafe in the Boulevard des Capucines, whilst in the company of the genuine British agent MARCEL. The latter, however was unmolested.
b) VAN DER WAALS aka DE WILDE aka ANTON, was Haupt V-Mann of Krimrat. SCHREIEDER of the SD, The Hague.
This man was responsible for the penetration of the Koos VORRINK group. In a message from London to BONI, Nr. 34 of 12-11-1942 orders were given to contact a certain VENUS, the latter was a member of the Koos VORRINK group and VAN DER WAALS, after making this contact, was able to penetrate this organisation. The orders to inspire confidence VAN DER WAALS asked that a BBC message should be broadcast, and this was done. This confidence having been obtained, Koos VORRINK sent out the 'VICTORY' messages through VAN DER WAALS, and these were transmitted on the BONI link.
It is pointed out that this affair - the group being indigenous - was handled by SCHREIEDER and Abwehr III-F merely loaned the BONI link for the purpose.
In the summer and autumn of 1943, black lists, distributed by one of the Dutch Resistance Groups, described VAN DER WAALS as being a notorious SD agent.
HUNTEMANN also declares that VAN DER WAALS was taken by Capt. ABEN (Camp 020 case) to see the British Military Attache in Stockholm. He is unable to give the date and this information is second-hand from SCHREIEDER.
In September 1944, SCHREIEDER told HUNTEMANN that "VAN DER WAALS in England sei und freiwillig heruber gegangen sei". HUNTEMANN had the impression that SCHREIEDER was considerably worried at this news. He also recollected that, possibly in 1943 VAN DER WAALS was notionally murdered by the SD as he was 'blown' throughout Holland.
Whether the BROADBEAN/GOLF (Gerard van Os/Willem van der Wilden) escape line fitted into the general scheme of the Abwehr and what were the dividends they received from it?
These two agents arrived in Holland on 2-2-1943 and were duly arrested on landing. Interrogation established that their mission was to organise escape lines for exfiltrees, etc. For this purpose they had been provided with blank French and Belgian identity cards and a large sum of French and Belgian money. The notional running of an escape line presented considerable difficulties to the Germans, since, had they given the impression to London that the lines were working satisfactorily, there would have been no excuse for making difficulties over the exfiltrations for which London was constantly asking. In addition, a series of notionalarrests on these lines would also have appeared suspicious. The policy therefore was to minimise as far as possible, the potentialities of the BROADBEAN/GOLF lines.
The only dividends according to the Germans were the addresses of safe houses and contacts sent by London, over the BROADBEAN/GOLF link. As for example the information provided in Nr. 2 to BROADBEAN/GOLF dated 28-4-1943, giving the address of a safehouse and a password. It was found that the contacts given were, in most cases, of minor importance and no arrests, as far as GISKES and HUNTEMANN know, resulted from this traffic, the policy being merely to keep observation and not to 'blow' the addresses and contacts. An exception to this was a house search at the address where MARCEL lived in Paris, believed to be in the Place Clignancourt, as it was thought that, in view of ADRIAN's (Anton de Wilde) 'arrest', no action would have appeared suspicious.
At a later date, which neither can remember, ARNAUD aka ARNO i.e. Uffz. CHRISTMANN, was sent to Paris to an address notified from London with a story that other exfiltrees were to be expected shortly. On arrival, however it appeared that London had asked for the exfiltrees of ARNO and the latter, willynilly, was sent along the line accompanied by a woman as far as Lyons. Here he came under suspicion, but managed to talk his way out of it and returned to Holland, where he reported the address of the house in Lyons. This address was passed to the AST in Lyons and the place was watched, but apparently the organisers of the line had realised the implication of ARNO's visit and nothing eventuated.
All addresses of safehouses and contacts sent by London, on the BROADBEAN/GOLF link, were passed to the relevant AST'n, but the results obtained were generally unknown to Abwehr III-F Holland.
What was the true identity of the passeur ARNO aka ARNAUD?
Uffz. CHRISTMANN, III-F, AST-Niederlande (Richard Christmann).
Details of activities of Col. KOPPERT?
Col. Koppert was a man who had good connections with a few senior German officers, names unknown to GISKES and HUNTEMANN.
It appears that RIDDERHOF met KOPPERT 'by chance' in a train and commenced talking about resistance activities. It seems, however, that KOPPERT mistrusted RIDDERHOF but put him in touch with Sgt. KNOPPERS. As far as GISKES and HUNTEMANN are aware, RIDDERHOF only met KNOPPERS on a few occasions and was unable to produce anything of an incriminating or interesting character.
The Germans, however, naturally expected to receive from KNOPPERS a great deal of information on the activities and future plans of KNOPPERS, after KNOPPERS had returned from the UK. (He did not return)
Administrative arrangements under which RIDDERHOF for Abwehr in both Holland and Belgium?
In the autumn of 1941, Uffz. KUP had come in contact with RIDDERHOF after the latter's release from prison. In December 1941 RIDDERHOF was receiving from Abwehr III-F a fixed salary of 200 Guilders which by mid 1942 had risen to 300 Guilders per month. By the summer of 1943 RIDDERHOF had become completely 'blown' in Holland and left for Brussels, with the idea, so GISKES and HUNTEMANN state, of withdrawing from all GIS activities. Nevertheless he still drew his monthly salary from AST-Niederlande. As far as GISKES and HUNTEMANN are aware, RIDDERHOF was never paid by AST-Brussels, but, naturally, was known there and he could rely on the AST's help for procuring identity papers, passports and living quarters. His various addresses, as known to Abwehr III-F Niederlande, were as follows:
a) Blaricum, Noord-Holland, near Hilversum: Korte Moolenweg 2. Frquently used, and relatives of his (by marriage) lived there.
b) There was another address, obtainable from the local police in Arnhem. He was probably registered here under the name RIDDERHOF.
c) Rue de Throne, Brussels. (Nr. forgotten)
d) In the spring of 1943 he lived for a time in various hotels in Spa.
Details of the two NORDPOL agents, alleged to be a British captain and a Dutchman, brought from Holland to Belgium, in the summer of 1944. The two agents are said to have agreed to co-operated with the Germans, but only against the Russians.
The two agents were EBENEZER (Lauwers) and TRUMPET (Jordaan). Details are given in statements by GISKES and HUNTEMANN at Annexure VI. Neither GISKES or HUNTEMANN can imagine how MIERSMANNS (Is dit Guy Miermans?) was aware of this incident.
Verbal Questionnaire Submitted by SOE.
Q-1: Was TONNET indentical with TER HAAK (See P.1 Section 3 of this report)?
Q-2: Who was ABOR?
A-2: ABOR is Arnoldus Albert BAATSEN aka WATERCRESS.
Q-3: Escape of PARSNIP, CABBAGE and LACROSSE?
A-3: See statement by GISKES, Annexure VII.
Q-4: Was RIDDERHOF identical with CHERRY BRANDY or George BRANDY?
A-4: RIDDERHOF, when making reports to Abwehr III-F on George BRANDY was supposed to refer to him as CHERRY.
A-5: Neither GISKES nor HUNTEMANN have any knowledge of this organisation, nor have they heard of it.
Q-6: CS-VI (CS-6)?
A-6: Neither GISKES nor HUNTEMANN know a great deal about this organisation. However, it is possible that it was penetrated by the SIPO, through LINDEMANS.
Q-7: Explanation of the German spelling of the key-word 'PRIJS' in (message) A/978 from KALE (Beukema toe Water)?
A-7: EBENEZER was certainly not being used to encipher, translate or transmit on the 25-4-1943, when the word 'PREIS' appeared in message A/978 from KALE via BROCCOLI (Ruseler, radio-link Broccoli). At this time EBENEZER was imprisoned at Haaren and the suggestedexplanation of this incident by HUNTEMANN is as follows:
Members of the ORPO frequently transmitted in the neighbourhood of 's Hertogenbosch, and on these occasions often visited the Haaren prison. It is possible, though unlikely, that one of these men gave to EBENEZER the draft message and asked him to encipher it. EBENEZER may habe learnt BROCCOLI's key-word through tapping on the central heating system, and thus have had the chance to insert the wordt 'PREIS' in the message. HUNTEMANN thinks, however, that this would have been very unlikely as almost always, messages were enciphered at the Fu-B-Stelle-ORPO, then at Driebergen, and taken to the place of transmission already enciphered. In addition, all enciphering and deciphering was subject to a double-check done by two different members of the B-Stelle. Accordingly, no credible explanation for this incident can be offered by HUNTEMANN or GISKES.
At the same time it is emphasised that all matters connected with ciphers and transmission were dealt with entirely by the ORPO and HUNTEMANN and GISKES knew little about the procedure adapted. Neither pocesses technical knowledge of codes, ciphers or W/T.
Custody of captured SOE agents.
In spring and summer of 1942, all captured agents were taken to the SD prison in Scheveningen. Interrogation generally took place in the prison, but in special cases agents were interrogated personallyby SCHREIEDER in the HQ of the SIPO, Binnenhof, The Hague.
EBENEZER (Lauwers) and TRUMPET (Jordaan) were detained for several weeks in the military prison at Scheveningen as they were being played back, and were actually transmitting; it was therefore necessary to prevent them coming into contact with other Dutch prisoners and their Dutch guards.
In about September or October 1942, all NORDPOL agents were taken to the special prison at Haaren. From this date onwards all arrested agents were conducted straight to Haaren, where they were interrogated, except those who appeared to have received spcial missions, e.g. Johan GRÜN aka BRUTUS and a female agent named FELIX aka CHICORY (Trix Terwindt), who were first interrogated at Binnenhof by SCHREIEDER.
After the escape from Haaren in December 1943 of PARSNIP, CABBAGE and LACROSSE, all NORDPOL agents, with the exception of EBENEZER, TRUMPET and FELIX, were transferred early 1944 to the prison at Assen, and thence at some later date, unknown to camps in Germany.
In mid-September 1944, SCHREIEDER told HUNTEMANN that TRUMPET and EBENEZER had also been sent to Germany, and that they were at SACHSENHAUSEN Camp.. At the same time, SCHREIEDER professed ignerance of the whereabouts of the other NORDPOL agents. Nevertheless, he promised to make enquiries, but Abwehr III-F were never informed of the result. As GISKES felt a special resonsebility for EBENEZER and TRUMPET as a result of the promises that had been made to them, he ordered HUNTEMANN to visit them at this camp. An account of HUNTEMANN's visit is given in Annexure VIII.
A certain Hptstuf. WACKER (Heinrich Wacker) was in charge of the prison at Haaren, which was also, at times, used as a detention prison for hostages.
Notes on SOE Agents.
It must be emphasised that the actual handling of the agents after arrest was entirely an SD responsebility, and for this reason both GISKES and HUNTEMANN are not good sources of information on the behaviour and presonalities of the captured agents; in fact, many of them were never even seen by GISKES or HUNTEMANN.
EBENEZER: Is described by HUNTEMANN as being crafty and moody. He was only prepared to co-operate as a result of a definite promise made that none of the agents caught through his treachery would receive the death penalty. The promise that his own life would be spared made ni impression on him, and it was impossible to turn him bt threats of this nature. He was absolutely convinced that London would be aware that he was operating under control, within three weeks. In fact he stated that a certain Col. BLUNT had assured him that this would be the case before he left the UK. Special pains were taken to school a B-Stelle operator in EBENEZER's transmitting idiosyncracies, as it was feared that if he should become aware of the seriousness of the position that his behaviour had entalled, he would, at no matter what cost, take steps to inform London. He never concealed his dislike of the Germans. (Huub Lauwers)
TRUMPET: Is described as being a man of little initiative and with a dislike for hard work. He appeared to be completely disinterested in his situation and HUNTEMANN had the impression that, even if free, he would have been a poor agent. During imprisonment he was subject to frequent fits of depression and for that reason HUNTEMANN arranged for him to share a cell with EBENEZER. (Han Jordaan)
CATARRH: Is described by GISKES as being a man of outstanding courage and determination. No promisses on threats would induce him to provide information or to co-operate in any way. After the failure of an attempted escape he refused to give his parole not to escape again. My information that he did provide, was given, when he was quite sure that it would do no harm to his cause. (Thijs Taconis)
FELIX: A female agent who behaved very well, and from whom it was alomost impossible to gain information. When London proposed liberty if she would consent to act as an SD agent in making contact. She refused SCHREIEDER's proposal preferring imprisonment where however she was well treated, according to HUNTEMANN. (Trix Terwindt)
MARROW: Is described as a man of high ideals and great patriotism, HUNTEMANN however considered that his affection for his wife and children was such that he would never have been a good agent. Whilst under arrest he was constantly asking for news of his family. HUNTEMANN declares that he presuaded SCHREIEDER to send the wife a letter and monet through an imaginary Dutch organisation, and the wife was allowed to send a letter back through the same intermediary. (George Jambroes)
WATERCRESS: Is described by HUNTEMANN as a bad character who voluntarily spied on his follew prisoners at Haaren and reported on then to the SD. Through him, many written messages from one prisoner to another found their way into the hands of the SD. At a later period he feel into disfavour with the SD who found papers indicating his intention to escape. (Arnold Baatsen)
BEETROOT and Van Sittard: Former members of the Marechausse. Described as exellent agents, who, at initial interrogation convinced the Germans that they were people of very minor importance. When in a signal from London at a later date, it was made clear to the Germans that the pair were 'EUEREKA' instructors, they were further interrogated, but both claimed to have forgotten their knowledge of the subject and the Germans were obliged to send the first set they capatured to Berlin, for expert examination, before they could work it. (Herman Parlevliet & Toon van Steen)
PARSLEY: Described as a good agent from whom the SD could get nothing for a long time. At his first interrogation after capture, he insisted that a W/T message should be send to London stating: "ELVIRA reached station 57 minutes late". This message appeared suspicious to GISKES and HUNTEMANN and in order to obviate having to transmit it, PARSLEY had to be notionally killed. (Cornelis Braggaar)
KALE & CAULIFLOWER: described by SCHREIEDER to HUNTEMAN as being good trustworthy men who gave nothing away of any importance, (Karel Beukema toe Water & Arie Mooy)
BROADBEAN: Volunteered to work for the Germans. His offer was refused as HUNTEMANN believed that he only made the offer with a view to future escape. (Gerard van Os)
TURNIP: Showed considerable resource in warning CARROT ( A-5 of SOE Questionnaire). (Leo Andringa)
SCHREIEDER expressed the opinion that the quality of agents progressively deteriorated.