THE HUNTEMANN FILE, ANNEXURE IV.
NB An account of LINDEMANS' activities is not stricktly relative to the NORDPOL affair, but has been enclosed for convenience.
GIKES first meeting with LINDEMANS.
In February 1944, whilst GISKES was in Brussels in connection withthe formation of FAK-307, he learned from KUP that NELIS (Camp 020 case) had made the acquaintance of a man who had prevously worked for the Belgian Intelligence Service and who was now prepared to change sides in exchange for the release of his brother imprisonned by the Germans in Rotterdam. GISKES instructed KUP to go further into this matter and as a result GISKES decided to see this man (Christian LINDEMANS) himself.
The first meeting took place in a house near the Jardins Botanique, Brussels, which was the billet of some of the Abwehr Hilfsoffiziere of III-F, Brussels. Those present at the meeting were GISKES, using the name of Dr. GERMAN, his adjutant WURR (WALTER), KUP (WLLI) and NELIS who brought LINDEMANS to the house. The meeting lasted about two hours, during which time LINDEMANS gave an account of his past activities with the Belgium and French Resistance and Escape organisations. In addition he produced for inspection various papers and documents including Grenzübertrittscheine for Holland, Germany and France, made out in false name which GISKES no longer remembers. LINDEMANS also showed a large quantity of blank documents which heused in his role as passeur, and various German Dienststellen stamps. LINDEMANS explained that in the autumn of 1943 he had enlisted the aid of his brother Hendrick LINDEMANS for his escape routes. The latter, however, had been caught by the SIPO and was now in Rotterdam prison awaiting death. Christian LINDEMANS thereupon told GISKES that if his brother HENDRICK were to be released he would gaive the Germans whote-hearted co-operation.
At the conclusion of the meeting GISKES told KUP to verify the facts about Hendrick LINDEMANS and, at a further meeting which took place in the same house about 8 days later, GISKES was able to tell Christian LINDEMANS that Hendrick would be released in return for his services. Accordingly Hendrick was released very shortly afterwards and Christian LINDEMANS started work for the G.I.S.
During the period February to August 1944 while LINDEMANS was working for FAK-307, GISKES had occasion to see him only about five times. LINDEMANS was handled exclusively by KUP, GISKES merely giving the general directions to the latter and leaving to LINDEMANS and KUP the ways means of fulfilling the orders.
Three Main Tasks given to LINDEMANS.
1) To give to Hptm. WURR the names and details of all Resistance and espionage movements with which he had come into contact, in France, Holland and Belgium. GISKES stated that the mass of material supplied was so great that it took WURR two or three weeks to sort it out.
2) To go to Holland and make contact with his Dutch Resistance friends and ascertain their future activities. It is possible that the organisation CS-6 was penetrated by LINDEMANS (The SOE/BBO Group of Bob Celosse, FARO?)
3) To make contact with the Belgian Resistance movement and to find out details about the missions that they were receiving from London.
Shooting of LINDEMANS.
About the end of April 1944, LINDEMANS happened to be in the Devisenschutzkdo. office in Rotterdam and apparently aroused the suspicion of a girl employee who called the police. On their arrival, LINDEMANS was asked to produce his papers and as he put his hand into his pocket he was shot by the policeman who thought that he was about to produce a revolver.
LINDEMANS was taken to hospital and on arrival there, the police were dismayed to find a document showing him to be an employee of the Abwehr. The matter was reported through SIPO channels to GISKES who instructed KUP to get LINDEMANS out of hospital without letting the Dutch hospital staff know that it was the German who were engineering the removal. KUP did this in such a way that the Dutch believed LINDEMANS to be a member of a Resistance movement who was being freed by his friends. GISKES then decided that it was impossible for LINDEMANS to continue working in Holland as his Resistance friends would think it very suspicious if once having been in the hands of the police he were still able to move freely without danger of arrest. GISKES therefore decided that LINDEMANS must now work only in Belgium.
Resistance in Belgium.
LINDEMANS had good Resistance contacts in Antwerp and Malines and he frquently reported on the activities of these groups to GISKES, who, however decided to take no action, as he wished to build up and maintain LINDEMANS contacts so that at the proper moment LINDEMANS would have received the full condidence od the Resistance and so be able to give really important strategic information such as the date of the Allied invasion. GISKES had received from Leitstelle-III-West, and Ic Militärbefehlshaber Belgian, a directive to find out the intentions of the Armee Blanche and the instructions that they were receiving from London in connection with the Allied invasion. GISKES policy was apparently justified as, about the 25th August, LINDEMANS reported taht the main Allied thrust would be directed against the Charleroi area and then northwards along the Maas; LINDEMANS also reported that on a date which GISKES cannot remember, Resistance in the Lille and Charleroi district were to come out into the open. LINDEMANS further declared about the end of August that the Allies would be in Brussels about the morning of 4th September. It is interesting to note that German estimates of resistance strength in Belgium varied between 15.000 and 50.000, and the German General Staff were never able to evaluate satisfactorily the potential danger of Resistance.
GISKES last meeting with LINDEMANS.
GISKES last saw LINDEMANS on the 2nd September 1944, at his office in Brussels, and gave him the mission to stay behind in Belgium and try to penetrate the British I.S. with the idea of finding out their plans for the placing of Allied agents behind the German lines in Holland. The same day, GISKES went to the Leitstelle-III-West, which was at that time in Liege, returning to Brussels on 3rd September. That evening he went to Antwerp taking KUP with him, who had apparently made a rendez-vous with LINDEMANS at a customs house on the Belgian-Dutch frontier. LINDEMANS failed to keep the rendez-vous. GISKES believed that after their last meeting in Brussels LINDEMANS may have decided to go to Antwerp.
Later on 20th September, GISKES received a telephone call from FAT-365 in Driebergen, which was then under FAK-306, saying that LINDEMANS was in Holland.
Before departure, GISKES had told LINDEMANS that if he managed to get back through the lines, on contacting German troops he was to ask for FAT-365.
About 3 - 4 weeks later GISKES received a written report from FAT-365 in which it appeared that LINDEMANS had crossed the lines near Eindhoven on the 15th September, having been given by the Allies the mission to contact Resistance in Eindhoven and give them orders that the Allies would be occupying the town in the near future and that no action from them would be required. LINDEMANS had been taken to Faalschirm A.O.K. Ic and gave the following information:
1) That a British attack in the direction of Eindhoven was iminent. So far as GISKES can remember the date and time were 17th September, morning.
2) That for this attack large forces of airborne troops were standing by. The exact place where these troops were to be employed was not given. After contacting the A.O.K. I LINDEMANS went to Driebergen and FAT-365, and thence back to Eindhoven and through the lines. The report further stated that during his stay in Brussels LINDEMANS had made Allied contacts at the Hotel Metropole. He mentioned two British Intelligence officers which names GISKES cannot remember. LINDEMANS reported also that 21st Army Group HQ was in Antwerp, and gave other unimportant details, such as an account of living conditions in Belgium.
GISKES states that LINDEMANS always seemed to have plenty of money. From KUP he received in all about 100.000 B Frs. and about 1.000 Dutch Guilders. LINDEMANS apperently always had large sums of money on him, which GISKES believes he got from the various Resostance groups. It was never clear to GISKES why LINDEMANS continued to work for the Germans.
Written statement by GISKES on LINDEMANS.
GISKES has submitted the following statement on LINDEMANS:
"A report by FAT-365 in Driebergen reached me towards the end of October 1944, and I remember the following information given by LINDEMANS:
LINDEMANS had reported to Fallschirm A.O.K. I, Abteilung Ic on 15th September 1944 that:
1) The English attack in the direction of Eindhoven was imminent (as far as I can remember LINDEMANS gave the time and date as being early on 17th September.
2) For the attack which was imminent, large forces of airborne troops are standing by. (The place or sector where these troops were to be committed was not given)
LINDEMANS on the same day had also given to FAT-365 a quantity of other information of a military nature, but it was of little impotance.
The source of the information in paras. 1) and 2) above was not shown in the report from FAT-365. I do not know if Fallschirm A.O.K.I Abtg Ic had questioned LINDEMANS on this".
Information from HUNTEMANN on LINDEMANS.
The following information on LINDEMANS was supplied by HUNTEMANN:
LINDEMANS was handled exclusively by KUP and HUNTEMANN only saw him on two occasions: first while driving from Brussels to Lille on 30th or 31st August 1944, in his company. On this occasion, it was agreed between them that if they were stopped by German troops, HUNTEMANN should answer and if by Resistance, LINDEMANS as he knew the password (namely "Vive la Belgique, vive la Belgique liberee") HUNTEMANN does not know what LINDEMANS was doing in Lille.
The second occasion when HUNTEMANN saw LINDEMANS was on 15th September 1944, in the office of FAT-365 in Driebergen. Whilst HUNTEMANN was in the office of KIESEWETTER, the latter received a telephone call from Hilversum saying that LINDEMANS (CC) had returned there. KIESEWETTER then requested that LINDEMANS should be sent immediately to Driebergen. HUNTEMANN had to go away but on returning at 21:00 hrs he found KIESEWETTER and the remainder of the Abwehrpersonnel busy writing a report on the information supplied by LINDEMANS.
It appeared according to HUNTEMANN, that LINDEMANS had received a mission from an officer in the Hotel Metropole at Brussels to go and contact four leading personalities of the Dutch Resistance organisation in Eindhoven and to deliver to them orders to the effect that their organisation was to cease activities as the Allies would be in Eindhoven within a few days. HUNTEMANN is not sure wheather it was on this occasion or later that KIESEWETTER told him that LINDEMANS had reported an imminent airborne attack in the Münster/Dülmen area.
It is pointed out that much difficulty has been encountered in attempting to reconstruct, under interrogation, the actual contents of LINDEMANS' reports concerning the imminent airborne attack in Holland. In the first place, GISKES, was not in Driebergen on 15th September 1944, and secondly, HUNTEMANN was absent from FAT HQ at periods on that day. Furthermore, HUNTEMANN's memory is confused concerning the events. It has been thought advisable, therefore, to include, for what it is worth, HUNTEMANN's own statement on the subject:
"I know from statements from GISKES that one day, probably at the end of 1943, or beginning of 1944, that the V-Mann NELIS, who was being run by Uffz. KUP, stated that he was in contact with a very important English agent who said he was prepared to place his extensive knowledge at the disposal of the German Abwehr and to co-operate with them in an active manner, provided that his brother, who was being held by the SD in Scheveningen prison, would be released. I assume that thereafter a few conversations took place between this English agent, known as 'CC' and KUP, and perhaps also on one accasion with GISKES. At ant rate, GISKES arranged for the release by the SD of 'CC's' brother, who as far as I know had been omprisoned on account of some non-political matter. 'CC' thereupon entered into the service of FAK-307 and was run by Uffz. KUP. The matter was 'Chef-Sache' i.e. nobody apart from those participating in the case, was to receive any information. Hauptmann WURR must, however, have closer knowledge of the affair as the files in connection with the 'CC' case were available to him and he referred to them with a great deal of interest.
Very great successes were evidently achieved through 'CC'. I was often told that the NORDPOL affair had been quite harmless in comparison to the information which 'CC' was supplying. Sometime in February 1945 at Wiehl, GISKES gave me, when we were having a private conversation, the number of more important people who had been arrested through 'CC's co-operation. I believe that the figure was 311 or thereabout.
Amongst other things, during a raid, 'CC' was shot at by the SD (GISKES was suspicious at the time that the SD had done this purposely to put us in disadvantage). He was in hospital, in pain I believe and was set free by a genuine Dutch resistance organisation and brought to Brussels. The whole story of his release, however, had been conducted by Uffz. KUP. The first attempt failed as 'CC' had just been taken into the X-Ray room, but the second attempt succeeded a few days later.
I personally saw 'CC' on two occasions. On the first occasion I drove with him from Brussels to Lille in a camouflaged car of FAK-307. This was on the 30th or 31st August 1944. 'CC' was picked up but not introduced to me, at a house in the vicinity of the Avenue Louise by KUP, who accompanied us on the journey. I knew, however, from what GISKES had said that 'CC' would travel with me. I drove at the time to Lille to be present at the expected parachutage in connection with the case 'FALKEN-KAPELLE' and 'CC' had a mission which was not disclosed to me. The matter was urgent and he needed the cat for a whole day in Lille as he had to get back to Brussels the same evening. He put me down at the Grand Place in Lille, at about 11 o'clock in the forenoon. At the time a certain amount of danger was involved in driving a lone car on the Brussels-Lille road. Many triangular shaped nails lay on the road for the purpose of sabotaging the tyres, and many surprice attacks were taking place by terrorists who also appeared on the scene wearing German uniforms. It was therefore agreed between 'CC' and myself that in the event of the car being halted by the German Wehrmacht, I was to do the talking, but if the car on the other hand was stopped by civilians or the terroists, he was to take charge of the conversation. He had the necessary papers to produce for just such an event, and knew the password "Vive la Belgique, la Belgique liberee". However, we were not stopped en route.
On the second occasion I saw 'CC' in Driebergen. It was in the afternoon of the Friday preceding the aor-landings at Arnhem when a telephone call came through from Hilversum, probably from the Ic of the Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber to Major KIESEWETTER, asking whether he knew a certain Herr GERMAN. KIESEWETTER denied knowledge of this name. As I knew that GERMAN was a seldom used covername of GISKES, I interrupted KIESEWETTER and explained this to him. There upon KIESEWETTER affirmed on the telephone that he knew a Herr GERMAN and Hilversum immediately replied that a certain 'CC' had reported there and desired to speak immediately to Herr GERMAN concerning an urgent matter. KIESEWETTER then requested that 'CC' should be sent immediately to Driebergen by car.
I had an appointment in Zeist with Kriminalrat SCHREIEDER and only got back to Driebergen at about 21:00 hrs. I found KIESEWETTER and the remainder of his Abwehr personnel of the Trupp busy compilling a report concerning the information brought by 'CC'. If I am not mistaken, KIESEWETTER had in meantime been to Hilversum and had also only just returned. From what KIESEWETTER and the remainder of those present related to me, and from waht I remember in connection with the drawing up of the report - which I did not completely read through - I know taht 'CC' had brought very important information. 'CC' had succeeded in getting in touch with the enemy intelligence service and in fact after the occupation of Brussels, had immediately gone to the Hotel Metropole where an important Staff had set up it's HQ. There he enquired for an Intelligence Service officer, but there was non there at the time, and after a long period of waiting, a Captain arrived, who had set himself up in a room on the 4th floor. Moreover, in a room on the 4th floor, a W/T station had also been installed.
From this officer, 'CC' was given orders for four leading personages of a Dutch Resistance Organisation, all of whom were employed with PHILIPS in Eindhoven and was instructed to deliver the orders personally to them. The order was to the effect that their organisation was to cease activities as in any case the Allied forces would be there in a few days time. En route for Hilversum 'CC' had already handed over these orders in Eindhoven, at which point he had crossed the lines.
After having now considered the matter at some length, I am not altogether clear as to whether KIESEWETTER told me at the time 'CC' had reported on an imminent airborne landing in the area Münster/Dülmen. It may be perhaps that Krimrat. SCHREIEDER, who always knew about many rumours and new events, and with whom I had just a lengthy conversation, had told me about this. Certainly, nothing was talked about in my presence that evening and the following day concerning an imminent aireborne landing in the Arnhem area. I am quite certain about that. Only much later, about February 1945, GISKES told me on an occasion in Wiehl during a private conversation that 'CC' had been a perfectly amazing V-Mann, as he had reported about the entire Arnhem undertaking beforehand. The fact that at the time I did not learn from KIESEWETTER about the Arnhem action does not necessarily mean that there was any mistrust of me; I had his complete confidence. In the confusion of that particular evening - at period he was not there, and at times I was also absent - all those present were conversing confusely about 'CC's reports - he may have perhaps taken it for granted that I also knew already at the time about this report. I must particcally assume this now, since he came to me from time to time and said that the reports which 'CC' had brought were quite amazing. I took this however, to refer to the fact that 'CC' had managed to play the double game with the enemy intelligence service.
Next morning I did not see KIESEWETTER as he was in Hilversum More over, I only saw 'CC' again in the morning after KIESEWETTER's return. I do not exclude the possibility that 'CC' was together with KIESEWETTER in Hilversum, but this is only an assumption on my part. Immediately after a meal 'CC' drove with a car belonging to FAT-365 to the vicinity of Eindhoven from which point he again intended to cross the lines. He had intention to return about a week later. From that day onwards, FAK-307 has neither seen nor heard nothing more about him.
Much later, GISKES told me - I think it was also in February 1945 in Wiehl - that he feared that NELIS had betrayed 'CC', as NELIS and 'CC' had become enemies, and NELIS knew precisely the role which 'CC' had played. And, the idiots of FAT-365 had sent, of all people, this man NELIS, through the lines to Belgium, from whence of course, he did not return.
GISKES believes that this man, after released from prison, went as a voluntary worker to Germany, where he had relations.
GISKES believes that he was connected with the Resistance Movement. Christian LINDEMANS stayed with Jan when in Holland, and KUP could contact him at Jan's address. GISKES is emphatic that Jan did not work for the Abwehr and that he never received money from it. Jan probably knew that Christian was working for the Germans but did not know the nature of the work. GISKES believes Jan to have been a patrotic Dutchman.