Huntemann, Annexure I

German Policy and Procedures.

The passing of 'Spielmaterial' to enemy intelligence services was a regular part of the functions of the Abwehr. All Dienststellen carrying out this work kept on hand regular stock of such material in order to be able to comply, within a reasonable time, with any request for information that might be made by W/T by the Allies.
For definite deception purposes, prepared material was distributed by higher authority (i.e. C-in-C West, Ic Army Groups, OKW, Seekriegsleitung) to the III-F. Referate concerned, for passing on to the Allies, where possible through several independent channels.
Each time contact was made with the Allies, no matter in what manner, Abwehr Abteilung III had to be informed and authority obtained for maintaining this contact. All enemy requests for information had to be reported immediately to Abteilung III together with suggested replies. Material for drafting replies was colliated by III-F with the help of other branches of the AST, and had then to be submitted for approval had been obtained, the suggested answer was telephoned to Abteilung III-D in Berlin for approval. If, however, time pressed, the information was often supplied and III-D's authority obtained afterwards. All material regarding economic or political conditions in Germany, or the shere of activity of another AST, was supplied by III-D.
When information on any soecific target was required, a member of III-F had to assume the role of an agent in order that only such information should be sent as could normally be procured by a real agent.

Deception.

The intelligence branches of the highest military authorities in the occupied countries could give information to the relevant AST for passing to the Allies, but in such cases the onus of informing III-D lay with the orginator, e.g. the intelligence branch of the service concerned.

Referat III-D.

This was a small section in the OKW at Berlin (Tirpitzerufer) consisting of the Leiter, Oberst SCHAEFER, one technical assistant and a female secretary. With the gradual eclipse of the Abwehr this section lost its importance and its role in the RSHA as III-D was only a small one.
From 1943/1944 onwards 'Spielmaterial' was distributed entirely by the Ic branch of the higher Wehrmacht HQ e.g,
C-in-C West, Army Group-B, etc.
There was apparently however no very fixed policy after the eclipse of III-D with regard to 'Spielmaterial' and some very curious incidents occured; for example in January/February 1944 GISKES heard that films seized in Brussels were forwarded through G.I.S. channels by mistake immediately after they had been developed.

One source of 'Spielmaterial'.

In this connection GISKES stated that genuine seized espionage material was always a good source of 'Spielmaterial'. The Dutch and Belgian I.S. were in the habit of forwarding material in triplicate by three different means and, if it was established that copies of the seized material had already been sent through other channels it was then forwarded in order to inspire confidence in the German-controlled channels.

Nordpol 'Spielmaterial'.

During the Nordpol affair, GISKES stated, that at various dates which he cannot remember, information was passed about the position of German watships, coastal batteries on the island of Beveland, the positions of HQ of Divisions alleged to be in Holland; in addition reports on the Dutch armament industries were also sent.
These reports were, of course, additional to the normal current traffic which was being sent over the various SOE links. For such future traffic GISKES gave HUNTEMANN a free hand and, unless it was necessary to forward answers to questions on specific military targets or troopmovements, etc, no other authority was required; but as has been stated above this latter type of message had to be referred to the relevant authority and III-D for their approval.
Copies of all signals sent or received had to be sent monthly to Abwehr Abteilung III.

Page IV of Annexure-I is missing 'Account of Reception Commitee'.

Preparation for and description of a dropping operation (cont.).

"We would like to invite you this evening to a little party at Wochenendhaus. We shall have some guests and would be delighted if you could come. A couple of 'Damen' are also coming. Bring a couple of partners for them or they may be bored".

The B-Stelle ORPO was not warned by telephone, but orally, as they were always close to where III-F was located. They of course knew that an operation was planned before III-F, as it was they who operated the W/T sets, but consultations had to take plave with them over the availabilitu of their men.
As the lack of personnel became more and more acute (the same men could not be out three nights running, especially as their normal daily duties remained to be carried outwhich could have meant that they got no sleep) Haultmann WURR, on choosing a new landing ground approached units in the neighbourhood and asked for the loan of 1 or 2 officers for the nights when an operation was planned. This request was always gladly granted and we got the greatest support from those units in Steenwijk, Wezep, etc and before returning in the morning were well looked after. For these Army officers a parachute operation was a new and unheard of thing and a very pleasant break in the duly routine. But for another reason also, units in the neighbourhood of the dropping ground had to be warned namely because on account of the experience gained in France and Belgium when receptions not under Abwehr control took place, it had been ordered that all units were to send out strong bicycle patrols at night especially in lonely heath country to look for suspicious lights and people wandering about, and to search for reception committees and if necessary shoot immediately. After such a patrol had almost attacked a reception committee under Major KIESEWETTER at Rolde near Assen, it was decided that, in future, all units near a dropping ground must be warned of the operation, although such a measure was obviously undiserable on security grounds.
At first, night-fighter units i.e. XII Fliegerkorps were warned of impending dropping operations in order to obviate the possibility of ant aeroplane destined for us being shot down. Later this fighter 'protection' was dropped, as it would have become noticeable, if these planes were never attacked. Later they were again reported to the night-fighters, but no longer protected and were treated in the same way as other planes. In one instance a plane was shot down immediately over the dropping ground by a night fighter, so that the reception committee only just managed to get to safety in time, and on one occasion a plane crashed on its right wing whilst coming in to drop. Evidently it was too slow and low. Two of the pilots were saved from the burning plane by Hauptmann WURR and his men and brought to the Luftwaffe hospital in Amsterdam. A W/T operator was also employed on the dropping ground after representations had been made by the Luftwaffe and he kept in contact with the night-fighter organisation, signalling as soon as the plane had dropped its load and was making off, the idea being then the plane should then be chased by nifgt-fighters which were than takking off. However, this produced no results and this arrangement was dropped. Abwehr III-F, in any case was against it, as we feared that W/T signalling in the immediate neighbourhood of the dropping ground might endanger matters.
After all section concerned had been advise by Hauptmann WURR to the effect that one or several droppings were to be expected for the following night, the places were notified within III-F. O.C. on the dropping point was a member of III-F section, even if, in addition, a higher ranking officer was ordered from AST-Hilversum to act as his assistant. Only if nobody from III-F couls be allocated to the job, the command of the party on the spot was taken over by an officer from Hilversum.
If towards the late afternoon it was established through a repetition by London of the definite signals, that a parachutage would take place during the course of the evening, Hauptmann WURR again notified the sections concerned, and after this there was nothing more to do. In the written description of the dropping point, which the Stellen concrned received from us, the approch route, its duration, time of the rendez-vous, camouflage, parking places, were accurately stated. When the parachutages took place at dropping points north of Amersfoort, this was nearly always the plave - the RV for III-F Driebergen, AST Hilversum, SD The Hague was nearly always the Hoevelaaken crossroads, about 5km behind Amersfoort. generally speaking, the ORPO B-Stelle travelled in III-F transport, as both sections lay close to one another.
On arrival in the vicinity of the dropping ground, which had to be approached without lights, the transport was parked and camouflagedwith parachutes, at pre-determined points underneath trees. The SD personnel generally selected a position for themselves in the neighbourhood of the dropping ground, and the members of III-F took up their positions on the ground, according to the direction of the wind. If the plane was to be ecpected after midnight everybody had to be ready in their positions by 23:30 hours, after lamps had been given a brief test.
Lights had to be extinguised immediately after the drop had occured in order to make observation difficult from the plane in case it made a second flight over the ground. At the beginning of the NORDPOL affair it was up to the Abwehr to attend to the carting away of the material, whilst the SD were responsible for the collection of the agents. However, the SD attemptedvsystematically and with success, to take the matter out of Abwehr hands. Whilst at first all the material was put at Abwehr disposal, later this was reduced to half, again later this was whittled down to half of the weapons, and ultimately this was reduced to what the SD considered as good for the Abwehr to have. About the end of 1942 the SD took over the carting away of the containers, and from then onwards the Abwehr had to be satisfied with what the SD permitted them to have. The ORPO in Driebergen wanted to participate in the distribution of the weapons and they were catered for by the SD in this respect.
The return journey from the dropping grounds had to take place at the earliest possible moment and the transport had to disappear before the farm workers went out to the fields.
The arresting of the agents generally occured after a short greeting at the exact moment when they were endeavouring to release themselves from their parachutes harnass. Later the SD decide to contact the agents in specially reserved houses in the vicinity of the dropping ground where they arranged a large reception party ... with the supposed chiefs of the organisation. During the course of these celebrations the agents generally became fairly lequacious and were interrogated by Dutchmen who were in the employ of the SD service. When the agents eventually became tired and turned in for the night they were arrested. The new procedure may have been motivated by the reaction on the part of the agent ARIE (Roel Jongelie), who ... after his arrest, told the reception committee was ... to send a W/T message to London, composed in the ... which follow, at the earliest opportunity, to indicate that he had arrived safely "ELVIA arrived at station 57 minutes late"
This message was not despatched, because I had the instinctive feeling that there was something not quite in order with it. I Therefore I created the story about ARIE's brainstorm which notionally led to his ultimate death. Later it transpired that the message with 'ELVIRA' really was a warning and there was something about it not in order. I assumed that SCHREIEDER introduced the variation in arresting the agents on account of this incident.In other words, they were only arrested after they has told everything to the supposedly genuine reception committee.

                                                                        ANNEXURE III.


                                                         Staged Sabotage.

During the early part of 1942, the Resistance goups in Holland had been instructed by London to refrain from any act of sabotage which might draw the attention of the Germans to the existence of an organisation in Holland. Only 'sabotage insaissiisable' was to be carried out. At this time, therefore, no such actions were required on the part of III-F. Some time in July 1942, however, CATARRH through EBENEZER was asked for the fullest possible information about the W/T station Kootwijk and was instructed to make plans for its destruction at a date to be notified. Shortly afterwards, this dat was norified from London in a complicated code message which, however, was broken by the B-Stelle.
As London appeared to attach considerable importance to the secrecy of this date, the Germans decuced that, on the day mentioned, operations of some importance would take place, and special precautions were taken by the Whrmachtsbefehleshaber Holland, and the SD, but nothing eventuated. It was then arranged, however, to stage an attack on the wireless station, and it was proposed that a mock battle should take place with troops and 'thunder-flashes' in order to evoke amongst the civilian population the impression that an ataack had really taken place, in view of the fact that it was feared that London might be independently controlling the existance of this attack. However, the stagingof the mock battle was turned down on security grounds, as it was desired to keep the circle of people aware of the double-play as small as possible. It was however, reported to London that the attack had failed as the groups had unexpectedly come upon anti-personnel mines and had incurred certain losses. The next day a notice from the Wehrmachtsbefehlhaber Holland appeared in all the Dutch newspapers reporting an attack by criminal elements on the station, which however, thanks to the watchfulness of the guards and the excellence of the security measures, had been frustrated, and that on account of the active assistance rendered by sections of the Dutch population during the defeat of the attack, General CHRISTIANSEN would refrain from taking hostages.
After this attack, it was decided to mount a successful operation. An old hulk of about 1.000 tons was procured through Referat III-M, and loaded with wrecks of old and damaged aeroplanes. The planes were painted up and covered with tarpaulins so that from a distance it was impossible to recognise their true nature. A charge was loaded in the hold of the ship by a certain Leutnant KLINGENBERG of AST-Belgien and Uffz. BODENS, who at that time was with Abt. II, AST-Belgien, but was loaned for the occasion. It was arranged so that the charge could be initiated from the deck of the hulk. A naval tug was ordered to take the ship from Amsterdam to Dordrecht via Rotterdam. Apart from KLINGENBERG and BODENS and two sailors on board the ship, no one knew what had been planned.
When one morning the tug and its tow were in the vicinity of the Maas bridges in Rotterdam, the charge was ignited and the ship began to sink. The tug cut its tow and tried to push the damaged ship towards the shore, whereby another ship was rammed and badly damaged. The ship with the 'planes' on board sank amidst cries of jubilation from the hundreds of Dutch people on the banks who believed it was an act of sabotage by Resistance organisations. KLINGENBERG and BODENS were actually arrested by the captain of the tug who suspected them of being saboteurs.
From then onwards, from time to time railway demolitions were carried out by Uffz. BODENS who in most cases took care to leave at the scene of the incident material obviously of British origin. The purpose of these demolitions was to create amongst the Dutch railway employees the idea that a British controlles sabotage organisation was actively operating. Later, however, III-F were forced to stop these acts of sabotage as the SD had decided to take hostages when any act of sabotage had taken plave, and it would have been noticed if in such cases hostages were not made.
In addition, it had become clear to GISKES that there was no siter organisation in Holland controlled from London which was supervisingsuch activities independently.
From then onwards, all acts of sdabotage which took plave in Holland and which were undertaken by small indigenous groups with homemade materials, were attributed to the London organisation and SOE was notified of them. On one occasion a munition train from Belgium consisting of 25 trucks was probably sabotaged by an unknown Belgian group, but in any case a report of the incident was passed to London as being the act of one of the SOE organisers. In addition sabotage in dockyards and factories was freely invented and passed to London, and London expressed considerable satisfaction with the results abtained.

                                                                          w.mugge@home.nl